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ABSTRACT

“WHO ARE THE TRUE CONSERVATIVES?”:
A CRITICAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN CONSERVATISM IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY
Danielle M. Holtz
Walter McDougall
This dissertation explores the elaboration of “conservative” thought in the United
States from its genesis in eighteenth-century transnational moral philosophy and biomedical research to its expression in national conflicts over race and slavery, empire and
expansion, immigration and naturalization, and free trade and market capitalism from the
1820s through the 1850s. Looking at competing groups of public intellectuals, politicians,
activists, radicals, and religious leaders who defined themselves or their positions as
“conservative” in the nineteenth-century United States, it argues that American
“conservatives” developed a radically adaptive system of meaning that can only be
understood within the contemporaneous development of conservative schema
internationally. This intervention connects American conservatism to the organismic
ontology of the state as a naturally progressing, living system, with its hybrid
philosophical genesis in British sentimental theory and continental theories of organic
generation and reproduction. The contest to represent the “true conservatism” of the
country reflected a struggle over the nature of the United States as an organically unified
society with a system of laws, government, and behavior that naturally developed to suit
that society. This long history of conservatism establishes the integral link between
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historical conservatism and contemporary racial nationalism and opens up an avenue for
inquiry into the role that biology played in shaping America’s socio-political imaginary
and its political and institutional genealogy.
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INTRODUCTION: A RIPPLE APPEARS ON THE SURFACE
On January 5, 1837, John C. Calhoun opposed Michigan’s application for
statehood on the grounds that it corrupted the “old, established” forms put into place by
“our ancestors of the revolution.” He warned that this state’s “irregular and monstrous”
birth marked the commencement of a great change, “a tendency to revolution” that was
“destined to go on till it has consummated itself in the entire overthrow of all legal and
constitutional authority.” He explained that the “right of every people to form their own
government, and to determine their political condition” provided the first, elementary
principle of the US government and that the doctrine of state sovereignty and States’
rights codified in the US constitution had “done more for the cause of liberty throughout
the world than any event within the record of history.”1 So long as he retained hope of
reforming the country’s political system, therefore, Calhoun vowed to defend it in its
“original simplicity and purity” as a “conservative, and a States right man.” Yet, should
the “common sense” and “voice of mankind” declare federal corruption and oppression
intolerable, Calhoun promised to tear that government down. “I am a conservative in its
broadest and fullest sense,” he declared, “and such I shall ever remain unless indeed, the
Government shall become so corrupt and disordered that nothing short of revolution can
reform it.”2 At this point, presumably, Calhoun would become a revolutionary.
More than one of Calhoun’s contemporaries noted the irony that Calhoun, who
had frequently been accused of having “radical” views on state sovereignty, would
1

To distinguish between the “state” in the sense of a government that exercised authority over a population
conjoined as a subject political community and the “States” federated under the American constitution, I
am reverting to the nineteenth-century convention of capitalizing the latter referent. Hence, “state”
sovereignty and “States” rights.
2
Italics in the original. John Caldwell Calhoun, Speeches of John C. Calhoun: Delivered in the Congress of
the United States from 1811 to the Present Time (New York, 1843), 249-59.
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describe himself or his controversial political positions as “conservative,” particularly in
the context of a speech where he openly advocated revolution as a legitimate method of
institutional reform. Yet, Calhoun represented a growing movement of state-rights
enthusiasts who self-identified as “conservatives,” even as they denied the legitimacy of
executive orders, asserted the state’s prerogative to nullify federal statute, and called for
dramatic limitations on the size and reach of the federal government. What might it mean
for these men to be “conservatives” crusading for what they called “liberty”? For that
matter, what did it mean for anyone in the nineteenth-century United States to be a
“conservative,” at all? Or, to put it in the concise terms of the Quarterly Christian
Spectator in 1838, “Who are the True Conservatives?”3

***
Overwhelmingly, the historiography on conservatism has focused this inquiry on
the twentieth century, producing a wide range of literature on the subject.4 Since George
Nash’s quintessential 1976 monograph on The Conservative Intellectual Movement in
America Since 1945, intellectual historians have profited from the inroads made in social,
cultural, and institutional histories of post-war conservatism, including Kimberly
Phillips-Fein, Jennifer Burns, and Kathryn Olmsted on the relationship between the
ideology of free-market capitalism, the interests of big business, and the modern
3

Porter, Noah. “Who Are the True Conservatives?” The Quarterly Christian Spectator X (1838): 601
Jesse Scarborough, “Modern American Conservatisms: Science, Activism and Political Identity in an Age
of Fracture” (University of North Carolina Wilmington, 2016), 14–37,
http://escholarship.org/uc/item/1b97w7zh; Julian E. Zelizer, “Rethinking the History of American
Conservatism,” Reviews in American History 38, no. 2 (2010): 367–92; Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism:
A State of the Field,” Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (December 1, 2011): 723–43,
doi:10.1093/jahist/jar430; Lisa McGirr, “Now That Historians Know So Much about the Right, How
Should We Best Approach the Study of Conservatism?,” Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (December
1, 2011): 765–70, doi:10.1093/jahist/jar478.
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conservative movement; Darren Dochuk and Leo P. Ribuffo on the religious right; Leah
Wright Rigueur on people of color in the conservative intellectual and political tradition;
Andrew Hartman and Kevin Schultz on the American kulturkampf in the 1960s; Reba
Soffer’s comparative analysis of American and British historians; and Niels BjerrePoulsen and Juilian E. Zelizer, who both tease out the dynamic between intellectual
conservatism and its political and organizational apparatus. Intellectual historians have
also reacted to the resurgence of right-wing politics internationally with a slate of edited
volumes highlighting the transnational histories of post-war conservatism, notably
Clarisse Berthezène and Jean-Christian Vinel’s Postwar Conservatism, A Transnational
Investigation: Britain, France, and the United States, 1930-1990; Anna von der Goltz
and Britta Waldschmidt-Nelson’s Inventing the Silent Majority in Western Europe and
the United States, Laura Jane Gifford and Daniel K. Williams, The Right Side of the
Sixties: Reexamining Conservatism’s Decade of Transformation, and Andrea Mammone,
Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary
Europe: From Local to Transnational.5

5

George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (ISI Books, 2014); Kim
Phillips-Fein, Invisible Hands: The Making of the Conservative Movement from the New Deal to Reagan
(Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2009); Jennifer Burns, Goddess of the Market: Ayn Rand and the American
Right (Oxford University Press, 2009); Kathryn S. Olmsted, Right Out of California: The 1930s and the
Big Business Roots of Modern Conservatism (The New Press, 2015); Darren Dochuk, From Bible Belt to
Sunbelt: Plain-Folk Religion, Grassroots Politics, and the Rise of Evangelical Conservatism (W. W.
Norton & Company, 2010); Leo P. Ribuffo, The Old Christian Right: The Protestant Far Right from the
Great Depression to the Cold War (Acls History E Book Project, 2001); Leah Wright Rigueur, The
Loneliness of the Black Republican: Pragmatic Politics and the Pursuit of Power (Princeton University
Press, 2014); Andrew Hartman, A War for the Soul of America: A History of the Culture Wars (University
of Chicago Press, 2015); Kevin M. Schultz, Buckley and Mailer: The Difficult Friendship That Shaped the
Sixties (W. W. Norton & Company, 2015); Reba Soffer, History, Historians, and Conservatism in Britain
and America: From the Great War to Thatcher and Reagan (OUP Oxford, 2009); Niels Bjerre-Poulsen,
Right Face: Organizing the American Conservative Movement 1945-65 (Museum Tusculanum Press,
2002); Julian E. Zelizer, Governing America: The Revival of Political History (Princeton University Press,
2012); Clarisse Berthezène and Jean-Christian Vinel, eds., Postwar Conservatism, A Transnational
Investigation: Britain, France, and the United States, 1930-1990 (Springer, 2017); Angus Burgin, The

4
Nonetheless, Nash’s work remains the standard-bearer for intellectual histories of
American conservatism, forty years after its publication in 1976. Nash argued that the
conservatives who emerged in the United States following the Second World War
constructed a conservative intellectual tradition from a combination of heterogeneous (if
predominantly Anglophone) sources, chosen from eighteenth and nineteenth-century
political philosophers. In their search for a historical and philosophical apparatus on
which to build American conservatism, however, these intellectual and political figures
occasionally conflated their designation of historical and philosophical antecedents with
the reality of a constant and historically operative precedent. In other words, they mistook
their incidental inspiration for intellectual tradition. In their popular publications, they
projected their political thought backward, committing the historiographic violence of
reading nineteenth-century political actors through the lens of twentieth-century political
thought.6 Those historians who have attempted to excavate a longer history of American
conservatism, such as Yuval Levin, Adam L. Tate, and Patrick Allitt, have tended to
follow suit, measuring nineteenth-century conservatives according to twentieth-century
standards, with the Anglo-American tradition, in general, providing the foundation for
analyses of nineteenth-century American “conservatives.”7

Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression (Harvard University Press, 2012); Laura
Jane Gifford and Daniel K. Williams, eds., The Right Side of the Sixties: Reexamining Conservatism’s
Decade of Transformation (Springer, 2012); Andrea Mammone, Emmanuel Godin, and Brian Jenkins, eds.,
Mapping the Extreme Right in Contemporary Europe: From Local to Transnational (Routledge, 2012).
6
George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945. (Wilmington, 2014).
7
Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism”; Yuval Levin, The Great Debate: Edmund Burke, Thomas Paine, and the
Birth of Right and Left (Basic Books, 2013); Adam L. Tate, Conservatism and Southern Intellectuals,
1789-1861: Liberty, Tradition, and the Good Society (University of Missouri Press, 2005); Patrick Allitt,
The Conservatives: Ideas and Personalities Throughout American History (Yale University Press, 2009).
Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” Journal of American History 98, no. 3 (December
1, 2011): 723–43.
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This approach has generated a provincial and analytically constrained
understanding of American conservatism in its historical contexts. As political historian
Kim Phillips-Fein observed, scholars tacitly agree that “liberalism” and “conservatism”
remained contested, variable, and contextually contingent concepts—not only across
national boundaries, but also within the United States and historically. The transnational
turn in intellectual history has compounded this problem, adding the task of literal
translation to the discursive challenge of historical translation. Yet, these categories have
persisted as active discursive fictions within the historiography. That is, historians have
continued to categorize historical actors and their socio-political positions as
“conservative” in spite of the fact that they might not have considered themselves
“conservative”—or even that “conservative” did not exist at the time as a political
category or personal characteristic. Even when intellectual historians recognize
conservatism as historically-contingent and variable, they continue to take recourse to an
essential “conservatism” that operates as the organizing principle of their work. For
example, in his intellectual history of conservative ideas and people in America, The
Conservatives, Patrick Allitt distinguished between categorically and nominally
conservative figures, writing that “certain people throughout American history can be
understood as conservatives, but with the important caution that this was not a noun most
of them used about themselves.”8 Allitt may have acknowledged that his subjects did not
necessarily consider themselves “conservative” and that the “word itself has meant
8

Allitt construed conservatism as an “attitude to social and political change that looks for support to the
ideas beliefs and habits of the past and puts more faith in the lessons of history than in the abstractions of
political philosophy,” but did nothing to distinguish this “conservatism” from historicism. A case could be
made that historicism as it was theorized at the turn of the nineteenth century significantly overlapped with,
influenced, or even directly contributed to the basic tenets of conservative philosophies, but, as Joep
Leerssen demonstrated in National Thought in Europe, historicist thought also formed the basis for
emancipatory and revolutionary movements in the nineteenth century. Allitt, The Conservatives, 2.
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different things at different times and that there is no consistency in conservatives’ beliefs
about what should be conserved,” but none of those considerations prevented him from
advancing his own conception of conservatism as an attitude that transcended those
material and historical constraints. If “conservative” was not a viable political category in
the nineteenth-century United States, as some historians have argued, then what purpose
does calling nineteenth-century political figures “conservative” serve? If contemporary
historians must construct the metric by which they identify “conservatives,” then what
analytic freight does “conservative” carry as a historical category? Unwittingly echoing
the nineteenth-century Quarterly Christian Spectator, Phillips-Fein asked, “Who are the
true conservatives, and what do they really believe?”
In The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin,
political scientist Corey Robin called it a “necessary condition of intelligent discussion”
that scholars “understand what the term [“conservative”] means, independent of its use.”
Unless the right “has some set of common features that make it right,” other than the fact
that it calls itself “right,” Robin asked, how can scholars “understand why individuals
from different times and places, adopting different positions on different issues, would
call themselves and their kindred spirits conservative?” Defining conservatism as,
essentially, an ideology of reaction, Robin set out to prove that conservatism was “forged
in response to challenges from below.”9 Yet, intellectual histories like Robin’s that seek
to identify a unified transnational conservatism (whether Anglo-American or “western”
in their approach) risk mystifying the historical, intellectual, and operational differences
between British, European, and US “conservatives.” Furthermore, their structuralist
9

Corey Robin, The Reactionary Mind: Conservatism from Edmund Burke to Sarah Palin (Oxford
University Press, USA, 2011), 42–43.
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approach often results in mischaracterizing or naturalizing the claims that self-identified
conservatives made about their own role in their particular society, and missing essential
figures that contemporaries considered “conservative,” like, in Robin’s case, Daniel
Webster and the America Whigs. Without exploring the advantage a politician like
Calhoun might gain from describing himself as “conservative” and his opposition as
“radical,” Robin elides the historical evidence that Calhoun’s contemporaries (allies and
antagonists, alike) frequently considered his “conservative” positions to be “radical” or
“revolutionary,” themselves, and that his anti-slavery opposition and other progressive
reformers simultaneously described their own politics as “conservative.” When antislavery Whig Charles Sumner addressed the “Anti-Slavery Duties of the Whig Party”
during Massachusetts’s 1846 Whig State Convention, for example, he challenged his
party to renew its commitment to the “conservatism of the Whigs of '76” by embracing
the abolitionist platform. According to Sumner, the name “Abolitionist” first legitimately
belonged to the “fathers” of the country: Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, and
George Washington.10 If the Whigs truly deserved to be called “conservatives,” he
maintained, they must honor the memory of their Constitution’s “revered authors,” whose
“truest and highest conservatism” guarded and preserved the “vital truths of freedom.” In
undertaking the vital battle against slavery, then, the Whigs would fulfill the
10

Sumner attested that Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson both advocated abolition, and that George
Washington privately expressed his own wish that the country abolish slavery and then set the standard by
emancipating his own slaves in his will. Sumner paraphrased George Washington’s 1786 letter to John
Fenton Mercer, having him say, “It is among my first wishes… to see some plan adopted by which slavery
in this country may be abolished by law.” In the actual body of the letter, Washington wrote that he never
meant to “possess another slave by purchase; it being among my first wishes to see some plan adopted, by
the legislature by which slavery in this Country may be abolished by slow, sure, & imperceptable degrees.”
(“From George Washington to John Francis Mercer, 9 September 1786,” Founders Online, National
Archives, last modified December 28, 2016, http://founders.archives.gov/documents/Washington/04-04-020232. [Original source: The Papers of George Washington, Confederation Series, vol. 4, 2 April 1786 – 31
January 1787, ed. W. W. Abbot. Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1995, pp. 243–244.])
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“progressive” promise embodied in their founding documents—the sublime ideal,
imperfectly instituted, “that all men are born equal”—making them conservatives “not of
forms only, but of substance,” not of the letter of the law, alone, but of its “living
spirit.”11 In other words, as Transcendentalist author and publisher Elizabeth Peabody put
it in the 1838 Democratic Review, in a society founded “to make free individuals,”
conservatism should protect and support individual freedom.12
In effect, historian Hyrum Lewis noted, approaches like Allitt’s and Robin’s have
perpetuated an “essentialist myth” that has rendered illegible the complexity and
contestation of conservatisms in their historical contexts. While the “term “conservative”
may serve as a useful heuristic device with which to navigate the historical landscape,”
Lewis acknowledged, historians must recognize that “it is nonetheless a protean, socially
constructed category which takes on new connotations and sheds old ones over time
without retaining any definitional core that transcends historical context.” Conservatism
has a history—“moments of mutation when dislocations, electoral necessities, special
interest demands, economic forces, influential figures, or institutional pressures caused
epistemic shifts in the meaning of conservatism”—but no essence. In its place, Lewis
called for intellectual historians to approach “conservatism” with the same theoretical and
methodological sophistication with which scholars have examined the historicallyconstructed meanings of race, gender, ethnicity, and nation. Instead of focusing on “how

11

Charles Sumner, “Speech on the Anti-Slavery Duties of The Whig Party, Before the Whig State
Convention, at Faneuil Hall, in Boston, Sept. 23, 1846,” in Orations and Speeches [1845-1850] (Boston:
Ticknor, Reed, and Fields, 1850), 117–30.
12
Elizabeth Peabody, “Claims of the Beautiful Arts,” Swackhamer, Conrad. Ed. The United States
Democratic Review. Langtree and O’Sullivan, 1838, 256.
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conservatism changed America,” then, Lewis suggested an “evolutionary” paradigm that
would shift the focus towards “how America changed conservatism.”13
Pushing past the question of authenticity (“who are the true conservatives?”), this
mode of inquiry asks, instead, what might it mean to be a “true conservative” in the
United States and why an individual or a group might choose make that claim. Who
invoked “conservatism” and in what context? What were the areas of contention? In what
linguistic, political, social, and cultural ecosystems did “conservatism” thrive, and why?
Or, to borrow the animating question that social and political historian Lisa McGirr
placed at the heart of the twentieth-century historiography of conservatism, “How did
radical free-market ideas, staunch unilateralism, a deeply hawkish nationalism, and
conservative religiosity—all with deep roots in American life but increasingly
marginalized” in US political economy and political culture—become so “prominent in
policy and politics” that it succeeded in “reshaping common wisdom about the proper
role of the federal government in the economy and society?”14 That twentieth-century
puzzle cannot be resolved without exploring the development of these conservative topoi
in their nineteenth-century context. Furthermore, to sufficiently grasp “how America
changed conservatism” in the nineteenth century, that investigation must integrate the
historical literature on nineteenth-century politics and political culture; social and labor
movements; race, gender, ethnicity, and nation; the history and sociology of science; the
history of readership, print, and oral culture, as well as censorship, education, and the
postal service. More importantly, it must triangulate between divergent “conservative”
13

Hyrum Lewis, “Historians and the Myth of American Conservatism,” Journal of The Historical Society
12, no. 1 (March 1, 2012): 27–45, doi:10.1111/j.1540-5923.2011.00354.x.
14
McGirr, “Now That Historians Know So Much about the Right, How Should We Best Approach the
Study of Conservatism?”
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stances on the essential issues of the early American republic: states’ rights and federal
power; slavery and abolition; banking, capitalism, and free trade; the relationship
between the American people and their government; and the relationship between the
United States and the rest of the world.

***
Calhoun’s language reflected a particular understanding of the nature of the state
and its relation to the people that developed in the eighteenth century. Though twentiethcentury American conservatives associated their political thought primarily with
Anglophone philosophers, such as Edmund Burke, nineteenth-century American
“conservatives” drew heavily from continental sources. The “conservative principle” was
originally conceived in the natural sciences as a mechanical and teleological force that
protected organic life from decay. It grew out of a century-old controversy over
metaphysical explanations for natural phenomena in organic life. On the one side,
Enlightenment philosophers, such as Rene Descartes, denied God an active role in the
world. Life had been set in motion by some cosmic force at some distant time and the
proper provenance of the sciences was to observe and catalog the natural laws that
determined the physical operation of these universal forces. The other side of the debate,
epitomized by German philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, argued that natural
phenomena could only be understood as the product of vital or living forces [vis viva]
that tied life continuously to a higher power. In this literature, the “conservative power”
was synonymous with the soul in organic life, the engine that generated the organism
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itself.15 It described an inborn ideal, something essential to the body’s continued
existence that God had granted and that God alone could remove. In all organisms, the
“principe conservateur” reflected God’s inviolability as the absolute source of power and
the elemental source for the body’s preservation and perseverance.
After passing through the life sciences and into German philosophy, it became
one of the “special causal forces” that the German Naturphilosophen invoked at the end
of the eighteenth century “to explain the instantiation of archetypes and their progressive
variations.”16 In the related body of medical discourse, the “vital spark of heavenly
flame,” the “animal spirits” of Descartes, and Leibniz’s “vis viva,” flowed into the “vital
principle” and “nervous fluid” of William Cullen, the “vis insita and vis nervosa” of
Albrecht von Haller, the “principe vital” of Paul Joseph Barthez, and John Hunter’s
“materia vitae.” In Johann Friedrich Blumenbach’s pivotal work, the vitalist and
materialist arguments represented by Leibniz and Descartes merged in the
“nisus formativus” or Bildungstrieb (the formative drive), which Balthasar-Anthelme
Richerand, Pierre Jean Georges Cabanis, and Sir Gilbert Blane would call the “principe
conservateur” and the “conservative principle,” respectively, at the turn of the nineteenth
century.17 Like Blumenbach’s Bildungstrieb, the “conservative principle” was a
teleological force materialized throughout the body’s constitution that preserved it from
putrefaction. According to Blane, who popularized the concept in English, an individual’s
original constitution and morbidity determined the relative strength of the body’s
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“conservative” power in its ceaseless fight for self-preservation. Combined with its
nervous sensibility and capacity for self-regulation, the body’s “conservative energy”
formed the “main basis, or stamina” of an individual’s “simple vital existence.”18 Bodies
with an exuberance of “conservative energy” in their constitutions could resist
disorganization in their vital parts; constitutions lacking conservative energy inevitably
decomposed.
Still, for Calhoun to call himself a “conservative” or to refer to the “conservative
principle” of a presumably artificial structure, like a state constitution, would have made
no sense without a parallel transformation in the political concept of statehood.
“Conservative” became a political category as the result of a comprehensive shift in how
people understood the nature of the state in the century before the French Revolution.
Political systems and institutions had to be categorized as expressions of organic life
before theorists could discuss whether a state’s “conservative” principles effectively
guarded it against vitiating forces. And people could only be conservative once they
became parts of a larger organism—organic elements in a living social body.
This schema traces back to Locke’s empirical “science of man,” in which he
situated individual bodies in their temporal and material conditions, and developed a
theory of association based on the relationship between context, consciousness, and
understanding.19 Through their phenomenological experiences, he argued, people became
connected sympathetically to a particular social body and, through the extension of their
18
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nervous sensibility, to widening social circles. Over the course of the next century,
Locke’s theory of association provided the foundation for an organic model of society,
developed in collaboration between moral philosophers and natural scientists, which
stressed the role that social groups and government institutions played in cultivating
healthy and thriving national bodies. In shaping the sympathetic nervous system—the
material body and the mind—society fashioned the nature and behavior of its citizens,
generating the patterns imprinted on the individual mind.20 In turn, the people became the
component parts of a synthetic, organic system, ideally situated in a state structure that
had developed naturally out of those people’s particular, collective constitution.
The attendant political theory treated the state’s organization as a living system,
with the same vulnerabilities as other species of organic life and the same formative drive
(nisus formativus or Bildungstrieb) pumping through its organs. In this sense, a society’s
conservative principles, powers, and forces, embodied in its organic institutions and
expressed in the character of its people, maintained its health and stability and kept the
living machinery of its government operating in cosmic harmony. As the contemporary
literary critic Paul Youngquist put it, a “good government” in the organic framework
“collectively incorporate[d] a physiology of function.”21 Like physiologists, statesmen
and political theorists examined the body politic to discover the key to maintaining states
in their vitality and, like other medical researchers, they disagreed about what constituted
a country’s fundamental or vital principles, as well as the best methods and means to
ensure their continued operation. Social stability and progress relied on a socio-political
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organization adapted to a society’s particular circumstances and genetic makeup: its
environment, climate, geography, economy, and age, and the character of its people (their
language and customs, religion, occupations, and habits.)22 The nature of the system
suited the population. An organic constitution required the harmonious balance between
the different systems that governed the body—everything held in its proper sphere and to
its proper function. Ideally, a society’s political system developed holistically from the
organic combination of all of these factors, leading to an organization co-constitutive
with society, infused with both conservative and regenerative principles—a stateorganism.
In an organic state, a conservative power worked only insofar as it was allowed to
operate without obstruction, and a country’s conservative principles depended on the
healthy and interdependent action of the organs vital to its constitution.23 Social or
political disorder indicated that some fault or corruption prevented the conservative
principle from flowing to all of the body’s parts, like foreign contagions attacking the
body’s nervous system—a problem that could be addressed by neutralizing or excising
the irritant. Alternatively, a dysfunctional state might develop if the country’s population
failed to live up to the intellectual and moral requirements of free citizenship, particularly
if they had not been sufficiently cultivated to the needs of their socio-political
organization. This condition was endemic to highly mobile, heterogeneous, and
industrialized populations, like the United States, but could be addressed through public
education.
22
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When a system continuously malfunctioned, however, it signaled a fundamental
problem—either the state’s constitution lacked the conservative principle entirely, and
needed a change at the foundational level (e.g., by a constitutional amendment), or the
state had contravened its organic principles. As Fichte explained in “Foundations of
Natural Right,” no treatment, medicant, or structural remedy could reconcile a people to a
political community alien to their interests and affections, or to a government that
systemically silenced their common will. In that case, he wrote, the subject population
retained the power to hold a convention and form a new government, if they saw fit, fully
justified in tearing down a corrupt and artificial state.24 By definition, every stateorganism contained conservative principles, vital to their self-preservation, but not all
states were organic and, therefore, not all states were meant to endure.
Once the body politic took on vital corporeality—once the concept of the organic
state naturalized—medical and biological knowledge became relevant to questions of
state. As Secretary of War (1818-1825), John Calhoun created the Army Medical Corps,
the office of the Surgeon General, and organized the army's medical department,
directing the surgeons at each army post to gather local medical statistics, as well as
information about the relationship between climate and disease in different parts of the
country, and report them back to the Surgeon General. This impulse, which grew out of
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the “enlarged views and devotion to science which have ever characterized him,” inspired
the same organization in England, according to his 1843 campaign biography.25 Although
Calhoun never expressly referenced Sir Gilbert Blane, whose Elements of Medical Logick
(1819) established the “conservative principle” as the essential constituent power in every
living system, he undoubtedly came across his theory. Blane had pioneered naval medical
science, particularly around contagion and quarantine, and drafted the authoritative model
for comprehensive public health reform in port cities like London.26 As the head of the
Royal Navy's medical board, he drafted Britain's 1799 Quarantine Act.27 When Blane
published the Elements of Medical Logick in 1819, his contemporaries considered it the
definitive authority on military hygiene, naval medicine, contagious disease, and
quarantine. Blane’s Elements remained on the index-catalogue of the Library of the
Surgeon-General's Office of the United States Army into the twentieth century.28
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Furthermore, Calhoun's work with the army reputedly spurred a life-long interest in
medical broadsides and scientific literature.29
In the ensuing decades, Calhoun and his pro-slavery allies adopted the logic and
legal apparatus of morbidity, quarantine, and self-preservation to inoculate the institution
of slavery against federal colonization, foreign contagion (in the guise of abolition), and
capitalist control. Starting in the 1820s, they advanced the idea that the southern states
formed their own separate organic nations, each of which retained the “conservative”
power of self-protection, be it through policing the bodies of people who would cross
their borders or through their state’s nullification of federal legislation that threatened or
corrupted their organic institutions. The organic schema provided men like Calhoun with
the cover to call themselves “conservative,” while still promoting the “glorious right of
rebellion and revolution.” Like all organic life, they asserted, the States followed the
physiological imperative for self-preservation, even at the cost of the Union.
Accordingly, when confronted with the risk of admitting the free State of Michigan into
the Union in 1837, for example, Calhoun declared, “while I thus openly avow myself a
conservative… Should corruption and oppression become intolerable, and cannot
otherwise be thrown off—if liberty must perish, or the Government be overthrown, I
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would not hesitate, at the hazard of life, to resort to revolution, and to tear down a corrupt
Government that could neither be reformed nor borne by freemen.” Organic states
retained an inherent right to protect themselves and their institutions—by force, if
necessary—and a categorical imperative to dissolve a civil constitution that
systematically and unalterably undermined their own organic constitutions.30
One other change had to come over the spirit of this dream before it made sense
for Calhoun (or any other individual) to call himself a “Conservative.”31 To be a
“Conservative,” an individual must first consider themselves the living embodiment of an
organic vital power. That conceptual shift occurred after the romantic “man of genius”
created the space for individuals to materially manifest life forces (like the conservative
force). In German and British romantic thought, the man of genius (generally an artist or
a poet, but plausibly a military figure or politician) authored the socio-political
imaginary, fixing the image of the social body in each individual’s mind, connecting their
nerves to the social nervous network, and bringing them into organic unity with their
social totality. In the work of British romantics William Wordsworth and Samuel Taylor
Coleridge, the masculine, male artist played the role of intercessor between impulse and
action. The man of genius restrained and channeled society’s nervous reactions,
correcting and controlling the monstrous body, as outside forces and conditions irritated
and excited its nervous sensibility. In freeing individuals from their particular
circumstances and revealing their role in the larger system, the man of genius cultivated
30
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in them a sense of duty that they would feel intuitively and reflectively. Recognizing their
organic relation to society, individuals would willingly subordinate themselves and fulfill
their duties to the whole. Because he instilled in each individual a sense of society’s
“antecedent Unity” (i.e., its Bildungstrieb), the man of genius, himself, manifested the
state-organism’s “conservative and reproductive Power.”32 By this logic, the right men, in
the right position, could themselves be Conservatives—and if they joined together to
guide the state-organism along its organic trajectory, then they will have formed a
Conservative party.33
In Great Britain, the first Conservative party started with a clever bit of
rebranding by Tory leadership. Contemplating the “propriety” of maintaining the name
“Tory,” a contributor to the January 1830 Quarterly Review advised they change the
name of the party to “Conservative” to indicate their willingness to promote “prudent and
practical” reforms to the state.34 At the same time, the name conveyed stability during a
period when the “signs of revolution” disturbed the “public mind.” In this moment, the
writer counselled, “a few honest words and intelligible acts from the proper quarter
would exert a magical influence.” Within a year, the parliamentary representative for
Tamworth, Sir Robert Peel, identified “two parties among those who call themselves
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Conservatives” in the new Whig-controlled Parliament. One party, he attested,
recognized that no government could exist without restraint and authority and so
supported monarchy, property, and public faith. The men of the other group, on the other
hand, pretended to be Conservatives, but merely sought power.35 Between the two, Peel
observed that a “Radical and a Republican avowed are dangerous characters; but there is
nothing half so dangerous as the man who pretends to be a Conservative, but is
ready to be anything, provided only he can create confusion.” The Tory party adopted the
name “Conservative” in 1832 after their defeat in the passage of the Whig-sponsored
Reform Bill, which expanded the franchise to the middle class and shut down the rotten
boroughs.36 Some contemporaries viewed this change as an effort to attract moderate
members of the opposition party. A Whig would never be a Tory, one commenter later
observed, but they might be willing to be a Conservative, if it meant saving the “altars
and throne” of their “imperial nation.”37
In the United States, normatively republican and foundationally revolutionary
politics complicated this calculus, as did the fact that the people most likely to identify
their politics as “conservative” in 1832 belonged to a group generally despised as
revolutionaries (the Nullifiers). Party names stood in for wholesale arguments about who
should govern, how they should govern, the balance of power in government, and the
relationship between the people and those men whom they elected to represent or govern
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them. In 1830s US politics, single parties often operated under several names (some of
which they coined, and others they had thrust upon them). For example, a December
1833 article in the Niles’ Register listed the following political designations for the
members of the 23rd United States Congress: the Jackson party, proper; the Jackson-Van
Buren party; the Jackson anti-Van Buren party; the anti-Jackson party; the nullifying and
anti-Jackson party; the anti-masonic and anti-Jackson party, and “one or two whose
political character is not easily classed.”38 Because names ostensibly represented the
principles that a party prioritized, however, when parties did publish official material,
they tended to choose names identified with the American ideals of liberty, revolution,
and popular representation: Democratic-Republican, Democrat, Republican, and Whig.
Nonetheless, in the late 1830s, a contributor to the Quarterly Christian Spectator
observed that conservatism had “speedily crossed the Atlantic” ever since its emergence
in British party politics, “eagerly” taken up by “more than one party, in politics and
religion” in the United States. The word “conservative” disgorged “from the mouth of the
genteel aristocrats of our cities,” from the “talking philosopher of our colleges,” and even
from “our preachers,” some of whom seemed “more anxious to preach conservatism”
than the gospel. According to the Spectator, American readers imported British
conservatism especially in the pages of the London Quarterly, Blackwood’s Edinburgh
Magazine, the Church of England Magazine, and the British Critic, in the publications of
writers Samuel Taylor Coleridge and William Wordsworth, dramatist Henry Taylor, and
the reprinted works of Anglican theologian Richard Hooker, who enjoyed (though not
personally) a resurgence of posthumous fame in the guise of the High Church Anglican
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Oxford movement. American critics of “foreign” conservatism also identified it in the
scholarship of German theologians Friedrich Schleiermacher and August Tholuck,
French philosopher Victor Cousin, and Swiss evangelical Jean-Henri Merle d’Aubigne.
By the end of the decade, this author noted the irony that he had even heard of
“conservatives” among the abolitionists and other “movement parties” of the day, a
paradox that proved both that the term effectively demarcated internal boundaries
(separating real reformers from reactionary pretenders) and also that it would inevitably
fall victim to its own ideological vacuity.39
The Spectator’s claims notwithstanding, self-identified US “Conservatives” were
just as likely to quote from revolutionary, democratic, utopian, or socialist sources as
anything considered “conservative” by British or continental standards. The incursive
“foreign conservative” was a strawman, like the “monarchist” or the “Jacobin.” Aside
from a few outliers—dedicated Puseyites, for example, or radicals who valorized
Robespierre—neither European conservatism nor European radicalism openly thrived in
the United States, even if European conservative and radical thought influenced its social
and political movements. Or, as Charles Dickens’s radical Daily News put it, “American
conservatism is so nearly akin to European radicalism, that many of our readers might
scarcely recognise the claim” a US party might make to conservatism, even if it did
consider itself “less intensely popular than its rival.”40 Unlike Great Britain, Europe, or
South America in this period, the United States lacked a single, cohesive conservative
party, drawn from particular classes or vested groups, that articulated an intelligible
39
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platform to protect long-established and legally-codified interests. In the United States,
those men whose wealth and position may have predisposed them towards a Europeanstyle conservative politics failed to form a single, unified conservative party because they
fundamentally disagreed on the nature of the country’s political, social, and cultural
institutions. Without this necessary condition for consensus, they could hardly agree on
which forces and institutions would best perpetuate, preserve, and protect that system, let
alone muster the resources for a lasting political coalition to institute and enforce them.
Instead, they wielded the word “conservative” like a shibboleth—a way to demarcate
political and ideological boundaries within and between conflicting groups, to co-opt and
express social power, and, ultimately, to silence dissent.
In this period, naming had incredible power. The politicians, intellectuals, and
journalists writing in the mid-nineteenth century had a robust concept of language and
constantly reflected on its use and misuse. Particularly in a democracy, they insisted,
“words are things.” Changes in political discourse acted as symptoms, alerting listeners to
larger changes in the socio-political imaginary, and providing early-warning signs for a
revolutionary pathogeny. “If you wish to mark the first indications of a revolution, the
commencement of those profound changes in the character of a people which are
working beneath, before a ripple appears on the surface,” Calhoun advised, “look to the
change of language.”41 These profound changes first materialized in the “altered meaning
of important words,” in language that ignited and accelerated the transformation of the
people’s “feelings and principles,” until the words themselves induced “an entire
revolution.”

41

Ibid.

24
Calhoun’s formulation broaches the central question for this project: What did the
protean meaning of “conservative” in this period indicate for the changes working
beneath the surface of the American people’s skin and what would the revolution signify
when it reached its eruptive stage? To put it more simply, what kind of work did
“conservatism” do in the nineteenth century? How did it fit within transnational
discourses around conservatism and how did it reflect and change American political
culture and society?
What distinguished American conservatism from European conservatism was not
its emancipatory potential, as some contemporaries claimed, but the nature of its organic
component, and, specifically, its distinctions based on “race.” In later years, critics would
use “racial” or “racist” to describe the warrant that undergirded the policies, legislation,
institutions, and socio-political organizations that promoted the “white” race over people
of color. Although proponents of white hegemony and white nationalism used “race” to
signal and reinforce hierarchical organic differences between groups, neither “racial” nor
“racist” existed as categories in this period. Since Blumenbach’s De Generis Humani
Varietati Nativa (1775), scientists sub-divided the human race into varieties based on
their physiological differences, attributed to their ancestral anthropography, and
developed hierarchical theories of differentiated development based on their comparative
study of these different races. Still, for most of the period at issue in this dissertation, race
remained relatively interchangeable with “nation.” The discursive shift to distinguish
between “race” and “nation” followed the proliferation of scientific theories of race and
race-difference in the first half of the century.42 After the 1848 revolutions, when nation-
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states became the predominant ‘western’ model for political statehood, “race”
demarcated ethnographic distinctions between groups living within the same nation, and,
in this context, advocates of race theory argued that “racial” disparities arose out of the
organic, physiological differences between different races. Functionally, then, the
distinctions bred by these policies predated the language used to describe them, and the
“conservative” legislation and legal decisions that codified them. For that reason, this
dissertation will use “organic” in the place of “racial,” addressing projected “organic”
differences and “organic” discrimination to characterize what would be reified later as
“racial” differences and discrimination. Furthermore, US statues restricting the legal
rights and civil liberties of non-“white” residents (excluding Native Americans) “deemed
and adjudged” anyone “descended from negroes or mulattoes either on the father's or the
mother's side” as “persons of color” or “people of color.”43 Because “color” (or the
designation of “color” conferred by ancestry) was the distinguishing designation in
popular and political discourse as well as in legal documents, this project will follow the
common convention and refer to “people of color,” unless a specific source or the clarity
of a debate dictates otherwise, in which case the terminology will appear in quotations.44
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As much as possible, this dissertation will adhere to the language used by the
actors in question and avoid anachronistic terminology. Occasionally, this commitment
requires some lexicographic acrobatics. For example, “economic system” was not in use,
but for some reason (luckily beyond the purview of this dissertation), “socio-political”
was. Two brief lexicographic notes should help lend clarity to the task of reading. First,
to keep with the convention of the period, this dissertation will capitalize the modifier in
party names, but not the noun (e.g., Conservative party, not Conservative Party), unless
citing a specific source that uses alternative capitalization, and it will use the common
form when referring to groups of people associated with ideas and parties, but not the
parties themselves (e.g., democrats and whigs, not Democrats and Whigs.) For example,
since the third chapter focuses almost exclusively on the twelve-year Jackson-Van Buren
regime, this dissertation will refer to their party as the “administration party” and the
various parties that rose to oppose them as the “opposition party” or “the opposition” in
that chapter. Moreover, because party names and capitalization varied by region and
source, and were deployed discursively, this dissertation will attempt to keep their usage
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consistent with the source in question, or within regional conventions, and, where
possible, indicate what purpose the name served.45
Second, “capitalism,” as a term that referred to an economic system in which
individuals or groups holding monetary assets (capitalists) controlled the production and
distribution of goods, and created a market that determined the value of those goods as
well as the price of labor used in their manufacture and delivery, came into use in the
early 1830s. Eventually, capitalism became conflated with the philosophy of “Free
Trade” and was designated “market” or “free market” capitalism, which carried a natural
or scientific connotation. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, politicians and public
intellectuals critical of “capitalists” generally understood capitalism to be a man-made
“Industrial Order,” artificially supported by the paper money system (and credit), private
banking, and government legislation (e.g., protectionist policies), that allowed a select
group of wealthy people to control and manipulate commerce. In the early republic, it
was not uncommon for people to oppose “capitalism” and promote “free trade.” Drawing
the distinction between free-trade advocacy and a position favoring capitalism should not
negate the historical role that southern “anti-capitalists” like John C. Calhoun played in
creating the infrastructure, apparatus, and material conditions for market capitalism. But
if you asked him, he would certainly have denied it.

***
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In the United States, the organic framework transmuted the social, civil, and legal
construction of citizenship, circumscribing those rights for people of color within its
geographic boundaries and generating the agenda for their expatriation, subjection, and
exclusion. Its imprint can be found in the logic of the American Colonization Society,
established in December 1816, which sought to gradually end slavery, but could not
imagine people of color as citizens of the United States; in laws that increasingly
regulated and restricted the conditions under which people of color lived and moved; and
in quarantine laws that excluded free people of color from entering or residing in certain
States.46 It identified the white, male, Christian body as the normative grounds for
citizenship and civic participation, and interrogated the incorporation or involvement of
anyone who did not fit that criteria. While the concept of an organic society motivated
democratic, anti-slavery, and progressive social reformers, as well, the plenum of
American politicians who expressed an ontological commitment to the organic state
projected an increasingly exclusionary socio-political imaginary, until it included only
those (white, male, Christian) citizens who supported white supremacy, in general, and
the institution of slavery, in specific.47 Ultimately, these were the men who earned the
name “Conservatives.”
This project explores the dialectic of “conservative” thought and its elaboration in
US politics, scholarship, and public discourse. Looking at individuals and groups that
defined themselves or their politics as “conservative,” it traces the development of
46
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competing claims to conservatism in the nineteenth-century United States from their
historical and philosophical antecedents in eighteenth-century transnational medicophilosophical treatises, to their translation, adaptation, and expression in debates over
industry and slavery, State rights and federal power, capitalism and popular democracy,
and immigration, in-migration, and territorial expansion from the 1820s through the
1850s. The first chapter focuses on the genesis of “conservative” thought, starting with
British moral sentiment, nerve theory, and physiology; working through the continental
revival of vitalist theories in natural history, models of organic development, bio-medical
research, and political theory; and concluding with German aesthetics, organic biology,
and natural philosophy, which combined to frame an organic theory of sovereignty, in
which naturally-formed societies constituted organic states infused throughout with vital
forces.
Following this long conceptual history, the main thrust of the dissertation tracks
the influence of this organic thought in the United States and, particularly the political
struggle to identify the country’s “conservative principles” with specific socio-political
agendas. Chapter two establishes the central antagonism between the unilateral
proponents of slavery (and their corollary commitment to State rights) and any forces
they perceived as jeopardizing slavery (including federal authority, anti-slavery
movements, and national education or culture). Reacting to the government’s
protectionist commercial policies in the 1820s, pro-slavery southerners defended their
“conservative” right to protect their particular social and commercial institutions against
federal interference through the “conservative principles” of State rights and nullification.
After the abolitionist movement mobilized in the 1830s, these pro-slavery forces joined
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in a “Conservative” front with northern anti-abolitionists to enforce the “conservative
principles” of “law-and-order” through censorship and violence against anyone
associated with the anti-slavery movement, including all people of color. In response, a
group of northeastern social reformers advocated a national movement to fund the arts
and public education and to free religion from the tyranny of “false conservative”
politics. Returning to the humanist potential of national culture theorized in German and
British romantic thought, they re-envisioned American conservatism as a force for true
(i.e., moral) freedom and justice.
Chapter three focuses on the first official “Conservative party” in the United
States, which splintered off from the Jackson-Van Buren party in the late 1830s. It
represents a slight departure from the earlier history of ideas because it addresses the
discursive function of “conservative” as an antagonistic label in American politics, rather
than the mimetic relationship between parties yclept “conservative” in the United States
and real transnational conservatism. In the 1830s, relatively unified, ideologically
coherent conservative movements seemed to blossom organically wherever parties
contended for power internationally. From the American perspective, these national
Conservative parties presented a united front to secure their own country’s “established
order” against the surge of transnational and international radical movements. Setting up
safeguards for social hierarchies and national institutions, these foreign Conservative
parties implemented policies to protect inherited wealth, the landed classes, and
capitalists, while suppressing popular, democratic, and socialist movements. When
opposition parties emerged in the United States to challenge Andrew Jackson’s
administration—first, under the guise of the Whig party and then from within his own

31
party—Jackson’s party connected them in public discourse with reactionary, antidemocratic “foreign” conservatism. This systematic smear campaign successfully
marginalized the party’s internal critics, who eventually embraced the pejorative label
“Conservative” and briefly formed their own party. As a result, Jackson’s party
consolidated its image as the party “for democracy,” defending the people against
capitalists, aspiring aristocrats, and corrupt career bureaucrats, while the Whig party
remained indelibly linked with foreign strains of conservatism in both the American and
international press for the duration of the party’s existence.48
The second half of the dissertation returns to the primary conflict between the
forces for slavery and the people who came in their way. Chapter four looks at the
Democratic reaction after the “Conservative” (in the sense of “anti-democratic”
European) Whigs took the White House in 1840. The electoral upset rattled the
Democratic-party faithful, who had felt assured of another Democratic victory on the tail
of such a popular, if socially-groundbreaking and politically polarizing, two-term
president. Not to mention the fact that Van Buren had already won once. And it
especially shook the workingmen’s and democratic wing of the party, who saw in the
Whig victory a repudiation of everything they knew to be true in the world. Feeling they
had to choose between political solvency and disavowing slavery, a substantial number of
northern Democrats distanced themselves from the anti-slavery cause and anyone
associated with it. One of these labor activists, public intellectual and internationallyrecognized American philosopher Orestes Brownson, used his public platform to theorize
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John C. Calhoun’s pro-slavery democratic-republicanism, positioning Calhoun as a
“conservative” reformer, crusading for justice, the Constitution, and the truly American
way of life (i.e, white supremacy).
The fifth and final chapter examines the process of confrontation, compromise,
and dissolution between “national conservatism” and “slave conservatism” from Polk’s
election in 1844 through the Compromise of 1850. The first type of conservatism,
“national conservatism,” empowered banks and corporations, favored centralized
organization and national planning (including protectionist commercial policies and
federally-funded education and national culture), and endorsed federal authority,
coordination, and oversight. Its commercial policies benefitted manufacturing, shipping,
and industry. The other type of conservatism, “slave conservatism,” promoted free trade
and open markets, proprietary rights, state sovereignty, and slavery. It opposed
consolidated government, federal authority, and protectionist policies like the tariff. Both
types of conservatism opposed “fanaticism,” in its various forms (e.g., socialism,
agrarianism, Dorrism, and abolitionism) and both advocated “law-and-order
conservatism,” provided that they defined the law and controlled the order. These two
groups fleetingly cooperated to push through the Compromise of 1850, a collection of
bills intended to resolve the festering question of slavery, including the role of the federal
government in securing “fugitive” slaves, the slave trade in the District of Columbia, and
the disposition of the Oregon territory and the Mexican annexations (California, Utah,
and New Mexico). The resulting compromise legislation hit the republican high-mark of
satisfying no one and agitating everyone else—in large part because its framers
contended for two distinct ideological visions of American society that undermined any
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common ground for compromise. In addition to their programmatic conflicts, “national”
and “slavery” conservatives advanced mutually exclusive variations on the theme of
white supremacy. “National” conservatives tended toward white nationalism, which
envisioned a country populated exclusively by “white” people. “Slave” conservatives, on
the other hand, demanded white hegemony, which predicated “white” freedom on the
material co-existence and subjugation of a “black” population.49 The people could live in
a “white” nation, or they could have slaves, but not both.
Ultimately, the organismic ontology of the state transformed the socio-political
imaginary in the nineteenth century, which changed the horizons of possibility for
political actors to understand and articulate their role and their objectives in state
formation and control. In this context, a society’s conservative principles, powers, and
forces, embodied in its organic institutions and expressed in the character of its people,
maintained its national constitution and social order and kept the living machinery of its
government operating in cosmic harmony. The men who claimed to guide their state
along this organic trajectory called themselves “Conservatives,” and these were the men
who dictated what America looked like (or, at least, what it should look like, according to
their ontological assumptions), and, unsurprisingly, it looked like them.
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CHAPTER 1: VITAL POLITICS
In the eighteenth century, a scientific and philosophic revolution in knowledge
production (from abstract deduction to historical empiricism) led to an expansion of the
legitimate subjects for scientific enquiry and an attendant transformation in theories of
personhood, humanity, society, politics, and the state. As a result, organic materialism
(genetic, progressive, operating by design, and susceptible to outside influences)
gradually supplanted Enlightenment universalism as the over-riding paradigm for
comprehending, controlling, and shaping the world.50 Uniting moral philosophy and
physiology, empiricist John Locke advanced a theory of association that placed
individuals in their particular historical and social contexts, establishing the foundations
for a progressive model of individual development. The Scottish moral philosophers and
physicians who followed Locke materialized morality in the human body. An
individual’s nerves connected them to their humanity through their “common sense,”
which tied them organically to their community, their society, and, with enough
refinement, to the world. Meanwhile, as historical empiricism came to dominate
epistemology, researchers in the incipient life sciences in Britain and on the continent
jettisoned universalist explanations for natural life and replaced them with particular,
dynamic, and progressive theories of organic development. Through their combined work
on the nervous system, physiology, moral sentiment, and aesthetics, these medico-
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philosophers and moral theorists transformed society conceptually from a dead machine
to a vital organism.51
During this period, locating the proper mechanism for organic development
gained social and political urgency in response to changes in the social order and
challenges to traditional and hierarchical state structures. Like all organic life, societies
carried within themselves a “conservative” ideal, an antiseptic and regenerative living
force, which maintained their health and stability. At the beginning of the eighteenth
century, the aristocracy performed this vital function. Poised at the top of a stable, natural
hierarchy, they protected and preserved the social body; as the educated class, they
served as society’s brain, guiding and ruling the lower orders. As the landed class, they
represented the “true owners” of the “political vessel,” whose property enabled them to
51
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embody a disinterested public spirit, in contrast with the vicissitude of newly-minted
“monied men.”52 Gradually, however, it became clear to some people that the aristocracy
represented a failed or putrefying form. The advent of a politically relevant and educated
middle class, expanding geographic and social mobility, urbanization, and higher literacy
rates (combined with the growing availability of affordable publications) all conspired to
render aristocracy redundant. Meanwhile, integrated theories of the mind suggested that
the body, itself, contributed the essential material for thought, while the brain merely
served as a data repository from which the mind synthesized input from the nervous
system. Parallel developments in sentiment theory likewise suggested that the mass of
people who formed the body of the state might make substantial contributions to the
state’s health and stability, if their moral senses were properly cultivated through
aesthetic education. Aesthetic education broadened the people’s capacity to embody the
vital principles of their society and prepared them for self-rule.53
In the decades preceding the French Revolution, natural scientists and
philosophers sympathetic to these changes looked to shifting models of organic
52
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development programmatically. Empirical research on natural life led them to formulate
the methods by which a state could change for the good of the body politic. Reciprocally,
it gave them insight into how they could guide the parts of that national body, awakened
to their distinct and vital functions in the life of the (national) mind, to operate in
sympathetic and organic harmony. Since organic bodies had a hierarchy of parts, this
schema accorded with hierarchical social organizations. Yet, because sentiment theory
indicated that each individual had the potential to access a disinterested common sense
that connected them to universal principles, it opened the gateway to more egalitarian
organizations. The people (aristocrats, middle class, and commoners, alike) provided the
material substance of the national organism. Their health, stability, and organization
determined the fortitude and durability of the state. And their capacity to connect with
universal morality (the “common sense”) dictated the state’s vitality.54
Germinating in eighteenth-century biology, aesthetics, and philosophy, the
organic model of statehood came to fruition as a cultural and political project of
resistance to French hegemony on the continent. In late-eighteenth and early-nineteenthcentury German thought, organic sovereignty represented the fulfillment of an essential
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idea of a nation in state form. In the adversarial context of French imperialism, it
projected the possibility of a state that embodied, preserved, and perpetuated the vital,
conservative principle of an organic polity. Organic societies built organic states
particularly suited to their needs, which prepared and developed the capacity of their
citizens for individual perfection and, ultimately, for them to embrace their universal
humanity. States that developed organically persisted and states constructed on artificial
or mechanical principles, however sound, were doomed to fall.55
For simplicity, the basic trajectory of this process can be compressed into a
schema of proper names. After addressing the conflict between Enlightenment
universalism and sensorial empiricism, this chapter starts in Great Britain, where Scottish
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moral philosophers Lord Shaftesbury, David Hume, and Adam Smith, together with
Scottish physician-physiologists William Cullen and Robert Whytt, and English
physicians David Hartley and George Cheyne elaborated the idea of an organic
(intersubjective and intertwined) society and tied “national” health to the behavior and
habits of a country’s citizens. It then moves to the continent, where French naturalist
George-Louis Leclerc (Comte de Buffon), Swiss physiologists Albrecht von Haller and
Charles Bonnet, and German physiologist Caspar Wolff developed a vital theory of
organic life and, through the work of the French Idéologues (physiologist-physicians
Balthasar-Anthelme Richerand and Pierre Jean George Cabanis, and political theorist
Antoine Destutt de Tracy) projected it onto the body politic. The chapter concludes in
Germany, where German philosophers incorporated British moral sentiment and
continental vitalism into a totalized image of organic sovereignty. Johann Herder and
Johann Wolfgang von Goethe integrated this sentimental and vitalist evolutionary theory
into their Volk philosophy and Sturm und Drung movement. At the same time, Johann
Friedrich Blumenbach’s organic biology, which built on all of these influences, inspired
the epigenetic turn in Immanuel Kant’s transcendental idealism, Friedrich Schiller’s
aesthetics, and, finally, Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s organic nationalism, i.e., the concept of
organic sovereignty as the ideal basis for state-formation or the ontological assumption
that societies were organic and that states should be.
THE BODY AND ITS ASSOCIATIONS
During the Enlightenment, natural philosophers set out to discover, explain, and
model the component parts of the universe, which they presumed to be and to function
the same way everywhere. Using these universal rules, forms, and principles they
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constructed a model of society that could be imposed everywhere, with more or less
work. Two epistemological systems dominated in this period. The first, epitomized in the
work of Rene Descartes and Isaac Newton in the late seventeenth century, approached the
world through the realm of mathematics, producing a mechanistic dualism that
distinguished between the physical and metaphysical realms.56 The second system,
popularized by Newton’s correspondent John Locke, derived its epistemology from the
burgeoning fields of medicine and physiology, and ultimately led to particular and
progressive theories of natural life and organic development.
In Newton’s model, the body was a machine, pulled by external levers and run by
necessity.57 The body’s organs transmitted impressions and sensations via the nerves to
the physical brain, which operated as a grand central station for sensation, a physical
warehouse for sensory information.58 The physical brain served as the mind’s sensorium,
which stimulated representative images in the mind.59 Similarly, the physical world
served as God’s sensorium, a sensory field that manifested God’s will. Unlike the human
sensorium (or sensoriolum, to distinguish it from God’s), God’s sensorium lacked the
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limitations imposed by time and space. Human beings could only see the image of a thing
and never the true thing because they were trapped in the machinery of the universe,
limited to the present.60 Through the faculties of intellect and imagination, the mind
manipulated these images and composed ideas, all within the rules imposed by God’s
laws.61
At the close of the seventeenth century, physician and moral philosopher John
Locke developed a sensorial empiricism, predicated on the study of human experience,
that radically altered the common understanding of the individual’s relationship to
society and society’s relationship to the state. Whereas Thomas Hobbes and the French
mechanists presumed that morality must be imposed unilaterally from the outside to
constrain mankind’s animalistic nature, in Locke’s theory of association, individuals built
their own morality on the foundation of their sensory experiences and through the
operation of their imaginations. In this system of medical–philosophical thought, the
imagination signified the material, nervous basis for consciousness and functioned as the
primary model for explaining the connection between human anatomy and human
behavior.62 Rather than being filled in by God, Locke asserted, the mind built itself.
Sensation begat consciousness. The nerves transmitted the body’s sensations through the
nervous system to the brain, which produced moral ideas through the process of mental
association and reflection. Every man shared a “common sense” when first encountering
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the world and the refinement of a man’s senses determined his ability to perceive nature’s
primary truths. Because Locke’s natural history of understanding situated individuals in
their temporal and material contexts, he provided the epistemological foundation for
progressive theories of organic development in both moral philosophy and the life
sciences, which, combined, contributed to an organic model of society.
By the mid-eighteenth century, British moral and medical philosophers fleshed
out the concept of morality as an organic, material faculty located in the body that could
be conditioned by environment, refined by experience, cultivated through education, or
stunted through labor. These synthetic works opened the possibility that all people had
access to morality through the exercise of their senses. Following Locke, they advanced a
theory of moral sentiments that embedded each individual into a social nervous network,
stressing the intersectional role that individuals, social groups, and governing institutions
played in cultivating healthy and thriving national bodies.63 According to moral sense
theory, popularized by Locke’s student, Lord Shaftesbury, individuals intuited and
generated morality through the combined faculties of their sensory impulses and
imaginations.64 They developed their moral sense through their phenomenological
experiences and refined it through their affective relationships with other people,
becoming connected sympathetically to a particular social body and, through the
extension of their nervous sensibility, to widening social circles.
In the realm of medicine, physiologists extended the boundaries of the individual
nervous system to include social, cultural, and national stimuli, effectively nationalizing
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Locke’s nervous system. In the English Malady (1733), physiologist George Cheyne
linked the health and stability of the individual body to the health and stability of the
national body, implicating both individual choice and national habituation. Like
individuals, nations developed distinctive nervous systems with characteristic nervous
sensibilities and sensitivities. Cheyne attributed the proliferation of particular nervous
disorders in England to the nation’s material conditions. Individual neuropathology
flourished due to a combination of England’s climate, weather, soil, food, the growth of
domestic wealth and foreign trade, the sedentary and decadent lifestyle common among
its upper classes, and the surge of residents in large towns and cities.65 Wealthy,
hierarchical societies, like England, were particularly vulnerable to nervous disorders
because they bred an entire class that had sensitive nerves and destructive habits by
design. To cure their national malady, Cheyne proposed a national remedy implemented
through the behavior of the country’s citizens.66
In the Treatise on Human Nature (1739) and Essays, Moral, Political and
Literary (1742), David Hume traced the biographical and social contingencies of nervous
development as they related to differences in sympathy and moral development. He
noticed that proximity and association bred sympathy, building particular communities
united by their common feeling. Similarly, environmental factors habituated members of
the same community in common nervous reactions (common sentiment), which naturally
and necessarily drew them together into communities, and ensured that members of the
same societies felt a connective bond of affection for each other. At the same time,
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however, class stratification created sentimental estrangement within communities. In
their effort to create stability, Hume explained, the people formed governments, which
instituted hierarchies of power through property that determined occupation,
environment, and education. Over time, these different stations in life generated habits of
mind that reproduced these power structures in the individual’s imagination, naturalizing
the social and political distinctions that fabricated these differences in the first place.
These social distinctions shaped the “whole fabric” of a man’s nature, Hume wrote,
“external and internal.” The “skin, pores, muscles, and nerves of a day-labourer” differed
from those of a “man of quality,” and “so are his sentiments, actions and manners.” All of
the factors of proximity and place that may have once united these men now served to
alienate their affections from each other. Yet, because sympathy converted an idea into
an impression by “the force of imagination,” it could enter into this breach and
communicate the impression of common sentiment where it no longer naturally thrived.
Even if members of the same community no longer felt the same sensations, a “man of
quality” could experience the sensation in his imagination, overcoming the social barrier
to common affection and ethical treatment.67
In a parallel development, in a 1749 monograph David Hartley, George Cheyne’s
personal physician, described the physiological process by which social contexts molded
individual morality and compelled sympathetic communities.68 Everything a person did
or encountered had the capacity to influence their associative network and, consequently,
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their voluntary actions. Over time, different behaviors developed their own affections—
their own relationships to different kinds of pleasure and pain in the mind. These
affections always functioned normatively, as they had in Locke’s model, directing action
toward the pursuit of happiness.69 This reciprocal relationship in the nerves between
action and feeling created the biological basis for interpersonal sympathy (sympathy
between bodies) and for the individual’s drive toward social unity. Sympathetic affection
acted as a powerful motivator that enabled individuals to transcend merely physical or
personal pleasure or discomfort, and to attend to the happiness of others. Within the
body, a well-developed sympathetic faculty enabled individuals to push past their
immediate sensations toward a gradual annihilation of their individual “self.” It regulated
humankind’s lower impulses and associations, reinforced their moral senses, and united
them with their sense of God (theopathy). Furthermore, sympathy was learned behavior,
picked up from nervous associations developed in childhood and refined over a lifetime.
A person’s affection for their family, their sense of duty to their community and
government, their reverence for authority and obedience to the law all introduced the
patterns of behavior that opened them up to universal sympathy and unity in God’s true
religion. The sympathetic drive incrementally awakened them to their membership in
increasingly expansive communities, until they realized their connection to all other
people as members of the same universal, mystical body.
69
Hartley’s Observations on Man, His Frame, His Duty, and His Expectations (1749) synthesized Locke’s
theory of associations and Newton’s doctrine of nervous vibrations. Drawing on Locke’s Essay Concerning
Human Understanding, Hartley started from the premise that internal feelings (the association of sensations
and ideas), characterized to some degree by either pleasure or pain, informed all human behavior. The
quality and complexity of an individual’s associative network, combined with their behavior, determined
the nature of their actions. Voluntary action (distinguished from the body’s automatic functions, like the
heart pumping or the bowels moving) grew out of the power of its association with previous circumstances
or bodily movements that left durable impressions (habits of vibration) on the nervous system. Habits of
thought and behavior, therefore, reinforced patterns of vibrations in the nervous system and in the brain.

46
In the 1750s, Hume’s physician William Cullen, the President of the Royal
College of Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow and then Edinburgh, and Cullen’s
colleague Robert Whytt reintroduced the soul into the body as part of a holistic theory of
nervous sympathy in which the nerves served as the apparatus for an individual’s
morality.70 Whytt argued that the nerves—although a material component of the body—
suffused the entire organism with a “sentient principle” (what Cullen and French
physician Paul-Joseph Barthez later called the “vital principle”), an aspect of the soul that
enabled the body to feel and respond reasonably, even in those cases where the outside
stimulus never reached the conscious mind.71 Nerves could lead to an idea being created
through association in the mind, to a physical manifestation, or to both.72 This
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“sympathetic” faculty ensured that all of the body’s physical organs reacted together with
the mind in harmony: a single, unified, vital organism.73
At the end of the decade, Adam Smith elaborated this intrapersonal sympathetic
network as a model for interpersonal social construction in his popular Theory of Moral
Sentiments (1759), proposing that the mind (i.e., the imagination) created society.74
Nervous sympathy generated a connective tissue between men, a “fellow feeling” that
could potentially supersede political and social stratification. From this information, the
imagination generated patterns of nervous sensibility and projected them onto the world,
identifying and organizing as “society” the communities with which an individual
connected sympathetically. Society developed from the aggregation and amalgamation of
each individual’s nervous sensibility into one giant nervous system. These webs of
sympathy, infused with the natural principle of humanity, tied together different organs
within the social body, each of which carried out specialized functions within a single
system. In this way, society functioned as an organism, with its individual members
serving the social body just like the component parts served an individual body in Cullen
and Whytt’s theory.75
In forging a theory of moral sentiments predicated on the acuity of an individual’s
imagination, Smith redefined sensibility as an intellectual and rational process that
conjoined morality and aesthetics. Building on the framework established in Hume’s
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Treatise, Smith speculated that the imagination facilitated and negotiated the relationship
between the nervous system and the outside world, operating as a field of experience that
mediated and elaborated upon the information received. An individual’s experiences
(Hume’s “habit”) bonded together to form an imagined spectator, an ideal self separate
from all material circumstances. When individuals sympathized with others, they
projected their own imagined spectator into the other person’s situation and recognized
the correctness of that person’s response to their conditions. The quality of their
imagination determined their faculty for judgment because it increased the capacity of
their imagined spectator to reproduce with accuracy all of the factors shaping another
person’s behavior. Because it built and refined the imagination, aesthetic education
enhanced an individual’s ability to transcend their own conditions and exercise accurate
judgment of others.76 Through the process of broadening and refining their aesthetic
sensibility, they gained the capacity to connect with and care for others in their
community, and their sense of communal connection expanded outwards to encompass
increasingly large and more diverse populations.
Since, in theory, anyone with access to education—even the upwardly-mobile
“monied men” and those occupying the “middle station” of life—could serve as the mind
of society, sensationalism and sentiment opened up the field of possibility for egalitarian
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and republican models of statehood, in which the virtuous middle class embraced their
responsibility toward their fellow man. Simultaneously, however, sentiment theory
presented a set of existential and philosophical challenges to this kind of universal
philanthropy. Because nations operated as organisms, they, too, developed a particular
moral sense, a socially-determined and historically-contingent combination of sentiment
and affections that drove all of their moral decisions. Societies might share frameworks
and practices with other communities across time and space, but, like human organisms,
they varied in their access to the universal moral standard; their organic makeup led them
inexorably to differentiation, alienation, and conflict. If Hume and Smith’s theory of
moral sentiments had opened up the transformative possibility for an organically
interconnected brotherhood of man, it simultaneously raised seemingly impervious
barriers to that unity.
In an effort to combat Hume and Smith’s skeptical and disaggregating
conclusions, Henry Home, Lord Kames, explicitly reintroduced God into moral sense
theory in the 1760s. In the “Preliminary Discourse Being an Investigation to the Moral
Laws of Society” to his Principles of Equity (1767), Home argued that God had stamped
mankind with an imprint of perfection, which gave rise to a universal and invariable
moral standard, a common moral sense propelling all humanity progressively towards
perfection. He elaborated, “In the order of Providence, the progress of our species toward
perfection resembles that of an individual: we may observe an infancy in both; and in
both a gradual progress toward maturity: nor is the resemblance less perfect that certain
tribes, like certain individuals, ripen faster than others.” But even Lord Kames, who
would restore the principle of universal teleology to the theory of moral sense, agreed
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that societies varied in their access to the universal moral standard. This variation did not
“disprove the reality of a common sense as to morals,” he noted, but it did reveal that
“the moral sense has not been equally perfect at all times, and in all countries.”77
Kames’s argument drew on concurrent advances in natural science, where
physiologists had theorized the relationship between the organization of an original plan
in organic life and the progressive or genetic changes in organic development. In
conversation (and often overlapping) with the key players in the moral sense debate, they
asked the same questions about organic life that moral philosophers were asking about
human society: Did organisms develop progressively toward an identifiable end? Could
novel forms develop or come into existence, and if so, by what mechanism did such a
genetic awakening or organic change occur? Most importantly, what gave an organism
vitality, extended its life, or preserved it? Over time, physiologists identified the vital
forces that shaped an organism’s structure, its genetic expression, its growth, and its
viability. As British sensibility and sentiment theory increasingly influenced continental
philosophy, this system of thought migrated along with it, inflecting the parallel debate in
moral and political philosophy over the natural structure, stability, and organic growth of
society. The vital forces for organic change—in either the evolutionary or epigenetic
model—formed the basis for the “conservative principle” in French and British
physiology and the transformative concept of Bildunstrieb (the formative drive) in
German thought.
By the mid-eighteenth century, evolution and epigenesis emerged in natural
science and history as the two dominant theories that explained variation in organic form.
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At the time, “evolution” signified preformation: the entire organism existed in its
complete form from its inception and simply unfolded, often in reaction to various
outside forces. In contrast, “epigenesis,” popularized by French naturalist George-Louis
Leclerc (Comte de Buffon), advanced a dynamic, additive model of organic development.
Like his counterparts in the Scottish Enlightenment, Buffon embraced Locke’s historical
and experiential methodology over the mechanistic and reductive approach characterized
by Swiss ecologist Carl Linnaeus. In the Linnaean system, all of nature already lay
stretched out on the horizon, waiting for scientific observers to fit its species-variations
into a pre-established hierarchical taxonomy. Conversely, in Buffon’s Histoire naturelle,
générale et particulière (a thirty-six-volume natural history published between 1749 and
1788), nature generated biological diversity epigenetically, bringing vital forces into
balance against the impact of space and time.78 In this causal genealogy, organisms
changed over time from their original types into their present forms as the result of a
variety of factors, including climate, environment, and geographical location—the same
factors that shaped the national body in the Scottish theory of moral sentiments.79
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In the following decade, Swiss physiologist Albrecht von Haller argued for an
evolutionary model in which an organism’s original organization dictated its final form.
According to Haller, all organisms existed in potentia, but required external stimulation
(irritation) to unfold from their nascent stage. Organisms had all of their preexisting parts
in embryo, he observed, which unfolded into identifiable organs during gestation. Like a
scroll of poetry, the parts of the organism were already written and merely required
articulation. In support of this theory, Haller’s friend Charles Bonnet advanced the
concept of “emboîtment [encapsulation],” a “natural evolution of organized beings” from
original seeds that carried within them entire genealogies, spilling out over millennia.
Everything that could ever exist, existed within those seeds, in complete formation.80
Haller’s concept of creative irritation would reappear twenty years later in German
aesthetics as the Sturm und Drang movement.
In response to Haller and Bonnet, German physiologist Caspar Wolff formulated
a dynamic, epigenetic theory of organic change in the 1750s and 1760s. He criticized the
preformationists for paradoxically presuming a divine miracle delimited to the moment of
the world’s creation and simultaneously denying “living nature” the power to change
itself. Unless God intervened, change did not happen—in every womb, life developed
automatically through the operation of a dead mechanism.81 Haller and Bonnet conceived
of bodies as replicable machines, he concluded, and reduced biologists to the role of
mechanics.82 In his research on the vascular system, on the contrary, Wolff observed that
life changed in embryo and concluded that organisms developed epigenetically according
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to a “principle of generation” through the agency of an “essential” drive [vis essentialis]
that turned dead matter into a living organism that grew and changed.83 The vis
essentialis transformed the body from a smattering of disparate materials into a proper
organism, giving it an organic structure and coordinating all of its separate parts. Wolff’s
epigenetic vis essentialis resembled Whytt’s “sentient principle” in that it worked as a
vital force on the body, but was not, itself, a material mechanism. In this way, it
incorporated both the vital and mechanical explanations for organic life, though it did not
fully integrate them. They would remain in tension for another twenty years, until
German physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach unified them in the formative drive
(the nisum formativum or Bildungstrieb), which will be addressed in the next section.
British sentiment theory, in concert with these dynamic models of organic change,
reanimated the vitalist hypothesis in French medical discourse, notably among
Montpellier’s medical faculty, and in philosophy, particularly among Diderot and
Montesquieu.84 Influenced by Whytt, Montpellier faculty-member Henri Fouquet
collectively treated sensibility and sentiment as the “base and conservative agent [agent
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conservateur] of life” in his 1765 Encyclopedia article on the subject.85 In the 1770s, the
head of the medical faculty at Montpellier, Paul-Joseph Barthez, proposed that a “vital
principle,” operating as an autonomous force, maintained homeostasis within
organisms.86 Working in a pre-established harmony with organic life, the “principum
vitale” regulated an organism’s active functions (the body’s motor, sensory,
hematological, thermoregulatory, and circulatory systems) and determined its capacity
for survival.87 The French Idéologues—physiologist-physicians Balthasar-Anthelme
Richerand and Pierre Jean George Cabanis, and political theorist Antoine Destutt de
Tracy—called this faculty the “principe conservateur,” an active agent that supervised the
body, balanced its faculties, and struggled against the powers that might “interrupt its
exercise” or extinguish its “vital motion.”88 In the field of medicine, the “conservative
principle” described the faculty within the system that harmonized the parts. Echoing
Hume and Smith, Hartley and Cheyne, Barthez and his colleagues at Montpellier detailed
a comprehensive science of humanity which indicated that individuals and societies could
improve themselves through the integrated treatment of their minds and bodies.
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PHILOSOPHIE FÜR DIE WELT: MORAL SENSE AND EPIGENESIS IN GERMANY
In the mid-eighteenth century, British moral sense theory migrated to the German
states in its various medical, philosophical, and aesthetic iterations, where it emerged in
the work of Immanuel Kant, Johann Gottfried Herder, and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing to
form the foundation for an organic theory of national sovereignty.89 For those German
philosophers dissatisfied with the dominant speculative and rationalist traditions in the
decade after Christian Wolff died, sensibility offered a compelling—and
transformative—epistemology. It corrected for the empirical and programmatic
limitations of dogmatic philosophy and it promoted an egalitarian understanding of
human potential. Spurred by Smith, Hume, and translations of other British moral sense
theorists, Johann Herder and his contemporaries shifted their focus toward publically-

89

Translated into French in 1764 and German in 1770, Smith’s publication coincided with several other
major works of British natural and moral philosophy. Johann Heinrick Merck translated Francis
Hutcheson’s An Inquiry into the Orginal of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue in 1762 and Karl Friederich
Flögel translated Alexander Gerard’s Essay on Taste in 1766. Leibniz’s systematic critique of Locke’s
Essay Concerning Human Understanding, published in 1765, re-introduced both Locke’s theory of
association and Leibniz’s speculation on the unconscious. In 1768, Christian August Wichmann finally
translated Shaftesbury’s Characteristics of Men, Manners, Opinions, Times into German (in fact, it was
translated twice in under a decade—in 1768 and 1776). Pieces of Characteristics had been translated
earlier, by Pietist FC Oetinger in 1753, who instructively translated “the formation of a genteel character”
as “Bildung” and “inner form” as “innere Bildung.” These publications prompted expanded translations of
Hume and his common-sense critics in 1771. In 1772 Christian Garve translated Adam Ferguson’s
Institutes of Moral Philosophy and his Essay on the history of Civil Society had already been translated into
German, in 1767. (Peter Jones, The Reception of David Hume In Europe (London and New York:
Thoemmes Continuum, 2005), 98-138; Vivienne Brown and Samuel Fleischacker, Essays on the
Philosophy of Adam Smith: The Adam Smith Review, Volume 5: Essays Commemorating the 250th
Anniversary of the Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York: Routledge, 2010); N. Waszek, The Scottish
Enlightenment and Hegel’s Account of “Civil Society” (Dordrecht, Boston, and London: Kluwer Academic
Publishers, 1988). “The Philosophical Situation in Germany after 1755” and “Scottish Common Sense and
the Reception of Kant’s Critical Philosophy” in Scottish Common Sense in Germany, 1768-1800: A
Contribution to the History of Critical Philosophy, ed. Manfred Kuehn, (Kingston and Montreal: McGillQueen’s University Press, 2004), 36-51, 208-237; Susan L. Cocalis “The Transformation of ‘Bildung’ from
an Image to an Ideal,” Monatshefte 70, no. 4 (1978): 399–414; Rebekka Horlacher, “The Philosophy of
Politeness as a Language for Bildung,” The Educated Subject and the German Concept of Bildung: A
Comparative Cultural History (New York: Routledge, 2015), 32-44; Heiner F. Klemme, Reception Of
British Aesthetics In Germany (Bristol: Thoemmes Press, 2001), 322; Stefanie Stockhorst, ed., Cultural
Transfer Through Translation: The Circulation of Enlightened Thought in Europe by Means of Translation
(Rodopi, 2010), 316-317.

56
minded questions.90 In the place of abstract, universalizing systems, Herder proposed a
“philosophy of the healthy understanding,” communicated to the people in their
language, which would connect them in a sympathetic community devoted to their
common interest and moving toward their common destiny. Instead of teaching the
people to improve themselves, this Volk philosophie would improve them through a
program of systematic Bildung (education or cultivation), molding “the human being, the
citizen, in accordance with better principles,” and giving them the “right directions” in
logic, morality, and politics. Philosophy “thinks,” Herder wrote, so that others may act.91
Combined with the dynamic theories of biological development publicized during
the Haller-Wolff controversy, sensibility provided this new generation of German
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philosophers with the model for creating organic unity and progressive change through
aesthetics. When Herder joined forces with Johann Wolfgang von Goethe at Strasbourg
University in the 1770s, they built a national aesthetic movement based on an
evolutionary and sympathetic understanding of organic life. Like the germ of a chick
nestled in a hen’s egg, the latent nation waited for the right irritating substance to initiate
its development: the “sturm” (irritation) and “drang” (stress or drive) that compelled its
evolution (in Haller’s sense).92 In Herder’s philosophy, aesthetics performed the irritating
function. Every nation “has its own center of well-being within itself,” Herder wrote in
1774, an “invisible germ of receptiveness to human happiness and virtue.”93 Aesthetics
connected the people to their authentic selves, roused them to their organic relationship to
the world, and opened them to the peculiar social and institutional expressions vital to
their national well-being.94 National aesthetics, expressed in folklore and folksongs, knit
a people into a single, unified nervous system, a national system of feeling. If the people
functioned as a single cohesive organism in the form of a nation, then aesthetic
expression operated as their vital force, driving their individual and collective evolution
towards a unique national genus. To that end, Herder and Goethe’s Sturm und Drung
movement promoted an ecstatic sentimental aesthetic designed to spark the vital life of
individuals as independent and virtuous organs of a unified national organism.
In his 1783 Prologmena to Any Future Metaphysics, Herder’s mentor Immanuel
Kant warned that sensationist philosophy appeared to promote a radical model of
individual fulfillment and human freedom, but, in reality, it cut humanity off from
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morality, free will, and the cultivation of its higher destiny. By questioning the grounds
of metaphysics, Kant noted, Hume exposed the emptiness of dogmatic philosophy, but
Hume’s skepticism promised nothing in its place.95 Taking Locke’s empiricism to its
logical conclusion, Kant argued, Hume’s experiential methodology opened a fundamental
breach between particular and universal knowledge. Subjugating reason to sensation, it
imprisoned human beings in their own bodies, in time and in space, in a fragmentary and
amoral world.96 As Kant observed, a moral philosophy that predicated all cognition and
behavior on phenomenological experience inevitably enforced a structure of contingency
on human life.97 If no discernable order existed outside of the unity synthetically imposed
by the individual imagination, then “it is useless to suppose that there is any human
standard, obligation, or purpose independent of the actual course of human history.”
Philosophers might employ reason to distinguish tendencies within a society and instruct
whether specific qualities or actions would lead to human happiness, but these moral
distinctions were meaningless outside of their social and historical contexts.98 With
experiences, Kant wrote, “we always remain in the chain of appearances,” which makes
“an intellectual intuition of objects outside of us, that do not exist through us” seem
impossible.99
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In Kant’s analysis, sensationalism opened the egalitarian possibility that all
people had access to morality through the exercise of their senses, but none of that
mattered if they had no critical capacity. Moral feeling “required that individuals take as
much interest in the form as in the matter.” To make a moral decision, they must have the
ability to consider an object either from the “perspective of universality” (teleological
judgment) or connect it to their own feeling (aesthetic judgment), and they must have the
cognitive leverage to make a disinterested (i.e., free) decision about their course of
action. Moral judgment depended on this free exercise of will: the individual’s power of
choice to subordinate their freedom for the universal good. Denied the capacity to
transcend their immanent, interested feelings, individuals became severed from the
transcendental ground of moral feeling; without the faculty to “consider something from
the universal perspective,” they had no incentive for moral conduct and no free will to
choose moral actions. Though connected in communities through the imagination in
Smith’s writing, individuals were still imprinted by their bodies with an essential and
insuperable otherness, cut off from transcendental principles. In light of this rupture, Kant
asked, what compelled the imagined spectator in Smith’s system to adopt the universal
good and how could critical philosophy provide an incentive for it to do so?100
In part, Kant resolved this disconnect between individual bodies and their
metaphysical contexts through Edmund Burke’s aesthetic theory of the beautiful and the
sublime, which Herder recommended to Kant in 1768 and Lessing translated into
German in 1773. In Burke’s theory, the beautiful formed the basis for the human drive
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for society, and found its expression in sensory objects; it connected individuals through
their sympathy to their surroundings and to other people. In contrast, the sublime applied
to anything that belied description or representation and individuals experienced it as a
nervous reaction to trauma. When witnessing the sublime, individuals experienced a flash
of the supersensible; they existed, for a moment, both inside and outside of nature. The
nerves transmitted this transcendental sensation to the mind, but the mind recoiled in
terror, overwhelmed by the incomprehensible. The sentiments and the imagination failed
to integrate the object of trauma, unable to transform it into an idea that fit into the
imagination. Through aesthetics, then, individuals gained a cognitive awareness of the
transcendental ground on which all relationships between phenomena rested. However,
Burke’s aesthetic theory lacked a mechanism to assimilate reflective (aesthetic and
teleological) judgment into the cognitive process. The aesthetic experience produced only
a transitory knowledge, a fleeting sense of teleology, and then a negative space charged
with affect, but no substance. For Kant, the question remained whether this aesthetic
experience could be translated into a critical faculty—the problem that inspired his
critiques.
Like Herder, Kant found his answer in a model of organic formation that united
the teleological and mechanical explanations for organic life in a single theory put
forward by German physiologist Johann Friedrich Blumenbach. In Blumenbach’s 1781
monograph on organic generation, Uber den Bildungstrieb und das Zeugungsgeschäfte,
he introduced the concept of Bildungstrieb, a formative force (nisum formativum) that
continuously connected the developing organism to its original organization, while also

61
regulating its growth, reproduction, and nutrition.101 Each organism operated
concordantly with its natural purpose, evident in the objective working of its system, and
every type of organism had its own Bildungstrieb that determined its final structure.
External conditions and forces could change its path, and it could develop and adapt, but
“change any of its constituent elements and the organization of the whole was not just
altered; it was completely destroyed.”102 Where British sensationalism had exposed the
disjuncture between the “physical-mechanistic” and teleological dimensions of
“organized nature,” Kant wrote to Blumenbach in 1790, Blumenbach’s model of
epigenesis reconciled them.103
Bildungstrieb restored metaphysics to the material realm by introducing the
teleological principle as a mechanical force in the body.104 Because he “virtually” united
the organism’s mechanical and transcendental elements, Kant wrote, Blumenbach
established a regulative principle for natural science, a thought machine that allowed
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scientists to discover mechanistic explanations for organic phenomena. The fact of
organized life proved the existence of final purposes, Kant explained in his third critique,
but Bildungstrieb operationalized them. Organisms did not simply unroll mechanically,
but were transformed through a continuous act of self-creation made in reference to a
larger plan.105 The “Idea” of the whole organism determined “the form and combinations
of all of the parts” and the parts “mutually depended upon each other both as to their
form and their combination.” Every part of the body functioned as an organ with its own
productive faculty, with all of the parts “reciprocally producing each other,” so that
together they produced a complete organism “by their own causality.”106 In organic life,
this embodied teleology propelled organisms to harmonize internally, in accordance with
nature’s final purposes.
Blumenbach’s dynamic theory of organic formation inspired the theoretical model
for reflective judgment in Kant’s Critique of Judgment (1790). In its reflective capacity,
Bildungstrieb translated morality (the object of reason) into an object of sense,
represented in moral feeling. In human beings, it provided the reflective mechanism
necessary for individuals to make disinterested decisions. For humanity, the “epigenesis
of happiness (self-creation) out of freedom” provided the “ground of moral feeling.” As a
categorical imperative, Kant noted, morality contained the “condition of the consensus of
all of our actions in the universal,” i.e., the conditions under which individual actions
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aligned with the universe’s formative drive. The human sense of morality developed out
of an individual’s ability to reflect on something from the universal perspective, and their
feeling of morality derived from the sense that a freely-chosen act harmonized with the
universal whole. Nature provided individuals a sense of “complete self-approbation” (a
formulation Kant borrowed from Smith) when they acted in harmony with the conditions
of morality.107 Smith’s imagined spectator adopted the universal good, therefore, because
it resonated with the “supersensible substrate” of his humanity. It gave him satisfaction
because it accorded with the universal Bildungstrieb.108
As a conceptual model for human cognition in Kant’s Critique, epigenesis
functioned as a heuristic to explain how individuals processed and represented
phenomena outside their understanding.109 It served as the mechanism by which
individuals reached beyond their own interested experience (aesthetic judgment) and
connected particular and universal representations in their minds (teleological judgment).
Through the study of art and nature, they developed their capacity to detect the
systematic nature of existence. In effect, the practice of thinking about the world as
unified made the world unified.110 Though the mind lacked the ability to translate the
sensory experience of the infinite (the noumenal) into a concept of infinity, it could
reflect on its own failure to integrate that experience as, itself, an object for cognition.
Individuals might not be able to conceive the infinite, but they could understand both that
the infinite existed and that they cannot conceive it. The aesthetic experience of the
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sublime made the incomprehensible legible as an opening toward the inconceivable
infinite.
In Kant’s philosophy, then, aesthetics served as the critical apparatus that freed
people from their contingency in time and space and connected them to the universal
good. Culture alone liberated individuals from the “despotism of their desires” and,
therefore, prepared them for “a lordship, in which Reason alone shall have authority.”
The beautiful arts and the sciences civilized them and trained them to subordinate their
immediate needs in the formation of civil communities, in which they could fully develop
their natural capacities. Though an imperfect system, a civil constitution created the order
necessary for individuals to cultivate themselves in the beautiful arts and sciences, and
citizens were obligated to obey the civil law in their various states so that civilization
might progress. Taken together, civil communities formed a cosmopolitan whole, a
system of states that co-existed perpetually on the verge of conflict, fomenting a
productive tension that spurred each community to develop “all talents serviceable for
culture.” Even when it incited war, Kant wrote, this tension reflected “a purposive
striving of nature to a cultivation which makes us receptive of higher purposes than
nature itself can supply.” Even disunity and social conflict became constructive in this
model because it compelled change. This entire structure worked progressively toward a
radical emancipation from the “tyranny of sense-propensions,” a transcendent departure
from the material world in which humanity collectively realized the ideal of perfection in
the dominion of pure reason.111
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In the work of the Jena Romantics, Bildungstreib shaped the conceptual
framework for the emancipatory philosophies that fermented in response to the French
Revolution. During the decade and a half from the Tennis Court oath through Napoleon’s
imperial march across Europe, Kant’s organic model engendered German idealism,
which viewed the world’s phenomena as the material incarnations of spiritual principles,
and germinated in German romanticism (romantisch), natural philosophy
(Naturphilosophie), and the synthetic “doctrine of science” (Wissenschaftslehre).112 In
that time, Jena’s illustrious ranks included the poet Novalis, Friedrich Schiller, Ernst
Arndt, Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Friedrich Hölderlin, the brothers Humboldt and Schlegel,
Clemens Brentano, Ludwig Tieck, Friedrich Joseph Schelling, and Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel.113 In the pages of their texts, these men fought the intellectual battles of
the French Revolution. They asked: did the revolution’s descent into chaos demonstrate
that the French people had not been prepared for sovereignty or that they were incapable
of exercising it? Did the Terror invalidate the republican position on universal suffrage
and political representation, or did this “monstrous birth” reflect that the French deviated
from the universal moral standard? Could the advocates of representative government
vindicate the people’s egalitarian and rational potential in the light of the overwhelming
evidence of their inadequacy?
These questions, viewed in the framework of Kant’s teleological biology, inspired
Schiller’s aesthetics, Fichte’s “ego,” and Schelling’s “self-legislation.” Individuals could
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not be made reasonable through mechanisms imposed externally; they must develop the
capacity for reason within themselves and create the internal structures for their
Bildunstreib to operate unimpeded. Given the proper conditions, individuals would be
able to penetrate through the world’s material epiphenomena and grasp the transcendental
reality of the ideal.114 In this schema, nations, governments, and their peculiar institutions
could be understood as the historically situated manifestations of the ideal world and,
potentially, the vehicles that moved individuals toward their transcendental future.
After the French Reign of Terror shattered the illusion of “enlightened” revolution
in 1793, Schiller wrote a series of letters to a sympathetic Danish prince in which he
vindicated the ideals of human liberty and equality in light of French excesses. In their
revolution and the Terror that followed, the French exposed the danger of treating the
political body like a machine with isolated parts, rather than a living organism. Instead of
evolving epigenetically upward, “this organization degenerated into a common and
coarse mechanism.” To artificially prolong the “miserable life” of this “abstract whole,”
the state extinguished the individual, reducing its citizens to numbers, set in a system of
classification that measured them by their utility to the state. The individual members of
this society, reduced to fragmentary cogs with “nothing in [their] ears but the
monotonous sound of the perpetually revolving wheel,” became deafened to the vital beat
of their common humanity. Their “darkened senses” trapped them in themselves; shut up
in their individuality, they could not transcend their material and temporal determinants.
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No wonder this society, when finally “set free,” collapsed into its elements. It contained
no men, only fettered fragments.115
Stirred by the democratic spirit of the age, Schiller recalled, people everywhere
strove for self-rule, but the French revolution demonstrated that democratic ideals could
not be imposed mechanically by the state, nor universally implemented. Rather, Schiller
argued, the state must be understood in light of Kant’s organic system. Like any
organism, “the state is an organization which fashions itself through itself and for itself,”
and it could only function “when the parts have been accorded to the idea of the whole.”
If they aimed to successfully refashion the state according to moral principles, then they
must first work a change at the individual level. Each member of the social body must
have the image (imagined object) of their totality fixed in their minds and integrated
sympathetically in their bodies. They must be conditioned by habit to sublimate their
particular needs in the service of their higher humanity, so that moral conduct became a
natural impulse for each constituent member of that society. The state could not establish
a “more perfect humanity,” Schiller concluded, but must instead be based on it.116
Two years later (1795), Schiller revised and released his 1793 letters in the
literary journal Die Horen (The Graces), which publicized his emancipatory program of
aesthetic education.117 Aesthetics, he argued, served a dual purpose in society. On the one
hand, it prepared individuals to ascend to the moral state; on the other, it prevented
physical society from breaking down, as France’s had, while the moral society gradually
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formed. In order for the people to evolve from their material state into moral beings,
Schiller clarified, they must first enter a transitionary phase, the aesthetic, which primed
them to be receptive to reason and truth.118 In the aesthetic, the soul passed from
sensation to thought, simultaneously activated by sensibility and reason, but free from
physical and moral constraint. In this province of “aesthetic liberty,” the “sensuous man”
obtained a state of disinterest, the ground of his moral life. As it had in Kant’s Critique,
aesthetics propagated man’s capacity for “rational liberty beyond the senses,” trained him
to exercise self-restraint over his inclinations, and taught him to elevate his desires
beyond his material interests. Ultimately, aesthetic education naturalized moral feeling: it
trained individuals to be free, and therefore moral.
In the imperfect state, aesthetic education served as a development and delivery
system for sensibility, training nervous associations through habituated response. For the
people to behave correctly, even though they lacked the objective faculty to understand or
legislate their own behavior, they must feel their duties. Their duties must occur
imminently in relation to their conditions. Aesthetic education trained the people’s
habituated responses to their nervous associations, so that they felt the right sensations
and reflexively responded correctly (sensibly) to their circumstances. Aesthetics refined
the individual’s constitution, establishing a stable principle that functioned as their
conscience and served as an internal check on their actions. Over time, they completely
internalized the law of reason, developing a “free constitution,” a disinterested common
sense that operated as an internal force, capable of judging the external impact of the
world on themselves. In the long run, these people would no longer need legislative
118
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organs to govern them because they would have become self-legislative. In the short
term, free individuals who joined to form a constitutional state would not suffer from
violent revolutions because their internal discipline prevented it.
The same year as Schiller published his letters, Kant issued a short philosophical
sketch stressing the importance of republican constitutions to rational freedom and world
peace. Citizens living under a republican form of government would rarely consent to go
to war, Kant claimed, because they would take into consideration its material and moral
cost. Despotic legislators, however, subject to different laws and conditions than their
constituents, did not bear the burdens of their wars and so would not hesitate to pursue it.
In moving “Toward Perpetual Peace,” Kant warned against conflating democracies with
truly representative systems. Republics, he professed, naturally and perpetually
propagated peace, but democracies tended toward despotism. Kant distinguished these
states by their constitutions, the “act of the general will through which the many persons
become one nation [volk],” which determined the mode and the method by which the
state administered its power over the people. In a representative government, the
constitution bound the legislators to the same laws they enacted and ensured the consent
of the governed in that legislation. The democratic mode of government, on the other
hand, generated a majoritarian autocracy that placed the general will in conflict with itself
and with freedom. Systematically, it socialized sovereignty, distributing the state’s
executive power to “all” of the people, who, as a body, were vested with the authority to
override the vote of its individual members. Though monarchies and aristocracies could
be reformed so that they embodied the spirit of representation, Kant wrote, “the

70
democratic mode of government makes this impossible, since everyone wishes to be
master.” Democracies could change, he granted, but only by “violent revolution.”119
Kant and the Jena philosophers presumed that all legitimate and self-sustaining
political states codified a natural organic form in which the state’s governing bodies
expressed the popular will. For Kant, the violence necessary to produce this kind of
representative government might be productive, but was never morally justified. In the
more radical formulation found in Friedrich Schlegel’s essay on republicanism, the
“deliberations and decisions of actual democratic bodies— the empirical realities—
constituted the only access we had to that noumenal entity, the general will of the
people.”120 Therefore, the people retained a right to revolution if their government
undermined the structures of deliberative democracy.
Similarly, Fichte argued that the “ultimate aim of all government,” was “to make
government superfluous.”121 Like Schiller, Fichte described political society as a means
to create the perfect society, but not an “absolute purpose” in itself. The political state
existed merely to provide the conditions for individuals to achieve a perfect unity with all
humanity through co-operation and reciprocal improvement. In Fichte’s epistemology,
the act of reflection that Kant described created an epigenetic ego: a transcendental selfconsciousness that continuously regenerated and perfected the self out of the seed of
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undifferentiated humanity implanted in the human mind.122 Recursively, he maintained,
the individual’s awareness of their own humanity operated as a moral imperative that
propelled them to improve the world, an epigenetic drive [Bildunstrieb] that drove them
to form communities in which they could pursue their ultimate purpose. Individuals
formed civil societies not out of fear (as Hobbes would have it), habit (Hume), or a
natural drive for self-preservation (Rousseau), but as a compulsive complement to their
own teleological progress. Ideally, societies embodied this ontological, dynamic, and
fundamentally organic formation—a “free reciprocal activity founded on ideas” and
“pervaded by design,” without which the individual remained incomplete. In fact, Fichte
maintained, human beings could only obtain absolute freedom after they had been
inculcated in the culture of morality by the state.123
Therefore, Fichte argued in “Foundations of Natural Right,” a government
remained lawful only insofar as it did not resist the “power of the people as a whole.”124
A state government that abrogated the popular will ceased to be a civil government. The
relationship, Fichte explained, could be understood as the same as the relationship
between the parts and the whole in an organic body. Like the human body, he argued, the
rational state existed for the sake of its parts; as an organized whole, it endured only as
the result of the “reciprocal interaction of organic forces” that maintained its
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equilibrium.125 The civil contract created an organically unified state comprised of a
community of free beings who voluntarily entered into an interdependent relationship
founded on their recognition of each individual’s personhood. The individual parts, each
operating according to their own Bildungstreib, continually produced themselves and, so,
continuously reproduced the whole.126 In its “natural institution,” which Fichte equated
with the legal realization of individual natural rights, the rational state provided its
individual members with the platform by which they could provisionally cultivate their
own humanity.127 “It is only within the unity of the state,” Fichte wrote, “that the human
being attains a particular place in the scheme of things.”128 In the case that the state
obstructed the organic Bildungstreib, the sovereign power devolved to the people who,
gathered in a convention, were then empowered to execute judgment against the
administers of public power.129
THE IMPERIAL AND NATIONAL SPECIES OF GOVERNMENT
In the midst of this intellectual ferment about the meaning of the French
Revolution, the French republic itself limped on, occasionally scrapping its constitution
to see if a more “controlled” system of democracy might better suit its populace. In
October 1795, the French formally established a constitutional republic, but the new
executive (the Directory) struggled to maintain balance between the resurgent royalists
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and the conventionnels (former Jacobins). The royalists, who dominated the 1797
elections, were only forestalled when the Directory arranged a military coup and then
deported them. The conventionnels exploited their advantage and prevailed in the 1798
elections, overcoming the Directory’s popular repression and political manipulation, but
the executive purged them soon after.130 In this system, French political theorist Antoine
Destutt de Tracy noted a decade later, there was “something wanting to the political
machine, in order that it may go regularly.” It had a “body for willing” and “a body for
executing that will,” but it required a body to “facilitate and regulate the action of the
other two,” to act as the “preserving power” of the republic and protect French society
from “constant hazard and violence.” After the 1799 Napoleonic coup that brought down
the Directory, the new French Consulate built a machinery of state designed to channel
and control the popular will. At the top, they established a “Sénat conservateur,” which
they entrusted with protecting the new constitution from democracy’s destructive
impulses.131 In this “conservative body,” Destutt de Tracy wrote, they completed the
organization of society.132
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Five years later, with the blessing of a democratic election, the Conservative
Senate crowned Napoleon the Emperor of France, a position that united the “conservative
principles of the interest of all” in a “government of one,” and the “strength of a
monarchy founded in a republic.”133 During Napoleon’s coronation on December 1,
1804, Senate president François de Neufchateau announced the birth of a new form of
government—the republican empire—an innovation in social science that combined the
elements of liberty, “that first of all moving principles,” with the “grand conservative
system” of nations, hereditary monarchy. Prior to this election, Neufchateau explained,
French patriots presumed that no medium existed between popular government and
monarchical regimes. With the revolution, they had attempted to create a chimera, an
organization that united the oppositional spirits of liberty and power (or authority) in the
same body. But the monstrous form nearly annihilated France. Powerless to stop the
popular torrent, patriotic republicans realized that they could not establish a proper
republic in a population “attached to monarchy by their wants, by instinct, and by the
force of a habit,” which nothing could overcome. A man of genius, like Napoleon, might
be able to create the illusion of democracy during his lifetime, shaping nature to his will,
but a single man could not transform the national character within a generation. Though
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“the chisel of a great artist forms at pleasure out of a block of marble either a tripod or a
god,” Neufchateau said, “the body of a nation cannot be modelled on the same principle.”
Like any living organism, it needed to develop gradually and it required a conservative
principle (“principe conservateur”) to ensure its internal harmony. Emperor Napoleon I
embodied this “principe conservateur” in the republic.134 As a democratically-elected
emperor, he lay the foundation for a stable and secure form of representative government,
implanting in France and its imperial states the “seeds” from which they would naturally
progress toward their “future perfection.”135
Still in the universalizing mode, however, Napoleon imposed the French order on
his “imperial family,” seeking to establish by force what did not already exist by nature.
The French model of statehood predicated sovereignty on systemic assimilation to their
heteronomous standard. In their republic, they had uncovered a perfect organization, a
living machine. Stability and security in their empire required that each state erect the
correct form of government, implemented with the apparatus necessary to secure the
corporate rights of its citizens, and the harmonious balance established by the Napoleonic
code. Under Napoleon’s direction, the French army fought an expansionist battle of
“liberation” across the continent (what their new tenants would call “conquest”),
enforcing social, cultural, and political uniformity on its formerly autonomous vassal
states.
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Napoleon’s homogenizing imperialism provoked the organic nationalist turn in
German philosophy. After the last Holy Roman Emperor capitulated to Napoleon and
Jena burned in 1806, Fichte and his contemporaries turned decisively against what they
perceived as the totalizing, mechanistic French state toward an ideal of a state built on the
organic associations that grew out of a people’s inborn and intransigent love of their
nation.136 In his Addresses to the German Nation (delivered in 1807 and 1808), Fichte
explained that the French and their copyists thought that they could break apart and
rebuild societies according to their specifications. Deeply rooted in the “mechanical view
of society,” they intended to construct a “clockwork pressure-machine,” engineered to
compel every part to serve the whole, but, first, they planned to “simplify the mechanism
by making all the parts of the machine as alike as possible and by treating them all as if
they were of the same material.”137 Standing over the corpses of the national bodies they
had conquered, the French ground together “all the germs of what is human in humanity,
in order to press the unresisting dough into some new form,” which Fichte described as a
“monstrous act of brutality… against the human race.” Misguided by their political
theory, the French proposed to spark the “living movement of society” from this
“condition of death” through their statecraft, but, Fichte observed, their theories were
inadequate to their task. A dead mechanism could not set a society’s reanimated corpse
along an epigenetic (self-perpetuating and self-regulating) path.138 Though the French
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system was serviceable to maintain humanity’s baser (sensuous) needs, it was a “fixed
and dead order,” incapable of revitalizing the “dead bones” of a “national body.” For a
perfect state to live—for the seed of human perfection to thrive—the political state was
not enough. It needed a vital spark: a living principle.
Fichte theorized a national Bildungstrieb, where the nation embodied the organic
state’s living principles, and operated as its formative drive. The national spirit, retained
in the nation’s original organs (its institutions, language, character, culture, and
economy), was the first and only element by which a fallen nation might rise to a new life
and the primary means for its preservation.139 The “love of the individual for his
nation”—the definition of “nationalism” in English at the time—was the love of the
eternal in the earthly realm.140 “Only when each people, left to itself, develops and forms
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itself in accordance with its own peculiar quality” as a nation, Fichte said, “only therein is
to be found the guarantee of their present and future worth, virtue, and merit.” Guided by
their national spirit, the people formed the “enduring and unshakable principles” that
governed their lives and thought as a corporate body. The nation’s peculiar forms and
qualities, its social structures and institutions, could not be imposed unilaterally; they
must grow organically from the nation’s living roots, which supplied the system’s “vital
impulse and action.” In turn, these organic expressions of the national spirit served as the
conduit for divine life in the national body, connecting it epigenetically to its “source of
original life.” Institutions “peculiar” to that society could not be disturbed or
compromised by outside forces without risking the entire system because they reflected a
metaphysical imperative expressed in the nation’s material institutions. The nation—that
community of feeling whose common history, common language, and common
development tied the people together in organic (natural, transcendental, and teleological)
unity—provided the ideal (natural) constitution for the state, while the civil constitution
existed solely to regulate that community.141
Both the German nationalist model and the French imperial system it criticized
advanced an organismic ontology of the state as a naturally developing living system to
which biological and physical rules applied.142 Because the organic model of state
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sovereignty relied on the vitalist concept of conservative formation, it had both
egalitarian and oppressive potential. The nature of a state’s conservative principles
depended on the Bildungstrieb encoded in its constitution at the time of its original
formation. In Fichte’s model, for example, the nation provided the living principle (or
Bildungstrieb) of an organic state and the Germans, in particular, carried within
themselves the power to manifest a republican future. But Fichte’s organic “nationalism”
represented just one genus of organic statehood (and one that remained the purview of
democratic and republican movements until the mid-nineteenth century.) Plus, Fichte
theorized an organic nation-state before its existence, while other state actors dealt with
pre-existing conditions. In autocratic states or constitutional monarchies, for example, the
organic structure would presumably reinforce established institutions and a hierarchical
social organization.
After the French Terror, the organic framework provided a schema for state actors
to control and restrain the over-active and over-excited body politic. Instead of abiding by
the rules and laws that governed machinery, societies seeking to survive the French
cataclysm looked to the impulses and principles that governed the body, the organic
catechism. The “mind” (or spirit), which served as the harmonizing faculty in the body,
was conceptually transformed into an organic theory of state in which the governing body
united the body’s disparate forces in sympathetic harmony, maintained their connection
to each other as a unified organism, and ensured the social body’s health and vitality
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through changing conditions. Different ages had different spirits, and different nations
had different conservative principles. Nations that adapted, prevailed.
Only in this framework could it make sense for an individual or group to assert
themselves or their doctrines as the “true conservatives” of the body politic. In this
context, the “conservative principle” reflected the fulfillment of an essential idea of the
nation in state form and the “conservative power” functioned recursively to protect and
preserve its organic system. “Every existing body has the right of self-preservation,”
Thomas Jefferson wrote in his 1811 translation of Destutt de Tracy, and “each species of
government” had its own “conservative principle” of action, located not in interest or
necessity, but in the “agents charged with conducting its concerns.”143 Jefferson’s
translation of and correspondence with Destutt de Tracy in the early nineteenth century
signaled the changes occurring in American political discourse that would eventually lead
Calhoun, among others, to declare himself a “conservative” in nineteenth century. When
Calhoun professed to be “a conservative in its broadest and fullest sense” in 1837, he
made a claim about the nature of a living system and his function in keeping it alive. That
he felt the need to clarify his position—that “because I am a conservative, I am a States
rights man”—signified a profound disagreement about what it meant to be a
“conservative” of this new political organism called the United States of America.144 The
next chapter will trace the trajectory by which different groups translated, interpreted, and
applied the “conservative principle” in the United States, the first step in clarifying the
contested terms of nineteenth-century American conservatism.
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CHAPTER 2: THE MEN THAT CALL THEMSELVES CONSERVATIVES
In the United States, the organic schema shaped the national conversation about
federal power and State rights, popular representation and popular sovereignty,
commercial progress and the institution of slavery. Like any living system, every society
had conservative principles that ensured its continued preservation, and conservative
powers that secured its “original principles” from “subversion” or “gradual decay.”145
The identity and character of these principles depended both on the nature of the system
and the spirit of the age, as well as the vantage point and personal politics of the person
or group naming them.146 Because the United States represented an unprecedented
political and social organism in the early nineteenth century, it generated a variety of
opinions as to what comprised its “conservative” principles and by what mechanisms and
institutions those principles functioned.147 Advocates of decentralized power, for
example, argued that the primary “conservative” function in this system was performed
by the States, which protected the people from ambitious and reactionary politicians.
Proponents of federal authority, on the other hand, located the state’s vital impetus in the
federal government, which, they argued, retained a “conservative power” to maintain the
constitution’s original principles in their purity and to “the benefit of the people,”
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especially against State power.148 To get at the dialectic nature of “conservative” and
organic thought in the early republic, this chapter will examine the development of
“conservative” discourse in the debates over Missouri’s constitution, during the extended
1824 presidential campaign, and in reaction to the perceived threat of imminent abolition
and slave-insurrection, which crystalized in a systematic and violent “Conservative”
suppression of abolitionists in the 1830s.
Characteristically, in the 1810s and 1820s, American statesmen connected their
claims about the country’s “conservative principles” to its revolutionary foundation in
liberty. Institutions that performed the conservative function in the United States, they
argued, should ensure the unimpeded operation of principles essential to a democratic
republic, like popular representation. In a free state, an organic constitution relied on the
free exercise of the franchise and the assurance of regular and representative elections; an
educated and intelligent public; and an active free press. Statesmen did not frame these
positions in a political vacuum, of course. Often, their self-described efforts to defend the
country’s organic establishment masked political or sectional motives. In the context of
the 1824 presidential contest, for example, southern anti-federalists urged a constitutional
amendment to preserve the popular nature of the country’s national institutions against
the “geographical formation of parties,” by which they indicated the political alliance
between northeastern capital and western protectionists that jeopardized their plantation
economy and the commercial viability of slavery. In this case, the “conservative
principle” of popular sovereignty was only endangered when the wrong party threatened
to win an election.
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In the South, the organic schema served as the basis of the nullification movement
in the late 1820s, in which southern statesmen asserted their “conservative right” to
defend the plantation economy against what they considered discriminatory
(geographically and systemically-biased) federal legislation. Nominally a response to
John Quincy Adams’s totalizing commercial policies (Henry Clay’s protectionist
American System and the tariff, in particular), nullification expressly aimed to protect the
institution of slavery against federal interference. Following Dr. Thomas Cooper—a
British expat whose position as president of South Carolina College made him an
influential figure in southern politics and whose pioneering work on metaphysics,
physiology, and political economy made him notorious on three continents—they
coalesced around the idea that the southern States formed their own separate national
bodies, each of which retained the right to secure their own organic civil, commercial,
and social structures against the “universal Yankee nation.”149 Discursively, the
nullification (and later State-rights) party replicated the dynamic of resistance against
French hegemony during the Napoleonic Era. To preserve their own organic bodies
against federal assimilation, they advanced the “conservative principle” of nullification.
Based in the essential law of self-preservation, nullification compelled States to reject
any federal law that damaged the State's healthy operation. The Nullifiers grounded this
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right on the “historical fact” that the States enacted the Constitution as “distinct and
separate bodies politic,” and not “the American People as a single community.” At the
height of the controversy over nullification, Calhoun rejected the “very idea of
an American People” as a “mere chimera,” arguing that “Such a community never, for a
single moment, existed” at any stage in the country’s development, either before or after
the Declaration of Independence.150
Because the organic framework encompassed all aspects of a society’s natural
organization, it opened the space for pro-slavery southerners to displace their advocacy of
slavery into the less provocative language of natural science, constitutional rights, and
political economy, which allowed them to forge alliances across the North-South divide.
Still, in every instance, southern arguments for organic sovereignty and the “original”
constitution served to preserve and advance the interests of slave-holders and the system
of slavery. When Calhoun referred to himself as a “conservative in its broadest and
fullest sense,” promising to “restore the Government to its original simplicity and purity,”
he implicitly equated the US Constitution with pro-slavery interests. By the mid-1830s,
southern States-rights advocates, northern anti-abolitionists, and northeastern merchant
capitalists briefly found common cause as “Conservatives ” who opposed Jacksonian
levelers and radical abolitionists. At the state level, they fomented violence against antislavery activists (in addition to dismantling their presses and supressing their literature) in
the name of “law and order” conservatism. At the national level, Calhoun’s State-rights
politicians joined with the “Conservative” Whigs in Congress to institue the first federal
gag on receiving anti-slavery petitions in the House, and the Senate “Conservatives”
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moved to place the postal service under State-jurisdiction, allowing the States to
determine which publications should cross their borders.
As conservatism became increasingly relevant in U.S. political discourse in the
1830s and ubiquitous in international discourse, critics in the United States and abroad
questioned what legitimate function “Conservatives” might have in American society or
whether conservatism could even operate as an ideology in a democratic republic.
Without the hereditary class distinctions and priestly orders that gave European
conservatism its raison d’etre, what did American “Conservatives” conserve? For that
matter, once they identified the fundamental elements in the American system, how
would they decide what forces and institutions would best perpetuate, preserve, and
protect those elements? What purpose would American conservatism serve? Of all of
these classes who, “arrogate to themselves the almost exclusive possession of the
conservative spirit,” the Christian Spectator asked, “Who are the True Conservatives?”151
A HARMONIOUS BALANCE
From his perspective, Jefferson had written to Destutt de Tracy in 1811, the
United States possessed the “wisest Conservative power” against the destruction of
liberty “ever contrived by man” in its State-governments. He described the States as
“regularly organized,” but internally independent in their administrations, with
legislatures and executives freely chosen by a population informed by a free press. In the
case that a State voluntarily submitted to a single man’s usurpation, Jefferson wrote,
alluding to Napoleon, the citizens of the other States would “rise up on every side” and
take him down. By this arrangement, the states prevented their country’s citizens from
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destroying their own liberty. Yet, as Calhoun would later note, every system had within
itself “the seeds of its own destruction,” and, in his correspondence with Destutt de
Tracy, Jefferson anticipated that the same “Conservative power” that ensured “the safety
of the public liberty” in the United States might ultimately imperil their Union.152
In the organization of the U.S., the State-governments played an essential (and,
some would argue, primary) role in protecting civil liberties, but State autonomy and
heterogeneity introduced instability at the federal level, threatening national cohesion
and, by extension, the country’s viability. In its otherwise “perfect and distinct
organization,” Jefferson acknowledged, the United States remained vulnerable to the
danger of State secession. But Jefferson dismissed this outcome as improbable. If local
discontents reached a majority in a State, he wrote, the electoral system transfigured them
into the controlling power of the regular government, where they could redress their
grievances peacefully and constitutionally. In the unlikely event that they successfully
fermented their disaffection at the State-level, this group would be “paralysed and selfchecked” by the habitual censorship that political parties exercised over one another in all
states where men had the liberty “to think, speak, & act freely, according to the
diversities of their individual conformations.” In fact, though the State-governments acted
as a perpetual check on the “liberticide views” of ambitious individuals, Jefferson
admitted, these ceaseless party permutations might themselves prove to be “essential to
preserve the purity of the government.” In effect, he implied, given the danger of
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secession (however remote), the partisan divisions endemic to any free society acted as
the real conservative principle of these United States.
As the United States extended its territory over an expansive geography during
the following decades, and on behalf of an increasingly diverse population, its
representatives, reformers, and political theorists reiterated Jefferson’s concern that the
country’s strength as a union of States might ultimately prove to be a liability. Like
Hume, Cheney, Blumenbach, and Buffon, they assumed that regional, climatic, and
geographic differences, alongside permanent inequalities of property, compounded the
other factors that led groups in the same society to develop incompatible habits,
institutions, and principles. Because it propagated heterogeneity between the States,
geographic extension amplified the States’ centrifugal force, increasing the likelihood of
separation. In a country that already boasted two distinct commercial systems (the
mercantile North and the plantation South), it seemed only a matter of time before “all
the American communities which compose the United States” declared themselves
incompatible.153
As early as 1820, Connecticut Governor Oliver Wolcott suggested that slavery
had already generated a “diversity of habits and principles of government” that threatened
the “natural equality which would otherwise exist between the states, and also between
all free citizens.” After the Missouri Compromise passed in the Spring of 1820, following
an extensive debate in the national legislature over the territorial extension of slavery,
Wolcott warned that “slavery is gradually forming those distinctions, which, according to
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invariable laws of human action, constitute the characteristic difference between
artistocratical and democratical republics.”154 In spite of the defensive claims made by
slaveholders, Wolcott argued that a system which relied on slave labor inevitably
replicated the hierarchies of proprietorship and penury characteristic of aristocracies. In
effect, this dynamic also inhibited “agricultural emigration” from the free States, whose
citizens had been habituated to enjoy certain political privileges and bridled at the
constraints on their liberty that living in a slave State implicitly required. While federal
law might restrain Congress from disturbing slavery in the States that had already
established it, he declaimed, the constitution also imposed on Congress an active duty to
defend “the great principles of the revolution, upon which our union depends.” Vitally, he
argued, the constitution guaranteed the States and their populations a republican form of
government—not the establishment of republics “in “form” only,” but a promise to
“render civil liberty immortal” in the perpetuation of their “free and mild institutions,”
which the institution of slavery clearly subverted. To fulfill its obligations and preserve
the union, Wolcott asserted, the constitution vested a “conservative power” in Congress
over all of the States to “protect the people against the masked batteries of aristocracy,”
to safeguard the rights of its “agriculturalists,” and, therefore, “to inhibit the further
diffusion of slavery” to new States.155 States might act as a conservative power against
individual ambition, as Jefferson had suggested, but Wolcott insisted that the national
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government guarded the people’s civil liberties against the powerful commercial interests
that controlled the States.156
It was also apparent in 1820 that commercial considerations trumped both State
and federal legislatures’ willingness to protect their residents’ civil liberties—at least
where race was concerned. When Missouri officially applied for statehood in late 1820,
its proposed constitution went beyond the structural prohibitions for entry that Wolcott
feared for his agricultural constituents and included an explicit provision proscribing free
people of color from entering the State.157 Pro-slavery representatives defended the clause
according to the constitutionality of State quarantine laws. Every State retained the right
to bar persons carrying “infectious diseases” from entering their borders, Virginia
representative Alexander Smyth observed during the House debate. Their “right of selfpreservation” conferred this “right of exclusion.” No one would deny that “a State might
exclude citizens of other States, for contagious disease, by quarantine regulations,” his
colleague, William S. Archer (VA) confirmed, or the State’s capacity to reject anyone
else that might otherwise endanger its population or contribute to their moral
degeneration. In this category, Archer included paupers, criminals, and, most of all, free
people of color, whom he did not consider capable of being safely absorbed into the
organic community. Smyth redoubled this argument by including “free negroes” in the
category of exclusion that covered “Indians, born in the States,” who were nonetheless
alienated from the political community. “A savage cannot be a member of a civilized
community; he is incapable of exercising political rights; and nature seems to have made
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the negro a perpetual alien to the white man,” Smyth declared, “Slaves are aliens.
Alienage was the first foundation slavery. Citizenship belongs to the civilized free man.”
Unable to resolve the question of whether Missouri had the right to exclude free people
of color who enjoyed (increasingly conscribed) citizenship rights in the other States, the
House shunted the bill to a committee under the watchful eye of House Speaker Henry
Clay. Clay’s committee resolved that the wording of Missouri’s constitution “shall never
be construed to authorize the passage of any law” that violated the federal constitution’s
privileges-and-immunities clause. Congress officially concluded the Missouri crisis on
February 26, 1821, when it confirmed its admission into the Union without restriction
(except for Clay’s conditional clause.) As historian Robert Pierce Forbes has noted,
Clay’s legislative compromise effectively presumed that people of color could not be
citizens, and set the precedent for States to enact prejudicial laws under the cover of
health regulations.158
During this three-month-long controversy over Missouri’s constitution,
southerners and south-westerners repeatedly raised the spectre of secession, confirming
Thomas Jefferson’s conviction that local prejudice, projected onto national politics,
would rupture the Union. Ten years earlier, Jefferson had described the Stategovernments to Destutt de Tracy as the “wisest Conservative power ever contrived by
man” on the condition that party-politics kept sectional discontent in check. So long as
each State was divided into parties, he had argued, their necessary electoral calculus
would operate as a censor on partisan extremists. After Congress had rejected Missouri’s
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constitution in December 1821, however, Jefferson judged that the northeastern
politicization of slavery had finally tipped the balance in favor of geographical party
lines. In an effort to convince his long-time ally Albert Gallatin to intercede with
Pennsylvania’s representatives on Missouri’s behalf, he argued that the Northeast’s
determination to demonize slavery and marginalize slaveholders represented a Federalist
(i.e., Tory) ruse to revive their party and recapture the federal government from the
Republicans (i.e., the Whigs). Unlike the old Tory-Whig division, however, this new
geographical division of power posed an existential threat to southern “whites,” which
would ultimately force them to secede to survive.159 On the question of slavery, Jefferson
wrote to John Adams in January 1821, “The inquisition of public opinion overwhelms in
practice, the freedom asserted by the laws in theory.” The northeastern “Holy Alliance”
intended to restrict southern liberty (to move with their slaves wherever they pleased) just
like its European analog restricted liberty on the continent. Given the numerical
dominance of the northern and eastern States and the sway that geographical division
held over public opinion, Jefferson worried that Congress might seize the power to
“regulate the conditions of the inhabitants of the States, within the States,” which meant
that they would have the power to emancipate the slaves. A long-standing colonizationist,
Jefferson was convinced that an internal population of recently-freed slaves posed an
imminent danger to the States in which they lived. From the perspective of the “States
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afflicted with this unfortunate population,” Jefferson insisted, the “real question” was:
“are our slaves to be presented with freedom and a dagger?”160
Jefferson also used the sectional anxiety that Missouri inspired to pressure
Virginia’s recalcitrant legislature into funding his university. Writing to James
Breckenridge and Joseph Carrington Cabell, both of whom sat on the University of
Virginia’s Board of Visitors and served in Virginia’s House and Senate (respectively),
Jefferson warned that the Missouri compromise marked out a “line of division” between
“different portions” of the confederacy that would never be obliterated. Yet, the
predominance of northern universities forced southerners to trust “those who are against
us in position and principle, to fashion to their own form the minds & affections of our
youth.” Virginia’s sons made up more than half of Princeton’s enrollment and a countless
proportion of Harvard’s student body. These boys would “return home, no doubt, deeply
impressed with the sacred principles of our Holy Alliance of [slavery] restrictionists.”161
For the privilege of alienating their own children, Jefferson noted, they paid hundreds of
thousands of dollars a year to these northern universities, where their sons imbibed
“opinions and principles in discord with those of their own country.” This “canker” was
“eating on the vitals of our existence,” Jefferson wrote, “and if not arrested at once will
be beyond remedy.”162 Whereas Jefferson had once advocated for federally-funded
national education, then, he now endorsed State-institutions. By endowing their own
prestigious university, Virginia would fulfill its duty to educate its own sons under the
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“luminous tuition” of their home country, from which they might rise to manifest
“destinies of high promise.” The bad blood engendered by Missouri’s contested entry
may have irrevocably tainted the national organization, Jefferson indicated, but the
southern States could protect themselves by strengthening their native institutions and
reclaiming control of their children’s education.
The formal demise of the partisan system in the early 1820s compounded
Jefferson’s anxiety that US politics would be reduced to a division between the
“Northernmost” and “Southernmost” candidates, sparking another one of those
“geographical schisms” that drove the States irresistibly toward separation. With the
Federalist party professedly dead and buried, everyone appeared to unite behind
republican principles, but Thomas Jefferson knew better. Despite the false impression
conveyed by the deluded US press, Jefferson wrote to Lafayette in November 1823, the
party system itself had not collapsed. The “name [Federalist] alone is changed,” Jefferson
reported, but “the principles are the same.” In truth, Jefferson wrote, “the parties of Whig
and Tory are those of nature, they exist in all countries, whether called by these names, or
by those of Aristocrats and democrats, coté droite or coté gauche, Ultras or Radicals,
Serviles or Liberals. [T]he sickly weakly, timid man fears the people, and is a tory by
nature. [T]he healthy strong and bold cherishes them, and is formed a whig by nature.”
These men would be true to their natures, regardless of their outward designations. Still,
Jefferson fretted, the illusion of single-party politics gave the “tories” cover to call
themselves “republican” as they consolidated power, pursuing a “geographical division
of parties” so that they might win the 1824 presidential election. Jefferson recalled how
the “coté droite” [right side], led by John Quincy Adams, had agitated on the Missouri
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question in 1820 for this very purpose, and how the “people of the North went blindfold
into the snare,” only belatedly realizing that “they had been used merely as tools for
electioneering purposes,” “injuring instead of aiding the real interests of the slaves.”
Enervated by similar tactics in advance of the 1824 presidential election, Jefferson
warned his correspondents that corrupt politicians, running under the banner of the
“republican” party, threatened to hijack the election for their own aristocratic and
commercial gain. Four different candidates would compete as “republicans” in the
upcoming election—William H. Crawford, John Quincy Adams, Andrew Jackson, and
John C. Calhoun—but “reflecting men” should not be deceived by the nominal lapse in
partisan politics; rather, they must separate the true “republicans” from their “tory”
pretenders.163
THE POPULAR CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLE
Facing the possibility of another Adams presidency, John Quincy Adams’s
opposition in Congress mobilized around the idea that the present system reinforced the
dangerous sectionalism against which Jefferson had warned. The elective process
featured a party caucus to choose a nominee and an inclination toward a general ticket for
the election, which effectively sacrificed popular representation in favor of an entrenched
political elite.164 Each State under the general ticket system operated as a single unit, by
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which all of a State’s votes went to a single candidate, instead of reflecting the more
heterogeneous distribution that might be indicated by the popular vote.165 If the States
operated as voting blocks, suppressing the minority vote within their State, then they
became alienated from each-other and fell into sectional and regional alliances.
When the Eighteenth U.S. Congress opened in December 1823, Calhoun-advocate
and South Carolina congressman George McDuffie proposed a constitutional amendment
to ensure that the popular will pervaded and sustained the machinery of government,
starting with the presidency. In the Senate, he was joined by other men who identified
their own politics with popular principles—Thomas Hart Benton (of Missouri), Mahlon
Dickerson (of NJ), and Martin Van Buren (of NY)—each of whom proposed variations
on McDuffie’s constitutional amendment in the Senate. McDuffie and other critics of the
caucus system generally considered themselves political outsiders, who assumed that
insiders rigged the system, since they took for granted that their own favored candidate or
personal friends would monopolize the popular vote in a fair election, and, therefore,
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could only lose as the result of political manipulation and corruption.166 In his
correspondence with Calhoun, whom he was convinced had cornered the popular vote for
the presidential nomination, McDuffie suggested that the structure of national elections
systematically severed public opinion from national politics, breaking down the
“conservative principle” of representative governments.167 Only a popular reformation of
electoral politics could remedy this dangerous defect in their political organization.
In December 1823, the House appointed a select committee to judge the propriety
of a constitutional amendment with George McDuffie at its head.168 In the absence of a
uniform system of election, McDuffie reported at the end of the month, an “artificial and
complicated machinery” had been erected to “filtrate the popular will, in order to purify
and enlighten it.”169 Modern European states required these kinds of checks on the
popular will, he explained, because their people were inadequate to the task of selfgovernment. The European social and legal system—feudal in origin and constructed on
feudal principles—generated a “permanent inequality of property,” which “naturally
produced the extremes of proud aristocracy and degraded populace, without any
166
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intermediate power sufficient to control their irregular tendencies.”170 In this system,
McDuffie acquiesced, a popular election could only result in anarchy and ruin. In the
United States, on the other hand, nearly the entire population corresponded with Europe’s
enlightened middle class. In this context, extending the elective system did “nothing more
than adapt our political to our social system.”171 To bring American politics up to speed,
McDuffie proposed two constitutional amendments: the first, that Congress sub-divide
the States into electoral districts to “infuse more of the Democratic principle” into
national elections and, second, that these districts also determine congressional
representation.172
McDuffie contended that a statesman’s “responsibility to the people” furnished
“the only adequate security for freedom, the great conservative principle of a
representative government.”173 Without this “essential function of popular sovereignty,”
McDuffie predicted, “cabals of politicians,” alienated from the people’s views and
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interests, would eventually control national elections. Reflecting on the present political
situation, McDuffie observed, “we need not the prophetic spirit of Washington to warn
us” that the country’s tendency toward a “geographical formation of parties” would
inevitably destroy the Union’s harmony and endanger its existence.174 Once the “citizens
of this Republic” no longer considered themselves “one people”—born to a “common
inheritance, purchased by the toils, the sacrifices, and the blood of their common
ancestors,” and “united by the ties of common sympathy and kindred feeling”—they
made themselves fodder for political jackals, who would manipulate their artificial
discord in order to consolidate power over them. In the place of public representatives
who affectively connected to the communities they served, the people would find
themselves ruled by a “succession of factions,” with each faction “proscribing the
members and destroying the work” of the faction that preceded it.175
Though the House tabled McDuffie’s amendment a month after his report, the
divisive 1824 presidential election kept the question of “conservative” popular reform
alive. Without these “federo-republican” constitutional amendments, Jefferson cautioned
his friends, “large fragments” of the people would break off from the political body,
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possibly by force.176 Like other “old republicans,” Jefferson had become convinced
during the eighteenth congressional session that the manufacturing interests and the
“consolidationists” (representatives who favored a broad construction of the constitution
and a strong central government) had conspired to subvert the popular will in Congress,
eking out majorities on the tariff, for example, that would have revolted a “great portion
of the people of the states,” had it been exposed to public opinion.177 Responding to one
of Jefferson’s missives, former Attorney General Richard Rush (then serving as the US
Minister to the United Kingdom) expressed confidence that the country’s democratic
system “carries within itself the conservative principle, so that if a bad choice be made at
this election, a few years will bring the people back again to principles that have been
found safe, and to men who are best identified with them.”178
In December 1824, the presidential contest ended in electoral stalemate and the
choice of president devolved on the House. When Henry Clay gifted his votes to John
Quincy Adams in return for political patronage the following February, he
simultaneously secured Adams the presidency and confirmed to his opposition that their
elective process effectively cut off the voice of the people, counteracting the putative
conservative principle of representative government. The outrage at the outcome was
general, but Calhoun loyalists were the most evocative and proactive in their reactions.
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On the floor of the House, McDuffie argued that the current system “literally” immolated
the people at the “shrine of an ideal phantom,” sacrificing the “fundamental principles of
the Republican system” to the “elusive and mistaken idea of preserving the rights of the
States” under the general ticket system.179 This scheme “infallibly introduced corruption
and death into our political Eden;” having contaminated Congress, it assailed liberty in
the “very seat of its vitality.”180
On the first day that the Nineteenth Congress addressed new business (December
9, 1825), McDuffie reintroduced the constitutional amendment that the last Congress had
tabled.181 When the House finally got around to debating it the following February, he
urged his colleagues to treat the disease of political corruption immediately:
We are admonished by the experience of Nations, that if we would resist
corruption effectually, it must be done in the incipient stages of degeneracy. No
nation ever has been seen to retrace her steps after having fairly and fully
commenced the downward march. The tide of corruption never flows backwards.
If once the fatal poison is infused into a vital part of the system, nothing is left to
us but to await the issue with melancholy resignation.182
The “responsibility of public functionaries to the People,” McDuffie reiterated, was the
“great conservative principle” that pervaded and sustained the US government. Like the
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“principle which sustains the harmony of the material universe,” McDuffie explained,
this representative principle acted as the “gravitation of our political system,”
harmonizing liberty and power. Without an effective mechanism for elective
responsibility, the “body politic” suffered from a “general paralysis,” exciting a “morbid
action” in its parts. Without a galvanizing popular investment in the presidential election,
the people lost their motivation to care about public affairs, sinking into a fatal
indifference that spelled “death” for American liberty. “The general patriotic excitement
of the people, in relation to the election of the president, is as essential to the health and
energy of the political system, as the circulation of blood is to the health and energy of
the natural body,” McDuffie advised, “Check that circulation and you inevitably produce
local inflammation, gangrene, and ultimately death.”183
In addition to reviving the debate over the district system, therefore, McDuffie’s
renewed amendment resolved that the people should determine the outcome of a failed
presidential election, rather than the House of Representatives. This recursive act of
popular will simultaneously reinforced the “conservative principle” of “elective
responsibility” and re-invested the American people in the outcome of their elections.184
Individuals and nations attained a moral elevation proportionate to the “magnitude of
their efforts” and the “disinterested magnanimity of the impulse under which they act,”
McDuffie said, but the American people tended toward popular apathy, a national evil
exacerbated by their idolatry of wealth and their inclination to worship liberty only in the
form of property.185 To attain their high political destiny, then, the people must first be
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“trained and educated to freedom” through the act of voting. As the world’s “last hope,”
McDuffie concluded, Congress had an obligation to humanity to preserve their system of
Government “in its purity” by adopting his amendments, protecting their liberty as a
“vestal fire” never to be extinguished. Only the constitutional promise of popular national
elections secured and perpetuated the true principles of American liberty.186
According to Virginia representative John S. Barbour, who had shifted his
allegiance to Calhoun after the election, popular reform was the “natural offspring” of the
agitations that shook the “public heart” during the prior election. In a republic, he said,
the judgment, passions, and interests of men acted as “moral agents,” which, “aided by
the lights of progressive intellect,” gave impulse to the “public mind” to improve the
defective parts of the national superstructure before its “political evils” grew “inveterate”
and became “incurable.” Like the contest of 1800, he said, the 1824 election “rent
asunder the veil of the Constitution, and exposed to public gaze its weakness and
deformity.” It proved, beyond doubt, that the Constitution failed to provide its “own
inherent means for continued existence,” the “essential principle of self-preservation” in
a representative government that protected the sovereign will from encroachment and
displacement. Without the necessary power to create and protect its own “essential
organs,” he cautioned, their political system could not be considered safe. Congress must
act on these amendments before the “germ” of corruption in the Constitution poisoned
the Republic, leaving a “diseased and debilitated” Government expiring from
“complicated miseries” in “some distant age.”187
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During the protracted debate, a small group of Adams-supporters noted the irony
that those congressmen who purported to support popular rights in the form of these
amendments all hailed from slave States.188 Though these men seemed eager to “extend
and enlarge popular rights” in the House, New Hampshire representative Thomas
Whipple observed, they still clung to the “great conservative power” of the Senate “as the
ark of their political safety” because it sustained their local interests and checked
“encroachments by the free states” against slavery, “should they be disposed to make
them.”189 In fact, he noted, McDuffie’s amendment kept intact the proportional difference
in representation between the slave and free States, effectively amplifying the southern
voice in the case of another failed presidential election.190 In refusing to redress the three-
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fifths rule, these measures increased the political power of slave-holders at the expense of
freemen.191 Slavery, Whipple said, “is a disease which has “grown with our growth and
strengthened with our strength”,” but it “should not be irritated and aggravated by the
rash hands and nostrums of political Charletans [sic]” willing to exploit public passion
for their own cynical ends. If they were truly interested in creating a “more perfect
symmetry” in the US Constitution, New Hampshire representative Ichabod Bartlett
remarked, the advocates of these measures would not have proposed a “partial remedy”
to the problem of political representation. Rather, he argued, they clearly intended to
silence the spectre of dissent over slavery: to “check the fountains, that the nervous
sensibility of the hypochondriac [the slave-owner] may not be disturbed by the murmur
of the rivulet.”192 In a reversal of McDuffie’s argument, Bartlett warned that these
proposed changes to the constitution would create a “dead political calm,” indeed, an
“indifferent lethargy, which precedes the sleep of death.”193
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OBSTA PRINCIPIIS (RESIST THE BEGINNINGS)
Slavery had never been far from the surface of debate in any period, but the
election of a president expressly hostile to the institution (and the first president not to
own slaves since the elder John Adams) exacerbated these tensions, as did Adams’s
declared intention to join the Panama Congress, which included South American states
that had recently moved to end slavery and aimed to discuss controversial topics such as
the slave trade and the condition of Haiti, Cuba, and Puerto Rico.194 In late December
1825, Adams formally submitted a list of nominees to attend the conference: John
Sergeant of Pennsylvania (a long-standing member of the “Pennsylvania Society for
Promoting the Abolition of Slavery, the relief of free negroes unlawfully held in bondage,
and for improving the condition of the African race,” and notorious in Congress for his
opposition to slavery) and the US Minister to Gran Colombia, Richard Clough Anderson,
Jr., a lawyer and politician from a slaveholding family in Kentucky, who nonetheless
publically endorsed the notion that agricultural societies benefitted from excluding
slavery. While the Senate Foreign Relations Committee chawed over this delicate matter
in conclave, the infamously indelicate Virginia senator John Randolph submitted a
motion requesting that the president provide intelligence on the “principles and practice
194
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of the Spanish American States,” relating to “Negro slavery.”195 Randolph’s motion and
subsequent soliloquy on the “character and color” of the South American body politic
ignited a conversation over the “character and color” of the North American body politic,
which trickled into the concurrent debates over McDuffie’s amendments in the House.196
Before the United States entered into “Congress” with the Spanish American
“Confederation,” Randolph declared, the Senate must be informed which of these South
American States explicitly endorsed the “black crusade” for abolition. The threat of
abolition struck a chord in the bosom of every southerner, Randolph said, and vibrated
“the heart of every man in our country.” Slavery was a disease, “a cancer in your face”
that could not be hidden, but it “must not be tampered with by quacks, who never saw the
disease or the patient, and prescribe across the Atlantic.” The “nostrum” of abolition
thrived in the physical and moral atmosphere of London—where the “pulse of life is so
habitually stimulated”—but it would “shake the nerves of such as are not used to it.” In
the atmosphere of this country, abolition acted as a medicinal poison, not a cure. Rather,
the disease of slavery must be allowed to “run its course” in the South as it had in the
North, Randolph prescribed, dying a “natural death” when it ceased to be profitable.197 In
contrast with New Hampshire’s Thomas Whipple, then, who had described slavery as a
disease that threatened the entire republic, Randolph limited both its treatment and its
impact to the States in which it continued to operate, insinuating that those States

195

"Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 113
Randolph’s motion and harangue took place in the middle of the debate over McDuffie’s amendment: he
submitted his request on March 1 and expounded on it the following day. In the chronology of this chapter,
it occurred after McDuffie defended his amendment and before Barbour, Whipple, and Bartlett spoke. Most
of the speeches given after Randolph’s infamous Senate address alluded to its race politics in some way.
197
"Nineteenth Congress..First Session." Register of Debates in Congress 2 (1826): 117, 118, 121, 129130.
196

107
constituted discrete organic communities into which the federal government and the other
States had no right to intrude.
Holding up a volume of Edmund Burke’s works, and quoting liberally from his
1792 speech on the Unitarians, Randolph cautioned his colleagues on the “small danger”
of ignoring their States’ peculiar circumstances and governing themselves, instead, “by
abstractions and universals.” In accepting this invitation and opening diplomatic relations
with the Spanish American States, Randolph announced, the president openly allied
himself with a group of men committed to the “genius of universal emancipation,” an
abstraction anathema to a “white population” and implicitly threatening to a country with
a “large Negro population.” If the Executive Office pursued this course and the Senate
endorsed it, Randolph said, he could not predict whether the “blacks shall be turned into
whites, or the whites into blacks, the slaves into masters, or the masters into slaves.” But
he was convinced that it would be the first step in an irreversible course ending in
tragedy. As the French had made use of “liberté, egalité, fraternité” to bludgeon the world
into submission two decades earlier, these South American States would wield abolition
as an “instrument of revolution and conquest.” In fact, he argued, their principles dictated
that they pursue a proxy war with Cuba as a means to force universal emancipation on the
United States. And when the Spanish American States invaded Cuba, Randolph asked,
“what is the situation of the Southern States?”198
Content to play the Cassandra (so he said), he cried out to the Senate, “obsta
principiis.” This popular reference to Ovid’s Remedia Amoris, commonly used in medical
discourse, read in full: resist the beginnings, the medicine is prepared too late when the
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malady has become entrenched.199 Once the Senate contracted this “black alliance,” he
warned, it would be too late. They will have opened their door to the South Americans,
who would cross the borders from Cuba and Mexico with their “proclamation of negro
emancipation in the van,” setting the slaves to cutting their master’s throats, “by way of
making allies of them” and “effectually invading and conquering the country.” In this
eventuality, he concluded, the Southern States must act for their own self-preservation,
regardless of “whatever the ink and sheepskin” of the Constitution might say “or be made
to say” and “whatever Congress may decree.” As “self-preservation is in individuals the
first law of nature,” Randolph quoted Burke, “so it is with societies.”200
Following immediately on Randolph’s heels, South Carolina senator Robert
Hayne left no room for ambiguity.201 In the event that a crisis arose involving the
“peculiar interests of the Southern States,” questioning their “policy” (slavery), or
endangering their safety, he proclaimed, the Senate should not doubt that the whole South
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will act and “will be as one man.”202 For now, he acceded, the Southern States would be
content if the Senate simply postponed the resolution.
In what some consider the sole congressional coup of his administration, John
Quincy Adams sent his chosen representatives to the Panama Congress, but the
opposition’s delaying tactics ultimately triumphed. By the time that the House approved
the cost of sending Sergeant and Anderson to Panama, reports of a yellow fever epidemic
(also known as the “black vomit” disease) stalled Sergeant’s departure.203 Anderson,
already en route, contracted the disease and died before reaching his destination. When
Sergeant finally arrived in Panama the following year, the South American Congress had
already dissolved.
McDuffie’s amendment, meanwhile, suffered a similarly anti-climactic fate. Twothirds of the House approved of the first part of the amendment (preventing the
presidential election from devolving on Congress, again), but evenly split on the part
pertaining to the district system and it failed to pass by a slim margin.204 On May 8, the
Senate briefly considered the surviving portion of the amendment. In a succinct
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statement, Van Buren confirmed that a change to the mode of election was indispensable
to “preserve the purity of the system,” and to “restore the balance of power among the
States.” He hoped that the “all-powerful agency” of public sentiment on this point would
be able to carry the next election with it. In the meantime, on Thomas Hart Benton’s
motion, they swiftly tabled the resolution.205 Having served its purpose in consolidating
Adams’s opposition in the House, electoral reform could be dealt with at some future
date.
On the issues raised in these debates—slavery, popular representation, and
“balanced” government— Martin Van Buren established the foundations for a political
movement coherent enough to unseat John Quincy Adams and to dominate the next thirty
years of American politics.206 As soon as Adams had made his intentions regarding
Panama clear, Van Buren visited Vice President Calhoun at his home to suss out his
attitude toward the administration’s course of action and, thereby, to gauge his
willingness to act against them.207 Finding Calhoun similarly hostile to the administration
he served, Van Buren set out to unite the rest of Adams’s opposition, a challenge that
Adams’s political misadventures made easy. By the end of the session, Van Buren had
determined that Andrew Jackson, alone, had a broad enough appeal to align the country’s
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disparate forces behind a single candidate.208 Though Jackson had resigned his Senate
seat in October 1825, before the second Congressional session met, he had impressed
Van Buren with his political acumen and personal charisma when the two sat near each
other during the prior session. In the course of his time in Washington, Jackson had also
attracted the support of other influential politicians, including his former aide-de-camp
Thomas Hart Benton, now a junior senator and a rising force in Missouri politics, who
had bloodied him in a duel a decade earlier. Over the summer, Calhoun also made clear
his intentions to join Jackson’s camp for the next presidential election. When Congress
reconvened the following December, Van Buren again parleyed with Calhoun,
committing his band of Crawford-supporters and his own considerable political prowess
to resurrecting the country’s “natural” party distinctions and, thereby, to electing Andrew
Jackson.
Capitalizing on the traction he gained in the first congressional session, Van
Buren set out to generate support in vulnerable States. He recruited Thomas Ritchie, who
ran both the Richmond Enquirer and the Richmond Junto in Virginia politics, and laid
the groundwork for a New York-Virginia alliance based on “old party feelings.” In his
opening salvo to Ritchie in January 1827, Van Buren proposed they form a combination
between the “planters of the South and the plain Republicans of the North.”209 Echoing
Thomas Jefferson, who had died six months earlier, Van Buren wrote, “We must always
have party distinctions” because they generated an “antidote” to sectional prejudice “by
producing counteracting feelings.” Unless they proactively resurrected the old party
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attachments, he warned, “geographical divisions founded on local interests or, what is
worse, prejudices between free and slaveholding states,” would inevitably fill the
political vacuum. In the absence of trans-sectional party affiliations, the “clamour against
Southern influence and African Slavery” would remain an effective political tool in the
North.210 Influential New Hampshire editor Isaac Hill and the dynamic Kentucky
journalist-politicians Amos Kendall and Francis P. Blair (editors of the Argus of Western
America) soon joined Ritchie’s Enquirer and Duff Green’s national United Telegraph in
sounding the call for a party devoted to “principles, and not men.” Propelled by Southern
paranoia, Northern political discontent, and Western disillusionment with the corrupt
politics of Adams and Clay, the new party rallied under the dissoluble platform of
“Jackson and Reform.”211
On the strength of this proliferating print network, Jackson’s party swept the
national elections in 1827, taking both the House and the Senate.212 This political coup
allowed them to tailor the congressional agenda so that it promoted Jackson’s candidacy
and undercut Adams. Based on their projections, Jackson supporters monopolized the
South and, in spite of Isaac Hill’s heroic efforts, he was not likely to make headway in
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the northeast.213 But the mid-west and the mid-Atlantic remained up for grabs and one
issue united them: economic protection.
As northern industry and western agriculture expanded in the 1820s, protective
policies had become increasingly popular. In the last congressional session (which ran
December 1826 through March 1827), the Adams-dominant House had crafted an
imports bill that appealed to western protectionists, but primarily catered to Adams’s
stronghold among commercial interests in the northeast. That bill passed the House in
early February 1827, but failed to pass the Senate when South Carolina senator Hayne
moved to table the bill and Vice President Calhoun cast his tie-breaking vote in the
affirmative.214 Once Congress closed its doors for the summer, Adams’s surrogate in the
West, Henry Clay, concentrated his stump speeches on his party’s protectionist policies,
namely the protective tariff, which was also the focus of a national convention held in
Harrisburg, PA, that summer.
At the beginning of the congressional session, therefore, Jackson’s party opened
with a legislative gambit devised to siphon protectionist votes from the Adams camp.
Van Buren charged Silas Wright, one of his loyal Regency disciples in the House, with
formulating a bill on import duties that would leverage support in the manufacturing
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States that had gone to Clay in the 1824 election (Missouri, Ohio, and Kentucky) and
consolidate power in the mid-Atlantic electoral behemoths (New York and
Pennsylvania.) Virginia Jacksonian Andrew Stevenson, handily elected Speaker of the
House, packed the Committee on Manufactures with a disproportionate number of
Jackson men, including Wright, almost all of whom represented pro-protectionist swing
States.215 Privately, Calhoun fretted that this combination of capitalist and manufacturing
interests in Washington set a “dangerous example” of separate representation and
association based on geographic divisions—a prospect that threatened to “make two of
one nation”—but, publically, he held his tongue.216 The resulting tariff bill passed both
the House and the Senate in February 1828 with the overwhelming support of
Jacksonians from the mid-Atlantic and the West, and against nearly monolithic resistance
from the South.217
In the aftermath of the bill’s success and the constitutional crisis it engendered in
the late 1820s and early 1830s, Jackson’s detractors contended that the Jackson-
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controlled Congress misplayed their hand—pushing through an exorbitant duties bill with
the expectation that it would be defeated in the Senate or saddled on Adams. Yet, in light
of the tariff’s relative popularity in the period and Jackson’s electoral position in 1828,
the tariff might reasonably have been considered a strategic gamble, a bill designed to
seduce the agricultural and manufacturing States with the understanding that it might
alienate the South (of whose vote Jackson’s party was assured), as well as northeastern
merchants and importers, whose support for Adams was never in question.218 Even with a
relatively high tariff, Jackson’s party had no reason to expect a southern mutiny. Every
major candidate had supported some version of protection during the prior election,
Jackson had voted in the Senate for the previous comprehensive tariff, and even Calhoun
was on record in support of certain kinds of protections.219 Irrespective of the bill’s
success, then, the Jackson party could position themselves as champions of the
manufacturing interests during the election and, by extension, American industry,
American jobs, and the working man.
Nonetheless, conditions had changed since the previous tariff had bill passed in
1824, particularly for the beleaguered representatives of debt-plagued South Carolina, as
had the structure of national politics. Still recovering from the 1819 economic crash,
South Carolina planters took a serious hit when international cotton prices plummeted in
1826; and the cotton market remained depressed until 1832, as did the price per pound of
rice.220 Cotton and rice plantations exported about twice as much product in these years,
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but made basically the same amount of money before expenses as they had in the first
half of the decade, all while the cost of slaves increased, driving down their net gain. At
the same time, South Carolina senator Robert Y. Hayne asserted, the “Colonization and
Abolition” societies reduced the value of slave property with their resolutions and tracts,
and Congress compounded the problem, granting these groups tacit legitimacy when it
humored their memorials.221
Meanwhile, a massive portion of the population migrated out of state, with
dispossessed planters and farmers seeking their fortune in the southwest and Carolinaborn intellectuals migrating to the major cities in the north.222 Under the “painful belief
that the days of South-Carolina have been numbered, and her prosperity is gone,” South
Carolina senator James Hamilton, Jr., lamented, “our countrymen are journeying in quest
of some more propitious land,” a “sorrowful pilgrimage” that reflected “the last
testimony of a decaying country” upon its inhabitants. In comparison, “Yankee”
manufacturers enjoyed an unprecedented boom in this period, supplemented by federal
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and private investment, and northeastern and mid-Atlantic agriculture also flourished
with the benefit of federal protection.223
Arguably, the tariff clinched Andrew Jackson the presidential election in 1828,
but it also became a flashpoint for both partisan and sectional politics, inspiring
Calhoun’s doctrine of States rights, enflaming southern separatists, and spawning the first
coherent “conservative” movement: nullification.224 In the summer of 1828, Calhoun
communicated to James Monroe his doubts that the system could sustain itself any longer
“under its natural action.” Pushed to its “present extreme,” it applied an imbalanced
pressure on its numerous parts, “which has of necessity a most pernicious tendency on
the feelings of the oppressed portions.” Theoretically, elections were meant to check
systemic abuses, but no effective remedy existed for a substantial minority in a
democracy who bore the burden of unequal laws. The “system is getting wrong,”
Calhoun concluded, and without a “speedy and effective remedy,” they must all expect a
shock.225
NULLIFICATION: THE GREAT CONSERVATIVE PRINCIPLE OF OUR SYSTEM- 1828-1832
As the nation’s politicians descended on Washington that fall, rumors circulated
that anti-tariff “disorganizers” in the South plotted to dissolve the Union. In its
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introductory editorial remarks for the new political year (September 1828), the antiJackson Niles Weekly Register accused Southern politicians of attempting to obtain “by
intimidation or force” what they could not accomplish by “republican practice.” The
Register followed this charge with a series of exposes leading up to the first
congressional session, picked up by papers across the United States, in which it detailed a
South Carolina disunion “conspiracy,” instigated the prior spring. It claimed that South
Carolina’s congressional delegation, led by representative George McDuffie and South
Carolina senators James Hamilton, Jr., and Robert Hayne, held secret meetings, plotting
to resign en masse from Congress, take up British muskets, and incite a civil war. Upon
their return to Charleston, the Register reported, this “cabal” of “traitors” met with British
ex-pat, Dr. Thomas Cooper (currently the president of South Carolina college and an
“avowed advocate of disunion”) who fed them the inflammatory rhetoric, which would
turn virtuous southern yeomanry into “infuriated dupes” willing to vote against their own
interests.226 Cooper’s involvement proved to the Register that the “disunion junto”
conspired with British agents, who fanned their “anti-republican, if not treasonable”
attacks on the tariff and funded their activity.227 A succession of intemperate and
defensive anti-tariff proclamations emanating from South Carolina fueled this
speculation, as did the sudden discovery of a “conservative” solution to sectional
disparity in the doctrine of nullification.228
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In an October 1828 address, James Hamilton, Jr., accused the federal government
of systematically “degenerating” South Carolina through its intrusive commercial
policies and illegal internal legislation. Ever since South Carolina adopted the federal
constitution, Hamilton charged, the government had drained out “the very heart and
blood” of the State through its custom house and, in the last decade, the “miserable
empiricism of the prohibitory system” had slowly poisoned the South. At the same time,
the protective system destroyed the “natural sympathy” that bound the citizens of a
common country together as “one people” with “one home,” alienating the northern,
middle, and western States from their brothers in the southern States.229 Though the
manufacturing interests claimed that the protective tariff served a transitory purpose—a
scaffold for American industry that would last only until they built enough capital to
compete on the international market—Hamilton warned that the “manufacturing spirit”
would never be satisfied.230 Citing Adam Smith, he predicted that its “unrelenting avarice
and selfishness” would drive its advocates to increasingly exclusive measures, until they
willingly defended it with violence against those men who dared speak against it. In the
struggle against capitalist hegemony, Hamilton declared, only “NULLIFICATION”
could arrest the progress of this evil and preserve the South from “fast coming decay.”231
According to Hamilton, nullification represented the “rightful remedy” to the
problem created when unscrupulous politicians perverted their constitution’s
“fundamental and distinctive character.”232 In response to the Register’s accusations that

229

Niles’ Weekly Register. Vol. 35 (1829), 206-208; Southern Review. A.E. Miller, 1828, 204.
Freehling, William W. The Road to Disunion: Secessionists at Bay, 1776-1854. Oxford University
Press, 1990, 255.
231
Niles’ Weekly Register. Vol. 35 (1829), 205.
232
Niles’ Weekly Register. Vol. 35. H. Niles, 1829, 206-208; Southern Review. A.E. Miller, 1828, 204.
230

120
the “revolutionary enthusiasm” and “treasonable aspirations” of some “political
incendiary” had birthed this doctrine, Hamilton appealed to the authority of Thomas
Jefferson and James Madison, “names venerated and endeared” to them “by associations
connected with everything that has been proud, valuable, and consoling, to our country.”
In their 1798 Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions, he professed, Jefferson and Madison
had advanced the same right to State-interposition against the same kind of power grab
that the general government had executed with the Alien and Sedition Acts. Not only had
Jefferson and Madison authored this “rightful remedy”, Hamilton claimed, but the “great
republican party” had immediately “canonized” it as part of their “catholic faith,” which
meant that anyone who opposed it committed heresy and should no longer be considered
republicans.
In this discourse, the “conservative principle” functioned at the cross-section of
theology and medicine—it reflected the divine will operating through an organized
physical structure, a process definitive of organic life that distinguished it from inorganic
matter. For the States, Hamilton said, this principle of self-preservation could be found
“in ourselves.” It flowed through every facet of their organization, each of which
provided an honorable and secure remedy to their systemic degradation: in the “sacred
Aegis of the constitution,” in their reserved rights as sovereign members of a civil
compact, in their legislative obligation to protect their citizens, and, not least, in the spirit
of their people “reared amidst those memorials which tell them they were once free and
educated by a constitution which instructs them that they have an imprescriptible claim
still to be so.” On these unshakable grounds, Hamilton promised, they might “build as
upon a rock,” trusting in the “conservative principle” that infused the States’ reserved
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rights to make them impervious to the “tempests and billows” that beat them, an allusion
to the Sermon on the Mount. Indeed, Hamilton noted, their system would be a “miserable
mockery” if it lacked a “conservative principle” to safeguard its constituent parts. Like all
living things, he explained, the constitution contained a “sanitive [sic] principle within
itself, by which the corruption and injustice which have been fastened upon it will be
shaken off.”233 To those gentlemen disheartened by their country’s “irreversible decay,”
Hamilton promised that while there was still “life” in the U.S. constitution, “there is
hope.”234
In identifying nullification as “conservative,” Hamilton ascribed to it all of the
positive characteristics associated with the “conservative principle” in physiology and
supplied a defensive strategy to those of its proponents accused of inciting revolution
(i.e., all of them.)235 Characterizing this position as authorized, historical, legislatively
sanctioned, sanctified, and vital, Hamilton implicitly reversed the charges leveled against
him and his colleagues. Theirs was not the revolutionary position; they were not the
disorganizers. Rather, those gentlemen who would maintain the status quo in direct
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contravention of their stated allegiances and national faith were the true traitors to their
common country. Regardless of the truth value of this claim, it put their adversaries on
the defensive, compelling them to explain their reasons for opposing Madison, Jefferson,
and the Union. Even if they successfully refuted Hamilton’s facts or complicated his
interpretation, they still implicitly validated his perspective, merely by engaging with his
argument.
The South Carolina State legislature formalized this position in late 1828 when it
disseminated 5,000 copies of the anti-tariff “Exposition and Protest,” an (initially)
anonymous treatise commissioned from Vice President (and vice president-elect) John C.
Calhoun that laid out the ‘authoritative’ rationalization for nullification.236 As he
understood it, Calhoun drafted, the United States suffered from a “disease” in which the
majority of States forced the General Government to exercise power outside of its proper
sphere, at the minority’s expense. In their sovereign capacity, the States could remedy
this imbalance and compel the General Government either to return to its prior
construction or to implement a constitutional amendment granting it the relevant power.
Through State interposition, Calhoun clarified, the “creating becomes the preserving
power; and we may rest assured it is no less true in politics than in theology, that the
power which creates can alone preserve,—and that preservation is perpetual creation.”
Calhoun may have borrowed that last clause from Swiss physiologist and theologian
Emanuel Swedenborg’s True Christian Religion, which translated into mystical terms his
earlier work on the vital principle organic life. In Swedenborg’s version of vitalism, the
soul unfolded throughout the different parts of the body, where its ends existed
236
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“simultaneously.”237 In Calhoun’s analog, the State took on the role of God; interceding
in its function as the “preserving power,” it gradually perfected the country’s constitution,
while protecting it from corruption or disease. Without this essential intercession,
Calhoun predicted, the totalizing “American System” would progressively corrupt the
country’s public morals and destroy its liberty.238
Because it relied on the ontological assumption of an organic state, nullification
essentially turned on the question of organic sovereignty in the United States. Did the
people of this country comprise distinct political communities, conjoined by a
constitutional compact, or should they be considered a unified “American people” who
collectively constituted a single nation? If the States retained their distinct national
character, then, as the British and European theorists had established, they reserved the
right to defend themselves against illegitimate and artificial power. In the case of the
tariff, the Federal Government could not legitimately deprive “one portion of the
confederacy” of its “natural advantages and natural rights” so that it might indemnify
“other portions of the confederacy for the natural sterility of their soil, or the unavoidable
mutations of commerce.”239 To substantiate their prerogative to void federal law,
therefore, South Carolina’s nullifiers had to also establish their State’s distinct
nationality. In protecting their “peculiar and rightful commerce,” Southern statesmen
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claimed that they merely conformed to the dictates of nature.240 In this way, the battle
against the tariff constituted a proxy war for slavery, discursively disguised as a struggle
to protect “free trade,” the natural order, and the trodden rights of a subjugated nation.
For too long, McDuffie recounted in the Southern Review, the North had built its
industry at the expense of the South, while the South slumbered under the “fatal
delusion” that “all parts of the Union have the same interest.” Now, these “combinations
of capitalists” from the Northern and Middle States, finding that wage labor made their
overhead too dear, set out to eradicate the only market advantage the South retained:
slavery. These same men who reaped the bounty of federal largesse sought to eradicate
the basis of Southern commerce, all while they literally minted money. Taking advantage
of the “fixed feeling of alienation” that grew out of the “habitual and long continued”
collisions between the country’s geographical interests, they seized on the “national
peculiarity” that distinguished the Southern States, fanning the “flame of national
animosity” against the “existence of negro slavery” in the South. As the Jacobin leaders
had done in Paris, these manufacturers and monopolists formed associations, clubs, and
juntos to satisfy their lust for private gain, manipulating the “common feelings” of the
“whole body” of the people with “all the external symbols and self-deluding professions
of disinterested patriotism.” In pamphlets, newspapers, and congressional speeches, they
relentlessly indoctrinated their constituents in “miserable and anti-social prejudices”
against the South by invoking the “cabalistic watchwords” of “free States,” and “slave
States,” “northern farmers,” and “southern planters,” “domestic industry,” and “English
240
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commerce.” With the tariff, the Federal Government endorsed and codified this
geographical prejudice, “fatally” misdirecting its active energies exclusively against the
citizens “of the Southern country,” and “literally devouring” the objects committed to its
guardianship and care.241
Although George McDuffie had once encouraged his colleagues to consider
themselves “one people,” the 1828 tariff exposed the South’s essential estrangement from
the rest of the Union. Just as they would never say that “all the nations of the earth” had
the same interest, McDuffie reflected, they could no longer be “permitted to believe” that
“all the parts of the Union” shared the “same interest.” The differences between the states
developed “from the laws of nature and the dispensations of Providence” and could not
be “obliterated by vain human theories,” like emancipation. Without comity or the public
sympathy, however, the South lacked the congressional capacity to redress federal
overreach. So long as the “united capital of the tariff States” retained control over public
opinion, Southern political representation was an “empty delusion,” as worthless in the
US Congress as West-Indian representation was in British Parliament “on the question of
negro emancipation.” Against this “perversion of the great conservative principle of
political responsibility,” McDuffie urged the Southern States to seek refuge in the
“protecting genius of the Constitution,” the States’ right to void an unconstitutional law
of Congress.242
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Some States rights advocates argued that the States did not merely have the right
to oppose federal incursion, but the constitutional imperative to do so. Each individual
State had its own “self-preserving power” generated by the “individuality of its people”
and measured in their “moral and physical energy,” Kentucky senator John Rowan
explained during 1830 Webster-Hayne debate. Once formed, the State’s “unity and its
life are inseparable.” At the foundational moment, he contended, the States could not
have transferred any of their sovereignty to the federal government without destroying
themselves and a “self-destroying will, or purpose, would be as unnatural in a body
corporate as in a body natural.” Therefore, he concluded, each State must, by its nature,
“exert its self-protecting power, through the organs of its government, or through a
convention,” against any “attempt by any of the members of the society to thwart or
counteract” its will. Given that all human institutions—even religious institutions—
degenerated, Rowan noted, the people invested in their governing bodies would
inevitably confront a choice between reform and revolution. In opposing centralized
power and Northern imperialism, Rowan claimed that the Southern advocates of States
rights had sought reform and been denied. If revolution came, he implied, the intransigent
North must be considered its author.
For the first three years of Jackson’s presidency, Calhoun maintained a public
face of supporting the administration while privately feeding the nullifiers, but he could
not sustain this balance indefinitely. First, because Calhoun no longer found his political
interests in line with Jackson’s administration by 1831.243 A succession of incidents had
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alienated Calhoun from President Jackson since their election in 1828, including the
notorious Petticoat affair, in which Calhoun’s wife led Washington’s socialites in
blackballing Secretary of War John Eaton’s wife; Duff Green’s February 1831
publication (at Calhoun’s behest) of Calhoun’s 1818 correspondence with Jackson about
the Seminole war, framed to vindicate his own character at Jackson’s expense; and the
dissolution of Jackson’s cabinet in the spring of 1831, which eased out Calhoun’s
partisans in favor of Van Buren’s. Ultimately, Calhoun concluded that Jackson’s
popularity weakened, distracted, and divided the South. Because people liked him, they
placed their confidence in the General Government; and their infatuation with the man
obscured the “true nature and character” of the General Government’s dangerous,
oppressive, unjust, and unconstitutional projects.244 Meanwhile, their “unfounded hope”
that he would provide relief prevented them from seeking their own forms of redress.
Their salvation from big government, then, must lie, in part, in discrediting Andrew
Jackson.
Second, the nullifying position allowed no real room for compromise. Not only
did the tariff damage the Southern economy, nullifiers argued, but it also granted the
federal government a toehold in legislating local commerce. If this infringement on local
autonomy went unchallenged, they alleged, Southern statesmen would have no grounds
to stop the federal government from legislating away their right to own human
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property.245 Any concession on the tariff ceded essential territory; any acquiescence
surrendered the South to federal intervention and control.246
Charleston’s “disunion junto” finally forced Calhoun’s hand on nullification in
the summer of 1831. At a Charleston dinner in George McDuffie’s honor, the city’s exmayor (Elias Horry) outed Calhoun during a succession of State rights toasts. Tucked into
tributes to “the cause of the south,” the “reserved rights of the states,” and the
“conservative principle of the federal union [nullification]” and its application in
“resisting federal aggression,” Horry saluted “John C. Calhoun,” who had been “tried in
the balance, and found not wanting.”247 In June, Calhoun expressed his regrets over the
incident to ex-Treasury Secretary Samuel D. Ingham, late of Jackson’s cabinet. He would
have preferred to choose his time, Calhoun wrote, but matters had been brought to a
crisis, compelling him to go public in his support of State rights. A month later, on July
26th, Calhoun wrote an open letter “on the Relations which the States and General
Government bear to each other,” published in the August 3rd Pendleton Messenger, in
which he basically reprised his anonymous 1828 “Exposition” and publicly defended the
“great conservative principle” of nullification for the first time.
Looking at the problem from the structural, logical, historical, political, and moral
perspective, and considering the nature of the “disease,” Calhoun determined that the
country’s political institutions depended on the sovereign State’s right to check federal
power, which he called the “fundamental principle of our system.” This “right of
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interposition,” he wrote—whether it was called the “State-right, veto, nullification, or by
any other name”—must be understood in the context of the country’s original
organization. At its foundation, Calhoun contended, the “constitutional compact” treated
both the General Government and the State governments as “a whole”, each “perfectly
adapted to its respective objects” and acting independently in its “proper sphere.” To
ensure the duration of their Constitution, their Union, and their liberty, they must
“preserve this sacred distribution as originally settled, by coercing each to move in its
prescribed orbit.” From this perspective, nullification functioned as the “great
conservative principle” not merely because it reflected traditional or historical principles,
but because it maintained the essential balance in the American political system. Though
their opposition characterized this doctrine as “anarchical and revolutionary,” Calhoun
avowed his solemn belief that it provided the “only solid foundation of our system, and of
the Union itself” because it allowed States to seek redress, “not in revolution or
overthrow, but in reformation.”248 In some distant age, Calhoun projected, they might
imagine a people so advanced in knowledge with a “state of intelligence so universal and
high” that they could “fully realiz[e] the sublime truth” undergirding peace, justice, and
harmony. Until then, the States’ right to call a convention on constitutional questions
offered an intermediate point between outright submission to oppression and State
resistance by force.
As his political fortunes waned over the next year, Calhoun determined that the
“whole system” was “deeply diseased.” Adams’s election in 1824 had given the
government a “downward impulse,” instigating an extensive and rapid “political
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degeneracy,” accelerated by the very man whose administration should have arrested the
descent.249 In May 1832, after Jackson’s “Republican delegates” nominated Martin Van
Buren for vice president at their first national convention (not even deigning to place the
incumbent in the running), Calhoun resolved to “make it the criterion of patriotism” to
refuse federal office until he had liberated the South. Articulating his support for
nullification in increasingly vivid terms, he reinforced the rhetorical infrastructure for
States rights as he helped build the political network to support a South Carolina State
convention on nullification. In an open letter to former senator James Hamilton, Jr., now
serving as South Carolina’s governor, Calhoun cast the mounting evidence of “disorder
and decay” in their system of government as symptoms of consumption:
“In the midst of youth, we see the flushed cheek, and the short and feverish
breath, that mark the approach of the fatal hour; and come it will, unless there be a
speedy and radical change— a return to the great conservative principles which
brought the Republican party into authority, but which, with the possession of
power and prosperity, it has long ceased to remember.”
This image simultaneously challenged the authenticity of the reigning “Republican” party
and naturalized the State rights position as conservative, even as it expressly committed
to a “radical” cure. To remedy their political disease, Calhoun turned to vitalist theory.
Amplifying his previous correspondence, Calhoun reaffirmed that the States functioned
as the regulatory agents of the political organism. In their power to obstruct
unconstitutional acts of Congress in their State conventions and through their exercise of
nullification, interposition, and State veto, the individual States manifested the “great
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conservative principle of our system.” When the political system required correction at
the constitutional level, as it did now, the States activated the “vis medicatrix [healing
power] of the system.”250 In their sovereign and confederated capacity in a General
convention, they directed the “energy of the repairing power” to amend the constitution
or otherwise correct systemic abuse and derangement. To begin the healing, Calhoun
resigned as Andrew Jackson’s vice president and took one of South Carolina’s seats in
the US Senate.251
In the fall of 1832, South Carolina administered the conservative remedy of
nullification. Though marginalized nationally, the State rights party cleaned up at the fall
1832 South Carolina elections, taking three-fifths of the statewide vote and capturing
eighty percent of the State House and seventy-five percent of its Senate.252 Two weeks
later, Governor James Hamilton, Jr., convened a special legislative session to elect
delegates for a State Convention on Nullification, held the following month (in the
middle of the month-long presidential election, which lasted from November 2nd to
December 5th). On November 24, 1832, the delegates passed an Ordinance of
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Nullification declaring the 1828 and 1832 Tariff Acts unconstitutional.253 They gave
Congress until February 1, 1833 to change the federal tariff or face the penalties. Should
Congress attempt to enforce its commercial authority over South Carolina’s citizens, they
declared, then they would consider their political obligations and social connections to
the union dissolved, and organize an independent state.254
Within weeks, the South Carolina Unionists organized an opposing convention to
protest nullification and declare, unequivocally, that they considered it an act of rebellion
cloaked in “conservative” language. Calhoun and his comrades commanded obedience in
the “language of despotism,” they declared. Against their better judgment, the people of
South Carolina had been “induced” to sanction nullification “upon the most solemn
assurance of its being a conservative,” and “not a revolutionary measure,” but the
Nullification Ordinance exposed that doctrine’s true nature in “all its deformity.” Not
only did the ordinance advance a “revolutionary” doctrine, they announced, but an
“essentially belligerent” one, which would naturally lead to civil war and disunion. Under
its auspices, they predicted, the Nullifiers intended to fragment the Union under the
“pretense of maintaining it” and plant their “bloody flag of anarchy” on its ruins.255 In
their “Remonstrance and Protest,” issued on December 10, 1832 (five days after Andrew
Jackson’s election and the same day that he issued his formal proclamation against
nullification), the Unionists rejected the notion that they owed their exclusive allegiance
to the State or that the State should be considered the primary guarantor of their rights.
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Instead, they wrote, they looked to the union to protect them from the treasonous and
despotic men who currently controlled their own State.
Jackson had diplomatically opened the space for compromise on the tariff in his
December 4th message to Congress, but his December 10th proclamation dwelt on the
same themes as South Carolina’s Union Convention. In it, he renounced the “illegal and
disorganizing” ordinance in the strongest terms and pleaded with its “deluded” supporters
to arrest its dangerous trajectory. From his perspective, the Nullifiers manipulated the
“honest prejudices” of people who essentially misunderstood the “nature” of their
government. Blinded by their “passions” their “State pride,” their “native courage,” and
their “sense of real injury,”, the people of South Carolina had been led to believe that the
Constitution formed a league of sovereign States, which retained the right to secede from
the Union, and that the general government operated on the States and not directly on the
people.256 Operating under this fatal delusion, they accepted the fundamental lie that the
“United States are not a nation.”
Nevertheless, Jackson professed, “We are ONE PEOPLE.” Contradicting
Calhoun’s account, Jackson clarified that the people of the United States had jointly
declared themselves a nation before the Declaration of Independence, collectively (if
imperfectly) formed a nation under the Articles of Confederation, and incarnated a
“single nation” in the United States Constitution. “In none of these stages,” he declared,
“did we consider ourselves in any other light than as forming one nation.” Succession,
therefore, must be considered a revolutionary act designed to destroy the nation’s unity.
Any other conclusion could only arise from an “abuse of terms,” a “solecism”
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perpetuated by men like Calhoun who intended to mask their true object (disunion) and
precipitate an otherwise patriotic people into committing treason.257
Sounding eerily similar to the patriarch of a British sentimental novel, Jackson
appealed to the “fellow citizens” of his “native State” to think of him like a father
stopping his children from rushing “to a certain ruin.” He asked them to consider their
privileges as American citizens and contrast it with the language their leadership had
used to deceive them. These men who had brought them to the “brink of insurrection and
treason” were not “champions of liberty emulating the fame of our Revolutionary
fathers,” Jackson protested, and, no matter how often they said it, the people of South
Carolina were not an “oppressed people” contending against conditions “worse than
colonial vassalage.” The government would soon redress the unequal commercial
burdens unwisely (though not unconstitutionally) saddled upon them, Jackson promised,
but the people of South Carolina must first reject the “disorganizing edict” of
nullification. If they loved freedom and valued peace (not to mention their own lives),
then he advised them to re-assemble their State convention and, this time, ensure that it
reflected the “decided expressions” of their will—to reject disunion and restore their
country’s tranquility. That they might not be “dishonored and scorned” while they lived
and “stigmatized when dead” as the “authors of the first attack” on their country’s
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Constitution, he urged them to say to those men whose names they once respected, “WE
TOO, ARE CITIZENS OF AMERICA.”258
To back up his rhetoric, Jackson attacked the problem on two fronts. First, as a
sign of good faith, he deployed a loyal New York representative, Gulian C. Verplanck, at
the start of the December 1832 congressional session to introduce a tariff bill that
seriously undercut protection.259 Second, he demonstrated his readiness to use force, if
necessary, to execute federal law. On January 16, 1833, he submitted his own “Force
Bill” to Congress, which would authorize him to employ military aid in South Carolina.
On the Senate floor, John C. Calhoun responded apoplectically, but, behind the
scenes, he encouraged his hawkish colleagues in South Carolina to keep their cool.260
While Hayne and Hammond prepared for “protracted warfare” and Hamilton drilled his
troops, Calhoun reminded them that their interests lay in victory, not martyrdom.261 At
the moment, he wrote, they lacked the strength and the sectional support to secure their
sovereign rights through military means, but even a year would make an “immense
difference” in their prospects. Moreover, if they acted on a (relatively) arbitrary deadline,
without material provocation, they abrogated the basis of their claims—that they acted
for “self-preservation,” alone. For the “conservative” theory of State rights to hold,
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Jackson must be seen to be the aggressor; South Carolina could only fight in self-defense.
The leaders of the South Carolina ‘States Rights and Free Trade’ party agreed and when
they met on January 21st they gave the federal government until the end of the
congressional session (basically an extra month) to comply with their ordinance.262
Contrasted with Jackson’s apparent belligerence, South Carolina’s temperance granted
politicians from outside South Carolina the pretext to support State rights without
seeming to sanction rebellion.263
In the meantime, Calhoun navigated a rapprochement with Kentucky senator
Henry Clay, whose devastating turn in the 1832 presidential election redoubled his
determination to bring down Andrew Jackson. Back in December, Clay drafted a barebones proposal that promised equal protection for all domestic industries (that all duties
would be applied equally, without consideration for particular commercial sectors) and
the repeal of all existing protective laws in March of 1840.264 By mid-January, rumors
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circulated that Clay parleyed with Calhoun to settle terms, secure southern support, and
cement the rupture in Jackson’s party.265 Meanwhile, Verplanck’s bill met resistance
from protectionists who charged that it conciliated the nullifiers entirely and from
Jackson’s opposition, who opposed on principle a bill that appeared to have been made to
order and filtered through the interests of Van Buren’s New York Regency. Both Clay
and Calhoun benefited from offering an alternative that might supplant Verplanck’s
proposal and show up the “popular dictator,” Andrew Jackson.266
Having gone through the rigor of a select Senate committee that included southern
and western representatives, the Clay’s compromise sailed through the House and the
Senate on the strength of a deep-south-southwest alliance. The resulting tariff (gradually)
met South Carolina’s demanded reduction (at the same horizontal rate that Robert Hayne
proposed in the 1832 debates) and took the tariff off the table for the rest of the decade,
giving Calhoun’s crew time to regroup and allowing Clay and his colleagues to reassess
what policies might best serve their interests.267 After it passed, Calhoun redirected his
efforts toward the underlying issue of government involvement in domestic concerns
(and its projected implications for slave-ownership), while Clay reassessed whether he
could advance American manufacturing without threatening slavery (or, at the very least,
if he could sustain an anti-Jackson coalition that included Calhoun’s cohort without
compromising American industry.)
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Jackson considered nullification “dead” after he signed the Compromise Tariff
and the Force bill into law on March 2, 1833, but the report of its death was an
exaggeration.268 When the South Carolina convention re-assembled in mid-March, its
members defended the principle of nullification as sound, even if they acquiesced to its
repeal in deference to the “united vote” of the “whole southern states.”269 South Carolina
still felt confident in the “conservative character of her remedy, which she believes to be
in perfect harmony with a true exposition of the doctrines of the resolutions of 1798.”
They backed up this claim by immediately re-invoking it. After they suspended the 1832
nullification ordinance, they reported a new ordinance nullifying the Force bill.
Furthermore, they left the door open to succession when they re-issued a test oath that
required all civil and military officials to declare their allegiance to the “free and
sovereign state of South Carolina” and renounce any allegiance “incompatible” with their
faithful citizenship to that State. This framework definitionally rejected Jackson’s
premise that South Carolina’s citizens must consider themselves American citizens, first.
In a letter to his constituents after the Senate shuttered its doors for the summer,
Calhoun likewise urged his constituents to consider the outcome a successful application
of conservative State rights doctrine. During the crisis, he claimed, nullification had
proved to be the “great conservative principle of the system,” which, “like some powerful
but dangerous medicine, cannot be prescribed, till the disease has become more
dangerous than the remedy and when the life of the patient with or without it is almost
despaired of.”270 They might shelve the medicine for the time being, but, he cautioned,
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they had “but checked the disease” with the present compromise, not cured it. The tariff
must be considered a symptom of a systemic disorder that constantly threatened their
State rights, which meant, primarily, their right to own people.271
While the disease remained in remission, he advised his constituents to guard
against its contributing forces—systemic imbalance, corruption, and despotic rule. In
practice, that entailed rooting out big government, capitalist interests, King Andrew
Jackson and his heir apparent, Martin Van Buren. When the disease inevitably relapsed,
they would recur to the same “conservative” remedy of nullification and succession. The
battle for nullification may have ended (though neither side agreed on who won), but, in
the war for slavery, its partisans would be satisfied with total victory, alone. In the
meantime, the “conservatives” of slavery must remain vigilant.
THE AMERICAN CONSERVATIVES
In the early 1830s, self-identified “Conservatives” surfaced in national politics as
part of a strategy to secure the southern vote. Even on his best day, southerners viewed
Martin Van Buren with suspicion. A career politician from New York, he had an
inconsistent voting record on slavery.272 While his southern supporters might concede
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that Van Buren’s political ambition would probably overcome any of his personal
convictions that had survived his time on the national stage, their lingering uncertainty
gave his opponents a wedge issue. At the congressional level, Van Buren’s opposition
conspired to force his allies into a position on slavery that would either hobble Van
Buren’s chances in the South or discredit him in the North. Adding fuel to the fire, Great
Britain abolished slavery in its colonies in the late summer of 1833, a fact that stoked
southern paranoia and increased the likelihood that the southern States would form a
sectional alliance around slavery.273 To court the South, then, both the Jackson party and
their opposition set out to demonstrate their commitment to southern values and
institutions by silencing and repressing anti-slavery activists and sentiment—to style
themselves the “conservatives of the Union” and portray the other side as soft on
abolition.274
In his effort to control the southern vote in the 1836 presidential election, John C.
Calhoun, Duff Green, and the rest of the States-rights crew cynically revived and
aggravated intense sectional conflict. Working with the popular press in the deep south,
Calhoun, Duff Green, and the rest of the States-rights crew cynically revived and
aggravated intense sectional conflict, exploiting the “fears, prejudices and pride of the
slaveholding States” to “blow the unquenchable fanaticism of the south into a devouring
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flame.”275 In particular, they fixated on a new genre of anti-slavery activist, generated in
England and infiltrating the United States: the immediatist. On January 1, 1833, William
Lloyd Garrison published the first issue of The Abolitionist, a monthly journal committed
to immediate abolition and opposed to colonization on the premise that the “native
country of the colored people of the United States” is the United States and that the
“blacks of America” could be “amalgamated, in all respects, in equal brotherhood with
the whites.”276 In fact, in arguing that people of color constitute a separate (or lesser)
race, Garrison declared, the American Colonization Society endeavored to make
“practically true” a social and civic alienation “which is one of the greatest stains in the
American character.”277 Over the next two years, the immediatists organized a national
Anti-Slavery society, which pursued a more aggressive and visible line of attack against
slavery than the uncoordinated regional societies had been able to effect, including a
systematic and unrelenting media blitz, delivered through the national postal service
directly to the heart of the South. In the summer of 1835, alone, they posted 175,000
separate mailings to the men on their list of twenty thousand “prominent” southerners.278
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Outrage against abolitionist mailings united the southern constituency against a common
enemy, however vague their actual threat, and also kept the recent post office scandal in
the public mind, with its indictment of Jackson’s party patronage and corruption.279
As the 1836 presidential election drew closer, the “self-styled conservatives of the
public peace” instigated a national culture war against the abolitionists and other
“movement” parties that swiftly turned to material violence. Anti-abolitionists nationwide
agitated against the whiff of anti-slavery sentiment in public media, in churches, and in
voluntary societies. Working to silence social activists, they organized campaigns to
suppress their literature, prevent them from making public appearances, and effectively
stop their societies from meeting.280 Fearful of damage to their property, landlords
evicted their abolitionist tenants, effectively shuttering their papers. Across the country,
outspoken advocates for the abolition of slavery encountered mounting popular violence,
as lynch-mobs destroyed presses, burned down newspaper offices, and murdered men
with anti-slavery sympathies.281 The Niles’ Register reported thirty-five anti-abolitionist
riots and violent attacks on people of color between 1833 and 1838.282 The anti-slavery
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newspapers put that number a little higher, reporting 165 incidents of violence against
abolitionists and people of color in the same period. That violence peaked in the summer
of 1835.283
The perpetrators maintained that they acted in self-defense, righteously protecting
their lives and their property from people who brought disorder and race-based division
to their doorsteps. To support their case, they pointed to recent anti-slavery activism
(with varying degrees of veracity): abolitionists had orchestrated slave insurrections in
Mississippi, established hundreds of “revolutionary” anti-slavery societies across the
country,284 deluged them with their subversive propaganda,285 and, worst of all, invited
“foreign emissaries paid with foreign money” to come to their country and destroy their
“peculiar institutions.”286 Functionally, then, the abolitionists incited these riots, bringing
violence on themselves and the people of color whose freedom they claimed to advance,
and they must be held responsible for it.287
Wary of losing southern support and southern dollars, northern politicians,
bankers, and merchants held a series of “Conservative meetings” at the end of the
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summer.288 First, Van Buren’s opposition gathered (in Portland and Bath, Maine, in
Boston, and in Philadelphia) and then his supporters (in Albany and New York City).289
Like they had in Britain, “Conservatives” in the United States claimed the position of
“law and order” against agitators whose activism threatened social stability. They turned
anti-abolition into a vehicle for them to perform their support for slave-owners without
explicitly endorsing or legislatively reinforcing the institution of slavery, itself.290
In their rhetoric, these conservatives endorsed the basic premises underlying the
State rights movement: that the States remained inviolable even after forming the Union
and the northern States had no right to interfere with slavery in any way. Speaking at
Faneuil Hall in August 1835, Boston’s ex-Mayor Harrison Gray Otis echoed the popular
southern narrative established during the nullification crisis.291 He reminded his audience
that the North acquiesced to slavery when they appealed to the southern colonies during
the revolution, implicitly confirmed this position when they confederated, and explicitly
ceded control of internal commercial regulation to the southern States when they framed
the constitution, which, he noted, included the right to import property and the right to
288
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hold whatever property might be imported. As a result, northerners had a positive
obligation to protect the institution of slavery that superseded their duty or capacity to
make changes, regardless of their “ardent desire for the freedom of the African race.”292
Not only must abolitionist principles be considered hostile to the “spirit and letter
of the constitution,” but also “imminently dangerous.” To the southern mind, even
discussing slavery was the same as ending the union. Otis explained that southerners
regarded all abolitionist-related discourse as a “war in disguise, upon their lives, their
property, their rights and institutions, an outrage upon their pride and honor, and the faith
of contracts—menacing the purity of their women, the safety of their children, the
comfort of their homes and their hearths, and in a word all that man holds dear.”
Basically, abolition threatened their white masculinity and, in so doing, destabilized their
entire world. These southerners might be mistaken in their opinions, Otis granted, but
northerners must understand that they were “hereditary” and “habitual” opinions that
could not be dismissed merely because they were irrational or inconvenient.293
In general, the men at these Conservative meetings treated human enslavement as
the price of doing business with the South. Slavery represented an unfortunate, morally
problematic, and, perhaps, embarrassing fact of the southern economy that had developed
naturally and could not be eradicated externally. Moreover, if they abjured the right to
move against slavery in order to meet their political and social obligations, they refused
to stand by and let some snooty foreigners judge them for it. At the Philadelphia
Conservative meeting, Jesse R. Burden put a fine point on this sentiment when he
remarked, “England had placed upon us the sore of slavery, and now pointed at us in
292
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scorn because it festered on our body”294 Though some speakers (like Joseph Reed
Ingersoll, a Whig representative from Pennsylvania and vice president of the American
Colonization Society) sought to end slavery gradually and constitutionally, others
“disapproved of any interference” with slavery, even colonization, because it deprived
southerners of their “rightful property” and beggared “the whites by benefitting the
blacks.”295 This sense of rights as a zero sum game between the races reverberated
through the long-form speeches and newspaper articles reacting to the immediatists.296
Immediate abolition would “change the civil polity,” Otis projected. Inevitably, it
would give “political power to those who have none, and the dominant power to them in
all places where they happen to be a majority of the population.” In the Black Belt south,
then, formerly enslaved people of color would outnumber the white population and hold
political power over them and, in Otis’s estimate, this power-dynamic represented the
best case scenario, one in which the abolitionist revolution obtained emancipation
without a “servile war.”297 Yet, southerners had spent years arguing that outside agitation
on the question of slavery would inescapably lead to just such a war—that, in fact, their
enslaved population could either be “contented and ignorant” or violent once informed.298
Once the abolitionists incited this war, Otis concluded, either the “citizens” would
294
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triumph and exterminate “the blacks” or the slaves would conquer and “the whites must
in their turn be exterminated.” Afterwards, he predicted, the “republics of the colored
race will have supplanted that of their masters” and northerners would be forced to
choose between alliance and constant war “with those who occupy the soil and the
habitations of the good and the great and the brave of our brethren.”299
From his first day in the Senate, Calhoun had used his position to systematically
politicize the question of slavery in order to seize power from Jackson’s party, and to
crush Van Buren’s chances for succeeding him in the next election.300 During the
Twenty-Fourth Congress, he (and his proxies) increased the pressure, introducing
explicitly pro-slavery and State rights measures, including a bill to enforce State
censorship of the post at the federal level and series of resolutions proscribing Congress
from interfering with or discussing slavery. When Jackson advised Congress in his
annual message to prohibit certain types of “incendiary” publications from the southern
mail, the opposition-controlled Senate directed the question to a special committee led by
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Calhoun and comprised almost entirely of his critics.301 Jackson’s message gestured
toward preventing people from mailing specific publications determined by a federal
mandate, in which case the person or people posting the publications would be liable for
breaking a federal law and punished accordingly.302 Instead of this federal standard,
Calhoun’s proposed legislation compelled postal employees to conform to each State’s
chosen standard. For legal precedent, Calhoun looked to federal legislation on disease
control. Congress lacked the power to pass federal “quarantine laws,” he recalled, but it
had passed legislation “to abstain from the violation of the health laws of the States.”
Similarly, Calhoun’s law shifted the onus to federal employees to follow the target
State’s directives and held them accountable if they received and mailed or delivered
items prohibited in their destination State.303 Calhoun implied that the federal government
had put crypto-abolitionists into office in the South—men whose sympathies led them to
turn a blind eye to the dangerous publications pouring across their borders that put both
slavery and slaveholders at risk. “While the southern States contained so many
postmasters opposed to their institutions,” Calhoun explained, “it was absolutely
301
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necessary for them to take effectual measures for their own security.”304 In case his
motivation remained obscure, he clarified explicitly that he grounded this bill on the
doctrine of “State rights and State intervention,” the “assertion of the principle, that the
States had a right to protect themselves.” That bill narrowly failed to pass the Senate in
February 1836, but it served the ancillary purpose of reinforcing sectional division and,
therefore, weakening Van Buren’s chances.305 Towards the end of the session, in May
1836, the House adopted all of South Carolina representative Henry L Pickney’s
resolutions, confirming that Congress lacked the constitutional power to interfere with the
institution of slavery in the States or in the District of Columbia (DC), and that they
would table any all “petitions, memorials, resolutions, propositions, or papers” related to
the subject of slavery.306
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For the better part of the decade, “rational” anti-slavery activists had encouraged
the more radical members of their movement to neutralize their rhetoric and work
through the proper hierarchies.307 When the anti-abolitionist backlash initially turned
violent, they argued that the resistance that the anti-slavery movement encountered grew
out of its tactics, not its purpose: its incendiary language unnecessarily antagonized
potential allies and riled their natural predators.308 Within a couple years, however, the
rational abolitionists could no longer sustain the argument that they could change the
conversation by going through the proper channels or adjusting their language. For one
thing, they no longer had access to public platforms. In addition to gagging the radical
307
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wing of the anti-slavery movement, anti-abolitionist “conservatives” tramped down on
voluntary societies, in general. Shuttering churches and persecuting printers, they barred
meliorist avenues for anti-slavery reform and set in motion legislation that effectively
silenced anti-slavery reformers at the federal level. This “literary inquisition” suppressed
“every discussion of slavery, whatever quarter, and in whatever form,” and put the “fear
of Lynch law” into public intellectuals, ministers, and anyone else interested in
discussion, debate, and free inquiry. For another, even if the immediate abolitionists had
been able to spread their message unfiltered, it had become clear that the immediate
abolitionists had been the “occasion rather than the cause or source of the mischief.”
Their agitation did not cause the “bitter passions and fierce fanaticism” raging in the
South: politics did.309
In his 1836 farewell address to the New York Anti-Slavery Society, Judge
William Jay condemned the capitalist cynicism that traded political liberties for southern
commerce. In the North, he wrote, where wealth made men “politically conservative,”
anti-slavery activists had assumed themselves relatively safe from physical assault
because conservatives, they knew, invested in law and order to secure their own interests.
However, the recent riots in New York City (1835), Utica (1836), Boston (1836), and
Cincinnati (1836) revealed that today’s “Jacobins” were arrayed among the “political and
commercial aristocracy in the North.” Making “merchandise” of “peace and good order,”
northern politicians sold the constitution and its laws for southern votes and its “great
309
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capitalists” speculated not merely in lands and banks, but also in the people’s liberties.
These men could hardly be considered truly conservative, he argued, given their
willingness to introduce “anarchy and violence on a calculation of profit.” Jay declared
the time ripe for abolitionists to spread their “truly conservative principles” across the
nation—with their last breath, if necessary. They now carried the sole responsibility to
restore “the tranquility of society, the security of property, and the continuance of
freedom” in America.
The following year (1837), the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church set
a national precedent when it shuttered churches that had served as venues for abolitionist
dissent and reform. In language that made clear that the question of slavery had decided
the issue, the assembly abrogated the 1801 Plan of Union with the Congregationalists and
excised synods known as “hot-beds of abolition.”310 Though the schism nominally turned
on a question of doctrine, the specter of abolitionism haunted its primary targets. When
Lyman Beecher and Albert Barnes stood trial in 1835 for heresy, for example, they
defended themselves against charges normally associated with abolitionist preaching,
namely the doctrine of perfection and the denial of human inability, both associated with
Yale professor Nathaniel W. Taylor’s “New Haven” or “New School” theology.311 When
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abolitionists pressed the question in the Presbyterian General Assembly in 1835, they
provided their opposition with the material necessary to expel them from the Presbyterian
polity. Reverend George A. Baxter, who published his infamous pro-slavery “Essay on
the Abolition of Slavery” in 1836, celebrated the “end to the abolition question” after the
General Assembly excised the offending synods in 1837. Speaking to a group of
seminary students after the 1837 Exscinding Acts passed, Baxter confirmed that the
“Presbyterian church, by getting clear of the New School, will at the same time get clear
of abolition”312
Without the means of production or dissemination, without pulpits and public
spaces, the abolitionists, in particular, and social reformers, in general, lacked the
mechanism to share their truth. Rational abolitionists might debate strategy, but tactics
required a coordinated effort—in this instance, among people with some serious
philosophical differences—and socio-political change required an unpredictable (and
often unmanageable) alchemy of forces and conditions. Having gone into uncharted and
hostile territory without a coherent plan of action, anti-slavery activists now found
themselves in a quagmire. Instead of being welcomed as liberators, they encountered
violence, political resistance, and entrenchment. The people were not primed for the
message and their religious leadership had abrogated their duty to ready them for it. In
the midst of this sustained attack, the barely coordinated branches of the anti-slavery
movement splintered. The anti-slavery perfectionists, led by William Lloyd Garrison,
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responded to this state of affairs by rejecting organized religion, the political process,
and, eventually, the American union.
THE “TRUE CONSERVATIVES”
Writing in response to the Presbyterian split, Congregationalist ministers Horace
Bushnell and Noah Porter attempted a radical intervention in defining the content of
American conservatism in the late 1830s. Up to this point, self-described “Conservatives”
had blamed the country’s social ills on abolitionists—a problem they attempted to resolve
by suppressing the irritant (through violence, censorship, and excision) and preventing its
spread (by policing the media, people, and theology that crossed State borders). In
contrast, Bushnell and Porter viewed the rampant social disorder as the symptom of a
graver pathology corroding national morality that state and religious censorship
compounded. The problem was not in the people, Bushnell charged, but in a sociopolitical culture that treated the people as means of production, and a learned class
(sacred and secular alike) that failed in its duty to teach them otherwise. “The political
tendencies of slavery have always been adverse to our free institutions,” Bushnell
announced in the midst of the 1835 riots, “claiming to itself the monopoly of liberty… It
has gendered a fearful spirit of radicalism and demolition.” Slavery engendered a moral
evil that only the unfetter spread of the gospel could counter. If slavery gradually
degraded the American people, then could the men whose actions artificially extended
the life of slavery be considered conservative? Could reactionaries who staunched the
flow of the gospel be considered conservative? Re-orienting sources like Coleridge and
Burke in the American context, Bushnell and Porter raised the possibility that in a society
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founded on the “true idea and settlement of liberty,” conservatism should struggle to
obtain the “true doctrine of civil freedom.”313
This approach distinguished between conservative models developed in British
and German romantic thought and the specific forms and institutions that British and
European Conservatives advocated. Though they drew on intellectuals who had become
associated with British and European conservatism by the 1830s, Bushnell and Porter
insisted that the theoretical logic of conservatism implicated different institutional and
social forms in a democratic republic. That is, they could adopt the Romantic mode of
thinking about the relationship between the people and the state—and even their models
for education—without advocating for monarchies or principalities. Though conservatism
promoted a reactionary adherence to anti-egalitarian and anti-democratic forms and
institutions in places like Britain and Europe, they argued that nothing inhered in the
concept of conservatism that necessarily bound it to regressive, repressive, or reactionary
policies or structures. In both medical discourse and political theory, conservative forces
aided an organism’s natural progress as a function of its living or vital force.
Conservatives did not have to function hierarchically to secure the power of one group
over another; rather, they were compelled to serve the constitutional needs of the society
in which they lived. In the United States, these ministers insisted, “True Conservatives”
would conserve democracy, instead of privilege, and liberty, instead of subjugation.
In the decade before this confrontation, British and German romantic thought
suffused US intellectual discourse. Several influential New England scholars matriculated
at German universities, primarily at the University of Göttingen, where Johann Friedrich
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Blumenbach continued to teach until 1840. Among them, editor, orator and politician
Edward Everett received his PhD from Göttingen University in 1817 and contributed
most of Harvard’s collection of German scholarship; historian, educator, and statesman
George Bancroft followed his 1820 Göttingen PhD with a stopover in Berlin, where he
attended Hegel’s lectures (among others), and returned to the US committed to
disseminating Herder; and George Ticknor left Göttingen (to become Harvard’s first
Smith Professor of the French and Spanish Languages and Literatures) before completing
his doctorate, but not before becoming close personal friends with Blumenbach. Ticknor
brought German-émigré Charles Follen onto Harvard’s faculty as its first professor of
German language and literature, where he taught Lessing, Herder, Schiller, Goethe,
Novalis, and August Wilhem Schlegel to future Transcendentalists George Ripley, James
Freeman Clarke, and Theodore Parker. During his popular public lectures on German
philosophy, which tended to focus on Fichte and Kant, Follen made friends with William
E. Channing (the god-father of Transcendentalism), Ralph Waldo Emerson (its widest
purveyor), Margaret Fuller (its “truth-teller”), and James Marsh, whose influential 1829
edition of Coleridge’s Aids to Reflection, 1831 edition of Coleridge’s The Friend, and
1833 translation of Herder’s Spirit of Hebrew Poetry served as the foundational texts for
the Transcendentalist Club (which he helped establish in 1836). Even before Marsh
popularized Coleridge in 1829, however, Horace Bushnell and Noah Porter had read it as
undergraduates at Yale University. Later in life, Bushnell reportedly said he was more
“indebted to Coleridge than to any extra-Scriptural author.” At the same time,
Transcendentalist author and publisher Elizabeth Peabody started building the foreign
library that eventually became her legacy. In 1826, Peabody’s sister Mary described her
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as “living” on “Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Dr. Channing.”314 Alongside Bronson Alcott
in 1834, Peabody founded the Temple School in Boston based on her understanding of
Herder’s progressive pedagogy and Swiss romantic Johann Pestalozzi’s model of
elementary education. Unlike Bushnell, who got his German romanticism in translation
from Coleridge and Bancroft, Peabody read it straight from the source, reporting in an
1836 letter, “I made quite easy progress in Schiller—but find Goethe harder.”315 As
historian Thomas L. Buckley observed, one-third of the journal articles written in the
United States between 1817 and 1865 concerned either Schiller or Goethe.316 Meanwhile,
Harvard philosopher Francis Bowen remarked in 1838, Coleridge and Carlyle enjoyed an
even “greater” popularity “on this side of the Atlantic” than they did at home.317 A
decade after these events, Noah Porter (by this time the Clark Professor of Moral
Philosophy and Metaphysics at Yale) reflected that Coleridge’s writings had “dawned
like a new light” on “many hundreds” of minds since their first publication in the United
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States.318 In Porter’s own study, Coleridge’s portrait kept company with portraits of
Schiller, Robert Burns, and Sir William Hamilton, as well as statuettes of Immanuel Kant
and Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (reproductions of German sculptor Christian Daniel
Rauch.)
Stepping into the moral vacuum generated by a society without an
institutionalized social hierarchy or established national church, Bushnell pushed to
institutionalize morality at the national level through a comprehensive, centralized system
of social and moral reforms, premised on publically-funded arts and education. As
Coleridge had explained in The Friend (1818), education operated as the
“nisus formativus” or “Bildungstrieb” of “social man,” the “appointed protoplast” of
man’s “true humanity” and essential to his “vital and harmonious body.” (Like Ticknor,
Coleridge learned his Blumenbach straight from the source, having attended
Blumenbach’s lectures at Göttingen and studied with him privately.)319 Writing On the
Constitution of Church and State in 1830, Coleridge identified the same process in the
national body. Under the tutelage of the clerisy—scholars of the liberal arts and
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sciences—the “national education” served as the “nisus formativus of the body politic,”
bringing out the “latent” humanity in “all the natives of the soil” and “train[ing] them
up” to become “citizens of the country” and “free subjects of the realm.”320 By their
scholarship, the clerisy balanced the nation’s “progressive civilization” (its advances in
the arts, access to amenities, and its spread of information and knowledge) with its
cultivation. Without proper cultivation, Coleridge clarified, civilization acted as a
“corrupting influence” on a nation, bringing out the “hectic of disease.”321 In Coleridge’s
sense, cultivation referred to the “harmonious development of those qualities and
faculties that characterize our humanity,” including “all the qualities essential to a
citizen,” without which no one could be counted on for the “conservation or promotion”
of the state’s essential interests.322 In other words, Coleridge wrote, the clerisy taught the
people to “be men,” so that they might “be citizens.”323
Fundamentally, the clerisy aimed to achieve “civilization with freedom,”
Coleridge declared, but its aims had been frustrated by the “diseases in the body politic”
and the “morbid symptoms” that kept them chronic in Great Britain.324 Among these,
Coleridge specified the salmagundi of ad hoc instruction that passed for “education” in
his country, and the government’s dedication to alienating the nation’s wealth from the
people’s welfare. Divorced from religion and morality, Coleridge reported, education had
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been drained of its higher principles, its spiritual drive, and reduced to empiricism and
utility. At the same time, Coleridge continued, Britain’s commercial laws and practices
“mechanized” its population, turning them into “engines” for the “manufactory of new
rich men,” so that the “machinery of the wealth of the nation” was made up of the
“wretchedness, disease and depravity of those who should constitute the strength of the
nation.” Britain’s political economy condemned the people to disease, vice, and poverty,
Coleridge claimed, while its statesmen promised to despoil them of whatever
commonwealth remained. Senators demanded public land as a right to pay down the
government’s debts to landowners, stockbrokers, and stockowners, while the country’s
laborers clung to its “magic wealth-machine,” praying that it did not stop and throw them
into pauperism. “Has the national welfare, have the weal and happiness of the people,
advanced with the increase of the circumstantial prosperity?,” Coleridge asked, “Is the
increasing number of wealthy individuals that which ought to be understood by the
wealth of the nation?” In practice, Coleridge concluded, this gross calculus substituted
the “wealth of the nation” for the “well-being of the people,” ultimately leaving Britain
with neither.325 Only the “permanent, nationalized, learned order” of the clerisy rightly
constituted the nation because it suffused the entire population with the idea of the
“nation, considered as one body politic,” which acted as the “vital principle” of the state
and without which its “vital functions” would fail.326 The clerisy developed the “seminal
principle” of the nation’s particular body, aiding the “progressive development” of the
“original germ” embedded in its constitution, and “transplanting” that “germ of
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civilization” to every part of the country, so that every community had a “nucleus, round
which the capabilities of the place may crystallize and brighten.”327
During the first years of in the Presbyterian church, Bushnell had served as a
peace-maker between the Old and New School factions in Hartford. In his estimation, the
schism distracted from the true work of the church. Now that the Presbyterian Church
had closed down heterodox congregations and impaired the work of the American Home
Missionary Society—seeming to fear the unfettered spread of the gospel, itself, even in
its most ‘neutral’ iteration—Bushnell came out against its reactionary leadership and any
“conservative” too cowed by interests to stand for truth. Adopting the Romantic model of
national cultivation, Bushnell argued that a unified national spirit, inculcated through a
system of national education and disseminated through the vasculature of a cohesive
national culture, served as the one truly conservative force in a republic.
Speaking three months after the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church
met and a month before Congress convened its special session on US monetary policy in
September 1837, Horace Bushnell identified the “present crisis” as a uniquely American
challenge: a social disorder that grew out of the conjunction of materialism and
democracy.328 In an address to the Phi Beta Kappa Society in New Haven on the
“Principles of National Greatness,” he attributed the recent outrages against free speech
and rational liberty to the national “deification of money,” which, he argued, fostered
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fatal, fractal tendencies in their republican society.329 “Piety to God, and piety to
ancestors, are the only force which can impart an organic unity and vitality to a state,”
Bushnell declaimed, but America’s politicians had replaced the nation’s higher principles
with the empty liturgy of political economy. In an effort to distract the people from their
country’s over-whelming moral crisis and their own dwindling political freedoms, they
perpetuated the destructive notion that the “good of the governed” could be measured in
“money and possessions,” inaugurating a “new era of misgovernment.”330
Following Adam Smith and his disciples, Bushnell argued, the people’s
representatives increasingly focused their policies and public measures on questions of
finance and trade, “as if property were the real end of statesmanship.”331 On one side, the
Whigs advocated federal oversight, flexible credit, and a national bank, ascribing the
pervasive sense of popular unrest to Loco Foco agitation for free trade, wealth
redistribution, and social democracy. The Jackson-Van Buren party, on the other hand,
blamed intrusive federal regulations, bank monopolists, and corporate abuse for causing
both the current economic depression and public disaffection from national politics. In
deifying the laws of trade, however, both of the dominant political parties turned the
government into “a dead and brute machine,” reliant for its perpetuation on an ignorant
populace likewise consumed by their own material interests. Trading on men’s greed and
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fear, American statesmen sanctified property as the sign of individual liberty, but liberty
was not property, Bushnell declared, echoing the anti-slavery discourse, “Liberty is
Justice Secured.”332
For their part, the country’s “cultivated citizens” had forsaken their responsibility
to making the people fit to rule. Alienated by their government’s mercenary policies and
despairing of democracy, America’s religious and intellectual leaders had fled the
nation’s barren “groves of paper cities,” seeking refuge in a “sickly and copied
conservatism” that valorized the British state and constitution and reduced American
literature to a flaccid imitation of British sources. These conservative intellectuals did not
betray their country because they embraced conservatism, Bushnell clarified, but, rather,
because they demanded “that which is radically opposed to [the state’s] fundamental
elements, and which God and nature have sternly denied.” Rather than nurture a national
literature that would “enthrone in the spirit and opinions of our people” the “true idea and
settlement of liberty,” they reached the false conclusion that only a hierarchical social
order could save the country. Grafting a borrowed nationality on their country, they
inhibited the development of a distinctly American literature by which the nation might
become “conscious of itself,” infused with a national spirit, and morally unified.
In faulting popular government, religious revivals, and other disruptive parties,
Bushnell said, America’s “conservatives” misunderstood the nature of the present
conflict. American leadership failed in their “conservative attempts” not because the
American people were inherently unworthy or because they needed hierarchical forms to
inspire their “public devotion,” but because their principles were too low. Neither
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democracy nor fanaticism caused the present crisis—materialism did. Without an
educated class to guide them, or a national culture to inspire them, the people succumbed
to the “miserable delusion” that their welfare could be measured by the number of their
possessions. Bushnell called this “dead consumption” of material goods a “great cancer
of destruction” on society, which he claimed originated in the “corruption of quality in
the people.” Meanwhile, the ceaseless pursuit of material wealth transformed the
republic’s representatives into political mercenaries, who treated their countrymen as
secondary to property and goods. They defunded general education, neglected the
nation’s history, refused to invest in public monuments or national parks, and condoned
popular violence against public intellectuals. A state should function “like a body whose
breathing, pulsing, digesting, assimilative, and a hundred other, processes, all play into
each other, in that wonderful reciprocity that makes a full-toned vital order,” Bushnell
said, but a “state torn from its beginnings is fragmentary.” Having devoted itself to
material production, it was an incomplete creature, a body with only one function, its
men reduced to mere copies of each other. “Incapable of public love, or of any real
nationality,” it lacked the principles for national greatness.333
Reflecting on the state of American society, Bushnell, like Coleridge, asked: what
is the definition of the “wealth of a nation” that included its “weal, or solid well-being?”
Bushnell identified the national wealth as “personal, not material,” measured by the
“natural capacity, the industry, the skill, the science, the bravery, the loyalty, the moral
and religious worth of the people,” and not in goods or gold.334 Since the founding,
Bushnell recalled, the “germs of a mighty nation” had manifested in its law, industry,
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power, and territorial expansion. To propel the country to true national greatness,
however, the state would have to invest in the “personal value” of its people, whose
“highest treasures as a state, they behold in capable and manly bodies, just principles,
high sentiments, intelligence, and genius.” True statesmen nurtured their people’s natural
abilities and organized the population according to their various capacities—determining
“who shall be the directing head” and who the “nerves of action”—ultimately compacting
all of the people into “one energetic and stately body inspirited by public love.” As
Coleridge had, Bushnell clarified his point with an example from organic life: “It is a
well known principle of physiology,” he said, “that cultivation, bodily and mental, and all
refinements of disposition and principle do gradually work, to increase the native volume
and elevate the quality of a people.” Because this process of cultivation occurred
gradually over the course of generations, it opened up a “truly sublime” opportunity for
American statesmen to implement practical policies directed at “ennobling” their
country’s “stock.” For example, Bushnell suggested restricting immigration to “races in
the higher ranges of culture and character” and enforcing morality by outlawing
corrupting vices that “poison the blood of the nation” (like drunkenness).
Ultimately, however, if they wished to perpetually revitalize the “whole body of
the state,” they must find a way to enter the “seat of the soul’s regency,” and establish
“order and principle” in each individual’s conscience, from which a “conservative and
genial power” could flow to every faculty, disposition, bodily habit, employment, and
enterprise. Abandoning their “mercenary and merely economical” policies, they must
concentrate the state’s resources on suffusing the spirit of religion through the nation,
building a system of national education for the country’s youth, and, central to both,

166
nurturing a national literature. Although the United States lacked a unifying established
religion in the traditional sense, Bushnell claimed that a national culture would inspire a
religious faith in the nation, making religion “virtually incorporate in the principles and
feelings of the people.” He imagined a truly American “voice of faith” echoing in the
country’s colleges and universities, in a “spirit of public devotion,” inspiring the “special
culture” that befitted a “republican nation.” At its heart, Bushnell described an “American
and characteristic” national literature that would inscribe the “American mind wrestling
with itself,” powerful enough to overwhelm “demagogues and factions” and expose
abuses. This distinctly American nationality was the only elemental force strong enough
to counteract the deadening effects of slavery. Borne on the “high waves of revolution”
and “reclining at peace in the establishment of order and justice,” it would engage with
the “fearful questions” that slavery engendered, “deriving lessons of wisdom from the
conflicts of experience.” Acting as both liturgy and catechism, this literature would instill
a national faith based in the “true doctrine of civil freedom” that conjoined liberty with
justice. Bushnell predicted that the country’s literature would eventually substantiate the
foundational truth that “Liberty is Justice Secured” and establish its permanent authority
(e.g., through a constitutional amendment), finally raising the nation to the same level as
the divine government, “which knows no liberty other than law,” and fixing it forever on
the rock of immortal principle.335
Bushnell insisted that the anti-national and “law-and-order” types were spreading
a “sickly and copied conservatism” contracted from reactionary British and European
models. Under its influence, these “false” Conservatives repressed the only truly
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conservative forces of a republican society: its literature, its intellectual discourse, and its
beautiful arts.336 In contrast with this “morbid spirit of conservatism,” these social
reformers claimed to represent the “true Conservatives” of the American revolutionary
promise, acting in the interests of the republican principles that alone would constitute a
“perfect” or “true” society—that is, “a society which has for its end, the welfare of its
individual members, and the preservation of its unity among the nations.” Explicitly
adapting British and German romantic thought, they sought to propagate a unified
national culture that would organically topple the slave-holding regime.337 Yet, the
romantic and sentimental intellectual tradition that these reformers marshalled to make
this argument presumed that “national greatness” required habitual, historical, cultural,
and biological homogeneity. Consequently, Bushnell replicated a normative model for
organic statehood that privileged certain physiological and behavioral characteristics as
markers or prerequisites for national belonging. Fundamentally, in their texts, white
(preferably Anglo-Saxon) Christian males comprised the presumptive organic parts of the
aspirational American nation. Ultimately, then, they reinforced the exclusionary organic
premises that circumscribed the emancipatory potential of American politics.
Meanwhile, in his scathing 1838 critique of “modern conservatism” in America,
“Who are the True Conservatives?,” Nathaniel W. Taylor’s son-in-law, Congregational
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minister, moral philosopher, and future president of Yale University Noah Porter
condemned every one of “the conservatives of order and orthodoxy” who had taken it on
themselves to police American society.338 The problem with American conservatism,
Porter argued, was that the language itself gave “self-styled Conservatives” license to do
more harm in the name of conservatism than the radicals had ever done in the name of
reform.339 Having imported “conservative” philosophy without attending to its particular
application, these men cultivated a “morbid spirit of conservatism,” nurturing a temper
“destructive of our institutions,” and “at war” with the “American spirit.” Citing the
“great master” of conservatism, Edmund Burke, Porter clarified that “True
Conservatives” did not create new models or break up theories, but, instead, attached
themselves to all of the habits, local attachments, associations, and religious forms that
shaped a people and followed their natural development. In resisting change “under the
name of conservatism” in a nation founded on the principle of innovation, he argued,
these “false” conservatives “made void the law of God.” Even more than those activists
who agitated for abolition and other social reforms, these men who claimed to be “the
only conservatives of order and orthodoxy rather deserve the name of the destructives.”
340

338
Porter wrote the article anonymously; it was attributed to him posthumously. G.S. Merriam, Noah
Porter: A Memorial by Friends, (New York: C. Scribner’s sons, 1893), 291.
339
In the 1838 Quarterly Christian Spectator, Porter sketched the general features of those men who “claim
to be, but are not, true conservatives in politics, literature, and religion.” In general, he wrote, they were
timid, indolent, inactive, fond of paradoxes, oppositional, harsh in judgment, unsympathetic, and
unforgiving. Bigotedly attached the olden times, he wrote, they extolled the ancients with indiscriminate
praise, and condemned the present, innovation, and any improvement, explanation, or addition to ancient
scholasticism. Content with a state of subservience to merely literary influences, they failed to master them.
340
Porter, Noah. “Who Are the True Conservatives?” The Quarterly Christian Spectator X (1838): 608610, 614-615, 621, 627.

169
These “Conservatives” were not simply bad Americans, Porter argued, they were
bad Conservatives. Their attempt to transplant foreign conservatism opposed “every
principle of conservative doctrine,” down to the very name. While an English
Conservative in Great Britain “contends for something which he would save,” Porter
explained, his American imitators set out to destroy and then re-construct on the English
model.341 Disengaging from their communities, these “subservient copyists” ignored the
wisdom espoused by “all the Doctors of Conservative Law”—that institutions must be
saved in their present form because they already exerted a strong hold on the people’s
affections.342 Porter warned his audience that the greatest danger to the church and to
American society, at large, did not come from the “disorganizers”—“a few scores of
perfectionists, who have appeared but for a week”—but from this false conservatism that
“severs the unity of the spirit and breaks the bond of peace.”343 Forced into “a short-lived
existence by artificial influences,” this foreign species of conservatism would inevitably
wither in the United States, but not before exerting a destructive influence on American
society.
In the article, Porter called out the Old School, anti-abolitionist authors of the
Presbyterian schism by name, decrying them for their bigoted, un-American attachment
to the past. Men like Robert J. Breckinridge, who spear-headed the attack on the NewSchool ministers during the General Assembly, and Bennet Tyler, who antagonized
Porter’s father-in-law in New Haven and worked to marginalize the New-School
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theology, “love the past better than the truth,” and “antiquity better than the progress of
the kingdom of Christ.”344 Such men could not be considered “the True Conservatives” of
the country’s civil or religious order, he wrote, because “this class of men were not even
the True Conservatives of the Presbyterian church.”345 Though they presumed to speak
for the Edwardian tradition, their every act negated the “New England spirit” in which
Jonathan Edwards laid the foundation for the American church. According to Porter,
Edwards privileged investigation and toleration, and devoted his entire life to shed “new
light” on the question of man’s agency and God’s moral government. The “pretended
conservatives,” on the other hand, silenced new inquiries and open theological
discussions, going so far as to excommunicate men because they dared update their
language. In open violation of Jonathan Edwards’s spirit, these men embodied “a spirit
which under the name of conservatism has, in every age of the world, made void the law
of God.”346
Still, Porter observed, the fact that “the word conservative” had so effectively
penetrated and suffused the American lexicon indicated that it served some purpose
beyond the merely instrumental. The “frequent use of a new term” he noted, always
signaled “some movement in the minds of those who receive and give it currency.”347 In
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other words, to name a thing is to give it power; to take that name is to claim its power.
Each system had its own conservative principles and forces, Porter explained. Ideally,
conservatism kept a system in balance, countering destabilizing and extremist forces that
naturally developed in any system. A society that developed from conservative principles
would naturally tend toward stability; and if it fostered conservative forces, it could grow
and change, without destroying itself.348 Like all societies, then, America needed
conservatism, but it needed the right kind of conservatism: a unified, consistent,
exceptionally American conservatism, cultivated organically from native sources, and
tailored to America’s unique political and social system.
With the country on the precipice of disaster, Porter proclaimed, the time had
come for “True Conservatives” to step forward in the American spirit of innovation,
investigation, and toleration.349 In the United States, he wrote, the “True Conservative”
firmly held that, “he who aims not to improve upon the past, is a traitor to the cause of
humanity, and a high-handed rebel against the course of God’s providence.”350 True
Conservatives did not hole up in their private studies, reading dead texts and suffocating
the spirit of religious revival in the United States, like the Old Light Congregationalists
had, or shutter reform-minded churches, as the Old School Presbyterians had. Rather,
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truly American Conservatives, having rejected the “morbid spirit of conservatism”
imported from abroad, empowered church ministers and lay members of all backgrounds
to act as moral agents in society at large, formed voluntary associations for benevolent
purposes, and bringing the gospel into spheres where religion had not yet flourished, so
that every member of the community had the opportunity for grace. They lived and acted
as moral agents in the present, engaging with the national network of social and moral
reformers. To accomplish this task, Porter directed his readers to the work of Richard
Baxter, a seventeenth-century Puritan theologian understood in Porter’s time as an
“abolitionist” who had vocally criticized the institution of slavery.351 Baxter would lead
each one of them to become “a true conservative, indeed,” trusting in the gospel as the
mechanism to promote man’s “highest well-being” and “perfect development,” secure in
their faith that the gospel’s “onward progress” would lead them to a more perfect
world.352
On the surface, Bushnell and Porter presented themselves as the standard-bearers
of an organic (and, therefore, legitimate) American conservatism that fortified the nation
against radical change while facilitating its moral progress. Nonetheless, the language
they used to articulate their claims situated them in the increasingly heated national
conversation about slavery, abolition, and intellectual and civil freedom in the public
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sphere. The anti-abolitionist censorship of public culture reflected the proslavery
paranoia that a centralized intellectual and moral culture would indoctrinate the entire
American community in antislavery ideology, particularly if the “New England spirit”
and “New England morality” dominated.353 In this context, slavery inflected every
conversation about cultural production and moral reform, even the advocacy of tent
revivals and a free-range gospel. Like the proslavery camp, Bushnell and Porter operated
on the premise that a unified national culture would reflect the dominant national spirit: if
a spirit antithetical to slavery predominated, then the people, once assimilated, would not
be able to abide its continued existence.354 In advocating a national cultural solution for
social disorder, therefore, they promoted anti-slavery aims. By framing their arguments in
the adjacent realm of moral discourse, however, they sidestepped the unambiguous
danger attendant on those public intellectuals who voiced explicit opposition to the
institution of slavery.
Using coded language, they attacked the apparatus that artificially maintained a
slaveholding republic without marking themselves as targets for anti-abolitionist
violence. Though politicians and other prominent figures painted the North and South as
two completely separate economic structures, social reformers increasingly described
them as an integrated system, with northeastern merchant-capitalists financing and
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profiting from southern slavery. In this discourse, the language of political economy—
e.g., “material wealth” and “finance and trade”—signified northern capitalists and
indicted their complicity in slavery, and the argument for a unifying national culture
signaled an attack on a system (slavery) that thrived only in a moral vacuum. Contending
that the country’s focus on wealth at the expense of liberty posed the real threat to the
country’s permanence and progress, Bushnell implicated both southern slave-holders and
the northeastern capitalists and merchants who benefitted from slavery. From this
strategic position, Bushnell implicitly attacked slavery as a national sin, buttressed by the
mindless production of wealth and the mass consumption of material goods.355 Without
directly addressing slavery (or any other controversial progressive platform), Bushnell
and Porter advocated institutionalizing a national morality through a program of
systematic moral reform that they presumed would lead to the end of slavery as an
institution. A unified American spirit, grounded in the law of republican feeling and the
practice of pure morality, would not suffer the systemic sin of slavery to live.
Because Bushnell and Porter predicated their program of moral regeneration on
an organismic ontology of the state, however they reproduced and, in some cases,
scaffolded the very structures they critiqued.356 The organic framework served as the

355

I have chosen to use the term “national sin,” instead of “social sin,” which has been more commonly
used in the historiography. For example, Molly Oshatz offered a compelling treatment of the anti-slavery
terminology of sin in Slavery and Sin: The Fight Against Slavery and the Rise of Liberal Protestantism, in
which the term “social sin” effectively signified the same phenomenon that these nineteenth-century figures
described with the term “national sin” or “public sin” in the 1830s. However, they used “social sin” to
indicate a sin that occurred between individuals in a social situation, a distinct transgression from the sin
for which a society or community held collective responsibility. NB: “Organic sin” came into usage in
1845 (Oshatz marks the distinction 88). Oshatz, Slavery and Sin: The Fight Against Slavery and the Rise of
Liberal Protestantism, 81 and onward.
356
Extensive historiographic work has been done on the racist attitudes of mid-century social reformers,
especially Bushnell, who expressly identified American nationalism with white Anglo-Saxonism. See, for
example: Horsman, Reginald. Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-

175
basis for both radical and repressive political thought in the nineteenth century, but it
tended toward social, cultural, and gender normativity, and organic exclusion. Like the
pro-slavery and anti-abolitionist conservatives, these “progressive” conservatives
presumed and incidentally promoted an organically homogenous and essentially
hierarchical republic. The philosophical assumptions and tactics embedded in their
organic metaphysics conspired to encode a normative organic marker in the structure of
the American genome, producing a fundamentally discriminatory epigenesis expressed in
the organization and hermeneutics of the American system, inscribed in its institutions,
language, and politics. Although their texts may be read as a strategic intercession against
slavery or on behalf of other progressive causes, therefore, they struggled to generate real
(let alone radical or revolutionary) alternatives to the reactionary, capitalist, and proslavery schema that dominated American culture and political economy in this period.
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CHAPTER 3: HOW THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY GOT ITS NAME
In the 1830s, a group of politicians formed the first Conservative party in
American politics. Initially, the Conservatives maintained their identification with the
Jackson-Van Buren administration, but eventually they severed ties, forming their own
party. In 1840, they held the first “National Conservative Party Convention,” with
William Cabell Rives, former ambassador to France and one-time star of the Jacksonian
party, as their keynote speaker. The narrative of Rives’s political career appears to
encapsulate the career of a nineteenth-century conservative: a moneyed pseudo-aristocrat,
who, in opposing banking reforms, democratization, and States’ rights, resembled a
“new-styled” federalist who wanted to maintain the privileges of the slave-owning class
without sacrificing the Union. In the words of John M. Niles (a Jacksonian senator from
Connecticut), Rives’s politics corresponded with the “present doctrines of the
conservatives in all the Governments in Europe… advocates of arbitrary power, and of
existing abuses, however flagrant.”357
After leading the Conservatives to small federal and State victories in the late
1830s and early 1840s, Rives joined the Whig party, traditionally considered
“conservative” by political historians and political scientists.358 When the Whigs
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dissolved in the 1850s, he identified as a Unionist. As threats of secession neared reality
in 1860, Rives appealed to border State newspapers to maintain the Union, and even
attended the impotent 1861 “Compromise Convention”—the “hope of the country”
among “conservative men.”359 After Virginia seceded, he represented the Ablemarle
district in the First and Second Confederate Congresses, and, when he resigned, he
promised his constituents, “we shall still be bound together by common
sentiments and common interests in the future as in the past. My constant prayer shall be
to make that future as propitious and glorious as heart can wish. But whatever it be, I
share it with you.” Echoing the opening to the biblical Book of Ruth, in which Ruth
pleads with her mother-in-law not to abandon her, Rives pledged to his constituents,
“Whither thou goest I will go; where thou lodgest I will lodge; thy people shall be my
people, and thy God my God; and where thou diest I will die; and there will I be
buried.”360 To that end, he represented Virginia at the post-war National Union
Conservative Convention in 1866. When Rives died in 1868, the New-Orleans
Commercial Bulletin compared him with Great Britain’s Robert Peel because, “Like Sir
Robert Peel, he had the courage to change his political position, but like Sir Robert Peel,
he preserved the personal respect of those who were most dissatisfied with his measures.
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Mr. Rives was always a Conservative.”361
But was he?
Rives was man who learned law and politics directly from Thomas Jefferson at
Monticello; whom both Jefferson and James Madison considered a protégé and, later, a
close personal friend; to whom Jefferson confided his private thoughts on the presidency
and banking in the last decade of his life; and with whom Dolley Madison entrusted her
husband’s legacy after Madison’s death in 1836. Although Rives eventually accepted his
association with the “Conservative party,” he refused to concede his rightful place as a
“Republican” or as a devoted supporter of Andrew Jackson’s “liberal, beneficent, and
statesmanlike” policies, even as the dominant forces in Jackson’s party made it clear that
he no longer had a place among them. Acknowledging his split with the Jackson-Van
Buren party in 1838, Rives said, “I do not know that there is anything in this name of
Conservative, as applied to American institutions, which an American patriot ought to
wish to disown.” As applied to American institutions, he argued, conservatism would
preserve and defend Republican principles and practices against all “schemes of wild
innovation and destruction.”362 In fact, Rives noted, in opposing Van Buren’s speculative
Independent Treasury scheme—the proximate cause of his exile from the party—he was
attempting to preserve something that Jackson, himself, had put in place (the State bank
system). Rives may have led the first Conservative party in the United States, but he
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accepted that label conditionally, identifying it as American and explicitly rejecting
foreign conservative ideologies.
Rives’s politics had been deeply influenced by European political thought, but
not the kind of thought that contemporaries considered “conservative.” When Rives
served as the American minister to France from 1829 to 1833, for example, he became
close friends with General Lafayette, who operated as the epicenter for a diverse group of
reformers, radicals, and international intellectuals.363 In 1831, he joined Samuel Morse
and James Fennimore Cooper in the American Polish Committee, raising money for the
Polish revolution, and even interceded on behalf of reformer and abolitionist Samuel
Gridley Howe when that habitual revolutionary found himself tucked away in a Prussian
prison. Through General Lafayette, Rives became acquainted with radical utopians
Robert Owen and Fanny Wright, socialists Charles Fourier and his disciple Albert
Brisbane, and liberal republican Benjamin Constant.364 Their writings informed his
politics and inflected his speeches for the duration of his career. As president of the
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Albermarle (VA) Agricultural Society, he drew inspiration from Robert Owens’s socialist
model of voluntary association, encouraging his listeners in an 1842 speech to consider
their meetings a “community of goods,” in which everyone contributed their experiences
and observations to a “common stock for the benefit of all.” No one should be content
merely to preserve the status quo when, by the communal refinement of their intellectual
and manual labor, they could enjoy a constant “progressive improvement” of their
conditions. To that end, he called on his audience to look to Swiss reformer Philipp
Emanuel von Fellenberg, whose work in the field of education with Swiss romantic
Johann Pestalozzi produced “prodigies of moral and physical improvement.”365 In his
1847 “Discourse on the Uses and Importance of History,” a speech comparing the
American and French Revolutions delivered to the Historical Department of the Society
of Alumni of the University of Virginia, he drew liberally from radical Joseph Priestley’s
“Lectures on History.” He warned his readers against adhering to or maintaining the past
in all things, “without change or alteration,” and encouraged them, instead, to allow
history to lift them from “the narrow vale of familiar and parochial associations” and
“enlarge and liberalize” their minds. “In all wise plans for the amelioration of the
condition of man,” he said, “the past must furnish the fulcrum, at least, upon which the
lever of improvement is to be planted.”366 If anything, Rives’s personal relationships and
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acknowledged influences connect him with Jeffersonian republicanism and the growing
socialist tradition, not with people and sources traditionally considered “conservative.”
Rives’s affiliation with European socialists, reformers, and radical utopians
raises the question of what, if anything, made him a conservative, and, if he was, what
that might mean in the early American republic. The Conservatives discussed in this
chapter represented a political movement from within Jackson’s party who argued that
Van Buren’s policies diverged too much from Jackson’s republican precedent.
Examining the role that Conservatives played in this period, then, reveals the instability
and incoherence of party politics in the 1830s, and calls into question the taxonomy of
American parties and their express identification with particular ideologies.
PARTY NAMES: A LONG STRING OF ET CETERAS367
The story of Conservatives in America traces a mode of thought and discourse,
but it is also a story of names and the way that language shapes and obscures politics. In
the rare cases when the secondary literature refers to the 1830s Conservatives, it most
often labels them “conservative Democrats,” a name that implies that they represented
the conservative wing of the Democratic party. This convention reflects an implicit value
judgment on the relative liberality or democratizing tendencies of their political stances,
compared with some aggregate measure of Democratic party norms. Yet, the
Conservatives held their positions against what they viewed as the party’s illiberal
tendencies, particularly Van Buren’s move to consolidate federal banking under the
executive branch, and the anti-monopolist pressure to move from a mixed currency to
gold. When Rives and his cohort opposed Van Buren’s Independent Treasury Bill in
367
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early 1837, they did so in an effort to preserve the banking reforms that Andrew Jackson
had instituted only eighteen months earlier—reforms that had been lauded as
emancipatory and democratic when Jackson implemented them.368 Unlike the Whigs,
then, who amalgamated as a party against Andrew Jackson, the “Conservatives”
remained loyal to him, even as they grew increasingly hostile to Van Buren. This
confusion over the relationship between names and ideologies developed out of the
period’s use of party names as demarcation lines, political tools, and machines of
adherence (and consent.)
Historiographical convention traces the Democratic party itself back to Andrew
Jackson’s election in 1828, and his ascension to the presidency did mark a tidal shift in
the democratic tenor of political rhetoric. For the first time, “the choice of a free people”
had appointed the president—at least, according to the first line of Jackson’s first
inaugural address. In contrast, Washington had been “summoned by his country” (twice.)
Adams obliquely attributed his election to “the sagacious injunction of the two Houses.”
Jefferson’s “fellow-citizens” twice assigned the presidency to him, and Madison’s
country called him to this station in 1809 and “placed” him in it in 1813. Monroe’s
“fellow-citizens” called him in 1817 and renewed their confidence in 1821. And John
Quincy Adams, in 1825, having lost both the popular and electoral vote, acknowledged
that he had been “afforded the opportunity” of the presidency by “peculiar
circumstances,” and accepted “the station to which [he] had been called” in passive
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voice. Whereas John Quincy Adams’s inauguration address dedicated his presidency to
upholding the Constitution, Jackson’s held him accountable first and foremost to the
people, promising to reform the federal government primarily through limiting its reach
and reducing its size. The implication was that the entire people had elected Jackson,
whereas only elites had elected his predecessors, and that Jackson would serve the entire
people, and not just the dictates of partisan interests (as, Jackson insinuated, John Quincy
Adams had.)
Still, although many of Jackson’s followers aggressively identified their party
as the “Democratic party” and the only repository of democratic principles, the historical
record does not reflect either this nominal clarity or ideological coherence.369 Starting in
the 1820s, Van Buren projected New York’s machine politics onto the national scene,
building an institutional and bureaucratic infrastructure that could successfully negotiate
national elections, and navigate the dynamic between federal, State, and local political
success.370 National party conventions became normative by the 1840s, an institution—
combined with an exponential boom in newspaper coverage—that rationalized and
ossified party names. But these conventions and the existence of unified national parties
were not axiomatic in the 1830s.
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Through the 1830s, Jackson’s party took a heterogeneous approach to their
party’s name. When Jackson’s allies held their first national convention in Baltimore in
May of 1832, for example, they published the proceedings as the record “of a convention
of Republican delegates.”371 Three years later, in 1835, the Globe reported on the
“National Democratic Convention at Baltimore,” but the party itself submitted the
“Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates appointed by the Democratic
Republicans.”372 In their speeches, the delegates themselves used “Democratic,”
“Republican,” and “Democratic-Republican” interchangeably. On May 23rd of that year,
that same group informed Van Buren that the “National Republican Convention” had
nominated him for the presidency. Even Andrew Jackson treated the party’s name with
fluidity. In a letter to James K. Polk later that year, he renounced the “once Democratic”
Tennessee apostates from the “republican fold” who had refused to send their delegates
to the “republican national convention.”373
An 1834 editorial in the Niles Weekly Register titled “Party Names” complained
that this heterogeneity placed an undue burden on newspaper publishers, especially when
speaking of elections, since their readers mostly wanted to know which party prevailed.
Unfortunately, the dominant party seemed pleased to take a “personal name” and call
themselves “Jacksonians… or “Jackson-democrats,” with a long string of et ceteras,” but
they had not made clear what appellation they preferred to be called in print. To further
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confuse matters, the administration’s supporters were called by the same general name,
but the parts of the party—the “Jacksonmen” and the “Jackson-Van-Buren-men”—had
very different objects and ends in their political view-finder. The Niles defended the right
for all parties to call themselves by whatever name they pleased, but chastised them for
using party names to score political points. Serendipitously, the whig-friendly Niles
Register explained, “as if by universal consent,” all parties opposed to the administration
had independently taken the name “whigs,” but they had no right to call the Jacksonians
“tories;” and the administration party—be they “democrats” or “Jackson-democrats” or
“Jackson-Van-Buren-Wolf- democratic-republicans”—had no right to denominate their
opponents as “federalists,” “apostates,” or “bank men.”374
Two years later, the New Hampshire Patriot and Gazette, the proadministration paper run by New Hampshire Governor Isaac Hill, also published an
editorial titled “Party Names,” protesting the practice of calling the dominant party “Van
Buren men, Jackson men, and administration men” or “having any other name attached to
the individuals of the democratic party than that of democrats.”375 Hill published the
article on “Party Names” during the month-long period from November 3rd to December
7th, 1836, when popular voting remained open for the presidential election, and four
different opposition candidates opposed Martin Van Buren. During the election, antiadministration papers habitually refused to call Van Buren a “democrat,” instead
addressing their criticism to the “Van Buren ticket” or the “Van Burenites,” and
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promoting their own candidates as the “Anti-Van Buren” ticket, the “People’s Ticket,”
the “National ticket,” and, where applicable, the “Whig ticket.”376 Another antiadministration New Hampshire journal, in quoting Governor Hill of the “Democratic”
party added “(Van Buren?)” in parenthesis, as if they could not be sure to which party
“Democratic” might apply, employing irony to signal the name’s inaptitude.377
Governor Hill touched on this phenomenon himself when he suggested that the
opposition take any name they pleased, since they have “disgraced and abandoned every
name they have heretofore assumed,” but he insisted that they not impose any other name
than that “which has ever designated the advocates of democratic principles.” As clearly,
then, as he stated at the outset that the individuals of the democratic party must be called
democrats, Hill concluded that, “the individuals of our party are democratic republicans,
and ours is the democratic republican party, and nothing else.” At the very least, this final
statement redounds upon the practice of referring to Jackson’s followers monolithically
as “the Democratic party,” but it also speaks to the question of how party names
functioned historically.
Like the “Whigs,” who formed a party out of a coalition of anti-Jacksonians,
Jackson’s party had formed out of a coalition of his supporters. Both groups suffered
from relatively permeable boundaries, and lost allies when party leaders enacted concrete
policies, and when the object of their (dis)affection left office. For a successful transfer of
power in the 1836 election, the party had to have a transcendent and not an embodied
name and that name had to be identified with Van Buren as closely as it had been with
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Andrew Jackson. So, Hill’s “Party Names" declared, the dominant party were not “any
man’s men,” (not merely Jackson’s men,) but were men of principle, who followed a
cause: equal rights. Of course, anyone who opposed them opposed that cause, and those
men willing to be “any man’s men”—as anyone who voted for the various opposition
candidates running on independent ballots would have to be—abandoned democratic
principles. The article declared the existence of a single Democratic party unified by
principle and not by a man precisely because no such party cohesion existed. In fact, in
spite of Hill’s refutation, even pro-administration papers continued to endorse the “Van
Buren ticket” (in addition to the “Van Buren Democratic ticket,” the “DemocraticRepublican ticket,” and the “Republican ticket”), instead of the “Democratic ticket.”378
To project a (nominally) uniform “Democratic party” back onto this period,
then, implicitly privileges one group’s democratic bona fides over another, and marks all
dissenters as expressly anti-Democratic and, by implication, anti-democratic. In his book
on the Whig party, Michael Holt argues that party names serve as a “literary
convenience” that have allowed historians to discuss loose coalitions of opposition before
they cohered around a central organization or developed institutional loyalties.379
Explicitly, Holt speaks to the convention of referring to all of Jackson’s opponents as
“Whigs” or the “Whig party” before 1836, but the insight also applies to Democrats and
the Democratic party. These names all served as arguments, as they ostensibly reflected
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the party’s ideology. Choosing one name, even as short-hand, naturalizes the argument of
one part of one party about its ethos, and, as a result, falsifies the political and ideological
history of the period. Not all of Jackson’s opponents considered themselves “Whigs” and
not all of Jackson’s supporters considered themselves Democrats, or, for that matter,
democrats. On the other hand, those politicians who opposed the “Democratic party” did
not necessarily oppose “the Democracy,” in spite of the vitriolic partisan arguments to the
contrary.
Likewise, the Conservatives who emerged in the 1830s were not necessarily
conservatives. As discussed in the previous chapter, some American politicians in this
period embraced “conservative” as a descriptor of the types of policies or politics they
pursued. Their self-identification as “conservatives” grew out of the connection between
ideological conservatism and the organic approach to government. These men argued for
a distinctly American conservatism that defended the fundamental structures of American
government: in particular, States’ rights, popular suffrage, and democratic politics.
At the same time, because the term had yet to become fixed politically, it also
served as a general term of opprobrium lobbed between political factions. After the
American conservative impulse became identified with the Conservative party in
England, no one could avoid the sense of conservatism as an essentially foreign
contagion, associated with international banking interests, capitalism, and state power,
even if the content of Americans’ conservatism belied those associations. This usage
developed from the American habit of denouncing the opposition as “Tories.”380 As the
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Conservatives in Great Britain gradually took over the disintegrating Tory party after the
1832 Reform Acts, “Conservative” gradually entered the American lexicon as an
alternative (or addendum) to calling the enemy “Tory.”381
The first national Conservative party in the United States did not arise because a
group of men identified with an international conservative movement or universally
recognized conservative principles. Instead, the “Conservative” party began as “some
cant designation,” a name inflicted by the opposition to mock Van Buren’s party, and,
ultimately, adapted to marginalize and control dissent within that party. None of the
Conservatives ever shook the association with banking and capitalism generated during
their opposition to the Independent Treasury. By and large, historians have accepted the
characterization of their party authored by their opponents: that they represented a small
group of capitalists who lashed out at their own party in order to protect their interests in
the State banks.382 Otherwise, how would the “Conservative” label make sense? Yet, the
Conservative party had no higher proportion of bankers or merchants than the
administration or opposition parties, and—with the possible exception of the New York
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contingent—they did not hold their position against democratizing or egalitarian
principles.383 In spite of partisan rhetoric, the Conservatives did not present a uniform
front or a single set of interests. Instead, they coalesced around their position of dissent.
Or, as it may be more accurate to say, the administration democrats who entered a
position of dominance in the mid-1830s forced the newly unorthodox members of that
party into a coalition as diverse as Jackson’s party had been at its inception.
The first part of the story about how the Conservative Party got its name begins
in New York, where local party politics set the stage for the dynamic on the national
level. After a particularly violent election, “Conservative” members of New York’s
Tammany party (the city’s wing of Van Buren’s political machine) resolved to put a lid
on the manipulative aristocrats in the opposition. By the end of 1835, however, the
“Conservatives” sought to muzzle the radical elements in their own party— in particular,
a small group of men occupied with dismantling Wall Street, destroying banking, and
restoring equal rights. In 1836, these New York “Conservatives” joined with a
heterogeneous group of dissenters to oppose Jackson’s (and then Van Buren’s) more
radical banking reforms. At its source, the Conservative apostasy emerged at the national
level during the debates over State banks and the distribution of the federal surplus that
began in 1836, swelled in the wake of Jackson’s Specie Circular, and then ruptured
Jackson and Van Buren’s consensus party after the 1837 economic panic.
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The Conservative defection disrupted the balance of power in American
politics, kicking off a “complete reorganization of the political elements of the
country.”384 For the duration of Van Buren’s presidency, the Conservatives shifted the
balance of power at the national and State level by siphoning votes and sympathy from
the administration toward the Whig party. Without the Conservatives, the opposition
would never have toppled the Albany regency or the Tammany machine in New York, let
alone the Richmond Junto in Virginia. The Conservatives disrupted the party’s control
over New York and Virginia’s national representation, and destabilized Van Buren’s
carefully maintained political machine.385 As a result, the Conservative movement
created the conditions for Van Buren’s fall in the 1840 presidential election.
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PART I: SOME CANT DESIGNATION
The first Conservative party in the United States started with a riot. Actually, it
started with several. In April of 1834, during New York City’s first popular mayoral
election, a “gang of a hundred infuriated wretches of the Jackson party” tore down
Independent Republican flags, invaded the Committee rooms, robbed them of their
ballots, and, armed with knives, commenced an assault on the Independent Republican
citizens trying to keep the peace.386 Jackson Tories and Jackson rioters flooded the Sixth
Ward, where they delineated the “true spirit of Jacksonism… in characters of
384
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BLOOD!”387 The New York Courier and Enquirer reported that Tories and Hessian
mercenaries commenced a “reign of terror” in the Sixth Ward, that “the blood of Freemen
has been shed; the Whigs have been assailed, trampled upon, and beaten to earth” by
Tammany Alderman George D. Strong and his band of hired “BULLIES and
ASASSINS.”388 The New York Spectator speculated that those who opposed Jackson’s
war on the National Bank were marked, and asked, “has the exterminator of the
Seminoles sworn in his wrath to hang the advocates of that institution, and placed halters
around their necks, preparatory to execution?”389 Denouncing the shillelagh-wielding
mobocracy, the Spectator called on every “candid and honorable man," who once
marched under Tammany’s banners to rescue the city from those Tammany men seeking
to prevent “the free expression of sentiment, and the free exercise of the right of
suffrage—the last, best hope of American liberty” by resorting to violence.390
In ideological and practical terms, the perception that New York Tammany
democrats allied with British radicalism touched on a perennial phenomenon in New
York politics. The Tammany leadership embraced the city’s radical elements only when
the opposition party truly threatened to unseat “the party.” When they felt insecure about
their electoral fortunes, they opened their doors to a group known alternately as the
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“working men’s” or “equal rights” party. Influenced by British radical egalitarianism, this
group was primarily pre-occupied with banking reform, bankruptcy laws, and labor
practices, and they advocated free trade, hard currency, and opposed banks, in every
form. Although instrumental in the 1829 and 1830 elections, they had gone to ground in
the early 1830s. By 1834, however, they regained traction, particularly in the Sixth Ward,
just as Tammany seemed to be losing influence. To get the working men’s votes,
according to the opposition press, Tammany marshalled their proxies in print and on the
street to spread vitriol against big banks and paper money, cynically riling up their
constituents enough to draw blood on election day.391
“There are two sides to the story,” Jackson’s presses protested, and they
offered a radically different account.392 The New York Standard blamed the opposition
papers for “enflaming the passion of the multitude” in the lead-up to the election, setting
the conditions for violence. On the first day of the election, they claimed, the merchants
had taken the “unprecedented” step of closing their stores and dismissing their daily labor
“for no other purpose than that of political coercion.” Abusing their position, anti-Jackson
“task-masters” threw all of their forces into the sixth ward, forcing “thousands of
individuals dependent for bread on the breath of their employers” to vote for their
candidates.393 In spite of this “outrageous conduct of the aristocrats,” however, “the
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People’s candidate,” (Tammany’s Cornelius Lawrence) won over Knickerbocker Gulian
Verplanck.394
Though the sources diverged on the identity and political orientation of the
aggressors, they agreed that the present political process bred violence and that the
burden lay either with their elected officials to stop it. In the six months that intervened
between the April 1834 and November 1834 elections, chronic violence (and a cholera
outbreak) plagued the East coast. New York City hosted seven riots in this time period,
and major riots occurred in Philadelphia (including an election riot in October 1834) and
around Boston, culminating when an anti-Catholic mob burned down a convent in
August 1834.395
The Tammany political machine used this social unrest as an opportunity to
distance itself from the more radically democratic members of their party and to appeal to
“law and order” moderates, but they avoided implementing legislation that might alienate
their baser elements. In June, the Tammany Mayor approved a special committee of five
New York Alderman to investigate the conduct of election inspectors in the riotous
mayoral election, but the summer passed without any resolutions. Meanwhile, several
“law and order” Jackson men held meetings at Tammany Hall on strategies to maintain
order during the next election cycle. Because of their interest in organizing a police force
modeled after Conservative MP Robert Peel’s “bobbies,” this group identified as
“Conservatives.” The pro-Jackson New York Evening Post, known for its advocacy of
organized labor, praised this “great Conservative meeting” for neutralizing the effects of
the wild and incendiary “Bank party,” which it had blamed for instigating the riots in the
394
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first place. In September, this group of law-and-order “Conservatives” proposed that “all
friends of public order” confine their “political exertions” to their own wards.396 The
resolution passed New York’s Board of Assistants unanimously—“the democratic
members voting in favor of it, of course”—but did not go so far as to provide the wards
with the resources they might need to enforce them.397 They offered one resolution
authorizing Mayor Lawrence to employ additional officers during the election, but
“Every Conservative” on the Board of Aldermen voted against it, according to the N.Y.
American (a Whig newspaper). It passed by a “pure Whig vote.” This duplicity proved
the “real disposition of “the Conservatives” to keep the peace,” the N.Y. American noted,
and should finally shutter their “Tory pretensions to uphold order and the law.”398 Thanks
to the Whigs, the New-York Spectator reported in November 1834, the November
election passed without bloodshed, riot, or row.399
As the N.Y. American indicated, the predominantly Whig-affiliated opposition
press in New York referred to the “law and order” Tammany men as “Conservatives,”
but purely as ironic posturing. For the opposition papers, the “Conservative” label served
a dual purpose: it explicitly identified the Tammany Hall democrats with British politics
and it gave them an easy hook to mock them. The Whig presses emphasized the
distinction between calling the Jacksonians “Conservatives” in their reporting, and
actually conceding that the Jacksonian “Conservatives” held legitimately “conservative”
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principles or supported recognizably “conservative” politics. 400 As an editorial in the
Spectator explained, “Jacksonism” and “Albany Regency-ism” resonated not with British
Conservatism, but with the radicalism of Irish “Emancipator” Daniel O’Connell, who
sought to overthrow England’s glorious institutions and destroy its constitution. In the
present age, the Spectator continued, the “Conservatives” of every party contended with
the “Destructives,” no matter what they called themselves. In Britain, the “real Whigs”
and the “ablest and most liberal of the old aristocracy” had banded together as
“Conservatives” to battle the “Demagogue-Whigs, the Trades Unions, and the Radicals.”
In the United States, men with “whig” principles opposed the “hydra-monster of
Jacobinism—or Jacksonism—for they are one,” as well as the “kindred isms of other
countries.”401 In the context of international politics, the Jacksonians might reasonably be
called “Tyrants,” the Spectator attested, because, like Tyrants, they encroached on the
rights of the people through the free use of gold; or they might be called “Tory” because
they challenged measures that allowed the mechanics, merchants, and workingmen to
exercise their right to vote, just like the Tories in England. Because they openly
associated with radicals and employed violent tactics to achieve their ends, however, the
Jacksonians could only be called “Conservatives” in scare quotes.
In response, the Jacksonian and Tammany presses began referring to the
“falsely denominated” Whig party as “whig conservatives” because, they claimed,
American “whig” politics mirrored European and British Conservative politics. These
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“pseudo-whigs,” the argument went, adhered to the “same conservative political school”
that banished Rogers Williams to the wilderness, and condemned witches and wizards to
hang at Salem. These “whig conservatives,” intent on undercutting the popular will,
imported the politics of England’s Conservative aristocracy to secure their “pecuniary
interests” through control of the public purse. Like the British Conservatives, the
“haughty” American Whigs used men of “obscure birth” and “vulgar manners,” such as
Davy Crockett and George Poindexter, as their agents in securing place and power. These
wily politicians exercised the “old and hackneyed means of corrupt governments,”
promising that their laws would serve the people’s interests, making “money plenty for
them, through the banks,” and constructing “great national roads” for their benefit.
Instead, they saddled the industrious classes with unequal and indirect taxes, threw the
burden of the State on them, and, in reality, increased the inequality in society.402 These
ruinous policies slowly eroded the “real conservators of good order,” the farmers and
mechanics of the north, who possessed the “major part of the wisdom, the wealth, the
morality, and the religion of the country.” Moreover, as southern statesmen had observed,
this partial and local legislation generated sectional division and jealousy, threatening the
preservation of the Union, itself. These men might be considered “conservatives” in the
sense of European reactionaries and British paternalistic aristocrats, the Globe declared,
but “the conservatives of [the] Union are the Democrats.” All other parties, “under
whatever name they may appear, are its enemies.” Anyone that opposed the Democrats,
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as the Globe defined them, undercut the people’s independence and prosperity, damaged
the vital interests of the States, and disordered the Union.403
By the time the next New York City election rolled around, the Tammany
democrats determined that the working men’s party had joined the ranks of these
“disorganizers.” Like the other parties that opposed the “Democrats,” the working men’s
leadership had the audacity to question their policies; in this case, challenging Tammany
authority and pushing to move the party in a more radical direction. When Tammany had
needed the working men’s votes in 1834, the Spectator observed, Tammany’s “masterspirits” instructed their followers to “howl maledictions upon the banks, monopolies,
chartered institutions and rag money.” As the Spectator recalled, “They were all agrarians
then.”404 Now, Tammany had so successfully squelched the opposition that it seemed
they no longer needed the working men. Without a common enemy to battle, the leaders
appeared anxious to dispose of their former auxiliaries.405
This noxious situation came to a head in the fall of 1835, when the Republican
General Committee met at Tammany Hall to vote on their ticket for the imminent
elections to the New York State Legislature. The Tammany men held the political power,
but quickly found “King Numbers” against them.406 To pass a straight ticket, then, the
Tammany “regulars” had to hold off and otherwise ignore the increasingly rowdy internal
opposition. On the evening of October 29, 1835, the regulars met at Tammany Hall and
attempted to vote on and announce their ticket before the “motley crew” of Radicals,
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Rowdies, Fanny Wright Men, Agrarians, Infidels, and Ringtails rushed in and carried
theirs.407 The chairman had just announced the official ticket when the “irregulars”
captured the podium and set to nominating their own docket for the forthcoming election,
replacing the “bank men” with anti-monopolists and equal rights activists. A
confrontation ensued, the lights extinguished, and the well-prepared agrarians reached
into their pockets and retrieved thousands of candles and newly-marketed lucifer
matches—known in America as locofocos—thus igniting a riot and, subsequently, a new
party moniker, the Locofocos.408
Tammany’s official organ, the Times, blamed the “wild doctrines” of Fanny
Wrightism, Agrarianism, and other egalitarian heresies for causing a completely
unprecedented scene of turbulent and violent faction.409 The Times asked, “Has it come to
this, that the rights of citizens are to be invaded, that the old democrats are to be driven
from Tammany Hall by the exercise of brute force?” After years of vehemently denying
its party’s aggressive tactics, the Times now turned against the newly minted Loco-Foco
party as men who had come among them “under the mask of democracy” only to betray
them “with lawless violence.” The Times denounced the entire proceedings as “illiberal,
unjust, and undemocratic,” but the opposition press rushed to “vindicate the seceders, as
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they are called—the agrarians—for their consistency.” Democratic doctrine indicated that
all participants must be allowed to post their handbills and distribute their tickets. Surely,
having promised democracy, Tammany could not now begrudge their followers’
resistance to their “undemocratic” process.410 The “disorganizers” had felt their own
power, and the anti-Jacksonian Commercial Advertiser, for one, did not fault them for
using it against their “former masters.”
The split between the Tammany regulars and the Loco-focos gave new life to
criticism of “the Democracy” as an unholy alliance between secret bank monopolists and
radical insurgents.411 In describing the scene at Tammany, the New York Spectator
alluded to popular narratives of the Jacobin-led Sans-Culottes march across Paris on June
20th, 1792.412 “Singing and hooting, as erst their prototypes, the Poissardes and Sans
Culottes,” the “radicals” turned on the “regulars,” that portion of “the Democracy” who
like the French Girondin had tried to keep the people “in the dark.” Victorious, with locofocos ablaze, the radicals paraded the streets “to the tune of the Marseillois Hymn” and
although they did not “bring any one to the lamp-posts [to hang] that night,” the
Spectator predicted that the prospects for such a result “were exceedingly fair.”413
Meanwhile, the Herald noted without surprise that the Times and its owner, Commercial
Bank president and former Sixth Ward Alderman George D. Strong, had thrown off the
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mantle of democracy. Last seen at the head of a hired band of “BULLIES and
ASASSINS” leading a “reign of terror” in the Sixth Ward in 1834 riots, Strong had
secured the Commercial Bank’s charter after the 1834 election, and could now afford to
come out against the “poor, duped, humbugged workies, who oppose all banks.”414 The
Tammany-controlled Times amplified the effect by editorializing against “disorganizers”
who, according to its own report, comprised four-fifths of a purportedly democratic
meeting. In anticipating that the election would effectually weed the party’s ranks of
“interlopers,” “who have tried so long to force honest republicans into supporting their
new-fangled doctrines,” the Times gave the distinct impression that the “old democracy”
could only survive at the expense of the great mass of the people. During this election,
the “democrats” merely revealed themselves to be the self-interested, hypocritical
aristocrats that the opposition had always claimed they were.
Having spent several years calling Tammany to task for its expressly
unqualified embrace of “the Democracy,” the opposition press now gleefully recorded
Tammany’s “ludicrous lament” against the devil it had raised. The Daily Advertiser
described the symptoms of disaffection at Tammany Hall as the product of the “fever of
the democracy.” In the eyes of the opposition, Tammany leaders merely reaped the
discord they sowed; they could not now “unteach the doctrines they have taught.” When
the Daily Advertiser described the scene as a confrontation between the Locofocos and
those who adhered to “conservative doctrines,” they hit on a fissure that would ultimately
splinter the party at the national level.415
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In its undoubtedly instrumental critique, the opposition press voiced a real
tension in the administration party between radical egalitarian and “regular” democrats.
The anxiety expressed in pro-Tammany editorials conveyed a rising sense that the party
was getting away from them, that a radical contagion had infected them and threatened to
change the party into something unrecognizable. As usual, New York politics betrayed
the early symptoms of a national divide: their rift heralded a greater rupture in Andrew
Jackson’s party.416 Over the next half decade, “Conservatives” from within Jackson’s
party united to counter the influence of Loco-foco democrats and to mediate their party’s
banking reforms. As apostates from the “democratic” authority, they must be considered
its enemies. Foreign conservatism had come to America.
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PART II: A NEW SCHOOL OF DIPLOMATISTS
The consensus cabinet of Jackson’s early years had long given way to loyal
Jacksonians and Van Burenite cronies, who combined to advance an anti-monopoly,
metallic agenda.417 When the Twenty-Fourth US Congress had opened in December
1835, the power in the administration party at the national level appeared to have shifted,
416

Of course, Jackson’s coalition had been schismatic from the outset of his first administration, and he
alienated affiliates each time he made an appointment, took a stand, or brokered legislation, an effect of
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fact, Jackson had been trying to get Taney confirmed to the court for over a year, but the oppositioncontrolled Twenty-Third US Senate, who had also denied him a permanent cabinet position as Secretary of
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and these few hardline hard-money and anti-monopolist democrats seemed to exert an
outsize influence on the thrust of party policy and the tone of political discourse. Van
Buren’s protégé Silas Wright (of New York) and old Jackson stalwart Thomas Hart “Old
Bullion” Benton (of Missouri) monopolized the Senate floor, and, after years of
jockeying to be elected public printer to Congress, Francis Preston Blair and his Globe
finally received the House commission during Congress's first week in session.
Whereas the administration party once housed a recognizably republican
coalition under its expansive tent, it now seemed to tilt towards those “American
Democrats” who argued that federal banking and corporate legislation tended against the
equality that naturally resulted from industry, skill, and economy, “free from all
controlling power through the laws.” In a series of letters home during the first
congressional session, John C. Calhoun observed, “a very great change” that transformed
the “aspect, if not the condition, of parties.” He wrote that he first recognized the shift
during the Senate’s deposit bill debates, when a conflict developed between the “real
plunder and humbug” portion of the party, led by Senators Benton and Wright, and the
more “honest” portion, represented by William Cabell Rives and Nathaniel P.
Tallmadge.418 On one side, Benton and Wright “furiously opposed” the bill. On the other,
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Calhoun had authored an earlier version of the deposit bill in 1835 that would create a mechanism for
the legislative branch to regulate the public money that Jackson had placed in state banks in 1833, and to
establish a system of distributing surplus revenue among the states. When he saw that the opposition had
lost its majority in early 1836, Calhoun shunted the bill onto the administration party, effectively forcing
them to publically confront the questions of executive patronage and revenue distribution that they had
sidestepped after they allowed the original bill to molder into obscurity on the House floor during the
previous session of Congress. Silas Wright took the bait, offering a substitute with provisions to regulate
the deposit banks and invest the federal surplus in state securities, and Calhoun seized the opportunity to
push the distribution scheme under the guise of deposits in state treasuries to be returned without interest.
Effectively, this move served the dual purpose of eradicating the federal surplus and undercutting Jackson’s
state banks. Although Wright attempted to sink the resulting bill in committee, he failed to prevent it from
being read and engrossed towards the end of the first session in June 1836. According to Calhoun, this vote
brought out the “real state of things in the Senate,” a “complete disorganization of parties” that might auger
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Rives and Tallmadge rose to its defense on the “old doctrines of the Republican party, of
economy, retrenchment,” attacking the Senate’s extravagant appropriations and “Mr.
Benton's gold Humbug.” In the Senate, at least, they had arrived “at a point at which it is
difficult for these two portions to go on together much longer.”419 Calhoun had hopefully
predicted Jackson’s party’s demise ever since Van Buren edged him out half a decade
earlier, but, this time, the party infighting on the Senate floor, in partisan newspapers, and
in local elections supported his claims.
The 1836 presidential contest, in particular, strained the party’s inchoate
ideology, exacerbating the tension in its ranks. Although it did not dominate American
media, ideologically populist democratic rhetoric plagued the pages of the dominant
democratic presses, from kitchen cabinet members Francis Preston Blair’s Globe and
Isaac Hill’s New Hampshire Patriot to William Cullen Bryant’s New York Evening Post.
The “secret language of party” subtly changed until being a member of the democratic
party meant going for the “Benton yellow boys, and down with all monopolies.”420 These
Democrats advocated, in the words of one proponent, a leveling “let-us-alone” policy,
“predicated on the principle of disorganization.”421

a permanent schism. Ultimately, forty senators favored the bill, only four opposed it on principle: Wright,
Benton, Felix Grundy of Tennessee, and Alfred Cuthbert of Georgia. (The other two senators who voted
against the bill, John Black and Robert Walker, both from Mississippi, did so because their state
constitution precluded their support.) At this point, any action Jackson took in reaction to the bill would
only serve to accelerate the demise of his party. In spite of reports that Jackson, “furious,” threatened a
veto, no veto came to pass. The law stood, but, as Calhoun observed, the damage was done. (Calhoun
Letter to James H. Hammond. Senate Chamber 4th July 1836, J. Franklin 1859-1937 Jameson, William
Pinckney Starke, and John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900., 362-363.)
419
Calhoun Letter to James H. Hammond. Washington, 19th June 1836, J. Franklin 1859-1937 Jameson,
William Pinckney Starke, and John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of John C. Calhoun., 1900., 359-361.
420
“Benton yellow boys” referred to gold. Burlington free press. (Burlington, Vt.) 1827-1865. 24 June
1836.
421
In using the phrase “let-us-alone,” the Spectator alluded to free trade arguments advanced by the States’
rights party during the nullification crisis, which adopted its usage from similar arguments advocated on
behalf of manufacturing interests in the early to mid-1820s. My second chapter goes into this debate in
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Over the summer and through the end of the presidential election, the
administration party cohered, even as Jackson and Van Buren pressed their appeal to the
metallic and radical egalitarian democrats. In July of 1836, Jackson issued an executive
order, colloquially known as the “Specie Circular,” which dictated that the public lands
offices would only accept payment in metallic currency in order to protect aspirational
homeowners from predatory land speculators pedaling debt.422 By August, the major
newspapers reported that Van Buren and his running mate, Richard M. Johnson, had
written flattering letters to the “General Convention of the Democratic party of the city
and county of New York, in favor of Equal Rights and opposed to all monopolies.” For
the opposition, these letters provided tangible evidence that Van Buren operated in the
interests of the “New York Loco Focos—i.e., a mixture of the dregs of ultra democracy,
agrarianism and infidelity.”423 The incident hit two of the opposition’s favorite Van
Buren talking points: as an elite New Yorker, he was disconnected from real America and
its interests; and as an extremist, he was unfaithful to America’s republican tradition. Van
Buren’s letter hardly implicated him in utopian egalitarianism, and the Equal Rights party
more detail. The Spectator also clarified that the American system of government was predicated on the
principle of disorganization: “all good men who believe in the perfectibility of society, or even in the use of
education to improve our species, should ever pray that this disorganizing process may never cease, till
mankind arrive at that point of moral and physical perfection, beyond which it cannot go. It is the very
essential attribute of a self-governed people, to be always disorganizing for the purpose of reorganization.”
(Communication. Spectator, The Globe (Washington, District of Columbia), Thursday, March 19, 1835;
Issue 239. Category: News, Gale Document Number:GT3014150496; Communication. Spectator, The
Globe (Washington, District Of Columbia), Friday, March 27, 1835; Issue 246. Category: News, Gale
Document Number:GT3014150523) 337.
422
In the debates and the press, Jackson’s executive order was more commonly known as the “Treasury
Circular” or “Treasury Order,” and tended to be referred to as the “Specie Circular” in the opposition
presses. I will use “Treasury Circular” and “Treasury Order” when I need to maintain clarity with the
primary sources, and, otherwise, will use “Specie Circular” to keep in line with the historiography.
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The designation “the New York Loco Focos—i.e., a mixture of the dregs of ultra democracy,
agrarianism and infidelity” came from the anti-administration Vermont Watchman, quoted in the proJackson Vermont Patriot and State Gazette in order to rebut its claims about Van Buren’s ultraism. (“Van
has written a flattering letter to the New York Loco Focos.” Vermont Patriot and State
Gazette (Montpelier, Vermont), Monday, August 08, 1836; Issue 32.)
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themselves found it unsatisfactory, but the mere fact that he found it expedient to respond
signaled their role as a legitimate interest that required attention.424 Van Buren’s
inclination to publically address this party’s concerns corroborated the administration
party’s transition toward more radical, egalitarian, and anti-capitalist policies. Over the
next couple years, this affiliative adjustment would lead them to divest themselves of the
more “conservative” members of their own party.425
Jackson’s final annual message amplified this sense of ideological tension in
Congress. In his past messages, he had spoken of monopolies, but never of capitalists,
bloody revolutions, or the laboring classes. On December 5th, 1836, Jackson warned
Congress that their current fiscal and monetary policy would inevitably lead to “one of
those bloody revolutions which occasionally overthrow the despotic systems of the Old
World,” and that paper currency led to the “ruin of debtors, and the accumulation of
property in the hands of creditors and cautious capitalists.” The democratic presses
praised his “benevolent views,” but the anti-Jackson Telegraph announced, “we have
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fallen on evil times. A large portion of the Van Buren party are undisguised anarchists
and agrarians—and nothing is so pleasing to them as commotion and uproar.”426
By the end of 1836, both the administration and opposition presses designated a
fundamental division in the administration party, which they characterized as roughly
split along agrarian-versus-capitalist lines. As Calhoun laid out six months earlier, the
anti-Jacksonian Burlington Free Press reported that William C. Rives of Virginia,
Nathaniel P. Tallmadge of New York, and Henry Hubbard of New Hampshire led a small
faction of “Conservatives” in Congress, who had emerged to challenge the supremacy of
hard currency and anti-Bank men, notably Thomas Hart Benton, Silas Wright, and (exFederalist) Pennsylvanian James Buchanan.427 The Free Press described a “mighty
contest” among the leaders of “what has been known as the Jackson party.” Two factions
had emerged: the Anti-Monopolists (also known as the “loco-focos”), who wanted to
annihilate all civil society’s ancient landmarks, and the Conservatives, who urged the
Anti-Monopolists not to destroy all law and all of the country’s institutions.428
Democratic papers also jumped into the fray. The articles in question rejected
William C. Rives and his “NEW SCHOOL of diplomatists,” who served in the
“conservative party of the new president.” Devoted to patronage and the money system,
these treasury parasites flirted with the chartered monopoly system of State banks, and
426
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defiled themselves among the “deposite prostitutes.” They could be nothing but “hateful
to the democracy of the country.” Now, the Democratic Herald predicted, only a “noble
republican of the Jackson radical school of simplicity and reform”—like Thomas Hart
Benton—could save the party.429 Reprinting these articles, Duff Green’s Telegraph
concluded that whatever else might come from this “mutiny” in the “Usurper’s camp,”
Thomas Hart Benton and Amos Kendall aimed to lead a “democratic division of the
democratic republican party.”430
In the immediate context, both sides were reacting to the positions assumed on
Jackson’s Specie Circular at the beginning of the second session of the Twenty-Fourth
US Congress in December 1836. Once again, Senators Benton and Rives became
figureheads for the conflict developing on the floor of the Senate, and in the attendant
newspaper coverage. Benton championed those Jacksonians who wished to build upon
the Specie Circular as the first step in an essential fiscal reform. Rives represented the
“conservatives,” those who wanted to moderate it in order to more effectively and
organically generate the same reform. Both policy positions countered the Whig proposal
to rescind the Specie Circular entirely at the beginning of the congressional session.
Benton attacked anyone who sought to reverse course from a system of
exclusive metallic currency, accusing them of indenturing the federal government to an
endless cycle of paper debt. He argued that the paper system went against America’s
founding principles. As Jackson had proclaimed in his most recent annual message, “It is
429
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apparent, from the whole context of the constitution as well as the history of the times
which gave birth to it, that it was the purpose of the [constitutional] convention to
establish a currency consisting of the precious metals.”431 Benton, like Jackson, defended
the circular as returning the country to first principles.
On the same side of the aisle, William Cabell Rives, who had, up to that point,
served as a loyal party lieutenant in spite of being waylaid in his trajectory to the White
House, advocated a policy of practical, gradual reform. While he agreed with Benton on
the principle of reforming the currency, he warned against “Utopian and visionary”
notions of an exclusively metallic medium. Not only would a complete suppression of
bank paper be impractical, in the American system it was impossible. In the current state
of global commercial development,432 he noted, such a radical reform would encounter
nearly insurmountable barriers anywhere in the world; but, in the United States, where
States exercised the power to create banking corporations, the federal government could
not proceed on such a course of suppressing the banking system without abrogating a de
facto (if arguably not de jure) State power.433
Instead, Rives introduced a measure to mediate Jackson’s circular without
repealing it.434 In place of Jackson’s moratorium on bank paper, he suggested gradually
suppressing small bills and systematically enlarging and diffusing specie as a circulating
medium. His proposal substantially relied on Andrew Jackson’s seventh annual message
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to Congress delivered a year earlier in December 1835.435 Jackson had sought “a practical
reform in the whole paper system of the country,” and, to that end, recommended that
Congress adopt conditions for the State banks “with a view to the gradual disuse of the
small bills.” Thirteen months later, Rives recalled Jackson's message when he argued that
gradually introducing metallic currency into actual circulation would have the effect of
making it a “practical currency of common life,” the “universal medium of ordinary
transactions.” By this process, specie would become the money of “the farmer, the
mechanic, the laborer, and the tradesman” and the merchant would still enjoy “the
facilities of a sound and restricted paper currency for his larger operations.”436 In this and
other speeches that Rives made defending his proposal in late December 1836 and early
January 1837, he echoed the major democratic talking points of Jackson’s administration.
Though he would be accused of switching his allegiance from “Jacksonian” to “Whig” or
“Conservative,” he had changed neither his political nor his programmatic orientation.
Rather, the locus of Jackson’s party and the stakes of fiscal policy had shifted radically
during the last year of Jackson’s presidency.
Partly, this phenomenon grew out of Jackson’s material gains during the
Twenty-Fourth Congress (1835-1837.) What ground Jackson had lost due to his heavyhanded exercise of executive power during the bank wars, his party had regained by the
spring of 1837.437 The administration party, in the minority by three senators when the
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term opened in 1835, closed the second session with a ten-man majority. In addition to
the administration-friendly senators from the newly minted States of Arkansas and
Michigan, ten of Jackson’s political allies, all committed to his program of fiscal reform,
joined the Senate from December 1835 to March 1837, mostly replacing dead or resigned
members of the opposition.438 This partisan shift gave Jackson’s party the leverage to
elect Francis Preston Blair printer to the Senate for the upcoming Twenty-Fifth US
Congress.439 The administration’s program also triumphed in the judicial branch where,
on February 12, all five of Jackson’s appointees on the Supreme Court concurred in

of the first session, three men who had been elected as Jackson’s supporters (none of whom returned for the
24th US Congress) joined with twenty-three opposition senators in passing a resolution censuring President
Jackson for removing the public deposits from the Bank of the United States. By the close of the 23rd
Congress’s second session on March 4, 1835, the opposition held a ten-seat majority (counting the two
Nullification party members, who tended to act as swing votes.) The opposition maintained a tenuous grasp
on their majority in the Senate when the 24th US Congress convened in December 1835, but had already
started losing its grip. By the end of the second session in March of 1837, they trailed the Jacksonians by
ten seats.
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famously resigned in February of 1834 rather than fulfill his instructions to vote to return the deposits to
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Buren would offer the position of Attorney General when he became president, replaced anti-Jacksonian
Benjamin Leigh, who had also resigned because he refused the VA Legislature’s instructions to vote for the
expunging resolution; Jacksonian and one-time Grand Master of the Grand Lodge of North Carolina Robert
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went on to implement radical reforms as Governor of Louisiana (e.g., abolishing property requirements for
suffrage and holding public office, balancing the budget by selling state assets, pushing an anti-tax
platform, opposing all internal improvements state expenditures, and eradicating the prison monopoly),
replaced anti-Jacksonian Alexander Porter who resigned on January 5, 1837, due to illness. Both new
states, Arkansas and Michigan, brought Jacksonians to the table: William S. Fulton and Ambrose H. Sevier
(AK), and Lucius Lyon and John Norvell (MI). The tenth Jacksonian to enter the Senate during the 24th US
Congress, Robert C. Nicholas of Louisiana, filled a vacancy caused by the death of another Jacksonian
before he was able to take his seat.
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Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, an anti-monopolist decision that effectively
empowered States to limit or dismantle corporations.440 Considered either a coup for
States’ rights or a blow to the inviolability of contracts, depending on one’s side of the
aisle, the ruling also provided the legal infrastructure for States to shutter private banks at
their discretion.441
Even though Rives’s more moderate currency bill passed the Senate by an
overwhelming majority, and was endorsed by the House with a preponderance of
administration men voting in favor, most newspapers painted Rives as the leader of a
strident minority.442 Benton and his cohort declared a mandate for their program of fiscal
reform, triumphant in the wake of Van Buren’s election, the recent Supreme Court
decision, and expunging Jackson’s censure from the Congressional Record. Media
coverage of Congress strengthened their position, depicting Benton’s faction as
dominating the party, and controlling the administration’s policy and message. Rumor
even spread that Benton had sat in on Van Buren’s first cabinet meeting, basically
dictating his position on the Treasury Circular with support from Attorney General
Benjamin F. Butler and Postmaster General Amos Kendall, both of whom were
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considered strident Anti-Monopolists.443 As the Twenty-Fourth US Congress shuttered its
doors for the summer, the Anti-Monopolist ascendancy in the party seemed assured. The
political pressure for compromise passed, and Rives’s bill got lost in President Jackson’s
pocket.
Virginia power-broker Thomas Ritchie, whose Richmond Enquirer set the tone
for the more politic elements in Van Buren’s party, regretted the bill’s failure, reminding
the new Van Buren administration that it had to “do its duty—and its friends keep
united,” so that “all will be well.” 444 Although Ritchie publically dismissed the ‘whig’
rumor that a struggle between Benton and Rives divided the administration’s friends, in
his private correspondence he worried that the party would schism over the Treasury
Circular if Van Buren refused to rescind it. Not only did the circular provide the
opposition with leverage against the party, but in the wake of the imminent financial
crisis, the people would seize upon the Treasury Circular as the cause of their distress and
clamor against the government. And, he insisted, they would be right to do so. Van Buren
had a duty to consider less what his predecessor had done than what would promote the
good of the country now. The coming crisis would require that all of Van Buren’s sincere
friends support him against the common enemy, but his “metaphysically mad”
commitment to the Treasury Circular threatened to alienate men whose interests and
feelings “naturally and deeply enlisted [them] in the success of the present Republican
Administration.” Citing Burke, he advised that “a statesman never losing sight of his
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principles” should be “guided by circumstances.” If Van Buren judged contrary to the
“exigencies of the moment,” “he may ruin his country forever.”445
Even if Rives and company had successfully mediated Jackson’s hard-money
policies, however, the force of the financial panic that engulfed the money market and
banking system in the spring of 1837 would still have determined the course of American
politics. Tremors of market instability long preceded its collapse, but it only registered on
a national scale during Van Buren’s first month in office, as major mercantile houses and
brokerage firms in New York, Boston, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and New Orleans failed.
Van Buren’s only campaign promise had been to maintain Jackson’s policies, a pledge he
redoubled in his inaugural address, but Jackson’s pocket veto of Rives’s currency bill left
Van Buren without an explicit statement on monetary policy. Surrounded by Jackson’s
advisers and press, all of whom denied the reality of commercial distress, Van Buren
passively allowed the Specie Circular to stand without open avowal or mediating
revision, in spite of commercial and political pressure to repeal it.446 In the absence of
material concessions to the heterogeneous interests in his party, Van Buren reinforced the
popular impression that he would do nothing to stall the party’s shift towards radical
reform.447
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The opposition predictably blamed the administration’s national currency
experiment for the distress. Through their negligence, the “great panic makers at
Washington” had willingly sacrificed the “working men”— “so dearly loved and
regarded before election”— to the “gold humbug of salaried politicians,” sending the
prospect of comfortable subsistence for families “up the Mississippi in silken purses.”448
For years, they had paid lip service to “useful and faithful” laborers, but, once in office,
they effected a “financial coup d’etat,” securing a monopoly over gold and silver.”449
Meanwhile, the Globe and the Albany Argus, and every paper that excerpted
them, dismissed reports of financial distress as rumor-mongering, a political fiction
conjured to scare the “the democracy of numbers” into submission. They censured the
“political panic makers,” who secretly worked to secure the power of bank monopolists
via the “great political engine” of the moneyed power in Great Britain, which, they
declared, still effectively controlled politics in the United States.450 The Globe traced the
origin of the “panic” to a “regular systematic plan” that Nicholas Biddle and his foreign
allies devised back in 1834 to expand the banking system by gradually increasing the
government’s taxing power, imposed through the circulation of paper money, and
establishing a monopoly of exchange businesses. The Globe called for a boycott of all
papers engaged in publishing “panic articles” or who have hired “panic letter writers” in
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service to the trans-Atlantic “moneyed aristocracy.” 451 Only then would the country
allay the panic, restore confidence, and bring relief.452
Possibly, if Jackson had signed Rives’s bill as a conciliatory measure towards
his party’s base or if Van Buren had made a definitive statement about the circular some
time during his first hundred days in office, they could have mitigated the political and
fiscal fallout of the ensuing financial crisis. But while Jackson’s administration had
projected strength, Van Buren began his tenure vulnerable to rumors of party disaffection
and personal weakness. Internally, portions of the party that had acquiesced to Jackson’s
strong-hold refused to bend to Van Buren’s will. Van Buren had encountered resistance
from the moment Jackson had made clear his intentions to ensure his succession. Four
States (Tennessee, Alabama, Illinois, and South Carolina) had refused to even send
delegates to the 1835 national party convention. As a representative of New York’s
Albany Regency, Van Buren’s ascendancy also stirred up regional power struggles,
especially with Virginia’s ruling class. So long as he had operated behind the scenes, Van
Buren had balanced the party’s interests with relative success, but once perched in the
451
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executive chair, he needed a Van Buren of his own to manage the party. Unlike Jackson
in 1832, Van Buren had not taken office with enough popularity to conduct his affairs
with impunity (or even enough leverage to control party policy.)453
At the end of May, Van Buren finally called for a Special Session of the
Twenty-Fifth Congress to begin September 1st, leaving three months for press speculation
to fill the vacuum generated by his silence. Over the summer, Van Buren played a waiting
game. Cloistered with a select group of his advisers—Treasury Secretary Levi
Woodbury, Attorney General Benjamin Butler, and internationally renowned anti-bank,
anti-paper economist William M. Gouge—he focused on building a legislative program
to satisfy his anti-Monopolist allies without alienating his broader base.454 In the interim,
he avoided publically committing to any position and left his party organs to track the
country’s temperature. Even from his Hermitage, Jackson made himself heard, but Van
Buren uniformly refrained from public statements, and refused to attend public dinners.455
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Unfortunately, Van Buren’s caution read as an unwillingness or inability to direct the
country in a time of crisis.456
THE CONSERVATIVE PARTY, PART III: PRINT, PAPER, AND THE CONSERVATIVE
REVOLUTION
Van Buren’s tactic of testing the waters through proxies reinforced the
impression that he did not wield power so much as submit to it: that, as a “mere cipher in
the government,” he served at the command of Andrew Jackson’s Kitchen Cabinet.457
The common knowledge that Kentuckians Amos Kendall and Francis Preston Blair
“controlled” Van Buren agitated regional jealousies, particularly in Virginia and New
York. Having kept a close watch on the Globe’s growing immoderacy, Richmond’s
Thomas Ritchie observed with alarm the public perception that Van Buren served at the
Globe’s discretion. In a confidential letter to Attorney General Butler, he cautioned
against the course taken by the Globe editors and other vocal Anti-Monopolists.458 In the
past, the party’s strength had rested on a combination of a fractured opposition and a
willingness to discard non-conformists, but political conditions had changed. The Whigs
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had consolidated power as a party and the administration could no longer afford to
alienate such a broad swath of its base;459 without the “conservatives,” the administration
lost the House.460 The party’s inconsistency on banking fueled these reports of infighting
and, by the end of the summer, the Daily National Intelligencer reported that the “Van
Buren Tallmadge men,” refusing to go any further with loco-focoism, had delivered an
ultimatum: “Either must Mr. Van Buren yield, or the party will sever.”461
The substance fueling the Globe’s rage against the money threatened to
consume the whole party, but Van Buren remained tight-lipped on his own course.
Without knowing where Van Buren would fall on the looming bank question, the
heterodox elements of his party diverged on how to act. The editor of the Herald “had
reason to know” that Van Buren intended to withdraw from the Globe faction and support
Rives in revolutionizing the democratic party from its “very flower” in New York,
Virginia, and the South.462 In one widely reprinted anecdote, a “consistent” member of
the Democratic Republican family, when asked to which party schism he belonged,
replied: “I intend to be on Van Buren’s side as soon as I can find out which side he is
on!”463 Even Thomas Ritchie’s Enquirer vacillated on where Van Buren might fall
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ideologically. Everyone prophesied, but “the boys in the secret” remained “as mum as
mice.”464
Growing restive, this silent majority found its voice in the establishment of a
new national paper in Washington, the Madisonian. The Madisonian promised to reflect
the “true sentiments, measures, and interests, of the great body of [the administration’s]
supporters.” It would faithfully represent the administration’s “real policy,” not dictate it,
like the Globe did. Where the Globe had disrupted the country, disoriented its domestic
self-respect, and damaged its international honor and credit, the Madisonian stepped up
to implement “a political reform in the theory and practice of the national
government.”465
In his prospectus for the new publication, editor Thomas Allen chastised “some,
from whom better things were hoped,” for their “head-long pursuit of extreme notions
and indefinite phantoms, totally incompatible with a wholesome state of the country.”
Their “unwise adherence to the plan for an exclusive metallic currency” had increased the
country’s distress by impairing public confidence in the credit system, and provided the
opposition with leverage to unseat the administration. For too long, the party had been
hijacked by a small group promoting “visionary theories,” who seemed more interested in
pursuing their economic and political reforms than in responding to the financial and
social crises that threatened to destroy the country. In contrast with the conduct of those
men who remedied abuses by “destroying the institutions with which they are found
connected,” the Madisonian promoted “more conservative principles.”
464
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Before the Madisonian’s first issue came out, the Globe network set out to
discredit it. One of the Globe’s satellites, the New Orleans Bee, attacked the paper as a
“shallow artifice,” a bank paper in disguise, published by the “conservative” editors of
the National Intelligencer to divide the “liberal party.” For the uninitiated, the Bee
explained, “The term “Conservative,” under which this publication is ushered to the
world, is perfectly understood in England, and is used in a similar sense here.” Men
interested in maintaining an order that benefitted them materially—the great bankers, the
Barings Sir Robert Peel, the Duke of Wellington, Lord Lyndhurst, Nick Biddle, and other
kindred spirits—were all conservatives.466
Still, the Bee claimed, no rival could supplant the Globe as the administration’s
paper. Over the previous two years, in its role as printer for the 24th House, the Globe had
maintained a vice grip on political discourse. It already held the commission to serve as
the public printer for the 25th US Senate; the House, having closed the session without
voting, would elect its printer at the beginning of the 25th US Congress. If it received both
House and Senate commissions, with thousands of dollars in government money fueling
its press, it would be positioned to act as a monolith, crushing opposition and gradually
suffocating any men and any administration presses that crossed it.
But the new paper in Washington did threaten the Globe’s monopoly over the
administration’s message and its control over the party’s media. Partisan presses buzzed
that Van Buren, tiring of the Globe’s “tyranny,” secretly approved of the Madisonian.467
The New York Morning Herald even suggested that the paper began as a conspiracy
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originating “in the very centre of the palace at Washington.” According to the Herald,
Van Buren and Rives, “one and indivisible,” planned to cast aside the Globe just as
Jackson had discarded Duff Green’s Telegraph half a decade earlier.468 The new party
organ could then implement a campaign to generate popular support for State banking
(and ensure Rives’s succession over Benton.)469
Van Buren quickly disabused any notion that he stood with the “conservatives.”
In his September 5th message, he publically declared his allegiance to the AntiMonopolists, firmly coming down in favor of the Independent Treasury system.470 In his
usual circuitous language, Van Buren laid out a plan to end Jackson’s State bank system
and bring the public revenue under the auspices of the Executive, reasserting the
government’s right (and the constitutional imperative) to accept payment in specie alone.
He acknowledged that this arrangement extended his branch’s power, influence, and
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patronage, but maintained that he had little choice given that the State banking system
had failed and the people had repeatedly rejected a national bank.471 Postmaster General
Amos Kendall’s report, which followed as an addendum to Van Buren’s message, stated
the official stance on specie unequivocally: “Gold and silver are the only constitutional
and legal currency of the United States,” and the only currency that could be offered
legally to public creditors.472
Eventually, Van Buren’s dissenters would hash out their grievances with the
administration in the debates over Van Buren’s proposal, but they made a strategic choice
in taking their first stand on the first vote after Van Buren’s message: the House election
for public printer. For years, at the close of every congress, the Senate and House each
elected a printer for the next congress. These contests—and the rules governing them—
had always been politically contentious, revealing the dividing lines within party
coalitions, and setting the stage for new ones. 473 Over the course of the 1830s, the printer
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debates directly reflected the administration’s power in Congress. If Van Buren could
successfully exert party discipline like Jackson had, then the House’s election would go
as smoothly in the fall as the Senate election had in the spring. With an administration
majority in the House, and the Senate commission already secured, Francis Preston
Blair’s Globe seemed poised to control the printing for all of Congress. With a bare
majority of votes required to win, the Globe should have walked away with the contract
after the first ballot. Yet, in ballot after ballot, the Globe fell short of the vital number. A
handful of administration men refused to vote for the paper.474
When the election for printer started, John C. Clark, who had loyally served
Van Buren’s New York regime for fifteen years, nominated Madisonian printer Thomas
Allen. On the first ballot, Allen received twenty-two votes—enough to prevent Blair from
winning an election that should have been a walk. The administration party
unsuccessfully attempted to stall the election until after the body had voted on Van
Buren’s proposal, hoping that they could pass it before a hostile press did irreversible
damage to the party’s prospects.475 Suddenly, the election had become a contest for
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party responded to the hopeless situation by stalling. In the Senate, Benton attempted to “reform” the
process by repealing the congressional rules governing printer elections. After weeks of argument, and
seventeen ballots, the Senate elected Gales and Seaton on February 28th. The House, on the other hand,
never elected a printer. The obstructionist administration party introduced a resolution that the elections
should be made viva voce, which effectively blocked the vote. During the 24th US Congress, the only time
when the administration party faced little overt internal resistance, the administration press finally won a
Congressional contract. When the 24th Congress convened in December 1835, the House elected Blair on
the first ballot. A year and a half later, in March 1837, the Senate elected Blair as its printer for the 25th US
Congress on its first ballot. The House, having closed the session without voting, would elect its printer at
the beginning of the 25th US Congress For the resolutions and debates, see: 23rd Congress 2nd Session Cong.
Globe 308 (1835) Thursday, March 5, 1835; “Monday, February 2, 1835,” Congressional Globe 23rd
Congress 2nd Session (1835): 153, 163-164.; Congressional Globe, 291)
474
"Election of Printer—Io Poean!" New-York Spectator [New York, New York] 11 Sept 1837; Our
Evening Edition of Yesterday. "From Washington." Morning Herald. 12 Sept 1837.
475
New Yorker Isaac H Bronson, whom Polk would appoint to the first US District Court for the District of
Florida nearly a decade later, submitted a resolution to delay the election for two weeks, permitting the

225
dominance, with the perceived strength of Van Buren’s party, the Anti-Monopolist
monopoly over the media, and the viability of Van Buren’s program all at risk.476
The Whigs capitalized on the administration’s disunity by proceeding with the
election. At the very least, they could subject the administration to a humiliating debate
over a seemingly trivial question of government bureaucracy during a time of national
crisis.477 On the outside, they could irrevocably divide the party, push through their own
printer (Gales and Seaton) and make a grab at controlling the national discourse.478

Clerk (Walter S. Franklin, a longtime friend of James Buchanan) to decide who should serve as printer in
the interim. Another New Yorker, William Taylor, submitted a resolution that they authorize the House
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elected viva voce. While on its face, the push for open voting represented a democratic and populist call for
transparency, real violence lay behind the threat of viva voce. Both parties employed physical intimidation
to ensure conformity, and the administration party, in particular, had become notorious for manipulating the
spoils system to exercise party discipline and systematically hamstringing party members who failed to fall
in line. (Register of Debates in Congress 11, pt. 1 (1835): 573-574)
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Virginia Whig Henry A. Wise goaded Allen’s supporters into an open declaration of dissent. He
insinuated that the Conservatives hid behind the ballot’s “veil for safety” because they feared that they
might “offend the President” if forced out in the open. But their cowardice was misguided: ““You are every
man of you marked,” Wise said, “Your doom is sealed.”477 Infamous for his temper and easy recourse to
physical violence, Wise’s personal reputation underscored the potentially violent consequences of crossing
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professional, political, and potentially physical harm for their non-conformity. Fellow Virginian James
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the Globe stand pledged to war against.” Recalling the parable of Roman Consul Titus Manlius, who had
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that he voted for Allen over Blair. Realizing that his little band had placed the party in an awkward
position, he moved to lay the subject on the table, but too late. (25th Congress 1st Session Cong. Globe 13
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Partisan papers declared the election proof that the party “has no binding” and that those
administration men who opposed the Globe would also oppose the President. The
“twenty horse power” who voted against Blair possessed the means of defeating all of the
party’s measures, the Morning Herald reported. The party must either “fall,” or “come
back to first principles.” Either way, ““Divide” is now the word.”479
In the first political vote of the new session, after three days and twelve ballots,
“some ten or a dozen Judases” secured Thomas Allen as public printer and irrevocably
altered the political dynamic on the floor of the House. The fact that Van Buren failed to
get his printer elected confirmed that the entire balance of politics had shifted since the
24th Congress had closed the previous March. Combined with Van Buren’s explicit
pledge to the Anti-Monopolist wing of his party, it cemented the schism in Jacksonian
politics, proving that the administration coalition could no longer abide under the same
roof.480 At last, the Boston Atlas declared, “the Conservatives had openly revolted.”481
Several Whig papers noted the irony of ascribing to these men the moniker
“Conservatives.”482 The Courier reported incredulously that men who once promoted the
“destructive policy of Jackson-Van Burenism” to an extreme had now been dignified with
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the name “Conservatives.”483 The Daily National Intelligencer stressed that “the
Conservatives” did not promote Whig principles, but held “less anti-republican,” “less
agrarian,” and, therefore, “less politically obnoxious” sentiments than the Globe party.
For those confused by the name, the article clarified for its readers that “the
Conservatives” could only be considered “conservative” “in certain particulars.”484 J.H.
Pleasants (the Richmond Whig’s editor) mocked the absurd pretense of this “little party”
who, “after all its insults to the Constitution,” had suddenly become “far too conservative,
too much attached to the Constitution, too jealous of presidential patronage,” to support
Van Buren’s Sub-Treasury scheme.485
In calling out the hypocrisy or self-interested cynicism of the Conservatives,
these papers touched on the central problem of party politics in a political system that
theoretically abjured political parties.486 How could men, purporting to be part of the
same party, hold such disparate and contradictory views on essential questions of public
policy? If, as the administration claimed, the Jackson-Van Buren party formed out of
their mutual commitment to the fundamental principles of democracy, and if they
opposed the banks (and all monopolies) as a function of adhering to those principles, then
every man true to democratic principles should promote the policies naturally derived
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from them. Disagreement on fundamental questions of policy, therefore, designated
either a fault in reasoning from first principles, or the destructive influence of passions or
interests in party ranks. Either the “conservatives” were not truly democrats or the
dominant party was not truly principled. Ultimately, this position reinforced the political
binary; like the “dominant party,” the Whig opposition argued in a bipartisan framework:
men either stood with them or against them.487
Having spent years accusing the opposition of being unprincipled and antiideological, members of the administration party now found themselves vulnerable to the
same critique. Heterodox party members now faced a choice: either stand with Van Buren
against the banks, or stand exposed as a pro-bank, pro-soft money, pro-capitalist, antidemocratic, anti-egalitarian, neo-federalist. In just over a year, the policies advocated by
the “conservative wing” of the administration party had gone from being normative to
putting them beyond the pale of party-adherence.488
Of course, rumors of a split in the dominant party served the interests of the
parties who spread them. For the opposition, they generated the sense that the
administration party verged on disintegration. Perceived infighting betrayed the
administration party’s political weakness and ideological incoherence, which confirmed
the opposition’s claims about its artificiality. If the party fractured under Van Buren, then
it had, in fact, been merely a cult of personality, a one-man Jackson party with delusions
of endurance. This evidence of the administration party’s profligacy also had the
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potential to unify the opposition in anticipation of their prospects as real contenders for
political power.
The Anti-Monopolist faction, on the other hand, wielded the rumors of
fragmentation to secure a stronghold on the party’s political agenda, exercising an
implicit threat that they would abandon the party if it failed to meet their demands. They
operated from a truly ideological position: anti-institutional and anti-government, their
intolerance of compromise reinforced their claims to principled purity, outside the bounds
of party discipline (largely because, at this point, they dictated it.)489 Up until this point,
the majority faction (the “Monopolists” who favored a mixed-currency compromise and
gradual shift to hard currency) had relied on the ideologically populist and democratic
rhetoric now inextricably associated with the Anti-Monopolists to build its partisan base.
If the administration party lost this vector of the party, then they forfeited their
ideological essence.
MERCENARY POLITICS AND ARMED NEUTRALITY
Across the country, popular papers decried the “unprincipled,” “mercenary,”
“partisan” politicians in Washington, who appeared more interested in policing party
lines than resolving the bank crisis. Nevertheless, the session wrenched onward without
any movement. Thomas Ritchie wrote to Rives to “keep cool” and compromise, but
Ritchie failed to account for the impact that the schism had on the party’s political and
public image. After months of employing every newspaper in its arsenal to threaten or
cajole the Conservatives into submission, the administration could not now negotiate with
489
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them without betraying weakness. Having taken the stand on ideological grounds, they
could not combine with them on a compromise measure without opening themselves to
charges of impurity. The administration had to remain committed to their current
trajectory or risk losing the entire game.490
Senator Silas Wright redoubled the party’s commitment to Anti-Monopolist
ideology in his September 14th bill for an Independent Treasury system. Building on
President Van Buren’s message, the bill made clear that the Anti-Monopolists did not
merely intend to separate the United States government from banks, they intended to
separate it from banking entirely. The proposed bill required that public officers should
act as depositories, instead of State banks, and directed them to keep the public money
without loaning or using it until the time came for them to dispense with it.491 No longer
would public money provide the funds that allowed State banks to extend credit, expand
commerce, and encourage foreign trade, as then Treasury Secretary Robert Taney had
recommended they do when Jackson first sent the federal deposits to them four years
earlier.492 In eliminating the possibility of surplus funds, Wright’s bill also short-changed
federal funding for internal improvements, striking a blow in that decades-long political
battle and appealing to the remaining contingent of Nullifiers.493 Wright placed the
system’s implementation and management under the executive branch. Granting Treasury
Secretary Woodbury complete oversight over the Independent Treasury, the bill relied on
the discretion of a man famous for his opposition to banks and paper money.
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The administration’s aggressive strategy risked more than the balance of
Congress. By October, it appeared that they risked the national balance of power, as well.
If Van Buren failed to re-integrate the Conservatives before the approaching midterm
elections, he risked losing both his home State (New York) and Virginia, both
battleground States and both States where Conservatives had established a beachhead in
the prior year. As the elections loomed, nearly a third of Van Buren’s party in the Senate
voted to adjourn and end the debate on Wright’s Independent Treasury, hoping to table
the trouble until after the election.494 Unwilling to compromise with the Conservatives
but unable to pass Wright’s bill without them, the Senate faced a stalemate.
John C. Calhoun had been waiting for years for just this moment. The
vulnerable administration desperately needed allies and Calhoun was perfectly positioned
to dictate terms. In his letters home, he expressed his intention to exploit the party’s
internecine tension to reclaim the “old Jackson party” for slavery, States’ rights, and free
trade. That he now held Van Buren’s fate in his hands merely sweetened the deal.495
Calhoun seized the opportunity to destroy the credit system and “break the last of our
commercial Shackles,” kicking off legislation that might prevent the federal government
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from interfering in the southern economy.496 During the debates over Wright’s bill,
Calhoun offered an amendment that essentially granted legislative sanction to Jackson’s
Specie Circular.497 On the day that the Senate concluded its debate over Wright’s bill, it
adopted Calhoun’s amendment. Once passed, the bill would now explicitly convey the
government’s divestment from the credit system, effectively rendering bank notes illegal
tender in the payment of government dues, and degrading the bill’s gesture towards
gradually changing the currency.498
With Calhoun and his States-Righters, the administration—barely—had the
numbers to push Wright’s Independent Treasury bill through the Senate at the end of the
special session. When the opposition could no longer stall (and failed to table) the bill, it
squeaked by with a vote of twenty-six to twenty-one on October 4, 1837.499
Unfortunately for Van Buren and his allies, although the Conservatives held a much
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smaller proportion of seats in the House than the Senate, they still took up enough space
to suffocate the Independent Treasury after a week and a half of debate. On October 14th,
fifteen administration congressmen joined one-hundred and fifteen members of the
opposition in tabling Wright’s bill in the House.500 They repeated this trick during the
following session and for the next three years, forestalling a change in American fiscal
policy that had appeared inevitable before the Conservatives revolted.501
In stalling the Independent Treasury, the “little Conservative band of armed
neutrals” kept a divisive administration policy in front of the American public,
continuously demonstrating Van Buren’s weakness on a national stage and providing
fodder for the opposition.502 But their success in destabilizing Van Buren came at their
own expense. Although they held their own State conventions in 1838, 1839, and 1840,
and won races at the national and local level, the Conservatives themselves ultimately
held sway only briefly, and then were consigned to the margins of political history.
Within five years, about half of those Conservatives who remained in politics had bled
back into Van Buren’s party, and half joined the Whigs. Several of the more outspoken
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Conservatives left politics entirely.503 By the time they held their first national convention
in 1840, they had already lost the battle over the Independent Treasury and with it the
battle over the essence of the “democratic republican” party.504
When the Independent Treasury finally did pass, it only did so as a product of
institutional failure.505 Van Buren’s party obstructed elections in Pennsylvania, New
York, Michigan, Virginia, Delaware, and New Jersey. Five of these States had vacancies
in the Senate when the Twenty-Sixth United States Congress began in December 1839.
Van Buren’s machine ensured that senators who had been crucial in blocking the
Independent Treasury bill were either excluded from higher office or stalled on their way
to Washington. Administration men at the State level refused to endorse anyone who
would not pledge support for the Independent Treasury in the upcoming Senate. In
Pennsylvania, the “Buckshot War” blocked Conservative Samuel McKean from reelection, in spite of popular support, leaving Van Buren loyalist James Buchanan to cast
Pennsylvania’s sole vote in favor of the bill.506 The Van Buren-controlled New York
State Senate blocked Nathaniel Tallmadge’s election in March 1839, leaving New York
without a senator until January 1840, when the Whigs controlled both houses and
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successfully elected him. Tallmadge arrived to take his position on January 27, 1840, four
days after the Independent Treasury vote. Local party politics also delayed Michigan
Whig Augustus Porter from joining the Senate until two weeks after the vote.507
Unresolved party disputes prevented Virginia508 and Delaware509 from filling their open
Senate seats for two years. Both States were left with only one US senator apiece until
Whigs gained control of their State legislatures in 1841. Tennessee’s Hugh Lawson
White resigned rather than follow instructions from the Van Buren party-controlled State
legislature to vote in favor of the bill, leaving Felix Grundy to cast Tennessee’s sole vote
in favor of the Treasury.510
When the Senate voted on the Independent Treasury Bill in January 1840, then,
ten senators missed the crucial vote, eight of whom would have voted against the bill,511
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which would have led to an even split.512 Ultimately, twenty-four senators (all Van
Buren’s men) voted in favor of the bill in the Senate on January 23, 1840, and eighteen
opposed it, including four administration men.513 It is unclear if Van Buren would have
allowed the bill to come to a vote if faced with a full roster in the Senate. Although the
measure would have passed (with Vice President Johnson casting his tie-breaking vote),
it did not have enough public support for Van Buren to push it through a recalcitrant
Congress. Even with a majority in the Senate, Van Buren had to delay bringing the bill to
the House until after two contested New Jersey congressional elections had been resolved
in his party’s favor at the end of June. Without those five seats, Van Buren could not trust
that his party would win the vote.514
On July 4, 1840, Van Buren signed the bill into law in what could only be
considered a pyrrhic victory.515 Van Buren’s fixation on this unpopular issue tanked his
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chances for re-election and the compromises he made to pass it completely reshaped his
party in a way that ultimately excluded him from it. The party narrowed ideologically
under Van Buren’s tenure, increasingly favoring the two factions he empowered during
the struggle for the sub-treasury: the Benton-led expansionists and Calhoun’s pro-slavery
faction. Neither of these groups trusted Van Buren to advocate for their interests. For one,
he had always been cagey on his own attitude toward slavery. Although he courted the
pro-slavery vote by defending States’ rights, deploying the gag rule in Congress, and
declaring that he would never sign a bill abolishing slavery in DC, he had often
advocated non-federal solutions on questions of slavery so that he could avoid taking a
positive position. During his career, he had been associated with the American
Colonization Society, defended the right of people of color to act as witnesses in court,
and consistently opposed slavery’s expansion to new territory, a position he maintained
when rejecting Texas’s 1837 bid for annexation. Pro-slavery agitators even considered
his behavior in the Amistad case suspect, since he essentially volleyed the case to foreign
powers. When he came out publically against annexing Texas in 1844, he torched his
relationship with both the pro-slavery and expansionist wings of the party.
In purging the democratic party of those members unwilling to conform
ideologically, the more radical democratic and anti-capitalist elements paved the way for
an ideologically (and nominally) coherent Democratic party. The 1840 Democratic party
platform declared that Congress had no power to interfere with the States’ domestic
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institutions and that party members would not abide any efforts “by abolitionists or
others,” to induce Congress “to interfere with questions of slavery, or to take incipient
steps in relation thereto.”516 The publication marked the first time a national party issued
a formal platform and the first time that any party explicitly declared its intention to
defend slavery. In fact, only after the Conservative defection does it make sense to refer
to the Democratic party. At its 1840 national convention, the party officially adopted the
name “Democratic” and in the “Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention,”
delegates uniformly referred to Van Buren’s party as the “Democratic party” and the
“Democrats.”517 Before this shift, the parties lacked coherent ideologies, but this conflict
solidified each party’s public image, and confirmed the power of polarizing invective in
the hands of a swelling popular press. Ultimately, then, the Conservative revolution
resulted in a complete realignment in American politics, leading pro-slavery and
expansionist factions to dominate the Democratic party after 1840, while also giving
them the rhetorical space to cast themselves as the defenders of American values and the
Whigs and other opposition parties as foreign conservatives.
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CHAPTER 4: THE ORGANIC REFORMER
Since Jackson’s first election, the Democratic party’s strength had rested on a
combination of a fractured opposition and a willingness to discard non-conformists. After
the “soft money” Democrats defected, however, the Whigs consolidated power as a party,
and consistently (if unevenly) disrupted Democratic dominance at the State and national
level. By the end of the 1830s, the Whigs had become the country’s de facto
“Conservative” party in domestic and international media, characterized as a facsimile of
foreign conservatism and, likewise, linked to the centralization of power, aristocratic
class structures, international banking, and the protection of amalgamated wealth. As the
last chapter addressed, the Democratic party in this period used the label “conservatism”
instrumentally to associate its opposition with foreign and reactionary parties, and with
corporate capitalist interests, in particular. “The tendency of American Conservatism,”
wrote the Globe in 1839, “is at bottom British Conservatism,” a struggle between
moneyed power and popular power, and of “mercenary influence against popular rights.”
Like the British aristocracy, the Whigs wanted nothing more than to “perpetuate and
extend corporation abuses” in order to “oppress and rob the people.”518 Although both the
Whig and Democratic parties harbored men with corporate, capitalist, and banking
connections, common knowledge at the time almost exclusively identified those interests
with the Whig party.
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In his three-volume work on America, British radical social reformer James Silk
Buckingham examined the American Whig’s policy positions and determined that they
basically reproduced their Tory and high-conservative Whig counterparts in England.
“The conservatives are here called Whigs,” he wrote, “and they correspond in political
character and sentiment with the Whigs of England; being quite as loud in their
professions of liberal principles, but quite as unwilling to carry them out into practice.”
Buckingham observed that, like their namesakes, the American Whigs sought to amplify
money’s voice in political operations. Economically capitalist and commercially
protectionist, they promoted monopolies and chartered (or incorporated) banks and toyed
with the idea of limiting the franchise to citizens with property.519 In their attitude toward
“the people” and universal rights, Buckingham elaborated, they sympathized “almost
universally” with the English Tories, fighting democratization and permissive voting
laws, and, just like the Tories had earlier in the decade, they obstructed debate over
slavery, being “generally hostile” to its abolition. Overall, Buckingham found the
American Whigs “quite as conservative” as Conservatives in England.520
If foreign observers concluded that the Whigs fostered anti-democratic, antipopular, and classist tendencies, they could hardly be accused of mischaracterizing the
party. Certainly, outspoken proponents for the national bank and other pro-banking
measures found a more comfortable home in the Whig party than among the Democrats;
and prominent Whigs like Daniel Webster, with overt ties to international capital,
compounded the public perception of their essentially foreign “whig” or “corporation”
519
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conservatism.521 As the LocoFoco movement appeared to overrun the Democratic party
in the late 1830s, moreover, some Whigs expressly longed to import the kind of foreign
conservatism that would wipe out America’s emergent labor parties, advocating measures
that attempted to secure social distinctions in a land without codified class heredity (even
if it structurally and legally perpetuated class-stratification.) In a March 1840 letter to his
colleague at the Baring Brothers financial firm in London, Webster complained that “our
locofocoism… is not a whit better than your socialism.” In their blindly obstructionist
opposition to capitalist measures, he reported, the Loco Focos prevented the federal
government from resolving State debts, which devalued US Treasury notes on the
international market and threatened American welfare at home and abroad. Considering
their “miserable exhibition” in the most recent congressional session, Webster concluded,
“We need a Conservative party more than you do.”522 Later that year, Webster’s
“Conservatives” consolidated their political power in a national campaign that completely
transformed American democracy.
Ironically, considering the theoretical antagonism between conservatism and
popular rule, the “Conservative” Whigs were the ones who cemented the popular turn in
national politics.523 Breaking with tradition, Harrison stumped for himself, as part of a
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centrally-coordinated national spectacle.524 In an unprecedented frenzy of rallies and
marches—featuring drinking, music, and overblown oratory—the Whigs trotted out
William Henry Harrison, once again, but this time as a national (instead of a regional)
candidate.525 During the 1840 presidential election, the Whigs touted their candidate as a
political outsider, a plainspoken hero and self-made man, who would end government
corruption and the political spoils system, and his opponent as a member of New York’s
elite, a physically weak, effete lifetime politician, who spent more on his clothing than on
his constituents, and who had ridden the coattails of a former president as far as they
would go.526 Reporting on these Whig political conventions, the Western Messenger (a
Cincinnati-based Unitarian journal edited by Transcendentalists James Freeman Clarke
and William Henry Channing) reprimanded the Conservative (Whig) party for
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increasingly indulging in this kind of “popular flattery.” In their conventions, the
Messenger disclosed, the Whigs called forth the “prejudice and hatred of the poorer
classes,” resorting to “slang and nicknames” and fomenting public drunkenness. In their
choice of leaders, they defaulted to the “available candidates,” when the “great aim of the
true Conservative party, from the time of Washington, has been to withstand demagogism
in all its forms.” In pandering to the people’s lowest instincts, the Whigs made them unfit
for self-government and created the conditions where they would soon no longer govern
themselves.527
At the end of the campaign, the Whigs successfully mobilized a large number of
Van Buren’s opposition: eighty percent of eligible voters made it to the polls (compared
with 56% in 1836) and the new voters cast their ballots for Harrison. Though Van Buren
received a comparable number of votes in both the 1836 and the 1840 elections, the
influx of opposition votes swept him out of office. The Whigs marshalled William Henry
Harrison to the presidency with strong support from the border States and the deep South,
and took control of both the House and the Senate, to boot.528 For the first time in forty
years, the “party of Jefferson” lost the South, due in no small part to the fact that the
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Whigs had seized the initiative on slavery.529 In addition to nominating a slave-holder for
president, they orchestrated and passed the first total gag on receiving anti-slavery
petitions in the House.530
The Whig coup thoroughly destabilized the Democrats. Not only were they afraid
that the Whigs would overturn the reforms they had implemented over the past decade,
but they were shocked that the Whigs had won, at all.531 The comprehensive
“Conservative” victory contradicted their teleological narrative of progress, in which any
American party constituted on anti-democratic principles could not thrive because it
contravened the “fundamental principle of our organic law, which is Democracy.” The
Democratic Review encapsulated this position in an article it published two years earlier
about the Whig loss in the 1838 midterm elections. Even if an anti-democratic party like
the Whigs successfully deluded a large portion of the population to vote against their
natural instincts and affinities, “by the profession of a popular character directly at
variance with the true spirit of its measures, and with the known and avowed opinions of
all its principal leaders and controlling influence,” and with its “nonsensical tirades”
about rigged elections and corrupt deals, or about the Democratic party’s hostility to
“commerce, credit, and national industry and prosperity,” or about the “abuse of power
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and ambitious monarchical aspirations of [the Democratic party’s] leaders,” the
Democratic Review declared that the Whigs could not sustain those lies for long. As a
party, it went against everything it claimed to support in its campaigns and no party that
had “any thing to conceal, any false professions to make, any unavowed ulterior objects
to attain” could flourish in a country with “free institutions, universal suffrage, and
unrestricted liberty of discussion.” Surely, the people would see past its abject
falsehoods; surely, they would realize that it intended to undermine their popular rights.
Without the “vital and conservative principle of pure democracy” flowing through its
body, the Whig party was a “hollow and a rotten thing” subsisting on “decay and
destruction,”532 and it would inevitably crumble under the weight of its own nothingness.
When the Democratic Review had predicted the Whig party’s imminent demise in 1838,
it had voiced the common Democratic-party consensus. Progressive democratic theory
determined that the Whigs were doomed.
When, instead, the Whigs routed the Democrats in 1840—and, again, somehow
hoodwinked the white working-class into voting against their interests—the Democratic
party scrambled to account for the loss. Immediately after the election, the Globe
concluded that the Whigs won because they spent an unprecedented amount of money.533
The pro-slavery faction, on the other hand, pointed to Van Buren’s weakness on State
rights, and the frontier Democrats blamed the perception that he had prioritized eastern
interests over western development.534 Calhoun seized the opportunity to push the pro-
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slavery agenda and Benton to encourage expansion; party Democrats re-entrenched
behind those positions to bolster their trans-regional appeal in the deep South and the
frontier States.535
The new balance of power in the Democratic party further alienated those
Democrats harboring anti-slavery sympathies (many of whom abjured the Whig party for
its accommodationist position, but had also become increasingly uncomfortable with the
Democrats after Calhoun re-entered the fold in 1837), and caused a rift among Democrats
active in workingmen’s causes, marginalizing those reformers who viewed slavery and
territorial acquisition as tools that profited merchant-capitalists at the expense of labor
and the debtor class. To be part of the Whig party meant aligning with capitalists and
banks; to be part of the Democrats meant aligning with slave-holders and their imperialist
enablers. So long as these two parties remained the only options for those reformers who
sought to be politically engaged, to be anti-bank or anti-capitalist—to be pro-labor—
entailed opposing express freedoms for people of color.536 At the national level, the
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Democratic party acted as a unit, but their fractured consensus remained evident in State
and local electoral and legislative politics, and vividly re-emerged on the national scene
every four years, like clockwork.537
After the election, the Democrats embraced the same popular Whig tactics they
had thoroughly excoriated during the 1840 campaign in order to restore their connection
with the white working-class.538 This shift exposed and amplified tensions within the
Democratic party and between equality-oriented reformers over the value and
implications of popular politics. At the time, social activists tended to equate democratic
and equality-oriented reform; to fight for one was to fight for the other. But the decisive
Whig victory demonstrated that popular or democratic reforms would not necessarily
benefit the working class, especially if something within the system itself gummed up the
works. In a corrupt democratic system, where capitalists controlled the franchise and
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misappropriated funds to finance their elaborate and seductive political campaigns,
private wealth distorted the popular voice. Even the most unconditional supporters of
democratic principles recognized that the election reflected poorly on the state of
American democracy. If the anti-democratic party simultaneously rigged the elections
and manipulated access to voting in their favor, then popular reforms actually increased
their strength and prevented emancipatory changes for the working class (or any other
marginalized or structurally-disenfranchised group). The Whigs compounded these
concerns when they shifted their politics toward nativism in the 1840s. In opposing
immigration, inciting anti-Catholic (functionally, anti-Irish working-class) sentiment, and
pushing against liberalizing naturalization laws, they suppressed the populations that
traditionally voted for the Democratic party.539
In this context, the Whig push to consolidate power in the federal government
took on a sinister aspect. Their democratic critics warned that these totalizing systems
exploited every ounce of control willingly ceded. In the same way that capitalists and
bankers deployed debt to create a dependent debtor class, they charged, the Whigs
wielded federal funding to transform the States from independent bodies into subordinate
vassalages, and their citizens from free men to peonage. Federal planning, federallyfunded roads and canals, federal standards and regulations all reinforced this artificial
539
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hierarchy, while federal education programs indoctrinated the country’s subject
populations so that they perceived the system as natural. As soon as the Whigs
successfully concentrated their authority in a hegemonic bureaucracy, their Democratic
opposition predicted, they would use the power unilaterally to reshape the electorate and
impose their will. If equality-oriented reformers sought to effect real social change, then
they might have to look beyond democratic means.
Before the 1840 election, the Whig Daily National Intelligencer had anticipated
that the Democratic party would fall out over their positions on popular electoral politics
and popular reform. Calhoun’s faction had initially allied with Van Buren’s LocoFocos to
further their collective anti-capitalist aims and the two parties shared a contempt for
federal control, the Intelligencer observed, but they entertained mutually exclusive
theories of government. Calhoun’s pro-slavery phalanx relied on disproportionate
representation and an unequal distribution of power to protect slavery from the northern
tyranny of numbers, while the LocoFocos privileged popular democratic rule over
republican safeguards, and programmatically promoted universal emancipation.
According to the Intelligencer, the LocoFocos had temporized their position on Southern
slavery in order to secure Southern votes against the Northern banks, but they could not
sustain that position for long. Philosophically, the LocoFoco concept of the “largest
liberty” embraced the “emigrants of all races, and the colors of all human kind,”
predisposing them to “abolition for the whole human race, as well as to the abolition of
all restraining law.” Furthermore, their commitment to democratic principles meant that
they would invariably flow in the direction that democracy thrust them: if the majority of
the people willed down “slave institutions,” then “down they must go.” Eventually, their
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totalizing theory of democracy would effectively unleash the same kind of hegemonic
consolidation as Whig federalism—a majoritarian absolutism in which the Northern
community imposed its will on the Southern. In that case, the Daily National
Intelligencer projected, slavery’s real defense lay with the kind of anti-popular
“Conservatism” associated with the Whig party—a conservatism that believed in
contracts that could not “be repealed by a majority at will” and constitutions that the
“majority may not in an hour upset.”540
In the uncertain political atmosphere following the election, Calhoun reached out
to northern political activists similarly skeptical about the absolute value of popular
democracy, wary of consolidation, and disaffected with the Democratic party’s
leadership—most notably, radical reformer and Democratic party proxy Orestes
Brownson. In the 1830s, Brownson had explicitly lifted his basic operating principles
from Calhoun’s political writings, which he habitually reviewed in his journals and cited
in his articles and public speeches. Although Brownson opposed slavery and had twice
spoken at Anti-Slavery societies, he had long supported Calhoun, attracted by his State
rights doctrine and his opposition to corporate capital and private banking. After reading
Brownson’s April 1838 article on “Slavery—Abolition,” Calhoun had returned the
affection, starting a correspondence with Brownson about philosophy and politics,
confiding in him his own desire to publish a treatise on the nature and object of
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government, and subscribing to Brownson’s journal (the Boston Quarterly Review),
which he cited and recommended to his friends.541
In Brownson, in particular, Calhoun found a loyal lieutenant and a metaphysical
counterpart. In Calhoun’s theories of government, Brownson found the socio-political
means to obtain his teleological aims. Brownson’s hybrid meta-political philosophy
anticipated the popular split in the Democratic party. Starting in the 1830s, Brownson
built an eclectic vision of organic progress based on his involvement with the
Transcendentalist and social utopian movements that prioritized practical methods to
secure social equality and justice over the reflexive (and, he argued, counter-productive)
adherence to popular government. In their “mania for governing,” Brownson wrote in
1838, American Democrats had lost sight of their purpose in fighting for political power
in the first place: to establish the liberating social conditions in which men and society
could freely fulfill their divinely-appointed destinies.
Brownson had company in this unexpected affiliation. In the early 1840s, a
number of northeastern anti-banking and pro-labor reformers turned to Calhoun for the
same reasons that Brownson had. Like Brownson, they distrusted Van Buren’s personal
politics, viewing him as an empty suit who paid lip service to democratic doctrine
because it would get him elected, and bowed to the peoples will, regardless of whether it
was right or just, because it would keep him in office. Like Brownson, they prioritized
worker’s rights over other kinds of reform, and had grown increasingly hostile to the
Northern anti-slavery movement because (they claimed) it attempted to legislate the
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material conditions of Southern slaves of color—damaging the delicate balance between
State and federal jurisdiction—while it hypocritically ignored the crippling poverty of
white workers in the North. It was work like Brownson’s that forced this double bind
between race and class, in the first place, because the logic of organic reform demanded
that activists choose improvement for one group over another, or sacrifice their chances
for progress, at all. In Calhoun, these reformers found a politician who voiced the
exploitation suffered by the white laboring class and grasped the dangers posed by the
banking industry; a revolutionary in the original sense of the term, who promised to
dismantle the wretched machinery of party politics, to prune the government of political
spoilsmen, and to return the Democratic party to the “purity” of the Jeffersonian era.542
Calhoun’s relationship with northern anti-banking and pro-labor reformers exposed the
fault lines in American radical and democratic politics—between the anti-capitalist, free
trade, and pro-labor positions—and heightened the internecine tensions between the
“proletarian” parties (in Brownson’s prescient phrase) and the various iterations of the
anti-slavery movement.
In the time between Harrison’s election and the next presidential campaign,
American democracy experienced a series of convulsions that reinforced Brownson’s
distrust of popular democracy. Influenced by the French romantic socialists, particularly
Hugues-Félicité Robert de Lamennais and Pierre Leroux, Brownson stressed the organic
generation of socio-political communities, as well as the dangers posed by the
centralization of power.543 What Brownson came to refer to as “social Democracy” (and,
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eventually, as “conservatism”) dovetailed with Calhoun’s doctrine of State rights, which
grounded power in decentralized organic communities, and his concept of concurrent
majorities, which theoretically absolved individuals and groups of their particular,
material identities and pushed them to engage one-another’s essential humanity. Over
time, Brownson developed a synthetic approach that balanced the destabilizing
tendencies of the country’s “movement” parties without sacrificing the nation’s forward
motion. Combining French romantic socialist theories, Saint-Simonian idealism, German
romanticism, and the organic attachment to established forms, Brownson bridged the
Transcendentalist notion of progress and Calhoun’s constitutional originalism,
advocating a leveling conservatism that bred equal rights organically from the nation’s
established constitutional order.
When Calhoun geared up to take over the Democratic party in the early 1840s,
Brownson donated his voice and his public platform to the cause. Brownson’s
increasingly explicit self-identification with Calhoun in the wake of the catastrophic 1840
election clarifies the shift in the way Brownson described his own politics in this
period—from “radical” to “conservative”—and the evident discomfort it caused among
his more popularly-oriented radical and reformist peers. Even as Brownson’s alliance
with the democratic party deteriorated in the 1840s, and after his express conservatism
made him an outcast among reformers, Brownson retained his affinity for Calhoun, who
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found in him a fierce and unwavering northern proponent of State rights and against
majoritarian politics. By the time the 1844 election rolled around, Brownson had been
declared apostate from the Democratic party for his conservatism and summarily excised.
Although Brownson’s continuous exposition in the service of Calhoun’s candidacy
ultimately led to his political exile, it also anticipated and contributed to the ideological
and strategic restructuring of the Democratic party as it shifted from popular reform to
“popular conservatism” in the late 1840s. His transition from radical reformer and
Democratic party proxy to self-confessed conservative prefigured the Democratic
trajectory toward increasingly coercive and authoritarian modes of governance, and his
theory of organic reform forecast the generation, through the combination of organic
philosophy and Calhoun’s leadership, of a uniquely “democratic” conservatism.
THE RADICAL
Like William Cabell Rives, Brownson once seemed an unlikely figure to associate
with conservatism, at all. Born into poverty and adopted by a middle-aged farming
couple in Vermont as a small child, Brownson received negligible formal education.544
After apprenticing with a Universalist minister for nine months, he obtained his
ordination in 1826, served as a pastor in half a dozen different congregations in the
burned-over district of New York, and worked as the editor for the Universalist Gospel
Advocate. When the Advocate fired him in 1829, they did so because his outspoken social
meliorism hemorrhaged their subscribers and his progressively radical views alienated
the Universalist brass. By the time he left the Advocate, Brownson had attracted radicals
544
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Fanny Wright and Robert Dale Owen, who reprinted his articles in their New Harmony
Gazette. Eventually, he joined forces with the Workingmen’s movement in New York,
writing for Wright’s Free Enquirer in 1829. Through Wright, he encountered what he
later described as “philosophical sentimentalism,” characterized by the works of
Bernardin de St. Pierre, Madame de Staël, Benjamin Constant, Chateaubriand, Adam
Smith, and Johann Georg Jacobi. In July 1830, Brownson established the Genesee
Republican and Herald of Reform in upstate New York, a paper dedicated to promoting
universal public education, working-class representation in legislatures, and antimonopoly legislation, and ending debtors’ prisons and caucus politics.545 Two months
later, the General Convention of Universalists for the New England States
excommunicated him for his radicalism.
For the next decade, Brownsons’s equalitarian, anti-capitalist, and pro-labor
politics defined his public persona, as did his association with the Transcendentalists.
After spending time leading small Unitarian congregations in New Hampshire and
Massachusetts, Brownson wound up just outside of Boston in 1836, where he founded
the Society for Christian Union and Progress, a working-class ministry devoted to
creating social change through education.546 In September 1836, Brownson’s friend,
Unitarian minister George Ripley invited him to join a new group of like-minded idealists
meeting at his home: the Transcendentalist Club.547 Like the other Transcendentalists,
Brownson had spent the prior decade immersing himself in German and French literature
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and had come to take an eclectic and idealist approach to religion.548 In particular, he
embraced the synthetic eclecticism of French philosopher Victor Cousin, with whom he
frequently corresponded (and who considered him one of the “best philosophical
intellects in America”549). Like Cousin, Brownson adopted a philosophical perspective
that combined the French “psychological” method with Schelling and Hegel’s brand of
German idealism. In a November 1836 monograph, he credited German romantic
Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher, French romantic Benjamin Constant, and German
radical Charles Follen (a German émigré who had lost his professorship at Harvard
University during the anti-abolitionist purge in 1835) with inspiring his “New Views of
Christianity, Society, and the Church.”550 Through these philosophers, Brownson
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reflected, he had come to understand that religion (not organized religion, but the true
religion) operated as humanity’s Bildungstrieb, the key to individual perfectibility, social
justice, and ultimate freedom.551 By the mid-1830s, Brownson had also encountered the
French romantic socialist Hugues-Félicité Robert de La Mennais, whose work he
translated and reviewed in Boston’s literary journals. When the economy collapsed in
1837, Brownson connected his advocacy for equal rights La Mennais’s emancipatory
Christianity, developed in his radical Paroles d' un Croyant [Words of a Believer].
According to La Mennais, the “soldiers of equality” believed that God gifted the earth to
all mankind, Brownson said, and they demanded that “it be left open to all.”552 In fighting
privilege and advocating social change, Brownson insisted that he only looked to bring
the civil government in line with God’s prescribed order. To support himself as he built a
“church of the future” that embodied and propelled this spirit of progressive change,
Brownson edited another journal devoted to social radicalism, the Boston Reformer.
The apotheosis of Brownson’s democratic activism occurred after Van Buren took
office in 1837, when the party recruited him to advocate on their behalf. In writing for the
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Reformer and other Christian periodicals, Brownson’s rhetorical flair had attracted
Democratic-party loyalist George Bancroft, who used his influence in the party to secure
Brownson a position administering the Marine Hospital of Chelsea. Though Brownson
had long denounced party patronage, and had only recently joined the Democratic party,
the opportunity came with an income that finally allowed him to establish his own
journal, the Boston Quarterly Review (hereafter: BosQR).553 In his introductory remarks
to the BosQR’s first edition (published in January 1838), Brownson abstained from
endorsing any particular party by name, but wrote, instead, that he hoped his review
might contribute something to the “power of the great Movement Party of mankind.” In
sympathy with the Locofocos’ drive to elevate labor, with the Abolitionists’ demand to
free the slaves, with the effort to reform and rationalize religion, and with the pursuit of a
profounder metaphysics than Hume’s base ‘Sensualism,’ Brownson dedicated his BosQR
to aiding the “progress of Humanity,” wherever he saw it.554 Over the next four years, the
BosQR published contributions from Transcendentalists Elizabeth Peabody, George
Ripley, Margaret Fuller, and A. Bronson Alcott, Democratic politicians and literati
Alexander Hill Everett, George Bancroft, and John L. O’Sullivan, and utopian socialists
William Henry Channing and Albert Brisbane.555
Unlike many of his colleagues in the Democratic party, however, Brownson
distinguished between his advocacy of democracy and the widespread trend to endorse
unqualified popular sovereignty. In his first article for the BosQR, Brownson urged his
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fellow Democrats to reconsider their position at this stage of American history. Popular
sovereignty had served a particular purpose in a particular point in time in the United
States, he explained. Once, it had been a rallying cry for the friends of freedom and
progress, empowered the people, and given them legitimacy. In many places, less
advanced than the United States, it continued to serve that purpose. Yet, Brownson
reminded his fellow democrats that words like “popular sovereignty” changed their
meaning as circumstances changed:
in contending for the same form of words, we are not always contending for the
same doctrine, and that in giving up an old form of words, we do not necessarily
give up the old truth we had loved. Words ever change their import as change the
circumstances amid which they are uttered. The form of words, which yesterday
contained the doctrine of progress, to-day contains a doctrine which would carry
us backward. The watch-word of liberty under one set of circumstances becomes
under another set of circumstances the watchword of tyranny. It is the part of the
wise man to note these changes, and to seek out new watchwords as often as the
old ones lose their primitive meaning.556
In principle, Brownson conceded, contemporary constitutional theory empowered the
people, assembled in their sovereign capacity, to enumerate and protect individual and
minority rights. In practice, it made those rights contingent on the will of a popular
majority, and, in so doing, usurped an authority it did not have. Once the doctrine of
popular sovereignty vested sovereign authority in the people, Brownson clarified, it
granted them absolute power in their collective capacity as the state. In effect, it
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transferred the people’s sovereignty to a ruling majority, which disenfranchised
minorities and reduced individuals to “fraction[s] of the body politic.” In politics, this
majoritarian rule destroyed “manliness of character” and independent thought,
transforming politicians into time-serving cowards, and reducing the political process to a
matter of numbers. Instead of looking for the most honest and capable men, who would
promote just policies for the public good, it forever recurred to the question of
expedience, asking which men and what agendas could most easily be sold to the public.
As a result, Brownson observed, the “assertion of the sovereignty of the people” in the
United States had become “the assertion of the right of the majority to tyrannize at will
over the minority, or the assertion that the people, taken individually, are the absolute
slaves of the people, taken as a whole.” Popular sovereignty no longer functioned as a
“doctrine of progress” in the United States, Brownson judged; it now inclined toward
democratic absolutism.
From Brownson’s perspective, “Democracy” should be defined by its aims, not its
gross mechanics. As Brownson understood it, “the word Democracy” signified a social
and political philosophy that propelled the masses toward social equality and individual
freedom. Therefore, he made the argument for democracy as a system of government that
codified justice, as opposed to viewing it in terms of popular sovereignty or popular
government. Corresponding with Fichte’s notion of citizenship, Brownson’s vision of a
justice-based “Democracy” hypostasized the doctrine of “true liberty,” leaving men “free
to do whatever it is just to do, and not free to do only what it is unjust to do.”557 In the
place of popular or state sovereignty, both of which generated their own brands of

557

Ibid., 55–56.

261
tyranny, Brownson’s Democracy commanded a socio-political system in which justice
obtained absolute sovereignty, leading to an organization that balanced social order with
social equality. It subjected every group and each individual to the same laws, and
demanded their loyalty and obedience to the state only so long as its government operated
within its legitimate sphere. To be a “democrat” in Brownson’s sense of the word meant
fighting for justice and equality for the masses, for social order and social progress, for
minority rights against majoritarian tyranny, and for a government that governed less.558
In addition to its glancing similarity with Calhoun’s theory of government,
Brownson’s critique echoed French socialist Hugues-Félicité Robert de La Mennais’s
Modern Slavery, which Brownson had translated into English in 1836 for the Boston
Reformer, and, especially, his Paroles d'un croyant [Words of a Believer], which
Brownson had cited in earlier speeches and would excerpt at length in his October 1838
BosQR.559 In Paroles, Lamennais exposed the backwardness of a “liberal” system that
framed essential human rights as a restricted contractual privilege predicated on
citizenship and obedience. First and foremost, Lamennais wrote, nations existed to
558
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generate liberty, which he described as the “living power” that permeated existence, the
“guardian genius of the domestic heath, the protector of social rights, and the first of
those rights.” Without liberty, men had nothing—no rights, no growth, no life. Any
nation that did not fulfill this emancipatory mission should be quarantined, Lamennais
advised, so that the “breath” of its people “may not infect the rest of the world.”560
Brownson, likewise, insisted that rights belonged to men by virtue of their human nature
and could not be granted or suspended at the pleasure or caprice of a popular authority.
“We are free… because we are men,” Brownson declared, “It is not a privilege of
American citizenship, but a right of universal Humanity.” Governments that presumed to
control and dispense these rights as privileges broke the boundaries of their natural
jurisdictions, creating an “artificial state of society” that “disturbed the natural relations
between man and man.” To “end to this great system of privilege,” Brownson argued, “is
now the great aim of Democracy.561
THE POLITICS OF REFORM
On one level, Brownson’s story picks up a narrative strand left dangling at the end
of the second chapter, in the heterogeneous approach to civil and social organization in
the mid-nineteenth-century United States and the impact of transnational sources on
theories of social order and change. Like his peers in the Transcendentalist and social
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reform movements, Brownson had the habit of describing his political position as
“conservative” in the late 1830s, and to advocate cultural solutions to social problems (in
lieu of revolution, destruction, or violence). Though his critics rushed to renounce his
radicalism, Brownson noted in the opening edition of his Boston Quarterly Review
(January 1838) that the majority of the American people also fought for better social
conditions and greater equality, and that the “American people are not revolutionists.
They are conservatives.” To be a “conservative in this country,” Brownson insisted, “is to
be a democrat.”562
American reformers like Brownson could afford to “think with the Radical” and
“act with the Conservative,” he argued, because democracy put them on the path that
organically led them toward social justice and equality. Living in a democracy, men
naturally progressed toward freedom—toward the absolute rule of justice—gradually
developing their common sense with universal humanity. Even in its imperfect practice in
the United States, the democratic form of government trained men that “man equals
man.”563 To “cure” the evils bred by their invasive and overactive popular government,
the American “doctor of laws” could simply follow the lead of the American “doctor of
medicine” and let nature guide them (because “nature is the best physician.”) Living in
the “most enlightened country” in the world (the United States, natch), all they had to do
to achieve perfect liberty was to sit down at the “feet of Great Nature” and learn to
govern however God ordained.
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Progress always had been and always should be a slow process, Brownson
admitted, but the reformer, like the law-doctor, could still play a part in closing the gap
between the American theory and its practice. In this context, acting with the
“Conservative” meant effecting reform through education in the German Bildung model.
Specifically, Brownson clarified in later articles, reformers should promote the study of
German and French literature because it would correct the country’s tendency toward
unchecked popular radicalism, on the one hand, as well as counteract the country’s
aristocratic tendencies, galvanized since the revolution by the cultural imperialism of
English literature. Unlike English literature, German and French scholarship
harmoniously united the elements of order and liberty, stimulating progress and the
“perfectibility of man,” and laying out the “peaceable and orderly means by which to
effect it.”564 Once reformers improved the country’s system of philosophy and morality
by introducing these sources, purified and rationalized public religion, and effectively
raised public discourse, Brownson promised, they could sit back, relax, and “let things
take pretty much their own course.”565 As it had in Fichte’s early writing, then, political
society performed an instrumental service, in Brownson’s philosophy: it provided the
means (through cooperation and mutual improvement) to propel its members toward
individual perfection, universal equality, and complete unity in a perfect society.566
But this perspective—this position on the epigenetic nature of reform—came with
a price. A teleological framework fundamentally grounded in the concept of natural
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history, it implied a linear progression through stages of development, which called for
an architecture of accretion that generated a hierarchy of need. In other words, it laid the
burden on its men of genius to figure out which or whose problems took priority and how
to address them in a way that created a solid infrastructure for future change. In
Brownson’s romantic metaphor, “The tree has its natural growth, and by natural growth
attains its height. It is not made higher by being plucked up by the roots, and held up by
artificial means.”567 Faced with a metastasizing economic crisis and rising race-based
violence in the late 1830s, social reformers diverged over the best methods to pursue
social justice (through State or federal legislation, through the court system, or through
apolitical, extralegal, or non-governmental organization) and, essentially, which issue
should take precedence— economic parity for the white working class or freedom for
people of color.568
Two additional factors complicated this algorithm for northeastern reformers in
the late 1830s. First, John C. Calhoun’s pro-slavery faction re-aligned with the
Democratic party, which made him the voice of the Sub-Treasury bill and the most
prominent exponent of anti-capitalist radicalism in national politics. As previous chapters
addressed, Van Buren’s position on slavery remained ambiguous before he became
president, giving anti-slavery Democrats reason to hope that he might not use the office
to reinforce or promote the institution, even after his support for the 1836 congressional
gag rule and other pro-slavery measures. During the 1836 presidential campaign,
northeastern democratic reformers with anti-slavery sympathies had criticized Van

567

Brownson, “Specimens of Foreign Literature,” 440.
An embarrassingly small proportion of reformers promoted women’s rights as an essential issue in the
period.
568

266
Buren’s accommodationist and pro-slavery propaganda, but few of them bought the line
that he was a “Northern man with Southern principles.”569 Instead, they reasoned that he
said what he had to in order to keep the people’s party in power.570 When Calhoun
returned to the Democratic fold in 1837, however, the party palpably shifted toward proslavery policies, forcing reformers who associated with both the workingmen’s and antislavery movements to make a choice. They could either continue their association with
the Democratic party and advance their pro-labor agenda politically, or they could choose
to eschew mainstream politics entirely and come at their activism from a different
angle.571
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Second, at the same time as Calhoun’s faction took a firmer hold of America’s
government and pushed the Democratic party more solidly into the pro-slavery camp,
Garrison drove the abolitionists to the opposite extreme, outright rejecting politics as an
avenue for change, dissent, or reform. In December 1837, he severed his affiliation with
the Massachusetts Anti-Slavery Society and elaborated a radically apolitical, antiestablishment, and anti-institutional mission statement in the Liberator. In the December
15th edition, he expanded the abolitionist mission to encompass universal emancipation
from subjugation in any form (from slavery, from servitude, from government) and
explicitly embraced both women’s rights and non-resistance as part of his platform.572
The gesture to emancipate women alongside slaves alienated those of Garrison’s allies
who saw it as a strategic mistake to conflate the two issues, as well as those men opposed
to women having a political voice, at all (even if they supported women’s education and
right to work, as Brownson did). Furthermore, Garrison’s argument for non-resistance
tacitly made the case that slaves—more than any other group—retained the right to
appeal to physical violence in defending themselves, their families, their liberties, and
their wages, both as individuals and in their collective capacity as a nation.573 Just as
Calhoun’s return to the Democratic party marked its adherents as complicit in the
protection and expansion of slavery, Garrisonian extremism generated the perception that
anti-slavery activism required a narrowly construed set of beliefs and behavior to which
adherents had to commit or be unceremoniously expelled from the movement.574
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Democratic reformers with anti-slavery sympathies struggled to assimilate their
incompatible impulses by focusing on a brand of socio-cultural activism that combined
their pro-labor and anti-slavery aims. But not Orestes Brownson. In 1838, Orestes
Brownson knew exactly where his priorities lay. “First, we must settle the bases of
individual freedom,” Brownson insisted in the second number of his BosQR (which he
devoted to the “rights of Man”) then “we may proceed to make all details harmonize with
it.”575 That meant putting abolition on the backburner, for now.
In their rush to emancipate the slaves before they fixed individual rights by law,
Brownson charged, the abolitionists counterproductively weakened the safeguards put in
place to protect individual freedom, in the first place—State rights foremost among
them—and threatened to thrust a whole new group of people into the already
overcrowded field of disenfranchised and impoverished workers. Brownson took the
opportunity in his April 1838 review of William Ellery Channing’s “Slavery,” to connect
Calhoun’s doctrine of State rights with the radical emancipation of workingmen, and
explain how abolitionists threatened to upset the balance that would eventually lead to
their own victory against slavery. Borrowing directly from Calhoun’s playbook,
Brownson attested that the States stood in relation to each other “precisely as the United
States as one nation stands in relation to France, England, or Mexico.” Because each
sovereign State comprised a separate nation, any attempt to interfere in the internal policy
or social institutions of another State of the union violated international law. The “right of
the people of the non-slaveholding States” to control slavery in the South, Brownson
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wrote, “is precisely what it is in relation to [slavery] in Constantinople, or in any foreign
slave-holding state.” So long as the States remained “distinct, independent communities,”
they endowed their individual members with a personal significance lost in the
homogenizing mass created by an all-consuming central power. “When hundreds and
thousands of our citizens are banded together to trample on the rights of independent
communities in the holy name of Freedom herself,” Brownson confessed, he grew
alarmed for those individual rights. “One barrier leaped, another may be,” he warned,
“and when communities can no longer make their rights respected, what can the
individual do?”576 In pressuring the federal government to abolish slavery, abolitionists
pushed it to assume an authority it did not have; destroying the “equilibrium between the
individual and the state,” they “endanger[ed] the freedom of both.”577
Ironically, Brownson argued, the southern institution of slavery generated the
impulse necessary to protect individual freedom and counterbalance federal hegemony in
the current system. In the North, the focus on social freedom came at the expense of
individual rights because it led Northern reformers to promote strong government. As
Brownson had noted in the first edition of his BosQR, political and social rights were
meaningless without individual liberty, which federal centralization gradually sapped. A
consolidated government had a voracious appetite and would not be sated until it had
ingested everything, and absorbed the individual into the body of the state. Because of
slavery, however, each Southern planter acted as a petty sovereign, just like the feudal
barons of Europe, and, like the feudal barons, they jealously guarded their individual
freedom and their state sovereignty. Furthermore, Southerners could not even perceive
576
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the need to free the slaves unless they felt secure in their own rights as individuals. Until
they “settled the controversy about state rights and individual rights and obtained the
amplest security for both,” Brownson determined, “it is as unwise as it is useless to touch
the question of slavery.” Once they got the government out of the hands of business men
and into the hands of the people, and the government treated everyone equally without
regard to class, and every man possessed his entire freedom under the authority of equal
laws, and they had obtained “all the individual freedom of the savage state with all the
order and social harmony of the highest degree of civilization,” then, and only then, could
they attend to the “Negro's right to be free.”578
When William Lloyd Garrison suggested that Brownson’s position on slavery
made him a traitor to true reformers, Brownson objected. “By many years of hard labor,
I have gained the name of Horrid Radical, Rash and Headstrong Innovator,” he wrote to
Garrison, “This name is my [sic] all on earth. I have worn it so long that it is dear to me,
and I am unwilling to have it torn from me.”579 Still, he admitted that he had become less
disposed to “revolutionary movements” or “sudden and violent changes” over time. As
he read more social philosophy and history, Brownson explained, he had embraced the
organic approach to social change. “Nothing can come before its time,” he reminded
Garrison, “The human race is in progress. It goes onward, but it is step-by-step. One step
only can be taken at a time.” Given the practical question of which step they should take
now, he insisted that the slavery of the poor must end before the slavery of the “negro”
could be addressed. In fact, by the logic of organic reform, the “progress and triumph of
578
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true democracy in the non-slaveholding states” would inevitably bring about the “certain
abolition of slavery at the South.”580 Brownson claimed that he did as much for the
abolition of Southern slavery through his efforts on behalf of Northern workers,
therefore, than anyone who labored directly for abolition, though he admitted that he
never personally mentioned abolition by name or had it in his mind while he organized.
On the other hand, John C Calhoun first contacted Brownson on the strength of this
article, so even with the benefit of the doubt about his implicit and unnamed long-term
aims, Brownson’s argument evidently gave comfort to the enemies of abolition and
proponents of slavery.
In anticipation of the 1838 midterm elections, Brownson drew an even sharper
distinction between abolitionist agitation for people of color and his own advocacy for
the white working class in the BosQR.581 As the last chapter indicated, popular opinion
had turned against the administration party’s “visionary” labor politics after the 1837
economic panic.582 Between June 1837 and August 1838, Whig candidates had won
65.2% of all congressional races and 66.7% of all governors’ races (including
Brownson’s home-base in Massachusetts), and Van Buren’s Sub-Treasury bill had twice
failed to pass the House. Meanwhile, the Whigs painted their antagonists all of one piece
in their political broadsides: crowding the abolitionists, loco-focos, jacobins, radicals, and
revolutionaries all into the democratic camp.583 From Brownson’s perspective, abolition
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would short-circuit or prevent the labor reforms essential to a free democracy. So long as
the two movements remained connected in the popular and political imagination, the
abolitionists hurt the cause for labor, especially as they radicalized.
Showing uncharacteristic political savvy, Brownson retraced these political
boundaries in his October BosQR, dividing the “conservative” friends of labor from the
“insurrectionist” abolitionists. Just like the rest of the country, Brownson insisted, the
labor movement had grown alarmed by the abolitionists’ dangerous tactics and
revolutionary agenda.584 Unlike the abolitionists, the labor movement understood that
everything must come “in its time and in its place.” The slaveholding States must be left
to extend legal protection to the “negro” as he advanced internally, so that he could
“imperceptibly but surely… grow into a freeman, if a freeman he can become.” Instead of
going to other States in search of monsters to destroy, labor advocates recognized that
they best served the “negro” by developing democratic freedom in their own societies
and looked to “elevate the free white laborer” in their own States.
Abolition could not be achieved without overturning the existing social order,
Brownson argued, but workers’ rights and banking reforms could. In fact, they were
essential to its preservation. At its best, Brownson maintained, democracy fostered both
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“conservative” and “progressive” elements, harmoniously combining liberty and order.585
In the United States, the Democratic party simultaneously represented the country’s
conservative and movement party, fighting to preserve country’s political system in its
original spirit, as the framers of the constitution intended, while implementing reform,
“for the purpose of preserving American institutions in their real character.”586 Unlike the
abolitionists, Brownson wrote, “we have accepted with our whole heart the political
system adopted by our fathers” as Humanity’s “most brilliant achievement.” Taking their
stand on the American “Idea,” the Democrats refused to countenance any changes,
innovations, or “alleged” improvements that did not strictly accord with the US
constitution, or that threatened to unsettle the constitutional balance of power between the
Federal government and the States.587 “As a lover of our race, as the devoted friend of
liberty, of the progress of mankind,” Brownson reflected, “we feel that we must, in this
country, be conservative, not radical.”588
Regardless, Brownson’s name quickly became a byword for extreme
Locofocoism and social democracy in the opposition press, which cited his publications
as evidence of the Democratic party’s agrarian leanings.589 During the 1840 campaign, he
went so far in his advocacy for the working class that the Democratic party tried to
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silence him, and the Whigs reproduced his most incendiary work as propaganda for their
party.590 His political infamy as a public radical reached its pinnacle in July 1840, when
Brownson penned “The Laboring Classes,” a review of Carlyle’s Chartism in which he
proposed restructuring the entire political-economic system (including eradicating the
banking system and the privileged monopoly over capital) to generate a social
revolution.591 Wage labor relegated a portion of society to virtual slavery, he argued, and
the market denied them the capacity to lift themselves from poverty to self-subsistence.592
Inheritance law perpetuated this inhumane structure of inequality across generations. The
evils of structural inequality, “inherent in all our social arrangements,” could not be
“cured” unless they produced a radical change in society itself. Like Calhoun, whose
speeches he consistently recommended to his readers, Brownson located the root of these
evils in government interference, linking economic injustice to government excess.
Government should legislate to aid the working class, and only to that end. It had
overgrown its limits when it became invested in perpetuating privilege, especially
through the federal control of the banks. Government should legislate to aid the working
class, and only to that end “There has been far too much government,” Brownson
insisted, “as well as government of the wrong kind.” So, to cure the nation’s social ills,
590
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Brownson recommended a great “undoing,” the country’s representatives to repeal all
laws that propped up its inherently unequal and unjust commercial system at the expense
of the laboring classes. “You must abolish the system or accept its consequences,”
Brownson wrote, “No man can serve both God and Mammon.”
Even though his position lost him both contributors and subscribers, Brownson
refused to back down. As the Morning Post reported, Brownson’s “zeal for the rights of
man knows not the bounds of conservatism; that word appears not to exist in his
vocabulary.”593 In October 1840, he published a ninety-one-page defense of his nineteenpage article in which he acknowledged that he demanded the “most radical” social
reforms and redoubled his critique of organized religion, capitalists, and inherited
property. Since American society “is bound to furnish equal chances to all her members,”
he asserted, they must enact measures that would end the “horizontal division” between
capitalists and labor.594 Addressing the critics who called him a “Jacobin” and the
“American Robespierre,” in November 1840, Brownson reportedly responded that he
liked those names, and intended to “immortalize the old sans culottes” in a novel in
which Robespierre would be featured as the hero.595
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How did this man—once considered the prophet of the lower classes, and widely
condemned as the exponent of social revolution and anarchy—come to be known as one
of the most conservative men in America?596 The answer to that question can be found in
the reorganization of the Democratic party after 1840. As the introduction indicated, the
Whig victory exposed the doctrinal and political tensions within the Democratic party
over the value of popular sovereignty, the practical structure and metaphysical purpose of
democracy, and the nature and pace of change in a democratic republic. At the same time
as the party divided philosophically over these issues, it also course-corrected
strategically towards popular politics. To undercut Whig authority, the Democrats
indicated that the Whigs had stolen the election by manipulating the public and
subverting their will, and that the Whig’s policies intended to undercut the free
expression of the public voice. While the Democrats aimed to reclaim their position as
the country’s popular party, they also enhanced the popular tactics in their electoral
arsenal. As a result, the party edged out those democrats who either publically questioned
popular democracy or who promoted political candidates like Calhoun, who disapproved
of the unmediated expression of the popular will. Brownson fell into both of those
categories, and, so, (in some ways) fell into conservatism.597
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THE DEMOCRATIC PATHOLOGY
The triumph of “whig conservatism” in December 1840 forced democraticallyminded radicals in the North to reflect on their role in the new socio-political order, to
prioritize their reforms, and to organize strategically. In the “great controversy between
Conservatism and Democratic Progress,” they asked, what were they trying to protect or
advance? Did they contend for “democracy” or something else—an end for which
democracy theoretically provided the means? If O’Sullivan had been correct—if
Democracy acted as the fundamental principle of the country’s organic law—then could
they find a version of democracy that produced the kinds of changes that they wanted to
see in the world? Did “democracy” entail a specific form of a government (the political
enfranchisement and direct representation of the common people in political bodies) or
could it be understood as an effect (the practical empowerment or rule of the common
people in society considered as a whole)? And, if Democracy could be understood
teleologically (as an end, and not a means), then what social organization or method of
government could achieve it?
In his own heterodox response to the election, Brownson strained the
philosophical boundaries of big tent democracy. Brownson devoted his first edition of the
BosQR after the Whig victory (January 1841) to diagnosing the disorder that led to these
election results and finding the best strategy to engage (or disengage) with a hostile
administration and an unreliable democracy. His programmatic resolution amalgamated
Calhoun’s constitutional conservatism with his own “social democratic” politics.
In his first article, Brownson imagined “Conversations with a Radical,” written by
“a Conservative,” which provided an overview of the two sides at issue in the current
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conflict between the Democratic and Whig parties, and restated his own past positions
against capitalist inequality and in favor of social progress.598 In the second article,
Brownson laid out his perspective on “The Times,” including meditations on political and
religious factions; the English System (i.e., capitalist power), which he compared to
Roman Catholic imperialism; and the resistless progress of the Democratic spirit. In the
third article, Brownson set out his policy recommendations for the “Friends of the
Constitution and of Equal Rights” going forward, advising them to form a “true
democratic party” that conformed to the State rights and Locofoco ideals, and worked
toward a decentralized organic community and social equality. In his fourth article,
Brownson published his fall 1842 Address to the Workingmen’s Association of
Charlestown, MA, in which he distinguished between “social” and “political” Democrats
and reiterated the need to unite the social Democrats in a single party. Also pejoratively
termed the “LocoFocos,” Brownson had explained, social Democrats were former
Jeffersonian Democrats who “having realized political equality [and] passed through one
phase of the revolution, now passes on to another, and attempts the realization of social
equality, so that the actual condition of men in society shall be in harmony with their
acknowledged rights as citizens.”599 Brownson closed out the review with a set of
Literary Notices that essentially comprised a reading list for social radicals.600 Brownson
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used the opportunity of his concluding notice on François Guizot’s Essay on the
Character and Influence of Washington in the Revolution of the United States of America
to remind his audience, in a subtle dig at president-elect, that the American people were
too great to ever be at the mercy of “great chiefs” like Harrison. In the long run,
individual men exerted a limited influence in this country, he wrote, and even outsized
figures like George Washington only helped the people achieve the glory that was their
due. Implicitly, Brownson urged the people to see themselves as the collective author of
their own independence, still free to resist and save their country.
In addressing “The Times” in his second article, Brownson blamed society’s
present condition on the combined efforts of English imperial capitalists and their
American political counterparts (the Whigs). In every epoch, Brownson wrote, the
Conservatives had relied on some “absurd fiction” to “retard” the “growth” of the
Democratic spirit and to bring large populations under their control. For years, the
“British political party” in the United States (the Whigs) had perpetuated the absurd
fiction that the United States benefitted from a free and independent capitalist exchange
with England, and that the wholesale adoption of Britain’s consolidated capitalist
system—replete with a National Bank and a protective tariff—would bring prosperity
and stability to the United States. By seditiously spreading the “political heresy
of CONSOLIDATION” and the “aristocratical doctrine” of a “central nationality,” England’s
Conservative agents in the United States sought to undermine the true nature of the US
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federal constitution in its “restricted and State Rights character.” A “central national
government” could not exist in the United States, Brownson reminded his audience,
unless it was enforced by “those coercive means which are in their very nature
incompatible with republican institutions” because “the extent of our country over every
natural climate; the vast geographical peculiarities of the distinctive States, and the
diversity of their relations to external nations, preclude[d] the possibility of one general
government legislating for the whole.” With British capital its materiel and consolidation
its grand strategy, Brownson charged, British capitalists engaged in a covert type of
imperial warfare against the United States. By spreading their political and capitalist
ideology across the country, they ultimately intended to transform it into a British vassal
state.
When the US National Bank scheme failed to subvert American democracy in the
1830s, Brownson reported, the English “infected” the United States with the “disease” of
abolition. Whole communities now suffered from the “disease in its raging stage.” The
British capitalist and consolidationist ideology organized the entire structure of the
debate, so that no matter which side won in principle (the abolitionists or the pro-slavery
faction), they both reinforced consolidation and capitalism, in practice. Fostered by
“clans of consolidationists” and backed by the “whole English system,” the contaminated
abolitionist population framed slavery as a “national sin” that required a national
solution. The southern and western consolidationists who opposed them, on the other
hand, promoted slavery as a “national blessing.” In their arguments, they all assumed an
“important difference” in working a man hard “for a pittance of money” and working him
hard “for a pittance of food,” which glorified money over liberty and reduced the
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abolition question to a conflict between slave and wage labor. In effect, the entire debate
naturalized the consolidated and capitalist system that the British intended to promote.
To counteract Britain’s biological warfare, “morally healthy” Americans might be
able to contain abolitionism in a “lazaretto” (a quarantine station) until it had exhausted
its “dangerous force,” but Brownson warned that no earthly means could put down the
“communal passion” roused on either side. Like any disease, he wrote, it must “run a
natural course to the peculiar crisis.” Nonetheless, Brownson urged his Democratic
partisans to remain optimistic about the country’s future. He insisted that the current
national distemper indicated a deeper pathology that boded well for both social progress
and equal rights. Collective societies always entered into an “irruptive [sic] stage” (i.e.,
the stage of an infectious disease when the skin breaks out in rashes) when it confronted
the “resistless progress” of some new “mighty spirit,” Brownson explained. What looked
on the surface like a devastating, degenerative ailment actually indicated an epidemic
communal reaction to a major “evolution” in the country’s social organization.
Brownson acknowledged that Harrison’s election might set back the “Liberalists”
for a day, but he assured his readers that the “new social spirit” of Democracy would
prevail over the artful mistruths spread by their country’s factious Conservatives. The
“supreme law of consecutive social passions” dictated that a “NEW unity of patriotic
feeling” would emerge in the United States, resulting in a “complete reorganization of the
host of republicans.” This new class of republicans—conjoined by their “ardent love of
individual liberty” and their mutual hatred for England and everything it represented—
would ensure the true “conservation” of American institutions. In the recent general
election, faction had enjoyed a “festival triumph” based on their Conservative fictions,
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but Democracy would inevitably “fell and root up all the stately products of [their]
artificial cultivation” and “plough deep the surface of the whole earth, to the final
annihilation of even the germs of fiction” that had once allowed the Conservative
enemies of progress to rule.
Brownson followed up his diagnosis with a prescriptive call to action for the “real
friends of Equal Rights and Social Progress.” In his third article on “Our Future Policy,”
Brownson urged the “real Democracy” to unite in a single party that promoted a strict
construction of the constitution at the federal level, and pursued a “true democratic
policy” of social and political equality at the State level. Although a significant majority
of Americans prioritized the plight of the working class, Brownson observed, they had
allowed themselves to be divided from one another on false issues during the election.
Because they conflated State and federal politics, they had joined competing national
political parties designated “Democrat” and “Whig,” instead of combining into a single,
unified worker’s party. At the same time, some reformers who might otherwise have been
their political allies condemned political action entirely and abandoned the political
sphere altogether; and some of the leading democrats who should have joined the
political fight for social justice, rejected the use of positive legislation to generate equal
rights because they refused to see the government by any light other than its negative
agency. This political and philosophical insolvency led to their failure at the polls. To
reunite the “true democratic party of the country” under a single banner, they must
recommit themselves to this country’s mission: to “emancipate the proletary,” to
“ennoble labor” and elevate the working class, and to “make every man really free and
independent.”
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As the late election proved, the democracy (i.e., the common people) could not be
fooled by empty promises. It refused to vote reflexively for people and parties “called”
democratic; for a party to secure its support, it must “be democratic” and its men
must “be democrats.” To win it over, Brownson contended, the “real Democracy” had to
prove that their policies would do more than “merely assuage the pain of the social
wound, without healing it.” Falling back on “first principles,” they had to enact measures
that would either “destroy the social fabric entirely, or reconstruct it as it should be.”
Addressing the recalcitrant reformers and the negative-liberty democrats, Brownson
stressed that civil government operated both as society’s agent and the instrument by
which society functioned, and that Democrats had a duty to use it to produce moral and
social progress, to create legislation and organizations that protected individual rights and
also forced those individuals to “perform their duties towards one another.”
In their practical political apparatus, Brownson recommended that they follow the
model endorsed by John C. Calhoun and his “State Rights friends.” According to
Calhoun, the US Constitution distinguished between the role that the State and federal
governments played in securing equal rights and social progress, setting up the States to
act like “Foreign Nations to one another, Free, Sovereign, Independent States, in no sense
responsible one to another.” Considering this relationship, Brownson advised his
colleagues to dissever the connection between the “politics of the State” and the “politics
of the Union,” and establish separate federal and State parties so that “a man’s views on
Federal politics” would no longer serve as the “criterion of his merits on questions of
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State politics.”601 Statesmen should ask and expect different things from their State and
federal governments. Since democratic parties only worked within single bodies politic
(like nations), Brownson suggested that they form a Constitutional (or Union) party at the
federal level made up of the smaller States, the slave-holding States, and the country’s
“real Democracy” (i.e., the “real friends of Equal Rights and Social Progress”), who
would resist consolidation and create the space for equal rights to be adopted at the State
level. In each of the States, Brownson advocated State-wide Democratic parties, which
would focus their efforts on dismantling corporate and banking monopolies and the paper
money system. In the short term, Brownson admitted, these bold measures might “give us
the gripes,” but “it is better to take a medicine, which will expel a lingering disease and
restore us to health” than “to be always sick.”602
In spite of Brownson’s prescriptions, the people refused to take their medicine.
During the special congressional session that spanned from May to September 1841, the
27th US Congress dismantled Van Buren’s banking reforms. In their last week in session,
six months after Harrison took office and five months after his death turned John Tyler
into “His Accidency,” the House Whigs resurrected the National Bank, overturning
President Tyler’s second veto against it to do so.603
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Convinced that this breach signaled the end of the Whig party, Calhoun began
coordinating his sympathizers to orchestrate a reformation in American politics and
government. At the end of October 1841, Calhoun wrote to Brownson that they had to
grab this opportunity to rescue the government and restore the constitution.604 To secure
their advantage, he insisted, they must beat out the “spoilsmen” of their own party at the
“game of President making,” uniting the “sound portion” of the party behind someone
who genuinely represented their principles. In “strict confidence,” Calhoun elliptically
gestured toward his own designs on the country’s highest office.605 If the country
determined that he, alone, could guide it through this essential “reformation,” Calhoun
wrote, then he would dutifully accept the responsibility of the presidency. Brownson
enthusiastically agreed, determined to inoculate the democratic republic against both
Whig conservatism and popular Democratic radicalism.
On the last page of the final number of 1841’s BosQR (October), Brownson took
a moment in his literary notices to reflect on the relative nature of radicalism and
conservatism in the United States. He had been berated as the “very ne plus ultra of a
Radical” for years, he remarked, but compared with Clinton Roosevelt’s radical Science
of Government Founded on Natural Law, for example, or any of a number of other
reform projects he had received in the last few months, he should be renounced for his
“conservatism.” Unlike his “Radical brethren,” Brownson confessed, he believed that a
country’s “geographical position, the productions of its soil, the genius of its people, and
of its existing institutions” predetermined the reforms it could handle, and precluded any
604
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reforms that required the “introduction or the destruction of a fundamental principle” or
that attempted to do anything other than clear away “anomalies” or develop “admitted
principles.” Since he clearly could not run with the “wildest of Radicals,” he joked, he
might try his hand “at being the staunchest of Conservatives” in the years to come.606
Though he had no way of knowing it at the time, Brownson’s agreement to aid
Calhoun’s presidential ambitions would eventually fulfill his ironically-voiced wish.
Between the time that the Whig-majority Congress opened its first regular congressional
session in December 1841 and Calhoun withdrew from the presidential race in early
1844, Brownson fought for Calhoun’s nomination behind the scenes. In collusion with
South Carolina representative Robert Rhett, Alabama representative (and then senator)
Dixon Lewis, and New York labor activist John Hecker (one of the founders of the Loco
Foco movement), Brownson penned addresses to be read at rallies, published anonymous
articles and pamphlets in Calhoun’s favor, and briefly (in late 1843) entertained the idea
of editing an openly pro-Calhoun paper. In his own work, Brownson continuously (if
more subtly) promoted Calhoun as the country’s “reformation” candidate. In addition to
reviewing Calhoun’s speeches and citing him directly, he also weaved Calhoun’s theories
of government into his own metaphysical reflections, creating an eclectic hybrid between
Calhoun’s anti-capitalist republicanism and, as it happened, French romantic socialism.607
Based largely on the strength of this work, Brownson’s Democratic colleagues would
declare him “too conservative” for their tastes by the end of 1843. In the “great
controversy between Conservatism and Democratic Progress” that took place in this
period, they decided, Brownson came down on the wrong side of history.
606
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THE GREAT CONTROVERSY
As it had with democratic activists, the 1840 “Conservative” victory challenged
the country’s social reformers, in general, to question where conservatism fit in their
vision of progressive change and to generate a response to it. Among the
Transcendentalists and social utopians, it sparked a conversation about the relationship
between conservatism, progress, and reform in a democratic republic. In August 1841,
Cincinnati lawyer Jordan A. Pugh gave a speech on “Political Conservatism” to the
fraternal order of Alpha Delta Phi, distinguished by its Transcendentalist influences and
its tendency to breed abolitionists and social activists. Political Conservatism opposed
change, Pugh declared, seeking its security in the structure of society, itself. Because it
wanted to perpetuate established institutions and sustain the country’s political relations,
political conservatism divided society into different departments, framing a complicated
system of government that checked the power of its constituents.608 To prevent social
advancement, it created classes by legislation and rendered men the “miserable slaves” of
its social organization.609 That type of political conservatism might be necessary in
England, Pugh observed, but the United States did not need to “fetter” man with
“restrictions,” “crush him by exactions,” or “legislate him into nothing.” Because it
enjoyed democratic institutions and treated man with dignity as a “unit in God's
creation”—not of merely the “member of a class”—the United States had cultivated a
“new race” of humanity in which each man acted as his own “conservator.” In the United
608
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States, alone, a man could be trusted with his “own destinies” because he could “preserve
himself.” So long as they kept their social organization “just and equal” and always
looked for the “happiness of the whole body,” Pugh remarked, political conservatism
would remain unnecessary in this country. Americans would find “conservatism” in their
own constitutions.
Two months later, in an October 1841 sermon on “Reform and Conservatism,”
Transcendentalist James Freeman Clarke counseled his congregation to mediate between
their polar impulses to either extreme conservatism or extreme radicalism. As he saw it,
the “separation and hostility” between conservatism and reform gave rise to unnecessary
and counter-productive social conflict. Instead, he exhorted, “every one ought to be a
conservative, and every one ought to be a reformer,” just like Jesus Christ. A “great
reformer,” Jesus Christ was also a “true conservative” because he knew that the human
mind entangled “the roots of truth and error” together and he “forebore pulling up the
tares lest he should root out the wheat also.” Similarly, in their own lives, Clarke
encouraged his audience to fearlessly combine the old and new, dismissing neither
orthodoxy nor liberalism in their search for truth.610
An “indifferent Whig” himself, Transcendentalist Ralph Waldo Emerson crowed
at Van Buren’s defeat for the same reasons that his Democratically-affiliated brethren
did. But he did not care for Harrison and he had no real hope that the new administration
would induce innovative legislation.611 As a party, Emerson reflected, the Whigs were
too timid to accommodate the friction necessary for constructive change. “The Whig
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assumes sickness,” he wrote in his journal, “and his social frame is a hospital.” Instead of
enacting laws that accorded with “primal law,” the Whig party legislated for the “present
distress,” putting the universe in “slippers and flannels, with bib and pap-spoon,
swallowing pills and herb tea.”612 Nonetheless, Emerson denied that the Democratic party
had the monopoly on democracy or humanity. The Democrats had better principles, the
Whigs had better people, but neither had anything in practice. Emerson leaned Whig
because he considered the Democratic leadership to be “worse men” than the Whig
leadership, but, in his final analysis, he found “no great difference” between the two
parties. The “democracy” espoused by the Democratic party was “no more principled
than the conservatism” and the party had no higher objects. Both parties rested on an
antiquated liberalism (a “whiggism”) that undercut real reform. “To vote at all for either
party is whiggism,” Emerson remarked, “and it is only a little more to vote for those
whose bias is conservative.”613 This ideological compression generated an artificially
constrained set of political parameters for state-driven social change.614 In addition,
Emerson reasoned, because reformers relied on political parties as the engines to advance
their causes, this state of affairs produced a profound tension within and between the
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various reform movements as they jockeyed for the small amount of space allotted to
them.615
Emerson reflected on this dynamic in a series of lectures on “the Times” days
before the Whig-majority Congress started its first session (in December 1841). “Every
Age, like every human body, has its own distemper,” Emerson announced from his pulpit
in Boston’s Masonic Temple, and a “new disease” had “fallen on the life of man” in the
present age. Coming up against the great monolith of Conservatism, “entrenched in its
immense redoubts, with Himmaleh for its front, and Atlas for its flank, and Andes for its
rear, and the Atlantic and Pacific seas for its ditches and trenches, which has planted its
crosses, and crescents, and stars and stripes, and various signs and badges of possession,
over every rood of the planet,” reformers shrank before their task. Instead of challenging
Conservatism’s claim to this vast expanse of time and space, they ceded the ground;
when Conservatism presumed the authority to “give” to whomever it wanted and to
“exclude and starve” whomever it willed, they turned on each other and fought for its
patronage. They built nothing positive—founding, instead, a negative faith in rejection,
repudiation, and criticism. Scorn of inadequate action gave rise to inaction. “Paralyzed by
uncertainty,” they got caught in a purgatory of indecision, a proliferation of thoughtpieces without the production of plans. Finally, distrusting their principles, they relied on
material forces: on “men, on multitudes, on circumstances, on money, on party; that is,
615
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on fear, on wrath, and pride.” They had lost their sense of the sublime, Emerson
concluded, their supreme nature, the vital, causative force that drove them with
unbounded energy and power toward the Everlasting. “All the children of men attack the
colossus [of Conservatism] in their youth,” Emerson lamented, “and all, or all but a few,
bow before it when they are old.”616
In his second lecture, “The Conservative,” Emerson compared the two parties that
divided the state—Conservatism and Innovation—and asked which party the “great,
brave, and beneficent man” should choose. Unsurprisingly, his evidence mounted up in
favor of the Innovators (the radicals, reformers, and idealists) and against the
Conservatives. In his lecture, Emerson imagined a dialogue between these two parties
(just had Brownson had a year before), where the Conservatives stood in as thinly-veiled
surrogates for the disappointingly inert Whig party. In this exchange, Emerson had the
idealist voice his own private critique of the Whig party as a criticism of conservatism—
verbatim, down to the slippers and the herb-tea. In this same language that Emerson
dismissed “the Whig,” the idealist observed that the conservative “assumes sickness as a
necessity, and his social frame is a hospital.” Just like the Whig, the conservative treated
the world like a patient with a terminal illness, and turned every social phenomenon into
an biological disorder that could be clinically diagnosed and contained. In this
framework, the conservative naturalized man-made systems, projecting the iniquities they
produced onto the bodies of their victims. Conservatives believed that misers were born
that way, the consequence of a long-standing and vicious “system of trade” that had
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“stereotyped itself in the human generation.”617 Since sickness had secured its footing,
the idealist recounted, “leprosy has grown cunning, has got into the ballot-box; the lepers
outvote the clean; society has resolved itself into a Hospital Committee, and all its laws
are quarantine.” Conservatives adapted every social sector—religion, education, and
law—into a mechanism for its bare maintenance. They did not care about the future; they
had no intention in steering the world “toward greatness” or fostering the “glory of a new
and more excellent creation.” They ruled to ensure that the days and years continued to
pass and to “make the world last our day.” Still, the Conservatives were not worthless,
Emerson concluded. They existed instrumentally, that they might spark true reform.
Mankind’s hope—that they might c and one day achieve it—grew on this “wild crab of
conservatism.” So, Emerson, too, remained hopeful, “It is much that this old and
vituperated system of things has borne so fair a child. It predicts that amidst a planet
peopled with conservatives, one Reformer may yet be born.”618
Where Emerson saw creative antagonism, and Clarke attempted a systematic
integration, Brownson found the potential for a living synthesis between conservatism
and reform. A month after Emerson’s address, Brownson took James Freeman Clarke’s
October sermon as an opportunity to develop the subject for his January 1842 BosQR.619
He started the review with an expression of respect and gratitude for his
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Transcendentalist colleague because he, too, had tried and failed to reconcile
conservatism and reform. He, too, had long wrestled with the paradox that the human
race “was made for progress,” and, yet, it assimilated tradition, just as the “body
assimilate[d] food”—it could not be divested of it. In his faith that he could overcome
this tension systematically, Brownson admitted, he had also promoted the doctrine that
the “true reformer” should work to “fulfill the old, never to destroy it,” compelling his
disciples to pivot perpetually “from the past to the future, and from the future to the past,
in endless gyration,” making no progress. Brownson had “no conception of the
impotence” of this doctrine, he claimed, until he found Clarke reproducing it in his own
sermon. In reading “conservatism to reformers,” and “radicalism to conservatives,”
Brownson realized, Clarke converted neither and alienated both. Blowing “hot and cold
in the same breath,” he succeeded only in creating a nauseating lukewarmness and
producing a state of “absolute indifferency” in his audience. Like Clarke, Brownson
wrote, he, too, had once “mistaken an imbecile eclecticism, for a powerful and living
synthesis,” but not anymore.
After a decade dedicated to Victor Cousin and Théodore Jouffroy, Brownson had
discovered the philosophy of French romantic socialist Pierre Leroux in 1841, and with
him, the secret to combining the “past and the future into a living unity,” and collapsing
the difference between the “stationary” and the “movement” parties.620 As Brownson
argued implicitly in this article and explicitly in the July 1842 BosQR (when he addressed
Leroux’s De Humaniti) Leroux’s doctrine of Progress created a “real synthesis” in the
“actual life of the race, and in that of the individual.” Because “we are the past, as well as
620
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the presentiment of the future” in Leroux’s philosophy, Brownson attested, every man
embodied a “living synthesis” of “what has been, and of what is to come.” Conservatives
and reformers merely struggled in varying degrees for progress.621 In the place of Kant’s
abstract, theoretical epigenesis, Leroux posited a literal epigenesis, effected by God’s
intervention through the agency of “specially inspired and extraordinarily endowed
individuals,” who acted as the “providential agents of the progress of the race.”622
Though all men descended from the same bloodline, some families and nations had
benefitted from a “continued superior moral, intellectual, and physical culture,” which
improved their blood over the course of human history. These “more advanced nations”
produced superior stock, with larger moral and social capacities than children of other,
less educated, bloodlines.
This line of argument quickly got Brownson in trouble with his fellow
democrats—because it suggested that heredity justified social inequality—and even the
Whig-affiliated New-York Daily Tribune, run by Brownson’s personal friend and political
adversary Horace Greeley, remarked on the “conservative” tendency of Brownson’s
recent writings.623 To short-circuit this criticism, Brownson clarified in his July review
that the trajectory he had described reflected a spiritual, as opposed to a natural,
621
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development.624 Brownson acknowledged that his January number had placed too much
emphasis on the theory of hereditary descent by natural generation, in which progressive
change occurred only within a single family line. Rather, Brownson emphasized, Leroux
attributed progressive change to divine intercession, a “spiritual generation” in which
God acted as the developmental force on successive generations, irrespective of their
“order of birth.” Metonymically, Brownson explained, humanity lived its own life as a
“collective being,” just as individual beings lived theirs. Recursively, the race
(understood Platonically as the “virtuality of man” or “human nature”) operated as the
“potentiality of the individual,” which developed by the same “law of growth” as
individuals did in their passage from infancy to manhood, continuously assimilating
divine truth based on God’s progressive revelation.625 By this process, “humanity as the
virtuality of the individual” became “enlarged,” increasing the human potential from one
generation to the next, so that “children of later generations are born…with greater
internal capacities” than the former.626 Succeeding generations transmitted their progress
through imbrication, each becoming the objective portion of the next generation and
transmitting to them the “higher life” that had grown within them according to their
Capacity and their Works. In this way, Leroux injected a providential (divine) element
into the doctrine of Progress—echoing Leibniz’s law of continuity, or continuous
creation, by which he equated an organism’s conservative and productive actions with the
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creative capacities of the divine will.627 Leroux resolved the tension between the past and
the future, conservatism and progress, therefore, by transferring it into the symbolic
register.628
In his concluding note for the July BosQR, Brownson credited Leroux for
correcting the aristocratic tendencies evident in his January number. Through Leroux,
Brownson revealed, he had come to understand that “spiritual generation” caused most of
the differences that he had habitually naturalized in his prior work. Furthermore,
Leroux’s symbolic synthesis corrected the weaknesses that he had identified in other
progressive doctrines. From his engagement with Leroux, Brownson hoped that “those,
who suppose us less democratic than formerly,” would realize that “we are more so.”
Whatever that meant.
The July number marked Brownson’s last full edition of the BosQR. The journal’s
finances forced him to shutter it with the October 1842 issue, in which he announced his
merger with John L. O’Sullivan’s United States Magazine and Democratic Review
(hereafter: DemRev). If Brownson genuinely believed that his readership would find him
more democratic than they had before, he did nothing to curtail his criticism of other
radicals. In the single article he published in his last BosQR, Brownson indulged in a
hundred-and-twenty-six-page long dissection of Theodore Parker's Discourse on Matters
Pertaining to Religion, which amounted to an autopsy on Transcedentalism.629 In his
second contribution to the DemRev the following month (November 1842), in which he
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discussed the utopian Brook Farm community (an experiment in socialist living that
Brownson’s close friend George Ripley started in 1841), he took aim at the other major
philosophical movement sweeping American reform: Fourier’s “System of
Association.”630 Since March 1842, Horace Greeley had given Fourierist Albert Brisbane
a weekly column in his Whig-affiliated New-York Daily Tribune, where Brisbane
proselytized for Fourier.631 Although Brownson praised Brook Farm, itself, his
November article so thoroughly ravaged Fourierism in the process that the DemRev
published a “Protest” on Fourier’s behalf in its next issue.632
Brownson rounded out the year with a lecture in front of the Mercantile Library
Association at the Broadway Tabernacle Church during which he laid out the philosophy
of government that would get him excommunicated from the Democratic party faithful
by the close of 1843. Speaking on the subject of government, Brownson protested against
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calling the US form of government a “Democracy” based on his understanding of the
dynamic between humanity, individuals, and the state. Ideally, Brownson insisted,
government existed to control the diversity of individuals so that each person had the
liberty to be himself without disrupting the delicate balance by which society sustained
the essential connection between each individual and his humanity. In a democracy, the
will of the people was sovereign, with no outside control. In the United States, on the
contrary, the constitution and the laws governed the people, affording them the order
necessary for them to manifest their own particular destinies. “We do American
institutions grievous wrong… when we call them democratic,” the New-York Daily
Tribune reported Brownson saying, “they are better than that, they are republican,
looking solely for the public good.” In this sense, Brownson explained, the United States
“most nearly approached a general model” of government because its form replicated the
ideal relationship between diverse individuals (the State Governments) and the unified
human Race (the Federal Union). The universal human Race and individual men lived
symbiotically: the Race provided the vital material for each man to become a distinct
individual, but no single man embodied the totality of humanity. Likewise, the States
drew from the Federal Union the vital elements of their nature, but they, too, retained
their integrity as distinct entities.
Reading into Brownson’s talk the subtext of the comte de Saint-Simon, the
Tribune praised its balance between conservatism and reform in the same language it
used to describe Fourier’s doctrine of association. As the Tribune had explained in an
article on “Conservative Reform” three weeks earlier, Fourierists believed that “the
soundest principles of innovation are conservative” in policy, seeking to improve existing
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institutions “gradually and by slow degrees,” progressing from the “present to the future,”
like an individual person growing from “infancy to manhood without losing their identity
of personality and character.”633 Though Brownson differed from the Fourierists on
several essential points, the Tribune found that his lecture resonated with Fourier’s calls
for universal unity and harmony through the varied association of mankind. Compared
with Fourier, the “most conservative of all reformers,” Brownson’s discourse proved
“eminently conservative and yet full of genuine love for Man and a zealous regard for his
rights,” according to the Tribune.634
Brownson’s December 1842 discourse marked the culmination of an entire year
covertly stumping for Calhoun’s presidential candidacy and signaled the more explicit
position he would take in Calhoun’s favor in 1843. His language called back to his
analysis of Calhoun’s Distribution speech (Janurary BosQR), in particular, in which he
clarified the “grave error” the party had committed in translating the word
“Republicanism” by the word “Democracy,” sparking their ruinous habit of treating their
party and their institutions as democratic, when they were not. By focusing on the
relationship between the individual and his universal humanity, Brownson brought in
Leroux, whose “living synthesis” provided a model for how the US might continue to
operate in dynamic tension between the States and the Union, and whose doctrine of
progressive revelation vindicated representative over popular forms of government.
Though the Tribune failed to note it, Brownson’s argument traced the metaphysical
contours of Calhoun’s republican and State rights doctrines. In lecturing on
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“Government, its Origin, Organization and End,” Brownson released an opening salvo in
his year-long bombardment on the subject in the pages of the DemRev—ranging from
synthetic philosophy, the community system, and universal history, to popular
government, the present state of society, and a three part series on the “Origin and
Ground of Government”—all aimed to re-shape the public mind in Calhoun’s favor.
THE CONSERVATIVE
What played out in the pages of the DemRev in 1843 as a pitched battle between
“Conservatism and Democratic Progress” more accurately represented internecine
campaigns within the Democratic party between the forces for Martin Van Buren and the
forces for John C. Calhoun. In a sort of call-and-response over the course of the year,
Orestes Brownson would write a provocative article making the case for Calhoun with
varying degrees of transparency, and John L O’Sullivan would reply with an editorial
meant to mollify his readers and mediate Brownson’s decree, while subtly promoting
Van Buren’s cause. On one level, Brownson and O’Sullivan debated popular democracy
and organic conservatism, but, as the 1840 Whig Daily National Intelligencer had
predicted, their conflict came down to the essential inconsistency within the Democratic
party between LocoFoco and pro-slavery politics. As the 1844 presidential election
loomed, the Democrats threatened, once again, to break up over the direction and thrust
of their party.635
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In the April 1843 DemRev, Brownson wrote a scathing indictment of popular
sovereignty in a polarizing editorial on “Democracy and Liberty.” He started his essay
with a warning to his “democratic brethren” that he intended to say “many severe things”
to and about them in the course of his argument, and that he hoped they would be able to
retain their good humor, since he did it for their own good.636 Mistakenly, he wrote, they
had believed that a “purely democratic” form of government would lead to the “Freedom
and progress of all men,” and “especially of the poorest and most numerous class.” They
assumed that external restraints on individual and collective freedom, alone, prevented
the people from gaining both the capacity and the drive to reach their highest individual
and social potential.637 But the people had yet to demonstrate the least capacity for
intelligent reflection on public policy and political affairs. During the 1840 campaign,
Brownson recalled, “Truth had no beauty, sound argument no weight, patriotism no
influence.” The people followed men, not principles. They had no real understanding of
the practical differences between political positions and no desire to learn them.
Consequently, though they had enthusiastically sustained Jackson, they rejected Van
Buren, even though he pursued the same policies. The people had viewed those men
“who had devoted their lives to the cause of their country, of truth, justice, liberty,
humanity,” as their enemies and voted, instead, to “make cattle of themselves.” In fact,
Brownson conjectured, the people had so little grasp of their constitution or what it meant
to live in a democracy, that “no measure of public policy can be proposed, so absurd or
so wicked but it shall find popular support.”
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Brownson reminded his Democratic colleagues that their government was a
“political organism,” invested with the power of a “living constitution,” which prescribed
certain protective and regulatory mechanisms designed to protect the people’s
sovereignty and liberty from this capricious and chaotic rule of the mob. When misguided
politicians removed the restraints on the popular will, however, they eroded these
practical, structural guaranties that protected individual rights and secured personal
freedom. Not only had their popular democratic doctrines proven insufficient to obtain
and secure popular rights, Brownson insisted, they actually damaged the positive exercise
of personal liberty. “We fear no attacks on Liberty but those made in the name of
Liberty,” Brownson wrote, because men obsessed with the word “Liberty” substituted
“passion for judgment, enthusiasm for wisdom,” and broke down everything that stood in
their way. “Liberty with them [was] merely political,” reducible to the freedom to vote or
seek public office, and for each man to follow his own will wherever it led him. They had
no sense of the delicate balance between resistance and control that liberty required. They
had no concept of what structures an organic community required to sustain true
individual liberty.
In spite of their claims, Brownson refused to consider these men “democrats” in
the proper sense of the term. For Brownson, the Democratic party “at heart” resembled
Calhoun’s vision: it stood against paper money, protective tariffs, corporate capital, and
federal consolidation, and favored free trade, State Rights, strict construction, low taxes,
and small government. A true democrat, in Brownson’s sense, fought for the “general
melioration in the speediest manner possible of the moral, intellectual, and physical
condition of the poorest and most numerous class.” Democrats who advocated popular
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doctrines, on the other hand, could never effectively secure its adherents true liberty,
practical freedom, or sustainable progress because popular suffrage in the United States
primarily furthered the interests of the “money power” at the expense of the proletaries.
In the end, popular democracy offered no greater protection for marginalized
communities than hierarchical forms of government did.638
Brownson concluded his article with a panegyric for conservative activism. The
“love of liberty” still burned deep and clear in his “true manly heart,” he reflected, but his
experience as a social activist and democratic political operative had finally led him to
reject the destructively radical politics of his youth. Though he still believed in the radical
side’s progressive aims, he had seen that their anti-establishment methods failed to effect
real social change. Even if they succeeded in tearing down church and state, he reflected,
they would gain nothing. Once they destroyed the progress of thousands of years, they
had no assurance that the human race would not develop on precisely the same lines as it
had before, re-constituting its old abuses. In their effort to acquire freedom and progress,
radicals swept away the infrastructure and authority necessary to secure them.
With age had come the clarity that liberty was not the absence of order; liberty
existed “only in and through order.” Social justice and human progress required
guarantees for freedom and good government built into the organismic working of the
system, itself. The “only true way of carrying the race forward,” Brownson wrote, “is
through its existing institutions,” advancing religion through the Church and society
638
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through the State. Brownson conceded that this Realist approach to progressive change
might give his readers the false impression that he had abandoned the Movement Party,
which he denied. Within the Movement, Brownson explained, two groups vied for
ascendency: a “radical section, seeking progress by destruction” and a “conservative
section,” which sought progress “through and in obedience to existing institutions.” The
conservative reformers understood that progressive change could not grow out of a
destructive radical impulse, but must be planted on “firm reality.” Between the two,
Brownson contended that the wise man chose the conservative side.
Brownson held an unpopular stance on popular sovereignty, and, having
expressed these views in a national forum during a Whig presidency, he placed himself in
a tenuous position with his Democratic colleagues. Anticipating his readers’ outrage at
Brownson’s anti-democratic position, John L. O’Sullivan injected some damage control
into the proceedings. Following Brownson’s diatribe, he published an editorial note that
distanced the DemRev from Brownson’s personal politics and mitigated his attacks on
popular sovereignty, without completely undercutting Brownson, himself.639 Jokingly,
O’Sullivan blamed Brownson’s ideological about-face on his rapidly-advancing years (in
April 1843, Brownson was just shy of forty and O’Sullivan was twenty-nine). Having
passed the “grand climacteric of life,” O’Sullivan explained, Brownson’s views had been
subject to the “usual process” by which the young Liberal “so often becomes
metamorphosed into the old Conservative.” Still, O’Sullivan speculated that he and
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Brownson might not differ so much, “after we get below the surface of names and
phrases.”640
While O’Sullivan agreed with Brownson that the 1840 election had been a
disaster, he argued that the Whig victory proved that the popular democratic principle
worked. In “turning us out neck and heels as they did so very unceremoniously in 1840,”
O’Sullivan determined, the people acted “just about right.”641 In the “revolution, or rather
the revulsion, of 1840,” the Democrats had lost not because the people were stupid, but
because the party’s policies had failed (particularly Jackson’s “Pet Bank experiment”). In
fact, O’Sullivan proposed that this choice reflected a kind of popular conservative logic.
Through its acts of self-government, self-reliance, and self-development, the popular
mind exercised its own conservative wisdom. If, in its freedom, the popular mind made
mistakes, they were necessary for it to “grow from inward to outward, through vice into
virtue.”642 Though Brownson had expressed his disappointed in the people’s capacity to
embrace abstract truths and progressive reforms, O’Sullivan suggested that they might
have instinctively understood that they were morally and physically unprepared for those
kinds of changes.
In his defense of popular self-government, O’Sullivan made a similar argument as
the German romantics had at the turn of the century. Seeming to echo Schiller,
O’Sullivan described the “constitution” as an internal force that operated both within
individuals and within nations to regulate their organization. In this way, he noted, a
national constitution performed the same function as an individual’s “common sense” or
640
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conscience, operating as a stable principle that judged the external force of the world on
the organic system. People became sovereign when they had developed a free
constitution: a transcendent, disinterested internalized law of reason that governed all of
their other, lower (sensorial) systems. Any community enlightened enough to possess a
free constitution would never suffer a violent revolution, by definition, because each
member of that community had internalized the “social vis inertia,” (the spirit of
“conservatism”) which served as a sufficient guarantee against abusing their power to
change their government. This “good” conservatism acted as a universal spirit that
ensured harmonious order and movement by acting as a co-ordinate centripetal principle
against the centrifugal force of radicalism and reform. The fact that the United States
already possessed a free constitution proved that the “general good sense, the social vis
inertia, the universal spirit of a true and good conservatism” already prevailed in their
community. What Brownson saw as a weakness, then, O’Sullivan categorized as the
system’s greatest strength. Popular sovereignty—the capacity of the popular will to
change its government’s forms and machinery—served as a corrective built into the
primary principle of its organization.
Unfortunately, O’Sullivan’s attempt to diffuse the mounting tension between
Brownson’s philosophy and the DemRev’s audience failed either to mollify his readership
or to quell Brownson. Infamously humorless, Brownson responded to O’Sullivan with a
series of increasingly hostile editorials, irrevocably damaging their relationship. Over the
course of the next six months, Brownson heatedly defended himself in the pages of the
DemRev. In his first editorial after O’Sullivan’s April “abuse,” Brownson claimed that he
had worked too hard and for too long in the “great and glorious cause of freedom and
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progress,” to “slough off” into a “cold and heartless conservatism” in his dotage.643 He
reminded his readers that he had initially avoided party politics because he did not think
the Democrats sufficiently radical for his tastes, and he joined the party only after they
adopted the principles of “Social Democracy” (i.e., the southern State Rights and
Locofoco doctrines) during the 1837 financial crisis. While he acknowledged that a
“revolution” had occurred in his opinions after Van Buren lost, he denied that the election
(or any other “earthly or unearthly” power) could turn him into a Whig. He still
considered himself part of the Democratic party, and an advocate of its leading measures,
in spite of the fact that he been “formally excommunicated” from it on several occasions.
Like all “true Democrats,” he wrote, he struggled for “Equal Rights and Equal Chances;”
he differed from the party solely in his approach to achieving that end.
Recent events—the 1840 election, the Whig Congress, the Dorr War—
demonstrated that the Democratic party desperately needed to change their tactics if they
wanted to achieve social equality. Following Benton, the party continuously framed the
political contest as a conflict between “MAN and MONEY,” arguing that the country’s
problems turned on the divide between corporations and businesses, on the one hand, and
labor, on the other. With everything else being equal, they reasoned, a fair vote would
necessarily favor the working classes, since they made up a larger portion of the
community.644 Nonetheless, the “party of Money” always prevailed.645 On the strength of
the “revolutionary and mobocratic doctrines preached by Mr. Clay and his Whig friends,”
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the people voted against their interests. In light of these results, Brownson pleaded with
the Democrats to recognize the impotence of popular democracy to secure workers’
rights or achieve any effectively popular reform. So long as the people could be duped
into voting for the wrong party or the wrong policies, they could not be trusted to protect
their own civil freedoms or hope to improve their “moral, intellectual, and physical”
conditions. They must be controlled, somehow.
Writing on “Popular Government” in May 1843, Brownson argued that the engine
guiding and advancing social change must be located in the structure of the system, itself.
True social amelioration could only be obtained if authorized by and evolved from the
present order—that is, from the constitution understood in Leroux’s organic sense as the
totality of relations, or the materialized whole.646 In this model, the constitution, acting as
the sovereign power, existed in and flowed through the actual organization of the body
politic, ensuring that the “whole” operated through the parts without threatening to
disrupt their coordinate functions. With this understanding of constitutionalism,
Brownson proposed that the Democrats “make themselves a true CONSTITUTIONAL
PARTY” on the basis of Calhoun’s weighted system of concurrent majorities. Brownson
insisted that Calhoun’s theory of government would secure a “much larger share of
individual freedom” and leave a larger field to “Free-Will, Conscience, Reason, and the
Bible” than the “consolidated democracy against which I have so often and so
indignantly protested—and for protesting against which I am called a conservative and an
aristocrat.” In the place of simple majority rule (the representation by one of all),
Calhoun’s system increased the relative voting power of a numerically smaller group, so
646
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that they counterbalanced the majority. Concurrent majorities cancelled out each other’s
material interests, so that only their universal interests remained, forcing them to engage
with each other as “men and citizens,” without recourse to their particular identities. This
formula basically reduced all political conflicts to questions of class. Although this
system theoretically dissolved identity politics based on the fungible (and potentially
fluid) measures of class, education, and profession, it simultaneously reinforced the
political disenfranchisement of women and people of color, since their essentialized and
naturalized organic differences of race and gender could not be erased, changed, or
canceled out.
In his note responding to this article, O’Sullivan conflated the Democratic party
with Van Buren’s politics and labeled dissenting voices (like Brownson’s and, implicitly,
Calhoun’s) as anti-democratic. While O’Sullivan acknowledged Brownson’s
consistency—his eclectic philosophy, O’Sullivan noted, had always combined
“speculative radicalism” and conservatism—he reiterated that Brownson seemed to lean
more heavily on his conservatism lately. It was one thing to give “conservative vetoes” to
minorities in order to protect their rights, but another thing entirely to sabotage the
People’s sovereignty, compare them to livestock, and suggest that they needed to be
controlled by government machinery. O’Sullivan confessed that he also supported
concurrent majorities in theory, if implemented at the foundation of a new civil polity. In
the United States, however, politicians invoked the term “minority interests” as a blind
for special interests (and classes) already supported by a long legislative history and
operating at the expense of equal rights. Given this dynamic, O’Sullivan recommended a
course of treatment based on the “homoeopathic principle that similia similibus curantur
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[like cures like].” Once in control, the people must be allowed to implement positive
measures to counteract the “manifold mischiefs of past mis-government.”647 As the true
(but previously silenced) majority, they should be given free rein to act in their capacity
as the “great repealing and reforming power” so feared by reactionary conservatives.
In his recent work in the DemRev, O’Sullivan reflected, it “certainly seemed as if
Mr. Brownson meant with particular emphasis to proclaim himself” part of that category
of conservatism attached to existing systems of abuse and oppression. Like many radicals
after the Whigs overthrew the Democrats in 1840, O’Sullivan observed, Brownson’s
disillusionment had led him to expressions against popular sovereignty that resonated
with the “highest ultraists of the anti-democratic school of politics.” In contrast, and
counter-intuitively, O’Sullivan viewed the Whig victory as the breaking point in the
“great disease of Whiggism, so long and deeply festering in the political body.” In taking
political power, the Whigs had lost the strength that they had generated in their
opposition to Democratic hegemony during the 1830s; without the Democrats to assail,
they lost the coherence they had built on their collective animosity. With the public mind
in a healthier state than it had been in years, O’Sullivan predicted that the parties would
finally pass the Independent Treasury, vindicating Martin Van Buren and marking an
essential step in the “onward progress of the high destiny of our country” and its
institutions.648
Though O’Sullivan kept the partisan source of his political disagreement with
Brownson in the margins, Fourierist and Democratic journalist Parke Godwin called out
the internecine conflict by name. In the Pathfinder (NY), he whittled Brownson’s
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argument down to this single point, “it seems that all [Brownson] meant to say in that
article was, that he was a believer in Mr. Calhoun’s notions of government.” As a former
supporter, himself, Godwin sympathized with Brownson’s allegiance in favor of Calhoun
and against the “democratic simplism” represented by Democratic party leaders like
Martin Van Buren, Silas Wright, James Buchanan, and George Bancroft. “They have no
originality of thought, and much less any real vital power,” Godwin reported, “There is
no life in them, only the imitation of life.” In contrast, Calhoun’s system of concurrent
majorities and local rights functioned to “nerve society, in its transition from the civilized
or incoherent order, to the harmonic or combined order,” which Godwin compared to the
developmental point in the life of the individual when the “childish trebble” changes into
“manly bass.” For these reasons, Godwin acknowledged that, like Brownson, he had also
promoted Calhoun’s candidacy, in spite of his position on slavery, because he had
believed that Calhoun’s principles would eliminate slavery, alongside other “social and
political evils,” once they were put into play. Recently, however, he had come to the
conclusion through his study of Fourier that Calhoun’s temporary fix would only slow
society’s growth; since societies had no need, like men, to physically pass from boyhood
to manhood, they could skip that step and jump straight to being a harmonious social
organism.649
Between July and October 1843, Brownson made the case for Calhoun in a series
of articles in the DemRev that demonstrated the vital urgency for a significant (but
conservative) change in the country’s leadership and organization based on its present
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condition. Starting with his July review of Thomas Carlyle’s Past and Present, Brownson
diagnosed the illness that ravaged the universal social organism, and especially the
“Saxon portion of it,” brought about by man’s worship of money and made chronic
through the systemic antagonism between master-workers and workers, Capital and
Labor. Modern society suffered from a potentially fatal disease: industrial capitalism.
Building on Carlyle’s description of England’s working class, Brownson traced the
morbid anatomy of industrial capitalism through the degraded condition of Boston’s
poor, the “four thousand victims of man’s infamy,” all able-bodied men and women who
had begged for work “with tears in their eyes,” and, finding none, submitted to the
indignity of soup and bread lines run by charitable societies. Even under the “virtuous
and intelligent rule of the democracy,” a “whole nation of working-men bound hand and
foot,” died starving, “while there is bread enough and to spare” and “poor human mothers
[were] driven to devour the flesh of their own offspring” in order to survive. The “whole
head is sick, the whole heart is faint,” Brownson judged, quoting Isaiah, because of the
“evil” inherent to an “Industrial Order” that failed to sustain a significant portion of the
population above the poverty line.650
Referring to his infamous 1840 article on the “Laboring Classes,” Brownson
recalled that he had offered his own “Morrison Pill” to relieve these symptoms, but the
public had rejected his cure.651 They resisted treatment because they refused to believe
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they were ill, Brownson explained; they mistook the “hectic flush on the cheek for the
hue of health.” Determined not to waste his own prescriptions (even if they were “quack
medicines”), Brownson proposed to leave the resolution to the natural leaders of industry,
religion, and politics, whom he hoped to sway with his depiction of the metaphysical
peril they faced, and the dangers that their present system posed to the constitution of the
state.
Before the disease proved fatal, Brownson called on these men to treat its
systemic causes—particularly their disordered way of thinking about their relationship
with the community. Over the years in which he had written about “political organisms,”
Brownson reminded his audience, he had always maintained that “we must be
conservative” in the United States. He had argued that the constitutional order in this
country contained within itself the elements of progress necessary for change, and that
activists had an obligation to work within that framework. In fulfilling their social
mission, Brownson had always insisted that reformers “preserve the order established by
the wisdom of our fathers” because he thought that theirs was the only path to finding the
“higher order of civilization for mankind.” Once men substituted the “worship of
Mammon for the worship of God,” however, they developed a faith in human
philosophies, “in mere theories concerning Supply and Demand, Wealth of Nations, selfsupporting, labor-saving governments,” finding their heaven in financial success and their
hell in the failure to make money. Under the thrall of the Industrial Order, he wrote, they
lost their faith “in the Noble, the Beautiful, the Just,” and their sense that a Higher power
existed. To heal the country, Brownson charged, the country’s leadership must reconnect
the nation to the sublime, govern in a way that benefitted the poor as well as the “rich
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capitalists and trading politicians,” and reorganize industry so that it provided for the
subsistence of the entire population and justly redistributed its profits. Though he did not
mention Calhoun by name in this article, Brownson’s policy recommendations spelled
out Calhoun’s political platform. In proposing that the people reconsider the method they
used to choose their leadership, moreover, Brownson gestured toward the battle over
political succession being waged behind the scenes of the Democratic party.
Over the summer, Brownson distilled what separated him from O’Sullivan and
other popular democrats: he treated society as a living organism, and they treated it as a
collection of individuals, “held together by that rope of sand, enlightened self-interest.”
Speaking at Dartmouth College at the end of July, Brownson argued that the “broad and
solid foundation of society” rested on an organic conception of human relations in which
each man represented a “distinct phasis652 of humanity” that no other man embodied.653
No one in this system could be spared. Because each man performed a unique service in
the “manifestation or representation of humanity,” anyone who wounded one man, even
the “least significant” one, damaged the “mighty heart of universal humanity herself.” On
the basis of this essential interconnectedness, society became a “living organism, with a
common centre of life, and a common principle of vitality; a one body with many
members, and all the members [were] members one of another.” This organic framework
led the scholar, the moralist, the politician, and the religious minister to address
themselves to the diversity of needs in their communities, finding the combination of
inspiration and instruction that would propel each man toward the progressive realization
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of his own destiny and, incidentally, contribute to the continuous growth of creation
toward realizing God’s “Infinite Ideal.”
In his three-part series on the organic “Origins and Grounds of Government,”
which the DemRev ran from August through October 1843, Brownson elaborated his own
metaphysical and teleological framework for civil government, contended for its
perfecting and emancipatory purpose, and explained how Calhoun’s conservative vision
would lead them there. Brownson argued that popular democrats, like O’Sullivan,
misunderstood the nature of society and the reason that human beings needed
government. The problem with modern democratic theorists, Brownson reiterated, was
that they had “no conception of society as an organism,—no conception of the unity of
humanity as the generative principle of individuals”—which led them to “lose sight of
the diversity of individual function, and try to compress all individuals into one, with one
and the same individual, and social, function.” Brownson railed against their popular
theory of democracy, expressed in a blind and insatiable leveling tendency, which
regarded men as interchangeable parts. By indulging in the impulse to level downward,
he complained, they
advanced an anti-intellectual doctrine of equality that reduced everyone to their basest
interests, stunting society’s organic growth and perpetuating the conditions for inequality
that it had intended to supplant, in the first place.
In terms of governing, Brownson noted, popular democratic theory begged the
question. It assumed the “freedom of every individual as the condition of securing the
freedom of every individual.” Yet, government did not exist because men were born
equal, as the Declaration of Independence claimed; it existed because they were not
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equal. “It is precisely because men are not free and independent, because they cannot be
free, and each in a condition to perform his special function in the social body, without
government, that government becomes necessary.” Government existed to make men
equal before the law and to order society in a way that granted them the liberty to realize
their human potential.
In Brownson’s organic theory of government, in contrast, government arose in
response to “man's nature”—to his “inherent and essential want of humanity.” Brownson
demonstrated that “what we term human society, is not a mere association of equals,” as
Fourier would have it, “but a Living Organism” in which humanity operated as the “one
vital force active in all, the lifecurrent, that flows through all individuals, making them
all members of one living body.” Following Leibniz, Brownson defined “humanity” as a
real, causative drive (the vis activa) that operated in the material world, to bring
individuals the substance without which they could not exist. They existed because they
acted and humanity drove that existence. As the “generative principle of men,” humanity
served the same purpose in the universal human social organism as the vital force served
in the human body. In this context, the atomized or disaggregated individuals that
provided the base units for O’Sullivan’s contract theory of government did not reflect
reality. Evoking Leroux, Brownson made man and society coterminous. Since “Man out
of society is a solecism; is not man” and societies had never existed without government,
Brownson reasoned, then government must also serve an essential purpose in the divine
structure of reality. Given that God created and governed everything “after its kind,” the
practical end of human government must be found in the “provision for the freest and
fullest manifestation of humanity in the life of individuals” or, put simply, the “Freedom
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for each individual to act out his own individuality.” The only way individuals could
exist in their full potential was to live in a society that gave full reign to their power to
act—that is, to their humanity. Because man accessed his humanity incompletely,
however, he was prone to misdirect or misuse his causative energy, to oppress other men
or seek personal gain at their expense, and that was why he needed government.
When someone like John L. O’Sullivan witnessed the chasm between the
country’s emancipatory ideals and the impoverished condition of its great mass of
citizens, he thought the discrepancy could be resolved by amplifying the voices of the
poor and disenfranchised classes, but Brownson disagreed. From Brownson’s vantage,
the poorer classes all viewed themselves as future masters and voted as if they already
belonged to that class. They voted against the particular expression of their humanity
because they had no capacity to recognize it and, through it, to be drawn to those men
who shared it. Like Charles Lane said in the Dial, “Our organic reforms are not organic
enough” because they never reached the life force (humanity) in the organ that most
needed reforming: the individual man, himself.654 Men as individuals had to be brought
closer to their own humanity before that force (their humanity) could pull them toward
the humanity of others in incrementally and concentrically larger social organisms. By
design, the civil government, combined with the moral force of individual statesmen,
acted as the “directive power” that controlled and guided man’s natural propulsion,
keeping him obedient to God’s will and on the path toward self-actualization through
communion with humanity, nature, and God.
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In the organic framework, individuals served specialized, coordinated functions in
their social organism, which the political apparatus served to secure and help order. The
precise form of this apparatus developed out of the organic constitution of its host—its
genius, its pursuits, its soil, its geography. “If universal human society be an organism,”
Brownson explained, “each nation is also an organism on a smaller scale, and has its own
vital force and central principle, which is the life of its members.” God endowed each
nation with life, creating a national organism, which, like man, strove to realize its
potential—to manifest its destiny. In Brownson’s turn of phrase, each nation struggled
always to actualize its faith or ideas in its national life. Consequently, men like
O’Sullivan and Brownson, who dabbled in national metaphysics, had to be careful in the
way they talked about the country, in the kinds of ideas they introduced, in the ways they
shaped its faith. Their faith and ideas must be “just and true” because with “false faith,
with false ideas,” the nation’s life could be “only death.”
Brownson attributed the present conflict within the Democratic party to its
confusion about the country’s dominant faith. Their faith was not democratic, it was
republican. “The party is wrong in calling itself the democratic party, and its faith
democracy,” Brownson cried, “Its faith is republicanism, and it is the Republican party,
and it should correct the misnomer of which it is guilty.” As the “true interpreter” of this
faith, Brownson distinguished between its attachment to democratic ends (which he
promoted) and its misguided promotion of democratic forms (which he decried). He
claimed that all Democrats “aimed at the moral, the intellectual, and the social elevation
of the great mass of mankind,” especially the working classes, and sought to establish a
framework for individual freedom and progress grounded on the condition of social
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order. Although they often agreed on policy matters, however, they never converged
behind a single Democratic philosophy of government. In an absolute democracy of the
kind promoted by the DemRev, Andrew Jackson, William Henry Harrison, and Thomas
Dorr (as well as Dorr’s highly-placed supporters: Martin Van Buren, Governor Marcus
Morton of Massachusetts, and Governor Henry Hubbard of New Hampshire), popular
sovereignty swept away all other external controls and made men into gods. Nothing
constrained the individual from acting in an absolute democracy, if he could convinced
enough people to follow him, because nothing bound him except for public opinion or the
popular will, “however expressed or collected.”
Brownson rejected as revolutionary any attempts to reorganize the government
according to these prevailing democratic theories. In terms of the US government’s
practical organization, Brownson claimed he had nothing to add to Calhoun’s solution.
Following Calhoun’s constitutional theory of government (as elaborated during the
nullification crisis and in his 1842 speech supporting President Tyler’s bank vetoes),
Brownson characterized the United States as a constitutional republic, where “the people
are free to act only within certain limits, only through prescribed forms, and, however
unanimous they may be, only such of their acts are laws, as are done through these
forms.”655 The US constitution contained within its structure the mechanism for progress,
making it ideally suited for its political organism. By its nature, the constitutional
republic produced the ideal balance between the individual’s propelling force and the
655
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government’s directive force. Though Brownson acknowledged, as Calhoun had, that the
people retained the right to resist (and even subvert) their civil government, he
maintained that they could never desire such a change because their government
encompassed “all that can be wished” in its constitution. Compressing Calhoun’s 1837 “I
am a conservative” speech, Brownson attested:
Every true American must say with Mr. Calhoun, “I am a conservative in the
broadest and fullest sense. I solemnly believe that our political system is, in its
purity, not only the best that ever was formed, but the best possible, that can be
devised for us. It is the only one by which free states, so populous and wealthy,
occupying so vast an extent of territory, can preserve their liberty. Thus thinking,
I cannot hope for a better. Having no hope of a better, I am a conservative.”
So long as the American people preserved their institutions “in their purity,” and
administered them according to their “true intent and meaning,” Brownson wrote, their
government would never give them cause to revolt. To the extent that imprudent
Democrats resolved the government into a democracy in practice, however, they altered
its character, polluted its structure, and undermined its capacity to attain its true organic
ends.656
Though the United States already enjoyed a perfect constitution, therefore, the
burden fell on well-educated and well-informed American statesmen, like Calhoun, to
guard against any departure from its “true nature” or any attempts to administer it in any
way that deviated from its organic republican principles. From their “elevated position”
and their “commanding genius,” these statesmen were particularly well-positioned to
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“operate powerfully on the masses.” Alongside scholars, priests, and moralists, these
great men drove the moral force that elevated the great mass of people, increasing their
intelligence and enlarging their moral capacity. As moral authorities, virtuous statesmen
educated and directed the people, they sought out and publicized (even unpopular) truths,
and they sacrificed their own interests to generate a “higher social and individual good.”
Adding Calhoun to the political pantheon of great men, Brownson asked, “What would
have been our country but for Washington, Jefferson, [Samuel] Adams, Jackson, and last
but not least, Calhoun?” This act of self-sacrifice, itself, modelled the sort of behavior
that inspired the masses to meet the demands of good government. In fact, Brownson
alleged, “we owe the preservation of the Constitution, and the liberty of this country” to
just one such man. In the course of his public life, John C. Calhoun had risen up against
the majority of his countrymen to prevent the “popular invasion of the Constitution,”
risking his career and (nearly) his life. As soon as “party animosities” and the “wrath of
defeated interests” subsided, Brownson predicted, the people would come to understand
that Calhoun had salvaged the “true nature” of their institutions, and they would make
that man their president.657
By the end of the year, O’Sullivan could no longer ignore that Brownson had
transferred his “Stentor voice” and “Ajax arm” from the “camp of the People” into the
“antagonist array.”658 In his final note on Brownson’s tenure at the DemRev, O’Sullivan
explained that he could not reconcile Brownson’s professedly egalitarian motives, on the
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one hand, with his continued expression of the “strongest doctrine ever advanced by the
worst enemies of the people” in language that sounded just like the phrases despots used
to justify their tyranny. He speculated that Brownson had been seduced into the party of
respectability, wealth, and social ascendency (i.e., the Whigs), who had “eagerly
welcomed him to a prominent position.” In the December 1843 edition of the DemRev,
O’Sullivan announced that he had recused Brownson from his position at the
magazine.659
In January 1844, Brownson opened the first edition of his eponymous journal (the
Brownson Quarterly Review) with an extended defense of his own politics. In spite of his
public split with “Democracy,” he maintained that he was, “of course,” a democrat. He
was a “democrat,” that is, in the sense that democrats constituted and administered
government so that it broke down “all factitious distinctions of class or caste” and
maintained—in practice—the people’s equality before the law. By these standards,
Brownson asserted, he fought harder to secure the “substantial freedom” of the “poor and
more numerous classes” than those democratic theorists whose popular doctrines
fertilized the field for self-professed “democratic” politicians, “who with their lips praise
the people, and with their hands pick their pockets, or those who act as jackals to the
dainty chiefs who are too exalted to plunder — except by proxy.” 660 It might be tempting
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to dismiss Brownson’s democratic claims as dissimulation. Certainly, in his lifetime,
most of Brownson’s American colleagues considered him to be unpredictably heterodox,
at best, and, more likely, treacherously hypocritical. Still, the evidence suggests that he
remained a member of the Democratic party and exclusively backed Democratic
candidates (albeit with a healthy dose of criticism) until the northern arm of the party
withered at the start of the Civil War. Brownson had not, in fact, joined the Whigs or
accepted their patronage (and, unlike William Cabell Rives, he never would), but, like
Rives, he had abrogated the party line in questioning its ideological orthodoxy. Echoing
other Democratic-dissenters “ycleped Conservative” in the prior decade, Brownson
argued that the Democratic party—in marginalizing dissenters who protested its more
extreme democratic tendencies—subverted the egalitarian and liberal ends it explicitly
advocated. Like Rives, Brownson declared that he had not left the Democracy, but that
the Democracy had left him.661
In prescribing to himself “Conservatism,” Brownson claimed, he merely named
the driving force behind real democratic reform. Based on Leibniz’s Law of Continuity,
Brownson emphasized that the Present and the Future “must be always regarded as
intimately linked with, and evolved from, the Past.” Working from the incomplete
patrimony inherited from past generations, each successive generation improved the
conditions of their race. Brownson elaborated that this principle compelled him to “take
the Conservative side” in politics, “in this country, at least.” In the United States, he
declared, statesmen should treat their fundamental institutions like churchmen treat the
Gospel: though they might develop and apply the laws, they should not change or dismiss
661
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them. They must fight to preserve the existing order without alteration or amelioration
“not authorized by it, and capable of being evolved from it.” If that position seemed
incongruous or undemocratic to his former colleagues, he asked them to reflect on their
own arguments for progress and reform. Unlike their European and British fellowtravellers, Brownson pointed out, they lived in a Constitutional Republic, a system with
the mechanism for democratic reform built into its political organism. That was what he
meant by “Conservatism,” he wrote, that “We may seek progress, but only progress under
and through existing institutions.”662 According to this logic, American democrats
already took the conservative side, so long as they did not confuse the means of reform
(constitutionalism) for its end (democracy).
In addition to publically embracing “Conservatism” in his opening Review,
Brownson announced his conversion to Catholicism.663 Philosophically, Brownson’s
conversion marked his departure from the organic constitutional conservatism that he had
cultivated through the BosQR, the pages of the DemRev, and his work for Calhoun.
Whereas he had once understood that the State ordered and nurtured the social organism,
defined by its particular expression of the universal vital force of humanity, Brownson
now envisioned the universal human organism as the fragmented body of Christ, which
must be healed by the same “curative process” by which nature healed any wounded
body. Just as nature threw off “bruised flesh” and formed “new flesh” by virtue of the
“vital principle, which is in the broken body” and in its “several parts,” Brownson
projected that the universal Church would be healed through the operation of a single
662
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organic principle—the vital force of love—that expressed the “living principle still in the
broken body of our Lord, and in all the fragments into which it has been broken.”664
Though Brownson had often criticized other reformers for abandoning the political
sphere as their central field of operation, he now promoted the Church as the “divinely
appointed medium of individual and social regeneration and progress,” and found that he
must, therefore, “labor to enlist men on its side, under its banner, as the preliminary
condition of Reform.” The Church (even in its fragmented condition) supplanted the
State as the mechanism for change that propelled the scattered pieces of God’s body to
recombine in one “living and indissoluble” organism.665 Serendipitously, Brownson’s
announcement coincided with Calhoun’s decision to remove his name from consideration
at the Democratic party’s Baltimore convention.
A CONSERVATISM TO CALL ITS OWN
The story of how Orestes Brownson became a conservative illuminates the
essential ambiguity expressed in the development of American conservatism—that is,
outside of its instrumental use, what would it mean to be Conservative in a democratic
republic? What might the philosophical conservatism of constitutional republicanism
look like? With the “destiny of Europe settled for the next century in favour of
conservatism,” American author Horace Binney Wallace had predicted in 1838 that the
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“unbridled license of democracy” in America would eventually “work out a conservatism
of its own.”666
Twenty years later, in an 1859 essay on “Politics at Home and Abroad,” Orestes
Brownson reflected bitterly on the kind of conservatism that American democrats had
built in the interim. Ever since Jackson’s election, Brownson claimed, the Democratic
party had encouraged a totalizing democratic absolutism that promoted democracy in
theory and form at the expense of true freedom and equality in practice. From
Brownson’s perspective in 1859, this Democratic conservatism was the unbridled license
of democracy that Horace Binney Wallace had anticipated in 1838. To consolidate
power, the Democratic party exploited the language of popular reform and individual
autonomy, promising to rid the government of corruption and excess, to reduce its size
and its reach, to remove government interference in commerce and secure a system of
free trade, and to restore to each white man the liberty to pursue his own unique destiny.
Through an aggressive and polarizing popular politics, they removed all constraints on
the immediate and capricious expression of the majority’s will in the name of
“conservatism,” while simultaneously ensuring that their popular reforms empowered the
right kinds of voters, privileging immigrants and the white working-class (who tended to
vote Democrat), at the expense of people of color. Operating politically as the unchecked
growth of the democratic principle, democratic conservatism had become an insatiable
force that gradually destroyed the very liberty it had once set out to advance.667
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The next chapter will examine the peculiar conservatism that democracy birthed
in the middle of the nineteenth century. With the combination of Calhoun’s leadership
(and pro-slavery conservatism) and the overwhelming push toward popular politics in the
1840s, the Democratic party generated a popular conservatism, which might just be what
organicism should look like in a democratic republic. Whereas the Jackson-Van Buren
party had aligned with leftist (or ultraist) politics internationally, the national Democratic
party re-oriented its politics in the 1840s away from the late Jackson-Era emphasis on
ideological purity toward a trans-regional alliance based in a politics of shared identity.
Having assimilated the biological and genetic models of statehood, they constituted
liberty as a function of whiteness and formulated whiteness as a privilege predicated on
subjugation. Borrowing from British organic, German romantic, and French socialist
thought, Democratic political theorists cultivated a vision of American society that
conjoined white Western frontiersmen, white Southern yeomanry, and white Northern
labor to promote “conservative” Democratic policies such as property rights, territorial
expansion, strict construction, State rights, limited national government, and free trade,
all of which served as proxy arguments for the protection and extension of slavery. Proslavery politicians from both sides of the aisle advanced the slave-economy (and its
corollary emphases on rural life, family values, and organic hierarchy) as the solution to
the nation’s class crisis. Unlike wage-labor, they argued, domestic slavery united capital
and labor in an organic system that vulcanized the country against the social unrest that
plagued capitalist societies. Within this system, pro-slavery ideology formed the
conservative basis of a national metaphysic—infusing every element of society with
purpose and meaning, it structured the state within an organic familial hierarchy and
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knitted the country together in a holistic and balanced national system. By 1859,
Brownson observed, “Conservatism has come to mean, with us, filibusterism, the
acquisition of our neighbor's land, the extension of negro slavery, the reopening of the
slave trade, and placing under the ban of society every publicist who raises his voice
against such conservatism.”668 Possibly, no ‘publicist’ was better suited to elegize
American conservatism than Orestes Brownson in 1859, since that particular strain of
American conservatism might not have existed without his contribution.

668

Brownson, “Politics,” 214.

329

CHAPTER 5: SLAVE CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA
In 1844, ex-governor of New York William H. Seward reflected from the comfort
of his (brief) political retirement that “American politics are utterly unintelligible to
Europeans.” In Great Britain and on the continent, he observed, irreconcilable political
principles distinguished the various parties from each other, creating clear and
insurmountable barriers between them. The Legitimist, the Juste Milieu, and the
Republican might sit together in the Assemblée nationale, and the Tory, the Whig, and
the Radical might all attend the British Parliament, but they could never come together in
principle. When these politicians visited the United States, Seward noted, they expected
to find the two parties arraigned along similarly incompatible lines, with a movement
party advocating republicanism and progress, and a conservative party in opposition. In
the United States, however, the names that classified political parties indicated “unreal
differences” within a homogenous population. Regardless of their nominal differences,
Seward wrote, “we are to a man… opposed to slavery, advocates of morality, virtue and
religion, all jealously conservative of State rights, and all willing and resolved to stand or
fall with the Union.”669
Progressive republicans they all might be, but they were by no measure united in
their opposition to slavery. The emancipatory forward thrust of American politics
benefitted an increasingly conscribed population in this period, as States rolled back civil
rights for free people of color and slavery “assumed an aggressive attitude” during the
1844 presidential campaign.670 After the pro-slavery expansionist Democratic candidate,
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James K. Polk, won the presidential election, democratically-affiliated abolitionists
redoubled their criticism of the highly constrained American political system, in which
one party professed the “most liberal principles” (claiming to be the “true friend of
popular government” and assuming the name “democratic”) and the other boasted of its
conservative character (because it promoted the tariff, the banking system, and
“the Union as it is”), while both parties maintained their national position through their
alliances with slaveholders.671
By the mid-1840s, slavery had obtained political hegemony, dominating both
major political parties and directing the national conversations about conservatism and
progress. During the internecine debates over slavery that led to the Methodist Episcopal
split in 1844, the disputants tacitly agreed that the “conservative ground of the discipline”
led to their complicity in upholding slavery. In 1845, the official History of the
Organization of the Methodist Episcopal Church, South maintained that the middle or
“conservative” Conferences might be anti-slavery in principle, but the “vital
conservatism of the Methodist Discipline” required that they oppose any action on the
question of slavery, in practice. This conservatism in both religion and politics “would
not so much preserve the existence of slavery itself,” the Anti-Slavery Bugle pointed out,
but it “clings to, and keeps in existence, those obstacles to emancipation, that alone
prevents the abolition of slavery.”672 In an 1846 article on “ANTI-SLAVERY in the
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UNITED STATES, the radical London Daily News reported that this attitude toward
slavery pervaded American politics. Though the two great American parties professedly
represented the “two elements of politics, conservatism and progress,” the Daily News
observed, they differed “very little from each other” in reality, merely operating as standins that alternately traded off who ran the government and who acted as the opposition.
With the slave-holding States controlling the balance of power, the Daily News predicted
in 1846, the country’s policy “will be the propagandism of the manacle and the lash”
until either God or the people lost their patience, and finally demolished the system of
slavery.673
Like many other radical sources, the Daily News presumed that societies
progressed from repression toward emancipation. In this framework, unjust and unequal
governments would inevitably fall, regardless of the scientific formulas they created to
protect their status quo. Reporting on “SLAVE CONSERVATISM IN AMERICA” in a
June 1846 editorial, the Daily News connected American conservatism with the “quack
medicine of external and skin-deep conservatism” that had developed across the Atlantic
after the French Revolution. Ever since the French encyclopaedists had voiced the
“cabalistic words” that awakened the common man to light and freedom, “scientific
Conservatists” had searched in vain for the prescription that might delay the inevitable
decline of their coercive systems:
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“Into all schemes of government (as they are called, by an apt derivation from the
equally exact science of astrology), erected in our day by the alarmed professors
of political economy, what is called the Conservative element enters in very large
proportion. We hear, every now and then, that some French chemist has
discovered a new antiseptic substance, by the applications which a dead body may
be preserved for an indefinite period of time against the advances of natural
decay. It is for a similar end that our political savans spend their efforts.
Something must be invented by whose means a stone-dead element of social
organization may be kept decently above ground, without transmitting
intelligence of its demise to the nostrils of those interested. In proper scientific
classification this is known as a conservative element. In plain English it means
simply a method of preserving that which ought no longer to be preserved; that
which has no longer in itself an inherent principle of life.”
In Europe, Conservatists overwhelming relied on the “infallible recipe” for stability that
amounted to reminding men to respect their particular State because “it is old.” In the
United States, however, Conservatists faced the problem that nothing in their country was
old. Confronted with an irremediable “historical parveneuism,” they attempted to create
the fiction of age. Conjuring a “dim mist” of ambiguous antiquity around the
Constitution, they spoke with reverence for the “glorious compact” of their “fathers,” a
scripturism that implicitly invoked the “Noachic” era.674 To protect slavery, they taught
the American people to regard the Constitution as “something too sacred to be looked at
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closely,” in spite of the fact that the framers provided them with a mechanism to change
the Constitution at its inception. Whenever the public debate touched on slavery, the
News noted, they claimed that the Constitution was “too sacred to be subject to that
immutable law of nature which demands of everything that it grow or die.” In this
attitude, America’s “blind conservers” reflected the same renitence as their European
counterparts. Yet, they would never find in the “pharmocopaeia of their political
economy” a preventative of destiny. They could neither shield their constitutions from
the laws of nature nor themselves from God’s attribute of justice, which had already
doomed their system. Echoing the major medico-philosophical treatises in the period, the
Daily News charged that the “great conservatism of nature is change and reproduction,”
through which God acted as the agent of human destiny, and that divine justice, alone,
worked as the “antiseptic for government formulas.”
For their part, American politicians who advocated for slavery agreed with the
Daily News, in principle. They, too, sought a conservatism that balanced the country’s
core principles with its organic and healthy progress. They simply disagreed on who
should benefit from that change and what elements of the American system they wanted
to reproduce. Whereas the Daily News forecast a society where the triumph of progress
meant slavery’s demise, slave-owners and their apologists developed a worldview in
which the institution of slavery actively protected American society and operated as the
essential agent by which the country realized its divinely-ordained destiny. Living in the
“simple, pure, conservative atmosphere of the country,” southerners maintained that
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“purity of sentiment and of purpose, which is the only true conservatism” in the United
States.675
Not only did the institution of slavery offer a superior model of production, proslavery southerners maintained, it also produced a more stable and humane social
organization than the northern manufacturing-industrial complex. According to Florida
representative Edward C. Cabell, the “moral power of slavery” generated the purest
“spirit of freedom and true republicanism.” Whereas the industrial cities of the North
filled with paupers, the southern people enjoyed the most “individual happiness” of
anyone in the world, secure in the knowledge that their social organization insured their
“life, liberty, and property.” Even northerners implicitly grasped the superiority of the
southern system—its inbuilt conservatism—which placed them in a bitter double bind.
They knew that they could never compete commercially with slavery, which explained
why they fought so hard to tear it down, but they also recognized that slavery “naturally
exert[ed] a conservative influence” on the entire Confederacy. Northerners affected the
position that the South needed the Union to survive, but they had it backwards—the
South did not need the Union’s protection, the North did. In a time when popular, laborled revolutions dominated the international press, Cabell warned the North not to alienate
the part of their country that offered them the greatest degree of stability.676 The
“conservatism of slavery” might one day be necessary to save the North from the
“thousand destructive isms infecting the social organization of [their] section.”677 For this
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reason, southern Whigs and Democrats declared, the founding generation had made
slavery a fundamental part of the country’s “organic law,” framing the constitution and
building their institutions to protect and perpetuate slavery, as well as its corollary
commitment to white hegemony.
The ontological assumption that societies should be organic provided a
comprehensive, hierarchical schema that continuously reinforced pro-slavery priorities
and reflexively protected the southern property in slaves. Democratically-affiliated proslavery politicians, in particular, stressed the role that the rural, “white” laboring class
(southern yeomanry and free labor, alike) played in creating a stable society and insisted
that they should be the primary beneficiaries of the country’s social progress and
territorial gains. At the same time, they asserted that “white” labor sustained their sociopolitical position on the basis of organic subjugation. While the anti-slavery forces
argued that slavery degraded labor, slave-holders rejoined that “white men” enjoyed an
equality in slave States that could not exist “where the same race fill the places of master
and menial,” as in the North. The “white laborer” found himself “elevated by having a
caste below him.” With the prevalence of “black” labor (slaves) in the South, menial
employment was a transitory state for the white laboring class, who made up the
“conservative portion” of US society. Integrating research from chemistry, biology, and
the social sciences with the increasingly popular doctrine of free trade, pro-slavery
southerners argued that without slavery, the essential, conservative element of “white”
labor would disappear from American life.
Non-slaveholding “national conservatives,” meanwhile, maintained an ontological
commitment to the Union that ultimately led them to capitulate to pro-slavery demands.
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In their efforts to hold the Union together, they tacitly (and often explicitly) reinforced
the programmatic commitment of pro-slavery “conservatives” to define and defend the
organic constitution of their communities—with an ever-expanding definition of
“community” that ultimately encompassed the entire United States as well as its
prospective States and territories. Throughout the contentious process of admitting new
states into the Union, they negotiated the tenuous grounds on which the Union persisted
through political compromises, as much concerned with what they did not articulate or
enforce, as what they did. This dynamic made abolition, in specific, and slavery, in
general, a discursive taboo that nonetheless seemed to dominate every conversation. It
stalked the halls of Congress during legislative debates over the laws governing the
movement of bodies between States, which bodies could be restricted from entering or
residing in States, and which new bodies politic should be allowed to enter the Union and
under what conditions. Southerners claimed the right to prohibit free people of color from
entering their States, and the prerogative to take their slaves wherever they saw fit to
travel or relocate, while new territories (like Oregon) submitted State constitutions that
excluded all people of color (free or enslaved) in an effort to preclude the entire question
of slavery. Influenced by the new science of race, northern and southern “conservatives”
alike framed their inter-sectional discontent in terms of managing people of color.
In effect, their divergent social organizations generated two distinct models of
conservatism: white nationalism (a predominantly northern and northwestern
phenomenon) and white hegemony (holding sway in the south and southwest). White
nationalism envisioned a country populated exclusively by “white” people, and vented its
hostility toward the continued co-existed of the “black population” through socio-
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political oppression, antipathy to slavery (which slaveholders insisted benefitted “the
blacks”), and their programmatic commitment to segregating, isolating, and ultimately
separating the “black” population from their midst. As historian David R. Roediger has
noted, politicians built national coalitions on the basis of a shared “white” identity,
disseminating “a vision of a “free white republic” without significant African-American
presence.” Legislating against the spectre of race on behalf of “white” people living
“largely in the absence of people of color,” they promised to “shore up exclusionary
efforts in the face of real and perceived threats of in-migration of those not categorized as
white.”678 White hegemony, on the other hand, propagated the idea that the “white
population” represented a superior race with a moral duty to dominate, care for, and
potentially uplift the dependent “African race.” In coming to America, Mississippi
Democrat Jefferson Davis preached, the “sons of Ham” came to their destiny—a place
where the institution of slavery provided for their happiness and usefulness as it prepared
them to fulfill their own civil and social destiny.679 Generally, but not exclusively, white
nationalists also endorsed “white” superiority. Yet, they reasoned that the co-existence of
an inferior alongside a superior race corrupted both groups, which led them to advocate
for separation, for example, through colonization in Africa. Notwithstanding their
incompatible programmatic implications, white nationalist and white hegemonic appeals
produced the same effect. In the words of historian James Brewer Stewart, “No matter
what their qualities or accomplishments African Americans must be branded by
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pigmentation alone as members of a perpetually inferior race.”680 In the politics of the
period, people of color represented a chronic contagion that continuously threatened to
upend the country’s organization, and that different strains of American conservatism
promised to manage or cure.681
To expose the process by which race and slavery shaped American conservatism,
this chapter will look at the incorporation of the State of Missouri (1820-21), the State of
Florida (1845), the Oregon Territory (1848), and the Mexican annexations (from the 1848
Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which ended the Mexican-American War), as well as
related disputes over federal naturalization laws, “fugitive” slaves, and the slave trade in
DC.682 The competing positions articulated through these debates exposed the
intransigence of conservatism as a political schema. The organic model resisted
compromise. It judged every component and potential part of the system on its organic
relation to the whole. For the United States, this criteria interrogated every State that
entered the Union and every individual that entered into and passed between the States.
Because the country’s health and longevity depended in large part on its constituent
680
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makeup and their organic interaction, questions of State citizenship, federal naturalization
laws, the admission of new States, and, especially, the extension, proliferation, and
prospective permanence of slavery took on vital implications. The unresolvable tension
over these issues culminated in an attempt at compromise legislation in 1850, which
aspired to “remedy” all of the country’s “open and bleeding” wounds over slavery.
Though the Compromise of 1850 provisionally resolved the disputes that grew out of the
Mexican-American War (the Texas-New Mexico boundary, New Mexico and Utah’s
territorial governments, California statehood), and the “slavery question” (foreclosing
DC’s slave trade and providing federal legislation to forestall “fugitive slavery”), it also
exposed the fundamental antagonism between “national” (or “white nationalist”) and
“slavery” (or “white hegemonist”) conservatism. The country could be “white” or it
could have slaves, but not both.
RACE QUARANTINE
As the definitive southern institution, slavery had shaped the thrust and direction
of American conservatism ever since the concept of organic sovereignty gained currency
in the 1820s.683 Starting with the debates surrounding Missouri’s constitutional provision
barring “free negroes and mulattoes” from entering the State, pro-slavery politicians
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repeatedly used the States’ authority over their own health laws (and, specifically, the
States’ right to institute quarantines) to circumvent the federal constitution’s privilegesand-immunities clause. “It would not be denied,” Virginia representative William S.
Archer asserted when the House took up Missouri’s constitution in December 1820, “that
a state might exclude citizens of other states for contagious disease, by quarantine
regulations.”684 Citing the “law of self-preservation,” Archer and other strict-construction
democratic-republicans asserted that State legislatures reserved the right to reject or
imprison those citizens of other States who posed an existential threat.685 Just as they had
a right to exclude “paupers, lepers, and persons infected with pestilential diseases” from
contaminating their States, they argued, they had the right to prohibit free people of
color.686 These laws did not locate the contagion in the visible manifestation of their
blackness, but rather in the metaphysical condition of their freedom. They asserted that
the legal distinctions between “whites” and “blacks” grew naturally out of their
physiological (or organic) differences, signified by their color. From their perspective,
people of color were physiologically indisposed to the rights they had been accorded
them in free States. The combination of unwarranted and unassimilable civil rights in
people of color generated a particularly malign and highly communicable disorder.
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Organic discrimination did not create the disparities in their socio-political statuses, they
insisted, it reflected them.
Similar laws were already on the books on the books in Virginia, Ohio, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Maryland, South Carolina, and Delaware, but admitting
a State that had such a provision in its constitution gave it the cover of national
sanction.687 In March 1821, a joint House and Senate committee passed a resolution to
admit Missouri on the ambiguously-worded condition that its legislature should never
pass any laws that excluded any citizens from the enjoyment of their constitutional
rights.688 Basically, Missouri could keep the offending clause, but it had to find other
ways to control and exclude people of color, which it did.689 As the second chapter
indicated, laws motivated by race-distinction followed the logic found in British and
German organic theory. Within this framework, States that ignored or denied organic
difference in their statutes disregarded their “best good sense” and transgressed against
the natural order. Whereas slavery exerted a net positive influence on people of color—
physically, morally, and intellectually civilizing and improving them—freedom degraded
them and endangered the public morals of those white citizens living in their proximity.
Because “whites” and “blacks” could never enjoy equality within a political body, their
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legal incorporation on those grounds could only lead to their unhappiness and mutual
degeneration.690
Over the next twenty years, the science of organic difference— including
phrenology, ethnology, anthropology, craniology, anthropometry, physiognomy—
flooded the United States, providing a positivist alibi for legislating race-inequality.691 In
his popular work on Slavery, as it Relates to the Negro, Or African Race (1843),
professional pseudo-scientist and Biblicist Josiah Priest laid out the empirical evidence
(in which he included scripture) that the “negro race” lacked the physiological capacity
for freedom. Citing English surgeon William Lawrence’s Lectures on Physiology,
Zoology, and the Natural History of Man, Priest argued that the “anatomical
organization” of the “negro race” generated an inferior “moral and intellectual character,”
an “insensibility of the mind, with respect to the moral feelings of the heart, as well as to
the sufferings of others,” removing them from the “common sympathies and moral
feelings of humanity” and fueling their innate tendency toward violence, anti-social
behavior, and sexual deviance.692 As a result of their physiological differences, Priest
wrote, the “idea of liberty, freedom, and independence” in the “bosom of a negro man”
did not arouse the same “sensations, hopes and expectations,” that it did in the “bosom of
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the whites.” For the white man, liberty represented the means to improve himself and his
race through the pursuit of knowledge, social order, and self-control; for the slave or
“free black man,” liberty signified a holiday free from restraint or control, an excuse to
indulge in laziness and the “animal passions.” Priest attributed the physiological
differences between the races and the corresponding impact on their moral capacity to
God’s intervention. During the Noachic era, God refused to grant the “race of Ham” the
“great conservative powers,” which drove the engine of all human independence and
progress. Without these “conservatives powers,” the “Negro race” lacked the capacity to
elevate itself to the physical, moral, and constitutional demands of freedom. Because God
“estimated the African race as exceedingly inferior,” he decreed their perpetual servitude
to the white race. “To exalt this people therefore, to political equality [with white men],”
Priest concluded, “will be to admit of a deteriorating element in the midst of superiors,
which will amount to nothing more or less than a blemish in the heart of the institutions
of the country.”693
In the same vein, political proponents of organic discrimination in the 1840s
denied that the privileges-and-immunities clause extended to people of color, in the first
place.694 On December 6, 1844, the South Carolina legislature resolved that “free negroes
and persons of color are not citizens of the United States within the meaning of the
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constitution, which confers upon the citizens of one state the privileges and immunities of
citizens of the several states.” South Carolina defended its discriminatory statutes and
resolution on organic grounds, referring to the precedent it had set in its own 1835 act.695
This act guarded against “free negroes and persons of color” on the “principles of public
policy, affecting her safety and her most vital interests.” The use of the feminine pronoun
in this act reinforced the analogy between South Carolina and a real, live human being,
and implicitly stressed the state’s vulnerability against physical attack—in this case, the
attack of a white woman by a person of color. Regardless of the political status
inappropriately granted to people of color by other States, South Carolina asserted that
southern States reserved the right to treat them as nature intended. As the 1845 New
Englander and Yale Review noted, in slaveholding States, the “whole colored race” lives
“under, but not of the state.”696
To a certain extent, South Carolina’s resolution adhered to the precedent set in US
Attorney General William Wirt’s November 1821 opinion of the “Rights of Free Negroes
in Virginia,” which would form the basis for Chief Justice Taney’s 1857 Dred Scott
opinion. In contrast with the South Carolina resolution, however, Wirt predicated his
definition of citizenship on the Enlightenment framework common to the revolutionary
era, which tied the legal status of “citizen” to civic action. As Wirt argued, the category
of “citizen” required its holders to act like citizens: voting, holding office, bearing
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witness, serving in the military, equal treatment before the law, and the freedom to marry
white women.697 Because “free people of color” in Virginia did not enjoy the “full and
equal privileges of white citizens in the State of their residence,” he argued, they could
not be considered citizens of the United States.698 State restrictions on civic rights
functionally alienated people of color, transforming them into “sojourning strangers.”
In referring to its own organic insecurity in relation to people of color, however,
South Carolina’s resolution more closely followed the logic found in Hugh S. Legaré’s
March 1843 opinion on the “Pre-emption Rights of Colored Persons,” which he premised
on an organic relationship between people of color and their country of native birth.
Legaré made his national reputation in the 1820s after founding the Southern Review, in
which he popularized British and German romantic thought.699 In 1843, when he wrote
the opinion, he reportedly owned the work of only six contemporary writers: Coleridge,
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Channing, Goethe, Thomas Moore, and Herder. As Legaré had described it in his earlier
writings, masters and slaves developed an intimate family relation by the “law of human
nature” and the “law of our hearts.” From this common affection, slaves experienced the
“feeling of loyalty” and their masters a “sort of parental or patriarchal kindness.”700 In
1843, therefore, the slave could not be an “alien” because the slave was a “part of the
family.” Similarly, regardless of his political status, Legaré considered the freeman a
denizen, born under this country’s jurisdiction and, therefore, “capable of all the rights” it
bestowed.701 Unlike South Carolina’s legislature, Legaré reasoned from organic common
sense grounds that free people of color enjoyed some civic rights, regardless of whether
their parent-States denied them political rights. Still, even the paternalistically-granted
liminal status that “denizenship” conferred confirmed the essential otherness of people of
color under US law.702 Legaré may have acceded to the free person of color’s right to
pre-emption alongside US citizens and immigrants awaiting naturalization, but he also
reinforced the presumptive organic hierarchy between white men, who could become full
citizens, and people of color, whose race marked them as requiring special care and
whose civic status relegated them to perpetual statelessness.
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The outcome of Florida’s application for statehood in 1845 encapsulated this shift
in attitudes. When Congress approved Florida’s statehood that March, its constitution
contained an exclusionary provision nearly identical to Missouri’s, granting the Florida
General Assembly authority to “prevent free negroes, mulattoes, and other persons of
color, from emigrating” to the State.703 In the House, Maine Whig Freeman H. Morse
proposed an amendment indistinguishable from Congress’s 1821 restriction on
Missouri’s constitution, but a large majority shot it down. When the bill to admit Florida
passed to the Senate, Virginian William S. Archer (now a Whig and a senator) reprised
the arguments about self-preservation that he had made during the Missouri debates
twenty-five years earlier, but, this time, he referred the Senate to South Carolina’s
quarantine laws. Maine Whig George Evans protested that the South already had a
remedy for people fomenting unlawful activities (arrest and punishment), and need not
prohibit free men who carried no evil intentions in their hearts for the sole reason that
they “happened to have a black skin.” Archer’s response reinforced the notion that free
people of color could not be granted the presumption of innocence because free
blackness, itself, caused the harm. To clarify, Archer asked the Senate to consider a
hypothetical situation in which South Carolina had no laws of quarantine and an infected
ship docked in its harbors. Even if this vessel had no idea it carried yellow fever or the
plague, he attested, its presence would still risk spreading an “infectious and fatal
disease” among the State’s inhabitants. Given the inherent danger that such vessels
posed, South Carolina rightfully assumed a pro-active position and implemented
preventative measures against all such vessels. Just as no one would expect South
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Carolina to “stand willing victims to the pestilence that was about to come upon them,”
they could not fault Florida for implementing the same “laws of self-preservation”
against inherently dangerous people. Regardless of their harmless intent (which Archer
found dubious), free people of color threatened evils “ten thousand times” greater than
the grievance southern States caused them through their exclusion.704
Georgia Whig John MacPherson Berrien implicitly denied that free people of
color had grounds to object to these laws, in the first place, because he (falsely) alleged
that no States recognized them as fellow-citizens. Without citizenship, he argued, they
had no protection under the privileges-and-immunities clause. In advocating the illusory
rights for free people of color and attempting to interfere in the constitution of sovereign
States, Berrien asseverated, he could only assume that their self-appointed protectors in
the Senate acted out of partisan motivations. Though he sympathized with the impulse, he
reminded his fellow Whigs that “there are principles which rise above all party
associations, because they are essentially vital—instinctive with life itself, and selfpreservation.” In his estimation, a State’s right to regulate its own constitution—
especially in relation to people of color—was one of those principles.705
Although Berrien and other advocates of codified organic discrimination
technically mischaracterized the legal status of free people of color, they did touch on the
reality of their contingent citizenship. Even opponents of Florida’s prohibition, such as
Indiana Whig Albert S. White, acknowledged that many State laws reflexively treated
free people of color “as paupers, just in the same manner that German or Irish emigrants,
704
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or the vagrants of the country, were treated when they were liable to become a charge
upon the pockets of the people.” In general, these States also presumed people of color to
be “fugitive” slaves until proven otherwise. Even the language describing people of color
who had escaped from bondage reinforced this dynamic, since it treated refugees as
“fugitive” from the law and, therefore, treated all people of color a priori as criminals
until they could prove their innocence.706 Though these States technically considered free
people of color “citizens,” their laws consistently alienated them—literally, treating them
as they treated non-citizen “aliens”—in an attempt to erase the spectre that free people of
color represented. This alienation expressly grew out of the perception of their organic
otherness, based on the increasingly naturalized premise that race reflected an inborn set
of interests that created an insuperable barrier between people.
Furthermore, because democratic-republican theory predicated political
representation on the basis of shared interest, essentialized organic difference precluded
the agency of free people of color in their own governance.707 According to Senator
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White, this structural disenfranchisement meant that the “colored man” had “no
advocates” in Washington, leaving Congress with the obligation to “anticipate the
judgment of the Supreme Court, and decide against him.” On this basis, Senator White
objected to authorizing Florida’s organic exclusion because it would amount to a broad
congressional sanction for the constitutionality of southern laws prohibiting free people
of color.708 Nevertheless, Democrats voted monolithically to admit Florida
unconditionally, as did southern Whigs, and the bill passed.709 Whereas Missouri had
obtained admission to the Union only on the condition that it curtail its organic
prohibition (at least, superficially), every motion to add the same restriction to Florida’s
statehood failed. As White predicted, this vote tacitly sanctioned contingent citizenship
and confirmed organic discrimination as a national project. A decade later, US Supreme
Court Chief Justice Robert Taney (whom Jackson appointed) repeated these arguments as
self-evident proof that people of color lacked de facto citizenship.710
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THE CONTAGION
Using the same logic of organic exclusion, members of the new Native American
party made the case to restrict foreign immigration, arguing that the “Old World”
disgorged its worst elements onto American shores—criminals, parasites, and foreign
agents sent to infiltrate and overthrow the American government (i.e., Catholics). This
type of nativist sentiment gained traction in Louisiana, for example, after Irish Catholic
Edward Douglass White won the governor’s race in 1835 and surged alongside
immigration numbers in the 1840s. Like other States home to major port cities (such as
Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania, which also experienced an uptick in
nativist activity), Louisiana housed a disproportionate percentage of the country’s
immigrant population. Foreign-born residents made up a quarter of the State’s white
population, a number that accounted for nearly half of the entire immigrant population in
the South.711 During Louisiana’s 1845 constitutional convention, nativist representative
Thomas H. Lewis advocated for prohibitive residency requirements to prevent the
incursion of “persons who are foreign to us in sentiment and feeling” and to ensure that
the people granted suffrage in Louisiana could prove that they “are identified with us and
attached to our institutions.” Every government had “some fundamental principles—
some conservative power to maintain its existence,” Lewis attested, a “conservative or
preservative” power “essentially necessary to its well being.” In a republic, this
conservative principle was located in the ability to deny the privilege of citizenship to
foreigners and strangers: to say to the teaming masses on its shores as God did to the
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engulfing waters of chaos in the act of creation, “thus far thou shalt go, but no farther.”712
This conservatism ensured that the people granted voting rights had the “love” of this
country “emplanted” in their breasts, and “bound up with the strongest ties.”
Furthermore, by including the natives of other American States in his embargo, Lewis
proposed another barrier against the threat of abolition.
Six Native Americans won congressional seats in the Twenty-Ninth US House of
Representatives (four from New York and two from Pennsylvania). That House opened
its first session in December 1845 with a resolution from Massachusetts Whig Robert C.
Winthrop (John Winthrop’s descendent) to amend the country’s naturalization laws.
Given the results of the 1844 election (the Democratic victory), he proposed that the
House make changes that would protect the “purity of the ballot box” against “improper
influence” and “gross frauds, destructive alike to the rights and morals of our citizens and
the stability of our institutions.”713 Pennsylvania representative Lewis C. Levin, who had
stimulated the violent attacks on Irish-Catholic immigrants during Philadelphia’s 1844
nativist riots, pled with his colleagues to maintain the “true American policy” of “selfdefense against foreign contamination” by raising the bar for naturalization.714 Referring
to the riots during the 1844 presidential campaign, he alleged that “drilled bands of armed
foreigners rushed with impetuous fury upon native-born Americans,” which he further
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described as a collision “naturally incident to the unbridled passions of those foreigners,”
who were “strangers to constitutional rights” and had been accustomed to the use of
physical force in the “Old World.”715 Desperate for the “foreign vote,” Levin charged, the
Whigs and Democrats had distorted the facts of these riots—absolving the “foreigners”
and indicting the Native Americans—in their attempt to “disease and poison the popular
mind” against the Native American party and in favor of these “foreign cabals.” In
contrast with these traitors, Levin swore to protect the “peculiar exalted, distinctive
character” of their “homogeneous nation” against foreign influence and moral
degradation. On behalf of all of the people of these United States, Levin pledged himself
to the “living principle” of “Native Americanism,” the “embodied vitality of all that is
pure in life, lofty in patriotism, and sublime in achievement.”716 Levin’s position echoed
a widespread belief among medical practitioners that disease resulted from the violation
of physiological law—not just the physical laws, but the vital laws governing all organic
life—and it presaged an identical argument about slavery’s vital role in US society that
gained currency at the end of the decade.717
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Time in Congress did nothing to dampen Levin’s commitment to this vital
principle. Toward the end of Levin’s first term in Congress, New York Democrat George
O. Rathbun submitted a bill to regulate passenger-accommodations for trans-Atlantic
voyages—an issue of public health, since the cramped quarters exacerbated an already
unsanitary environment. Levin responded with a proposal to rename it “a bill to
accommodate paupers and criminals of Europe in their migration to the United States.”
Quoting Burke, he reminded his colleagues that “wise men… apply their remedies to the
causes of evil which threaten to be permanent.” Easing foreign immigration did not
“remedy the evils” affecting the American people, it aggravated them and increased the
power of a political party even now in the pocket of foreign governments (i.e., the
Democrats). “Can the tenants of the poor houses of Europe,” asked Levin, “land on our
shores with faculties so formed by nature, or so fashioned by education, as to become the
conservative element of our free institutions, whose very basis demands intelligence,
patriotism, and virtue in the voter?” Obviously not. In Jefferson’s time, he continued,
when only “educated and responsible men” who seamlessly “melted into the mass of the
American population” emigrated to the country, statesmen still deemed it necessary to
institute a five-years residency requirement in “self-defense.” Now, considering the
“deteriorated character of the foreign population” currently immigrating, the Native
American party proposed “astringent checks, and astringent only” to “save the
country.”718 An astringent medicine, of course, binds together soft organic tissue and
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hardens it; the nerves and muscle fibers contract, making the organism resistant to
external irritants and nervous excitement, which medical science believed heightened
morbidity. An astringent immigration policy, by extension, would harden the country’s
porous borders, protecting it from outside contaminants, increasing its resistance to
infection, and bonding its organic constituents together.719
Though the mainstream parties generally relegated Lewis’s Native Americans to
the margins of national politics in the late 1840s, the surgent nativist appeal resonated, in
part, because it channeled a pervasive existential anxiety related to foreign contagion and
competition. In the first place, in the late 1840s, the United States faced real pathogenic
epidemics. In addition to the potato disease that drove Irish emigration to the US in
unprecedented numbers, soldiers fighting in the Mexican-American War (est. April 25,
1846) brought home malaria and yellow fever, and the influenza pandemic spread from
Europe to the Americas in 1848.720 In 1849, the English cholera outbreak reached
American shores, again, and rapidly spread across the country, hitting hardest in New
York, Chicago, and in cities all along the Mississippi (especially St Louis and New
Orleans, which seemed to incubate every infectious disease that hit its shores.)721 In the
same period, immigration rates tripled: from 1841 through 1845, 430,336 people became
legal permanent residents of the US; from 1846 through 1850, 1,282,915 people gained
that status. Meanwhile, mid-1846, Great Britain repealed its Corn Laws, gradually
phasing out the tariff on imported grain over the next three years. By 1849, Britain’s
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Whig government had retrofitted its political economy on free trade principles, opening
up a larger market for American agriculture and a broader field of competition for
American manufacturing, and further exacerbating sectional tension over commercial
policy in the United States.
With Britain’s new position on protection, the South anticipated a growth
economy, particularly after the Democrat-dominated Twenty-Ninth US Congress passed
the Walker Tariff, which brought the tariff down to rates not seen since before the 1828
Tariff (of Abominations), and the Warehouse Act, which facilitated the import market.722
Still, they remained at the mercy of Congress—whomever controlled Congress,
controlled the country’s economy—and while Southern wealth increased, so did the
Northern population. Both the 1846 treaty with Great Britain resolving the boundaries of
the Oregon territory and the war with Mexico (1846-1848) compounded the problem
because each raised the spectre of new states and, if the Missouri compromise held, the
probability became that free states would soon outnumber slave states.723 Although
Pennsylvania Democrat David Wilmot’s proviso (to prohibit slavery from extending to
any new territories acquired during the Mexican War) failed to pass during the TwentyNinth Congress’s first session (1846-1847), it aggravated the slaveholders’ persecution
complex.724 In December 1847, Congress confirmed Iowa’s admission to the Union as a
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free state, bringing the total to fourteen free states, with Wisconsin’s imminent
application on the horizon. Plus, the Whigs had retaken the House in the midterm
elections, which meant that the more schismatic southern Democrats confronted the
prospect of a nationally-oriented and conciliatory conversation over the territories.725
In this context, pro-slavery conservatism took hold of the South, as they fought to
defend their proportionate weight in Congress (against the ever-encroaching northern
population) by either preventing annexation or preserving the new territories for
slaveholders. As usual, Calhoun grabbed the lead in articulating this position, addressing
the Senate in February 1847 on the “Slavery Question” during the vote on the Three
Million Bill (which would provide the means to conclude the Mexican-American War,
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and had an analog to the Wilmot Proviso attached). Calhoun submitted four resolutions
demanding unequivocally that the slaveholding States had an equal right to emigrate to
the new territories, along with their property (slaves). Any other policy discriminated
between the States and unjustly deprived them access to their “joint and common
property” and any law enacted with these effects clearly violated the constitution, States’
rights, and the perfect equality that should exist between citizens. With his choice of
language, Calhoun subtly shifted the perspective on the problem presented by territorial
acquisition. Instead of merely framing it as a prohibition on “slavery,” Calhoun framed it
as a prohibition on the “slaveholding states”—a figure of speech that conjured the
geography and substance of the States themselves, as well as their residents. In this way,
he implied that the proviso discriminated against huge swaths of the American
population, as opposed to discriminating against an institution that many political
economists and slave-owners doubted would thrive in the region at issue, in the first
place.726 The slaveholding States represented the “conservative power” of the country, he
asserted, and any policy short of perfect equality tended “directly to subvert the Union
itself.”
Calhoun traced the congressional bias against the slave-holding States to the
pernicious tendency to think of their country as a nation. During the proviso debates, for
example, Rhode Island Whig James F. Simmons held that the “people of the United
States” should be considered equivalent with the “people of the States united.” Out of this
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“mere change of language,” Calhoun remarked, he and his cohort spread their fiction of a
“National” government. By this abstract notion of “nationality,” Calhoun argued, nonslaveholding States masked their intention to transform the slaveholding States into
second-class citizens. Because nations functioned as single organisms with differentiated
parts, national governments could (and arguably should) treat them in such a way as to
enable them to fulfill their unique functions, but not necessarily identically or equally.
Through this national schema, the northern States sought to nationalize “Dorrism,”
coerce the southern States into subjecting their “peculiar institutions” to majoritarian rule,
and crush them.727 They had made no effort to hide their intentions, Calhoun continued.
In a conspiracy stretching back to the 1840 London’s World Convention, they had openly
colluded with a foreign government (Great Britain) to abolish slavery in the United
States. Calhoun accused them of bypassing established diplomatic and foreign policy
channels to meet secretly with the British Foreign Secretary (Lord Aberdeen), with whom
they conspired to “expel the white population from the southern States” and replace them
with people of color.728
Everyone knew that the founding generation did not want a “national”
government, Calhoun declared, and that the people would not have tolerated it. Their
forefathers framed a federal government: a union of States. With the constitution, they
manifested a “combination of nations,” not a “single nation.”729 When George
Washington advocated adopting the Constitution, he did not refer to the “nation” or even
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a “consolidated Government,” but to the “Union.” The States stood in front of the federal
government like twenty-nine individual (white male) constituents, with equal rights and
privileges. In a system based on justice and equality between these individuals, the
government would not enrich some individuals at the expense of others, but rather would
look to higher ends, to the greater good and prosperity of the whole. Like any common
property, the new territories should be shared and enjoyed equally, not given as a
monopoly to a single section.
Borrowing the schema of the French socialists, Calhoun presented the
organically-integrated southern society as an alternative to the unstable capitalist system
predominant in the North. By uniting “capital and labor” in a single system, he asserted,
the slaveholding States protected the Union from the “political revolution, anarchy, civil
war, and widespread disaster” that plagued other countries. The slaveholding States “are
the conservative portion—always have been the conservative portion—always will be the
conservative portion,” Calhoun declared. Years ago, Calhoun recalled, he had a
conversation with some English gentlemen about the “wonderful phenomenon” that had
kept the Union together. “Without any suggestion or leading remark of mine,” Calhoun
reported, Lord Stanley (now leader of the British Conservative Party) had said that “it
was all owing to the southern States.” That is—the Union persisted because of the
slaveholding States. They held the balance of power of “these United States” in their
possession, Calhoun reminded the Senate. For this reason, the “North is as much
interested in upholding the slaveholding States as the latter can possibly be themselves.”
So long as the slaveholding States received their due, Calhoun reassured the Senate, they
would continue to act as the country’s conservative power, maintaining its equilibrium
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and upholding this “glorious Union of ours” for future generations. Though they had
often been accused of “creating excitement” in these chambers, he demurred, the
slaveholding States had so far merely “stood upon the defensive,” only modestly
protesting against the calumny thrown their way. If the non-slaveholding States continued
their “aggressive policy,” however, he refused to put odds on their chances.730
Even those southerners who demurred on calling slavery, itself, “conservative,”
still effectively agreed that “Conservatives” of either party must commit themselves to its
protection. Slavery did not destabilize the Union, they argued, agitation on slavery
(including any policy or activity that brought the question of slavery into the halls of
Congress) did. Border-state Whigs like Maryland’s Reverdy Johnson, for example,
stopped short of arguing that slavery exercised a “conservative influence” on the
country’s “free political institutions.” Yet, even if the South’s peculiar institution, itself,
did not mark its value to the Union, Reverdy continued, southern valor on the battlefield
distinguished its people and their “morality, religion, and patriotism” placed them
alongside the eminent civilizations of the world. Anyone who attempted to interfere with
Southern society—who would dishonor or degrade its men by placing them on unequal
footing with the rest of the country—threatened the Union with civil war. Immediately
after Reverdy’s speech, the Senate voted down the anti-slavery proviso, and returned the
Three Million Bill to the House, where it passed without the restriction on slavery.
At a Whig meeting in Georgia in October 1847, John MacPherson Berrien (last
seen denying people of color citizenship status during the House debates over Florida)
identified the Whig party with a conservatism that protected slavery as an article of faith.
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Particularly in anticipation of campaign season, Berrien noticed, the Democrats
harangued the Whigs to publically define their principles, on the assumption that they had
none. It had become clear to him, however, that their party’s principles were “embodied”
in the word “conservatism.” In contrast with the Democrats, the Whigs stood for:
“that conservatism which would guard the constitution as a sacred casket—which
would look to it as to the ark of the covenant of our political, civil and religious
liberties—that conservatism which would preserve the coordinate branches of the
government, and limit each to its respectively defined powers, and a strict
accountability of public officers—that would see to it that... there was a clear
grant of power for each governmental act—of that conservatism which formed
our constitution and had preserved us as a people, and which was aptly expressed
in the homely phrase of “let well enough alone”.”
The Democratic party had pursued a war of acquisition, he claimed, even though it
violated the constitution and threatened the harmony of the Union. The Democratic party
had introduced the Wilmot proviso into their national legislation and the “northern
democracy” intended to “engraft” it onto all future territory. The Democratic party was
falling apart over the co-constituent issues of slavery and equality. Meanwhile, Berrien
said, “our whig brethren at the north” had joined their southern counterparts in opposing
territorial acquisition on constitutional grounds. Unlike the northern Democrats, the
northern Whigs had anticipated that new territory would raise “dangerous questions” in
the capitol, and act as a “firebrand” on their national legislation. Northern Whigs
understood that “perfect equality” in the territories barred the exclusion of slavery from
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it.731 Berrien insisted that the constitution itself granted them the right to take their slaves
to the northern territory, if they wished, but that he would prefer that they drop the
matter, entirely, and leave the cursed land to Mexico.732
THE IMAGE OF CONSERVATISM
For an over-determined number of reasons, American politics experienced a tidal
shift in 1848. As they headed into a major election cycle, everyone heated up the tenor of
their public rhetoric. Since losing the 1846 midterm elections, the Democratic party
continued to bleed membership over its “imperialist” war in Mexico and the corollary
crisis over slavery in the territories. Having been consistently challenged by the Whig
opposition for a decade, they now also faced a substantial anti-slavery critique internally.
In October 1847, six days after the Liberty party convened its national convention, David
Wilmot (of “proviso” fame), New York commercialist and Regency-Democrat Churchill
C Cambreleng, and magic Van’s son John (Van Buren) assembled in Herkimer, NY, to
repudiate the New York State Democratic Convention, which had taken place in
Syracuse at the end of September. Namely, in a resolution that the Syracuse convention
had refused to even discuss, they declared their “uncompromising hostility to the
extension of slavery into territory now free.” These “Barnburner” Democrats endorsed
the Wilmot proviso over the general wishes of their party. Over the next year, they joined
other disaffected Democrats and Whigs to create the Free Soil party, which offered a
broader platform and less controversial appeal than the Liberty party. In August 1848, it
summoned its first national convention, and nominated its first national candidate—
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Martin Van Buren—threatening Whig dominance in the East-North-Central States
(Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin) and siphoning off Democrats in the
critical electoral States of New York and Pennsylvania.733
Across the Atlantic, meanwhile, labor organized. Egalitarian movements
threatened political regimes, legal institutions, and property rights in Great Britain,
Europe, and Russia. In January 1848, the Austrian Empire faced civil disobedience
strikes and riots in Lombardy, Sicily, and Naples, which spread to Tuscany in February.
That same month in France, Louis Philippe abdicated the French throne and a new
government forged between political and social republicans took his place, re-organizing
the country on modified socialist principles.734 Upon hearing the news, students rioted in
Vienna, the capital of the Austrian Empire, where they were soon joined by the Viennese
laboring class.735 Prince Metternich, who had served as Chancellor for the Austrian
Empire since the Missouri Compromise, failed to control the masses and the Empire’s
head of state forced him to resign. Days later, the Austrian Empire’s Governor-General in
Hungary responded to Hungary’s intensifying independence movement by granting its
petition for a parliamentary monarchy. By the summer of 1848, American newspapers
reported riots in Prague and Berlin, where mobs attacked the Prussian arsenal, and the
militarization of the conflict in Italy between imperial and popular forces. In France, the
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republican government’s inconsistent and inadequate social and political reforms
fomented discontent among the working class in Paris, who armed themselves, organized,
and rose up in a grisly confrontation that lasted three June days and counted casualties in
the tens of thousands.736 The European “Springtime of Peoples” (Völkerfrühling)
destabilized the region, leading to years of infighting and popular insurrection, and, in the
American imagination, constantly looming on the edge of the Atlantic.
For the United States Democratic party, the blossoming popular violence in
Europe (and its threat in the United Kingdom) served a dual purpose. The revolutions that
began in 1848 supplied the Democrats with a series of vivid images pitting popular
democracy against repressive regimes (i.e., the Feds). But those same images also
indisputably displayed the chaos that followed the unmitigated destruction of longestablished institutions by social revolutionaries. For a party that needed both its
democratic and pro-slavery elements to win national elections, that last detail was key.
While they praised the democratic initiative shown by rebellious parties in Europe, they
also reiterated the party doctrine that Calhoun had long established. The United States
embodied the best possible political system imaginable, ideally suited to protect the
individual free agency of its white (male) citizens. However, it would remain so if and
only if they protected their institutions (i.e., slavery) as they had received them, without
alteration, and enabled their free exercise, without constraint or artificial intervention.
Gradually, pro-slavery politicians and their allies adopted this position, which
allowed them to play both sides of the foreign conflict, regardless of their partyaffiliation. They exploited the anxiety attached to the international condition by situating
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their arguments to secure their property in the context of social revolution and popular
self-defense. For example, during a House discussion on the relationship between the
federal government and the territories, South Carolina Democrat Joseph A. Woodward
explicitly connected the effort to prohibit slavery from the northwest territories to the
communist threat in Europe. The US Constitution existed expressly for the purpose of
protecting individual rights, he insisted, and, chiefly, personal rights in property
(including slaves). The legitimacy of their entire system of government rested on its
ability to secure (and, when necessary, restore) this property. “Slavery, therefore, is
national,” Woodward reasoned, and existed by “recognition and guaranty everywhere.”
To defend these rights, Woodward explained, the Constitution made all of the
government’s powers and particularly its legislative powers “conservative under our
system,” meaning it could not legitimately “destroy anything for the sake of which it was
instituted.” It could not seize jurisdiction over the “general institution of property,” it
could not challenge certain types of property, and, certainly, it could not “abrogate
property, and substitute communism.” Any act that infringed on these rights violated the
“fundamental ideas of our political institutions,” breached the conditions on which
constitutional authority rested, and constituted just cause for “popular revolution.”737 As
Woodward did, pro-slavery politicians continuously raised the spectre of national
revolution if they were not satisfied with the safeguards extended to their organic
institutions. Yet, at the same time, they reiterated that the “conservative” South, alone,
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protected the United States from the more dangerous strains of radical ideology currently
agitating the established natural order in Europe.738
Not for nothing, the anti-slavery press characterized the national legislature in
1848 by its “pro-slavery conservatism.”739 For their part, Northern Whigs (particularly
those with ties to trans-Atlantic capital, inter-state commerce, or companies undertaking
major internal improvement and transportation projects) assumed a conciliatory posture
toward slave-holders, thinking that a large enough moderate or center position existed for
them to occupy. Likewise, they reached out to their southern cohort in the spirit of
compromise with promises to protect their property and their rights. With few exceptions,
the extent to which a party, policy, or person convincingly supported pro-slavery interests
after 1848 (even passively, through non-intervention, non-exclusion, and popular
sovereignty) signified the measure of their conservatism and, therefore, their fitness for
office (in the case of parties and people) or implementation (as per policies and
legislation).740
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During the Thirtieth US Congress, which opened its first session in December
1847, the nation’s representatives attended to the territorial fallout from the MexicanAmerican War, the disbursement of the Oregon territory, and the looming presidential
election. In his annual message, Polk reiterated his 1846 admonition to resolve Oregon’s
organization and recommended that Congress begin the process of turning New Mexico
and California into US territory. Spurred by the president’s message, New York’s Daniel
S. Dickinson and South Carolina’s John C. Calhoun each offered a series of resolutions
that demonstrated the polarized positions within the Democratic party on expansion.741
Dickinson’s first resolution favored an aggressive program of geographic expansion,
reflecting the majority view of the party. In his second resolution, he laid out the party’s
emerging notion of popular sovereignty, proposing that Congress foster residential
sovereignty and self-government by “leaving all questions concerning the domestic
policy” within the territories to the “Legislatures chosen by the people” of those
territories. As soon as possible, Calhoun offered his own set of resolutions denouncing
the entire expansionist agenda. “To conquer Mexico, and to hold it either as a province or
to incorporate it in the Union” departed from the Government’s “settled policy,”
conflicted with its “character and genius,” and would ultimately subvert “our free and
popular institutions.” Specifically, the new territories threatened Calhoun’s projected
slave republic, particularly if the Senate adopted Dickinson’s stance on taking received
law as precedent and respecting each territory’s organic government. Because Mexico
or territorial governments from barring slave-holders from bringing their slaves into new acquisitions, i.e.,
“non-intervention” on slavery. Lewis Cass based his version of “non-intervention” on the doctrine of
popular sovereignty, promoting an approach to territorial government where the people residing on the land
determined their own laws and legislation on slavery. (Holman Hamilton, Prologue to Conflict: The Crisis
and Compromise of 1850 (University Press of Kentucky, 2015), 145.
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outlawed slavery in 1829, the residents of former Mexican territory could reasonably
argue that their foundational domestic organization precluded it.
Oregon posed a similar problem. Congress had made its first attempt to devise a
territorial government for Oregon in 1846, after the treaty with Great Britain settled its
boundaries, but the bill stalled over its over its race-related provisions.742 In the early to
mid-1840s, Oregon had attracted settlers dreaming of an uncorrupted white Eden: mainly
small Missouri farmers tired of competing with slave-labor and other middle-class
aspirants who blamed people of color for their condition. Whereas Missouri and Florida
each had constitutional provisions that excluded free people of color from residing within
their borders, Oregon’s 1843 Organic laws excluded all people of color from settling in
the territory, at all, including slaves.743 The provisional government also included
language from the 1787 Ordinance barring “slavery” and “involuntary servitude” from
the territory northwest of the Ohio river.744 In the House in January 1847, Illinois
Democrat Stephen A Douglas submitted the measure, basically formalizing Oregon’s
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provisional constitution, including the relevant section of the 1787 Ordinance. The bill
passed, but the Senate tabled it on their last day in session, effectively killing it.745
When (now Senator) Stephen A. Douglass submitted a new Oregon bill to the
Senate in early January 1848, it contained the same controversial provisions. Defending
Oregon’s Organic Laws two days later, Dickinson recurred to the precedent set by the
Declaration of Independence, which recognized the people’s “inborn” right, by virtue of
their “innate sovereignty,” to fashion a government “suited to their condition” in all that
pertained to their “domestic concerns.” Oregon’s inhabitants had successfully
implemented just such a government, he argued, reaching their own conclusions about
domestic slavery without the aid of outside “ordinances,” “provisos,” or “unalterable
fundamental articles.”746 Conflict only arose when the federal government attempted to
stick its nose where it did not belong. Let local communities build their own institutions,
suited to their own particular interests, Dickinson reiterated, and let the federal
government devote its energy to national issues. Having harmonized with the “spirit of
the Constitution,” he said, the country could turn its attention to fulfilling the imperial
destiny allotted to them, without undue conflict on ancillary issues, like slavery.747
The Whigs, meanwhile, framed their opposition to territorial expansion as a
“conservative” stance against policies known to create dangerous friction on the question
of slavery. They asserted that the Democrats disturbed the harmony of the Union with
their inconsistent politics, their hypocritical policies, and their insatiable lust for new
land, while the “great Conservative Whig party” remained steadfast, rooted in the
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constitution and compromise. When their election of Massachusetts Whig Robert C.
Winthrop to Speaker of the House generated controversy, one of their southern
representatives published a letter in the national Niles Weekly Register to reassure the
southern public that the Whigs would do nothing to endanger their sacred institutions.
“The Whig party, North and South, is characterized by a spirit of conservatism,”
Florida’s Edward C. Cabell wrote. Unlike the Democrats, the Whigs embraced the
“whole country,” refusing to be influenced by a “narrow, contracted, selfish, sectional
policy,” by which he meant abolition. While the Democrats had supported Martin Van
Buren—who had once acceded the “right of Congress to abolish slavery in DC” and who
had “voted to place free negroes on a footing with whites” at the New York
Convention—“most” of the Northern Whigs would willingly cast their ballot for a
“Southern man for President of the United States” in the upcoming Whig national
convention.748
After the Whigs nominated a slave-holding war hero from Louisiana in June
1848, they argued that southerners had no reason to seriously consider any other
candidate. Untried as Taylor might be in the field of politics, he had already distinguished
himself on the field of battle. In addition, they argued, his southern provenance and his
property in slaves marked him as conservative—unassailable on the major issues of the
day. “His advocates, of whatever original party denomination, feel that they are
Conservative Republicans,” Pennsylvania Whig Joseph R. Ingersoll claimed, “and they
sustain him because they know him to be of the same character.” In the only publicized
account of his views (an April 1848 letter to a Kentucky tobacco manufacturer), Taylor
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stated that the “high conservative power” of the veto “should never be exercised except in
cases of clear violation of the constitution, or manifest haste and want of consideration by
Congress.” Of course, what a man considered unconstitutional depended to a large degree
on what latitude he called home. For example, Pennsylvania’s Andrew Stewart read a
national platform suited for the whole country into Taylor’s letter, while North Carolina’s
Willie P. Mangum believed that Taylor would take especial care of the southern States.
While most Whigs attested that Taylor would implement his “conservative veto” on any
legislation resembling the Wilmot proviso (or otherwise limiting slavery), some Whigs
read into his putative opposition to territorial expansion an unstated distaste for extending
slavery. In fact, because Taylor lacked a political past, the Whigs posed him in whatever
manner they wished during the campaign, positioning him as a “conservative” candidate
that appealed to the entire country.749
The Democrats did not fail to miss this nuance of the Whig campaign, or to press
the issue on the public record. In one of many exchanges over the presidential election
that erupted during the regular course of business in Congress, Democratic senator Henry
S. Foote, from Mississippi challenged General Taylor’s fitness for office as a Whig
candidate, interrogating his Whig colleagues on Taylor’s stance on traditional Whig
policies, such as the national bank, internal improvements, and high tariffs. To further
bait the Whigs, Foote speculated that Taylor was secretly a “Wilmot-proviso man,” like
his vice president (New York’s Comptroller and former congressman Millard Fillmore).
Though Taylor had confronted this charge before, Foote noted, he had never directly
denied it. In fact, Foote said, the Whigs as a party avoided a straight answer on where

749

Holt, The Rise and Fall of the American Whig Party, 309–14.

373
they stood on the Wilmot proviso, specifically, or slavery, in general. Whereas the
Democratic party platform plainly stated that Congress had no constitutional power to
interfere with slavery and promised to resist any efforts to compel Congress to do so (i.e.,
the Wilmot proviso), the Whigs side-stepped the issue, mentioning neither “slavery” nor
“abolition” in their national platform. They avowed Taylor’s “sound conservative
opinions” and his “true fidelity to the great example of former days, and to the principles
of the Constitution as administered by its founders,” and assuming that these vague
assertions would reassure the South of their fidelity.750 But their professed
“conservatism” merely raised more questions. Conservative “is a word of many imports,”
Foote charged, “In what way are they conservative? The devils in hell were sent there to
dwell in never-wasting fire, that they might be conserved there for eternal punishment.
There might be conservative for evil as well as for good. Did they propose to conserve a
national bank, &c.?” The Whigs had yet to respond with satisfaction to these lingering
questions, Foote charge. Until this “image of [Whig] conservatism was shivered by the
sledge-hammer of truth,” Foote demanded that the Senate remain in session.751 In fact,
the Senate did not adjourn for another two and a half months, and they spent the rest of
the summer wrangling over slavery in the territories, providing ample opportunity for the
Whigs to show their true colors. Unfortunately for Foote, Democratic infighting over
slavery dominated the debate.
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By the time the Senate finally returned to Douglas’s Oregon bill at the end of
June, two new free State Democrats from Wisconsin had joined their ranks, marking the
first time in American history when both the northern and southern sections of the Union
enjoyed equal representation. Like the 1847 bill that the Senate had trashed, Douglas’s
1848 bill included a provision that arguably placed the territory under the jurisdiction of
the 1787 Ordinance.752 In addition to Dickinson’s advocacy for the bill on popular
sovereignty grounds, anti-slavery representatives repeatedly pushed for amendments that
would make the injunction against slavery explicit. New Hampshire Independent
Democrat and abolitionist John P. Hale declared his intention to use the bill to decide the
question of slavery, once and for all. The Senate had the responsibility, he contended, to
determine whether the Declaration of Independence acted as a “practical element of our
political institutions” or whether its assertion that “all men are born free and equal”
provided nothing more than a “rhetorical flourish.”753 This claim represented a broader
strategy employed by the growing anti-slavery faction in Congress. They sought to
establish the Declaration of Independence as authoritative precedent for their assertion
752
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that the American revolutionaries founded the government on the basis of universal
liberty and equality, and that they intended slavery to melt gradually away.754
Reprising his argument against the extension of the ordinance to the new
northwest territories, Calhoun urged the Senate to consider the danger that these types of
documents, founded on the erroneous doctrine of equality, incubated and eventually
unleashed on an unsuspecting population. Paraphrasing Leroux via Brownson, Calhoun
explained that man might be equal in a state of nature, but maintained that if he lived in a
state of nature, he could not be considered man. Man needed society for the “proper
development of all his faculties, moral and intellectual” and for the “very existence of his
race,” and societies required governments. Therefore, Calhoun reasoned, the Creator
must have formed man for the political state, “into which he is impelled irresistibly, and
in which only his race can exist and all his faculties be fully developed.”755 Because all
men were born into this political state, which included the social sphere, all men were not
born free and equal. Just like the German romantics, Calhoun described liberty as the
endpoint of a long trajectory of personal and collective development. As people rose in
the “scale of intelligence, virtue, and patriotism,” he said, they acquired an understanding
of the nature and purpose of their government, and tended less and less toward “violence
and disorder.” Liberty was the “noble and highest reward” bestowed on those whose
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“mental and moral development” had reached a stage where they no longer required the
power of government to keep their impulses in check.
According to this developmental model of liberty, the proportion between a
particular government’s “quantum of power” and an individual’s quantum of liberty
“must necessarily be very unequal among different people, according to their different
conditions.” In Europe right now, he noted, the leading cause of anarchy was the rush to
grant “unbounded and individual liberty” to everyone, “without regard to their fitness
either to acquire or maintain” it. Similarly, the doctrine of equality had performed a
powerful function in the United States in taking down the British government, but it also
posed a grave threat because it grounded their government on a lie. As a result of its
influence, when Jefferson wrote the Declaration of Independence and proposed excluding
slavery from the territory northwest of the Ohio river, he took an “utterly false view of
the subordinate relation of the black to the white race in the South.” Jefferson had
wrongly concluded that the “black” race, though “utterly unqualified to possess liberty,”
were “as fully entitled to both liberty and equality” as the “white race,” and that “to
deprive them of it was unjust and immoral.” Calhoun traced the country’s present
disarray to the moment that Jefferson admitted this misconception into the Declaration. It
“lay dormant” for decades, he said, but “in the process of time it began to germinate, and
produce its poisonous fruits.” Like a noxious weed, it now threatened to overwhelm the
country’s political institutions.756
Though most of the debate on the Oregon bill centered around the twelfth section
(applying the 1787 Ordinance), the question at issue involved more than just slavery. As
756
Anti-slavery advocates echoed precisely this sentiment, but reversed the figures. 74 Niles' Nat'l Reg. 49,
64 (1848-1849)

377
New York’s Barnburner Democrat John Dix pointed out, the Senate’s decision on this
bill would determine the organic makeup of the United States, in addition to its
predominant commercial-industrial system. Because the bill tacitly sanctioned Oregon’s
Organic laws prohibiting people of color, they compelled Congress to confront “one of
the most interesting and important problems both for the American statesman and
philosopher,” a “subject of vital importance to every section of the Union,” which
concerned its strength and security from “external aggression,” as well as its vulnerability
to “intestine disorder and violence.” What would be the character of the people
occupying this continent, he asked, of “what race or races” shall this “vast population”
consist? Arguing in favor of the bill as written, Dix imagined the Oregon territory as a
sacred space for the white race, the starting point for a white empire stretching beyond
the limits reached by the ancient Romans.757 Unlike the Roman empire, however, Dix
envisioned an empire “founded in peace, and extending itself by industry, enterprise, and
the arts of civilization,” peopled entirely by the superior stock of the “Caucasian” race. In
fact, he claimed that the entire country’s “public order and prosperity” depended on a
homogenous population, identical in the “great outlines of their physiognomy, animal and
moral” and filled with the “same blood,” supplied and augmented by “homogenous
currents” of refugees flooding the country from Europe. “The nearer the great body of
our people—those especially who till the earth—approach the same standard intelligence
and political importance,” Dix insisted, “the more likely we shall be to maintain internal
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tranquility in peace, and bring to the common support in war the united strength of all.”
In Dix’s white nationalist fantasy, the northwest territories provided a pristine landscape
on which they could test this theory. The “white race” could satisfy both their material
and spiritual needs on the open frontier, where they would work the land themselves and
reap its rewards. This form of labor would reinforce their particular suitability for the
rights and privileges granted freemen, as would their physical isolation from corrupting
influences.758
Where, in this vision, did people of color fit? Culling from the scientific theories
of race, which had developed to flesh out the concept of organic sovereignty, Dix argued
that people of color fit only where the terrain necessitated their labor, within the current
boundaries of the southern States. Otherwise, he considered them an “inferior cast,”
counting for nothing in the physical or intellectual strength of the “body politic.”
Regardless of whatever the “liberal and humane” might attempt to do on behalf of the
“African” race, he maintained, “they cannot change the unalterable law of its destiny.” It
had already entered the “first stage of retrogradation,” where it no longer reproduced its
own population. In a few generations, Dix predicted, by the “slow but certain process of
nature, working out her ends by laws so steady, and yet so silent, that their operation is
only seen in their results,” the “black race” would be extinct. Public prejudice aided this
process along—excluding them from white privilege and keeping them socially
degraded—but Providence ordained it. By the “force of immutable laws,” Dix reminded
the Senate, a “degraded class is always, and must be” an element of insecurity and
weakness within a superior population. In that case, the extension and artificial
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regeneration of the slave population to the northwest territories—against the express
wishes of the sovereign community living there, as well as the recommendations of
political economists and agricultural experts—worked against the long-term interests and
safety of the American people.759
Even more so than Missouri or Florida, then, Oregon’s exclusionary conditions
for entry posed a problem for Congress. Supposing that Congress removed the 1787
Ordinance language from the bill, Oregon still effectively precluded slave-holders from
bringing their slave-property into the State.760 Because Oregon’s Organic laws prohibited
all people of color, including slaves, they forced the Senate to address whether a
territorial government (or Congress, in sanctioning that government’s laws) had the
power to “interfere with persons emigrating with their property” into a State. A vote in
favor of these laws functionally confirmed federal power to interfere with slavery; yet, a
vote against them sanctioned federal interference in a sovereign territory’s organic
constitution. If Congress let these laws stand, they established a precedent that would
allow other territories to exclude slavery pre-emptively. This question gained even more
urgency after President Polk returned the ratified Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo (settling
the Mexican War) to Congress on July 6th, with a message encouraging them to move on
provisional governments for the annexed territories as soon as possible. If Congress had
to respect a territory’s organic laws (so long as they did not violate the Constitution), then
they would have to admit New Mexico and California without slavery, as well—unless
Congress determined that the Constitution guaranteed and protected it.
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After Polk’s directive on the territories, Virginia Democrat Robert M. T. Hunter
parsed the fine line between granting the federal government the power to intercede on
behalf of slave-holders and granting it the power to interfere with slavery. As part of its
power to acquire territory, he argued, the constitution granted Congress the implied
power to govern its acquisitions.761 Specifically, it invested Congress with the power to
“train these infant communities under such institutions as may fit them to become
members of our Confederacy,” until the moment they arrived at their majority, at which
point Congress had to step back. Hunter maintained that this precise distribution of power
was “vital to the body politic and essential to the scheme of American association.” The
Constitution granted these powers to “preserve the existence of this political organism”
and they must not, therefore, “be perverted to destroy it” by undermining either the
equality of the States or their proportionate weight. Above all other considerations,
Hunter insisted, the government must avoid committing itself to anything that would alter
this society’s “organic structure” or impair its “vital functions.” In refusing the southern
States access to new territories, Congress crippled the “vis medicatrix naturæ” of their
political system: their prerogative to transplant their excess slave population to the open
frontier. In spite of Senator Dix’s claims, Hunter continued, this state of affairs
“dangerously” diminished the “relative superiority of the white race at home,” as well as
eroded the South’s capacity to protect their rights at the federal level. The country’s
safety and prosperity—its very existence—depended on maintaining the southern States’
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proportionate equality, which accounted for the “fundamental principle” of American
society. Without it, he anticipated, the entire Confederacy would become unhinged.762
Ultimately, Hunter’s argument centered around the crisis of social revolution in
Europe, and its implications for the political economy of the United States. The industrial
revolution in England reversed the natural order. Children, whose superior suppleness
made them particularly suited to working machinery, rose to an unnatural position of
independence and authority in the family, gradually undermining the paternal hierarchy
and bringing about a revolution in the household government. This poisonous effect
worked its way out from inside the family to spread through the manufacturing centers,
where Hunter described brutalizing lives of crime, destitution, subjection, and suffering.
While the “doctrines of communism” understandably spread among the laboring classes
in Europe and the northern United States, Hunter persisted, the social organization of the
South “naturally” exerted a “conservative influence” on the country. The capitalists who
ruled the industrial centers of the North discarded their labor like garbage, he said, but
men “willing to work” did not die for “want of bread” in the slaveholding States. Positive
legislation, public enactment, and private affection combined to secure the “subsistence
and protection of the slave, from the cradle to the grave.” In this context, communism
represented a failed attempt to get at what slavery had already accomplished. The
Government treated wage labor as a modified form of slavery, redistributing the
“proceeds of production between capital and labor,” but this imperfect remedy still left
labor at the mercy of capital. Citing Scottish radical Robert Burns, who had been
absorbed into the British romantic canon by mid-century, Hunter reminded the Senate
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that they would not in the South “See yonder poor o'erlabored wight,/ So abject, mean
and vile,/ Who begs a brother of the earth/ To give him leave to toil.” Unlike the North,
the slave-holding States had erected a socio-political economy based on the natural
hierarchy found in all organized life, where the superior organism governed and cared for
the weaker. While industrial societies fell to moral depravity and misrule, the South
thrived in an organic system that promoted harmony, prosperity, and progress for all its
denizens.763
In fighting over this territory, then, Congress fought over the future of American
society, over the durability of its institutions, and the stability of its commercial system.
The institution of slavery acted as the “balance-wheel of this Confederacy,” Hunter
explained, “the conservative element” standing between the extremes of “Federalism”
and majoritarian popular democracy. He reminded them that the southern Democrats led
the charge against the predatory banks, exploitative tariffs, and artificial monopolies, and
fought for the just distribution of profits between capital and labor. If Congress forbade
slaveholders from bringing their property into the territories, then they acted against their
own conservative interests. As the federal government weakened the relative strength of
its southern States and diminished the capacity of its southern citizens to exercise their
authority over their own property and ensure the sound operation of their commercial
system, it damaged its own vital interests, which were fundamentally attached to the
stability of southern institutions. Without the essential southern phalanx, Hunter
indicated, the slaves would inevitably revolt, and the blood of the white race would flood
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the United States. The next day, as if to vindicate this dire warning, the Niles National
Register published word of the June Paris uprising.764
On the last day of debate over Oregon’s government, in the midst of a twenty-one
hour long session, Connecticut Democrat John M. Niles posed the question, “Is the
principle of slavery more conservative than the principle of freedom?” By definition, a
conservative principle must enable a system to grow and develop, he observed, but
slavery had “undergone no essential change” for at least a century. Slaveholders resisted
any improvement either to their own domestic institutions or to the general government.
On the contrary, they held the government hostage, paranoid of any movement or
measure that they did not author. Quoting the last stanza of Lord Byron’s Childe
Harold’s Pilgrimage, which Frederick Douglass had popularized for its anti-slavery
themes, Niles recalled the slaveholders’ willingness to dissolve the Union with the
flippant phrase, “Farewell—a word that has been, and must be,/ A sound that makes us
linger—yet farewell.”765 During the present discussion, the “slave power” continuously
took recourse to veiled threats of disunion and violence, baldly declaring their refusal to
comply with the majority’s decision, if it dared to resist their dominion. Paraphrasing
Jefferson’s first inaugural, Niles reminded the Senate that the majority’s will served as
the “vital principle of a republic,” and that the threat of force was the “vital principle of
despotism.”766 Far from being a “conservative principle” of their popular institutions,
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slavery was an “incurable” blight on their free republic. Not its conservatism, but its
intractability made it a “peculiar institution” in the United States. “Such an institution,”
he determined, “so difficult to be improved or abolished, should not be extended.”
Instead, Niles pled with his colleagues “by all that is sacred in the past” and “by all your
hope of the future,” not to reject the “principles of freedom, of justice and humanity”
found in the 1787 Ordinance.
In its basic outline, Niles’s speech reflected the prevailing international attitude
toward slavery: that it represented an outdated, obsolete form of labor that would recede
as soon as slave-holders stopped propping it up with artificial means.767 As several
northerners noted during the territorial debates, slave-holders used to share this
perspective. In prior decades, many of them described slavery as an illness or curse
transmitted to an earlier generation by Great Britain, which they hoped would pass in its
own time. Because all systems tended toward liberty, slavery would naturally subside in
favor of a more progressive order.
By 1848, however, slaveholders had developed a pro-slavery schema that
configured white hegemony as the natural (and divine) order, and slavery as its ideal
system of labor. In the industrial north, the merchants owned the capital and exploited the
labor, which alienated the parties from each other and antagonized their interests. This
dynamic generated both social and political conflict, as well as a barrier to fair
representation in government. The “contest between capital and labor” precipitated
“human suffering and oppression,” Mississippi Democrat Jefferson Davis observed, but
because “Slaves are capital,” no such contest existed in the South. With capital and labor
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coequal in the “mind of the master,” the slaveholder could represent both interests
without conflict. In addition, Davis explained, slavery elevated the white laborer by
putting a “caste” below him. As a result, slavery mitigated the class tensions that
constantly threatened to overwhelm the North. “White men” in the slave States enjoyed
an equality that could not exist in places where the “same race fill the places of master
and menial.” Furthermore, because slaveholders and free-trade advocates had allied in
their opposition to northern protectionism for decades, slaveholders had also fashioned
slavery as an institution that thrived in a system of free trade, which progressive thinkers
projected would ideally supplant capitalism, particularly as free trade gained currency in
British and European commercial agendas. Slaveholders assumed that slavery would
soon overtake free labor as the superior institution in a free trade market. In this
worldview, slavery signified the future.
Pro-slavery politicians also insisted that slavery was morally superior in its
treatment of “blacks” than the northern social organization because it replicated the
organic hierarchy between the races. Slave-holding senators agreed with New York
Senator Dix that the “black population” could not survive in a state of freedom, but they
expressed outrage that Dix would promote a “policy which seeks, through poverty and
degradation, the extinction of a race of human beings domesticated among us.” Dix’s
“hostility to the African race” exposed the cynical nature of northern concern for “black”
humanity, which only extended as far as it furthered their political interests in weakening
the South. Hence, northerners fought to dismantle slavery while fostering the degrading
conditions that they openly acknowledged were destroying the “free black population”
living in their midst. In contrast, southern slaveholders like Davis, Georgia Whig John
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MacPherson Berrien, and Virginia Democrat James M. Mason argued that the plantation
system, built on the family-model, generated unbreakable bonds of affection between
slaves and their masters. Having been “born and brought up in the midst” of slaves,
Georgia Whig John MacPherson Berrien claimed, Southerners had developed “feelings
of kindness and forbearance” towards the “sons of Africa” that someone who grew up in
a free State could never have. On the subject of slavery, Berrien reasoned, a “man’s
opinions and feelings” depended on the “place of his birth, his education, his
associations, the habits and feelings and institutions of the community in which he
lives.”768 Were a free-State critic of slavery to observe the institution in person, Berrien
predicted that he would find the “quantum of labor” less than in “free” labor societies; he
would see a “body of laborers cheerful and content,” “fed, clothed, and ministered to in
sickness and old age” owned by a body of honest, humane, pious, and charitable men.
Slave-holders argued that the organic structure of southern society provided the
“best conditions” for “black” race to eventually reach its full potential. Comparing the
conditions of northern “free blacks” and slaves, Jefferson Davis said they would find one
group “miserable, impoverished, loathsome from the deformity and disease which
follows after penury and vice; covering the records of the criminal courts, and filling the
penitentiaries,” and the other group “contented, well provided for in all their physical
wants, and steadily improving in their moral condition.”769 When Africans were brought
to the United States, he said, “they came to their destiny.” Only in the conditions of
slavery could they makes themselves happy and useful. The slave found his natural
protector in his master—someone who put his needs above all other considerations. In the
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secure comfort of his master’s household, he was bound up in the ties of affection. Davis
speculated that slavery “may have for its end the preparation of that race for civil liberty
and social enjoyment.” The structural hierarchy of plantation slavery progressively
elevated “the blacks” by their association with a more advanced race, gradually
improving them until they might one day rise to the condition of liberty.770 Other
southerners—Whigs and Democrats, alike—agreed. As a matter of fact, though the two
sides rarely shared a common political language or rhetoric, they shared a common
discourse around slavery.771 Slavery was their glorious past and, if they played they cards
right, it represented their patriotic future, as well.
The final version of the Oregon bill allowed its existing organic laws to remain in
place, but included a rider promising non-interference on slavery in the territories that
would become New Mexico and California. In what might be considered just retribution
for their treatment in 1847, the House immediately tabled the Senate bill. For the next
two weeks, the House and the Senate volleyed slightly different versions of the bill back
and forth between their chambers. In the end, a version with the 1787 Ordinance
language passed.772 On Congress’s last day in session, Polk signed it and, against
Calhoun’s strenuous objections, included a message to Congress explaining his decision.
Polk acknowledged that the “transcendent” question of slavery concerned more than just
property rights. For the slave-holder, it encompassed the “domestic peace and security of
every family” in the South. Nonetheless, he felt compelled to uphold the Missouri
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Compromise, which had successfully “tranquilized” the public mind in 1820 and, again,
when Texas entered the Union in 1845. He closed with an injunction to protect and honor
this compromise when they dealt with the newly acquired Pacific territories.773 The
message, which circulated broadly in newspapers, included a lengthy section of George
Washington’s Farewell Address, a reminder to the people to fight for the “sacred ties”
that held them together:
“The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to
you…it is of infinite moment that you should properly estimate the immense
value of your national union to your collective and individual happiness…
Citizens by birth or choice of a common country, that country has a right to
concentrate your affections. The name of American, which belongs to you in your
national capacity, must always exalt the just pride of patriotism more than any
appellation derived from local discriminations.”
Washington (and Polk, by proxy) concluded his message with a warning to the American
people to guard themselves against sectional jealousies and “distrust the patriotism” of
any man who worked to weaken their bonds of union. Party men would attempt to divide
them and alienate their affections from each other, Washington prophesied, particularly
along “geographical” lines. They would blow the slightest hint of diversity out of
proportion and misrepresent the “opinions and aims” of other sections, to build up the
belief that a “real difference” separated them, when no such difference existed. In his
own words, Polk expressed his conviction that the American people’s “sound patriotism”
would lead them, upon “sober reflection,” to throw their support behind an equitable
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compromise on the new territories, one that would respect everyone’s rights. He was
wrong.774
Over the next four years, politics became increasingly volatile and polarized
around the sectional issue of slavery, starting with the election of the second Whig
president, Zachary Taylor, in 1848.
NATIONAL PHYSICIANS
During the debates over the territories, southern slave-holders worked out the key
facets of their pro-slavery conservatism, which would become the cornerstone of their
policy positions over the next decade. As part of their revisionist history, they asserted
that the Constitution grew out of a consensus on slavery, and that it fundamentally
protected property in slaves. Slavery performed a vital, conservative function in the
United States, essential to its health and progress. Anything or anyone that threatened or
infringed on slavery, in any way, could not be considered conservative. For that reason,
they claimed, slavery must be allowed to be introduced anywhere, regardless of climate,
terrain, or the preferences of the population already residing there. They argued that the
slave system of labor had already proven itself superior to free labor, both in productivity
and morality. Unlike northern capitalists, who oppressed and terrorized their populations,
slaveholders claimed that they served an enlightened and humanitarian service for their
labor—that slavery improved and advanced the dependent race that lived among them.
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Losing Oregon (at least provisionally) merely strengthened their resolve to protect the
organic structure of their society and arrest the disease eroding its vital parts.775
So, what did it mean to be a conservative in this climate? For slave-holders and
their allies, it meant advocating free trade and opposing capitalists; it meant white
hegemony over white nationalism; it meant State rights, so long as those rights furthered
slaveholder interests, and strict construction, so long as that construction authorized
slavery; it meant a small (federal) government, until slaveholders needed that government
to enforce their interests and retrieve their property, and it meant an expansive
perspective on individual liberty and personal freedom, unless that individual was a
person of color, a woman, or an abolitionist.
In 1849, Thomas Ritchie summarized the Democratic party’s new “conservatism”
in the revised prospectus for his Daily Union, which had overtaken the Globe as the
Democratic national organ during Polk’s administration. In conjunction with his new coeditor, the aptly named New Hampshire congressman Edmund Burke, Ritchie explained
that the Democrats represented the “progressive spirit of the age, adapting to new forms
and conditions,” while also advocating limited government, original and strict
construction of the constitution, and the individual and property rights “of all”—that is,
all persons and all property. In order to “faithfully adhere” to the democratic principles
“laid down and interpreted by the fathers of the republican faith,” Ritchie and Burke
committed the party to a policy of non-intervention on the question of slavery in the
territories and DC. He and Burke regarded this position as the “true conservatism,”
Ritchie wrote, “that conservatism which preserves popular liberty,” while it endeavored
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to secure “just and equal protection” to every person and their property. The Daily
National Whig adroitly termed this position “progressive conservatism and slavery nonintervention.”776
For their part, the Whigs had elected the first deep-South president, and they
continued to call for a conciliatory conservatism that privileged compromise on behalf of
slave-holders.777 In January 1849, Indiana Whig Richard W. Thompson predicted that the
executive office would soon emanate a “spirit of popular conservatism” that would “be
poured like oil upon the agitated waters of party.” Under Taylor’s guidance, Thompson
said, “we shall neither know the name of North or South, of Whig or Democrat” in the
“settlement of great national questions,” but rather “be prompted by those high, holy, and
elevated considerations which exist in the heart of every patriot.” In spite of their
concessions to southern sentiment, however, the Whigs could not deny (and southern
Democrats never failed to point out) that their northern wing operated in league with the
Free Soil party. In 1848, the Free Soil party had poached just enough votes in New York
and Pennsylvania to sink Democratic candidate Lewis Cass. The Democrats still held the
Senate, but they had lost substantial ground, and southerners no longer possessed the
quantum of power in the Senate once Wisconsin’s statehood equalized the number of free
and slave State senators.778 Similarly, though the Democrats technically retook the
majority in the House (113 to 107), the nine Free Soil members held the balance,
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particularly since five of them had previously served as Whigs.779 Poised on the edge of
the 1850 census (scheduled for June), national representatives anticipated additional
changes in the Congressional makeup. Taking into account the country’s migration
patterns and the influx of immigrants, the census promised to increase representation in
areas with strong Free Soil support (the Mid-Atlantic and East-North-Central regions)
and decrease representation for the South Atlantic States (particularly Virginia and South
Carolina), whose populations had not kept up proportionately with other States.780
From the international perspective, the Democratic party had long thrived
because it allied democratic liberalism with Southern pro-slavery conservatism, and the
“Conservative” Whigs had maintained their stronghold in the North by uniting social
liberalism and political conservatism. Conservative writers in the UK attributed this
paradox to the idiosyncratic role that State-rights played in American politics. “The
precedents of history uniformly point to circumstances like those of the South, as
eminently adverse to progress and to the spread of new ideas,” the Glasgow Herald
observed, “and to those which characterize the North, as invariably breeding a leveling
and democratic spirit.” European conservatism enshrined the same principles found in
Calhoun’s State-rights doctrine: strict construction, limited legislative authority, and

779

Of the rest, two had been Democrats, one had been a member of the Liberty party in his only other
election, and one had been elected for the first time as a member of the Free Soil party. In the Senate,
which had two Free Soilers, one had been a Democrat and one had been a Whig.
780
In Michigan, where Van Buren won 15.97% of the vote, and Illinois, where he won 12.6 % of the vote,
the population had nearly doubled between 1840 and 1850. In Wisconsin, where he received 26.6% of the
vote, the population had increased by ten times the number it had in 1840 (from 30,945 to 305, 391). In
New York, where he received 26.43 % of the vote, the population had increased by a third, which may not
sound like much, but amounted to 667,473 people (i.e., the entire population of South Carolina in 1850).
Speaking of which, in the same period, South Carolina’s population grew by 74,109 people (from 594,398
to 668,507) and Virginia’s population by 94,000 (from 1,025,227 to 1,119,348). Due to a change in census
apportionment, as part of a bill to rationalize and institutionalize the census introduced by Ohio Whig
Samuel Finley Vinton and formalized in May 1850, Congress experienced a less drastic shift than some
members feared. (citation assistance: https://www.census.gov/prod/3/98pubs/CPH-2-US.PDF)

393
proprietary autonomy. On both sides of the Atlantic, this position promoted caste
privilege over democratic rights, yet, in the United States, the leveling northern
democracy tirelessly advanced southern interests. The Herald traced this relationship
back to Thomas Jefferson’s “extreme lasser aller” politics, by which he identified federal
constitutional power as the means by which the government would interfere with
individual free agency.781 Jefferson’s ideological antipathy to consolidated power
incidentally generated “liberal” cover for “conservative” Southern policies, and ensured
that John C. Calhoun and his ilk remained mainstream. In September 1849, however, the
Herald forecasted a “complete transformation” of political parties in the United States.
When the New York Barnburners seceded from the Democratic party, it wrote, the entire
political system shattered. Everyone fragmented; “Calhoun alone holds his old course.”
From the outset, Taylor’s administration exposed the danger of choosing an
unknown entity to represent a party’s interest in the executive office. Rather than pick
major players in the Whig party for his cabinet, he selected nationally-oriented men who
shared his distaste for partisan politics.782 He also broke with tradition in selecting his
official printer, establishing and patronizing his own broadside, instead of gifting the
Whig National Intelligencer the lucrative executive printing contract. Taylor quickly
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sank Thompson’s hopes that his hypothetical “popular conservatism” might quell
sectional tension, as well. Although he owned plantations in Louisiana, Mississippi, and
Kentucky, and a substantial number of slaves, Taylor had no problem with admitting
California and New Mexico as free States and he drew a hard line against maintaining
them in limbo as territories.783 When Texas and New Mexico nearly came to blows over
their disputed shared border, Taylor backed New Mexico and threatened to send troops to
enforce their claims. He also endorsed federal power in DC, encouraging Congress to
attend to the city’s interests and consider what policies might “contribute to its
prosperity.” In supporting congressional authority over the District, Taylor simply
restated Article I, Section 8, Clause 17 of the US Constitution, granting the US
government the right “to exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever,” over
the autonomous District that housed it. Nonetheless, DC had long served as a flashpoint
for pro-slavery and abolitionist activists, alike, who viewed congressional action related
to slavery in DC as a potential foothold for the federal government to arrogate to itself the
power to intervene elsewhere. In the context of Taylor’s views—specifically, that quick,
decisive action in the territories would short-circuit national agitation on slavery—his
theoretically innocuous stand on DC indicated to Congress that he intended to push them
to issue conclusive legislation on slavery and the slave trade in the District, as well.
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Taylor set out these priorities in his first (and only) annual message to Congress, which
he clarified in a special message delivered in late January.784
A week later, Whig patriarch Henry Clay (who had narrowly lost his party’s
nomination to Taylor the year before) offered his own spin on Taylor’s
recommendations, laying out eight resolutions that would come to be known collectively
as the Compromise of 1850. Clay’s stated mission: “to settle and adjust amicably all
existing questions of controversy” between the States “arising out of the institution of
slavery.”785 On January 29, Clay resolved that California be admitted to statehood upon
application, without restrictions regarding slavery (either its exclusion or introduction),
and that Congress should establish territorial governments in other parts of the Mexican
Cession, also without restrictions or conditions on slavery. Regarding Texas and New
Mexico, he proposed that they fix Texas’s shared boundary with New Mexico, and pay
down Texas’s public debt in return for its promise to relinquish its claims to New
Mexico’s territory. As related to DC, Clay continued, Congress should not unilaterally
abolish slavery without popular consent from DC and Maryland or just compensation to
District slave-holders; however, Congress should prohibit the slave trade within citylimits. Regarding the question of fugitive slaves, Clay advised legislation that would give
teeth back to the 1793 Fugitive Slave Act, to effectually provide for the “restitution and
delivery of persons bound to service or labor,” who may escape to other States or
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Territories.786 Otherwise, Clay asserted that Congress had no power to regulate or
legislate the slave trade between the States, and that the “admission or exclusion of
slaves” transported from one State to another depended “exclusively upon their own
particular laws.” This last turn of phrase gestured back to Clay’s wording in the Missouri
Compromise restriction, which likewise balanced a potential State’s organic laws, and its
putative sovereignty, with the Senate’s imperative to appear proactive in protecting
slaveholders’ property.787
For the purposes of this project, Clay’s compromise measures provide a
reasonable summary of the issues involved in the 1850 congressional debates. They
framed the conversation in the Senate and they established context for the parallel
discussion occurring over the same issues in the House. Still, the details of the resulting
legislation and the horse-trading involved in getting it passed matter less than the
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language used to discuss it, and its implications for American conservatism and organic
sovereignty.
In the prevailing theories of social behavior, extremist sentiment and activity
developed in response to over-excited nerves, an organic contagion particularly endemic
to democratic societies. Presumably, once they removed the root of this excitement, the
agitation itself would dissipate. Radical parties thrived on antagonism, but could not
subsist without a continuous source of conflict. In the context of the compromise,
“conservative” men claimed that they had identified the etiology of the country’s disorder
(the open question of slavery) and sought the legislative means to resolve it.
The first thrust of the debate took place in the House, after President Taylor
delivered his February 13th message relaying California’s constitution for consideration.
As with Oregon’s, California’s constitution included an explicit provision barring
slavery, which incited Tennessee Democrat Frederick P. Stanton to protest
immediately.788 The excitement over slavery during the Thirtieth Congress had grown to
alarming proportions, Stanton recalled, seeming to presentiate a “disastrous convulsion of
nature.” The intensity of their debate had indicated a “violent and acute” pathology,
which may have “yielded to remedies judiciously adopted and firmly administered,” but
the Thirtieth Congress had failed to discharge its duty to its patient. Over the course of
the summer and fall, Stanton said, the “symptoms” had worsened. While Southerners had
been lulled into a false sense of security after the Wilmot proviso died, Taylor’s
duplicitous management of California revealed that its spirit still lived. His agents had
788
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transmigrated its “living principle” and “breathed” it into the “body of the California
convention.” Southerners had no choice but to resist California’s admission as an act of
self-protection, but that act alone would not restore their health.
All this time, Stanton charged, northern politicians had been building their
political base on the detritus of southern rights, fabricating a transcontinental coalition at
the expense of the U.S. Constitution. In the face of such hostility and aggression, Stanton
asked, how could they expect the South to capitulate to this latest injustice? How long
could they sustain a union, “Whose deep foundations lie/In veneration and a people’s
love,” (in Wordsworth’s romantic turn of phrase) once they had ground their ties of
brotherly affection into dust?789 The “disease in our system… lies deeper than the slavery
question itself,” Stanton insisted, “It is organic in its character.” After the “disease has
attacked the heart,” he warned, it might just as easily “seize upon the lungs, or even the
brain.”790 Now, Stanton feared, the “disease of the body-politic has become chronic and
inveterate,” extensive throughout the entire system. With its “subtle poison,” he
remarked, it “taints every organ of the public service.” Although the House had preceded
so far with apparent calm—in spite of the fact that it took them sixty-three ballots to elect
Georgia Democrat Howell Cobb Speaker—Stanton apprehended in their proceedings the
“sallow hue, the listless mood, and the languid action of a patient, thoroughly diseased,
and insensible to that almost inevitable stroke of fate which seems to be impending.”
Because they suffered from an organic disease, they must administer an organic remedy
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to the affected organs, starting with the “irregular throbbings” of their common heart. To
preserve their body-politic, they must work to reconstruct their “alienated affections,”
putting an end to northern fanaticism and abuse. Congress could start this course of
treatment at once by “restoring the Constitution to its pristine purity” and honoring its
“sacred compromises,” both in letter and in spirit. In effect, that meant protecting and
extending slavery wherever slaveholders desired to take it. Only then could they begin to
heal.
If Taylor and Clay set the agenda for the congressional debate, Stanton set the
tone. When the House reopened discussion on California the following week, North
Carolina Democrat Abraham W. Venable also diagnosed an “organic disease in the
system,” which he saw advancing with “fearful rapidity” on a vulnerable minority. The
agitation and disruption that they witnessed in Congress and across the country
manifested symptoms of “prior and powerful principles of disorganization, long in
operation,” he argued, which could be traced back to a flaw in their original constitution.
The people of the United States had designed their constitution to protect the “safety of
minorities” by limiting the power of “numerical majorities,” but their organization did
not effectually account for the disorganization bred by power-lust, unequal taxation, and
party patronage. Meanwhile, the weakened South, casting out for some relief, repeatedly
returned to the very party coalitions that had caused their distress in the first place:
We have been often reminded by the press of the necessity of maintaining the
integrity of the two great national parties, particularly the Democratic, as a
panacea for the disease which preys upon the heart of this Republic. Like the
inebriate, who follows the blind impulse of his appetite, and resorts to the bottle
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as a remedy for his disease, or the confirmed opium-eater, who finds the narcotic
necessary to allay the nervous turmoil which his vicious habit has produced—it is
an appeal to an exciting cause to counteract its effects…
Once in office, party men invariably appealed to the northern majority to sustain their
authority, fattening them on public spoils at the expense of the southern minority, whom
Venable claimed paid the brunt of the taxes and received none of their benefit. This
systemic discrimination produced “organic incurable evil” in their union, in evidence by
the “new words” introduced to obscure it. They had transmuted the “Federal
Government” into a “national” Government, and they spoke of “national parties” and
“national objects,” unaware of the power of names to pervert their institutions or the fact
that this “new nomenclature” signified the decline of their liberty. In Venable’s imagery,
the Government took on the aspect of a Shelleyan monster, debased by an immoral
majority, who had “inverted the order of things.” Repudiating the framers’ intentions,
they had twisted a Government built to reflect State power into a “means of prostrating
State sovereignty.” The “creature” now aspired to “control the creator.” These men called
themselves “conservative,” even as they dismantled the sacred protections of the
Constitution they claimed to venerate, because they benefitted from the warped system.
Yet, if the vital question came to a direct vote on the floor of the House, Venable
predicted that the South would soon discover the true nature of the “conservative friends”
of whom they had heard so much. As they had before in their lust for plunder, northern
“conservatives” would turn their backs on the South and strike at the institution of
slavery. In light of all of this political pathology, Venable concluded, Clay’s compromise
merely represented another “gilded pill containing the deadly poison. Saying to the
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generous South, Give, give.” Equal justice alone supplied the Union’s vitality; without it,
they all bided their time until death.791
Specifically addressing the “Slave Question,” Louisiana Democrat Isaac E. Morse
repeated Venable’s morbid hosanna. For the first time in historical memory, Morse noted,
Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Daniel Webster agreed on something: that northern
States, in refusing to surrender fugitive slaves, violated the Constitution. Still, not even
they seemed capable of resolving this “evil.” If not one of the three “masterminds of
America” could compel the North to fulfill their foundational duties, “then indeed is the
disease organic, and too deeply seated for the ordinary remedies.” The South had already
conceded too much. Everyone knew that the Wilmot proviso was defunct in name only; it
had been reborn as the “Executive proviso” against slavery in the territories expressed in
Taylor’s message and the “Mexican proviso,” which would uphold Mexican
manumission as organic precedent for prohibiting slavery in the Mexican Cession. The
“modern reckless” interpretation of the Constitution endangered southern interests and
compromised their principles. But they would no longer passively take northern abuse, or
be seduced by the “siren song” of Union. “No disease was ever avoided by concealing the
danger, or cured by wishing the patient well,” Morse attested, “so neither discontent nor
disunion will be prevented or cured by lauding the glories of the Union, or threatening to
drive the traitors into the Cumberland river.” Rather than wait for a remedy to present
itself, the South set out to find a remedy of its own. Delegates representing a “large
majority of southern States” intended to assemble in Nashville in June “with every
disposition to be calm and conservative.” Morse did not anticipate that their convention
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would break up the Union—though the “cords” had already “been sundered” and the
“last one may be easily broken”—but they would air their grievances. Furthermore,
Morse pre-empted the critique that these perceived aggressions never occurred in realty.
It did not matter if northern iniquity existed “in truth or in imagination,” he said, “If only
imaginary, like the disease of the hypochondriac,” then it must be taken even more
seriously. “The mental is worse than the bodily,” he claimed, citing Macbeth, “for “who
can minister to a mind diseased?”792 In the end, Morse conceded that Congress could.
Though this convention might not “allay the irritation under which the southern mind is
laboring,” Congress had the power to minister to the southern mind by removing the
source of their mental illness. They could “take away all cause for the convention”
through a commitment to non-intervention or else an amendment to the Constitution
explicitly securing slavery.793
In advocating a constitutional guaranty, Morse repeated the climactic turn in John
C Calhoun’s March 4th speech on the “Slavery Question.” Still visibly suffering from the
effects of pneumonia, Calhoun had sat shrouded in his black cloak while Virginia’s
James Mason read his morbid prognosis794 In the forty-two page manuscript, Calhoun
described in detail the etiology of the disease that endangered the Union, so that, like a

792

In Act 5, Scene 3, when Lady Macbeth’s doctor informs Macbeth that his wife was not sick, but was
troubled with “thick-coming fancies,” Macbeth responded: “Cure her of that./Canst thou not minister to a
mind diseased,/Pluck from the memory a rooted sorrow,/Raze out the written troubles of the brain/And
with some sweet oblivious antidote/Cleanse the stuffed bosom of that perilous stuff/Which weighs upon the
heart?” The internal answer to this question, of course, was “no.” Or, rather, that the patient must heal
themselves, which Lady Macbeth did by auto-defenestration (i.e., jumping out of a window). Presumably,
Morse did not mean to draw a parallel between the South, whose mental illness (he might claim) developed
out of their attachment to the providential institution of slavery, and Lady Macbeth, who lost her mind as
the result of her complicity in serial murders, but that was the comparison his allusion drew.
793
31 Cong. Globe 1, 327-329 (1850)
794
Merrill D. Peterson, The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun (Oxford University Press,
1988), 460.

403
good physician, he could pronounce “by what remedy the patient could be saved.” At the
end of it, he determined that a constitutional amendment, alone, would heal the damage
done to the South.795 The Southern States could remain in the Union only if they reached
a constitutional understanding with the North that restored the equilibrium of power
between the two sections, and reconstituted the South’s ability to defend itself, its rights,
and its property against northern encroachment and interference. Although the titans of
oratory might protest otherwise, Calhoun opined, the Union could no more be saved by
the eulogistic cry of “Union, Union, the glorious Union!” than a dangerously ill patient
could be saved by a physician crying “Health, health, glorious health!” A slightly revived
Calhoun summarized this position viva voce the following week in a pointed exchange
with Michigan Democrat Lewis Cass. Unlike Calhoun, Cass advocated the doctrine of
non-intervention exclusively, leaving the question of slavery to the resident sovereign
population. Calhoun chastised Cass for recommending a “course of palliatives,” which
relieved symptoms without treating the underlying condition, when dealing with “a
disease that would be fatal if not finally arrested.” They might as well “treat a cancer”
that verged on “striking into a vital part” with palliatives, “as to treat [the slave] question
with palliatives.” In Calhoun’s analysis, the South would not be out of danger—they
could not consider the disease safely in remission—until they received a constitutional
guaranty. If the South was not administered this constitutional amendment soon, “it
would, in the end, be fatal.”796
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Calhoun died of influenza two weeks later (one such death in a minor epidemic),
but his commitment to slavery as an organic, conservative institution survived him, and
ultimately effected what he, in his lifetime, could not: a complete reorganization of the
parties on ‘Republican’ principles.797 So long as slavery remained a facet of southern life,
but not necessarily its definitive or fundamental institution, representatives could
maintain nuanced (or passive) views on it, and vote accordingly. For much of the
Democratic party’s history, southern slavery found a natural ally in the northern
Democracy, just as Jefferson had predicted, and for precisely the reasons that the
Glasgow Herald laid out back in September 1849. Both groups prioritized individual
liberty and opposed consolidated power. And while the northern and western wings of the
Democratic party had long capitulated to southern interests in exchange for their support
against federal authority, big industry, and the banks, they had not done so without
reservations or stipulations, which they were free to have. Diverse political coalitions had
to work a little ambivalence into their alliances and a healthy dose of ambiguity into their
platforms to withstand intersectional differences. Once Calhoun and his fellow-travelers
signified slavery as “an essential principle of their very organism, and indissolubly
interwoven into the very framework of their being,” co-extensive with the Union and
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“infused into the Government at the moment of its birth,” ambivalence was no longer an
option.798 In a question of life and death, how could they choose death?
Calhoun had stated outright that he intended California’s admission to serve as a
“test question” for measuring each representative’s loyalty to the South and it quickly
transformed into a test act for the Democratic party. By mid-April, the damage to the
Democratic party began to show, as the fiercer advocates of slavery started to pick apart
the middle ground. The most outrageous example occurred in a confrontation between
Mississippi senator Henry S. Foote and Missouri senator Thomas Hart Benton. Calhoun
and his cohort had colluded against Benton for years, skeptical of his loyalty to slavery
and free trade, and Foote had a hand in Benton’s political defeat in Missouri politics.799
Between the close of the Thirtieth Congress and the start of the Thirty-First, Benton had
made himself anathema to his section and his party by stumping against Missouri’s 1849
Jackson-Napton Resolutions, which had been based on Calhoun’s February 1847
resolutions on the “Slavery Question” and denied congressional authority over slavery in
the territories. In speeches across the State, Benton declared his “personal sentiments”
against slavery and its “introduction into places in which it does not exist.”800 For that
reason, he spent the first several months of Senate debate offering a series of amendments
to prevent the proposed Special Committee from discussing anything other than the
conditions of California’s admission. At the beginning of April, he openly mocked the
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other measures as “quack medicines” that had been marketed as “real genuine Brandreth
pills” (a purgative cathartic used to purify the blood), warning that they would “produce
worse diseases than they are intended to cure.”801 On April 17th, Foote responded to
another of Benton’s attempts to curtail the Special Committee with an epithet meant to
draw fire. When an enraged Benton rose from his seat, Foote cocked a loaded pistol at
him. Amidst cries that they “Be cool,” Vice President Fillmore temporarily restored order
to the Senate chambers. At the end of April, the Senate formed a Special Committee (the
Committee of Thirteen) to take the compromise measures out of the Senate for a spell
and let the members simmer down, a bit.
Similar, albeit less spectacular, scenes played out with other ambiguously-allied
figures, like Michigan’s Lewis Cass, who had become less circumspect about his distaste
for slavery since losing the presidential election, or Missouri’s John S. Phelps, who
announced his intention to vote for California’s unconditional admission in accordance
with his constituents’ wishes. Neither Cass nor Phelps could have been considered antislavery, but no one would have called them pro-slavery, either. Unlike Benton—a
slaveholder who vocally opposed slavery—neither of them took a public stand. Still,
unilateral southerners, who would accept nothing short of an explicit invitation and a red
carpet into the territories, took issue with Cass’s doctrine of popular sovereignty, which
they felt did not go far enough to ensure their rights. Virginia Democrat Lafayette
McMullen chewed out Benton’s colleague in the House, representative John Phelps, for
his inadequate commitment to slavery, and Phelp’s suggestion, in reference to Thomas
Ritchie’s Daily Union, that the Democratic party had endorsed California’s unrestricted
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admission during the prior congressional session. This claim exposed Phelps as a
“counterfeit,” who intended to “injure” both Ritchie and the Democratic party. While
Phelps played politics with the “renegade” “political traitor” Benton, a “southern man
with northern principles” who had “deserted the South in the most critical period of her
history,” he diverted the legislature from their vital purpose.802 Congressmen stood in the
“attitude of great national physicians” to a “body politic” diseased, McMullen exhorted,
inflicted with a “cancer or tumor” and “sick well-nigh unto death.” They must do
something immediately to advance the interests of slavery, “or we shall lose this great
patient.”
This polarization on slavery, and the impulse to naturalize it through organic
metonymy, resonated in Clay’s proposal on behalf of the Senate’s Committee of
Thirteen, as well. On May 21st, Clay presented their recommendation for an omnibus bill
(covering California, the territories, Texas, the fugitive slave bill, and the slave trade in
DC) that he described as a “broad and comprehensive scheme of healing” the “open and
bleeding” wounds that threatened the “well-being, if not the existence of the body
politic.” With the “country bleeding at every pore,” Clay reminded them, President
Taylor had submitted a plan that aggravated the injury on the issues he addressed and left
the other wounds to either heal themselves or bleed out. Taylor would have them admit
California, “even if it should produce death itself,” and leave the territorial governments
and Texas boundary to “cure themselves by some law of nature,”—by the “vis medicatrix
naturæ” or some other “self-remedy.” Taylor offered no course of treatment for the States
hemorrhaging slaves to the North or to salve the rift over selling slaves in the capital.
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With the generosity of spirit endemic to the US Congress, McMullen expressed his wish that Phelps’s
duplicity follow him for the “residue of his natural life.”
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“Unless some such measure prevail,” Clay declared, “instead of healing and closing the
wounds of the country, instead of stopping the effusion of blood, it will flow in still
greater quantities, with still greater danger to the Republic.” The committee’s collective
approach, grouping the legislation in a single bill, prospectively improved its chances of
passing the Senate and inoculated it against Taylor’s veto.
Even those representatives who opposed the omnibus bill did not question the
ontological assumption of organic sovereignty. In enumerating their objections, they
started from the shared principle that they all lived in an organic system, susceptible to
the same natural laws as other living organisms, and that their programmatic response to
systemic disorder must account for its organic properties. For example, both Lewis Cass
and Tennessee Whig John Bell opposed the territorial legislation after an amendment
stripped it of its natural remedy for intersectional distress: the doctrine of popular
sovereignty. On June 5th, the Senate modified the committee bill so that territories could
not pass laws “interfering with the primary disposition of the soil, [or] establishing or
prohibiting African slavery,” which would have the effect of superseding or repealing
local statute. Five days later, Cass dissented from the amended legislation because it
counteracted the “conservative” power of self-government. Through the exercise of selfgovernment, he contended, a community’s inhabitants forged and sustained their society
and preserved their relationship with the “parent country.” Like “every true American,”
Cass wanted to restore harmony between the sections, but he maintained that “no vis
medicatrix [could] be found in political nature” that replicated the “conservative” effect
of self-government.803 After another month of debate, Senator Bell expressed his concern
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that the altered compromise measures, “may not only fail to heal” the country’s “open
and bleeding” wounds, but that they would not “even stanch” them. Whether or not these
measures “heal the surface,” Bell warned, these wounds “will continue to fester within
until the vital parts of the system are seriously affected.”804 Furthermore, he noted that
none of their legislation addressed the “inherent elements of dissension” in their
system—that half of the States maintained the institution of slavery and the other half did
not. Nor could they completely resolve their chronic “paroxysms” without destroying the
system, itself, he argued. Instead, they must treat their inevitable intersectional tension as
an “inveterate and incurable” systemic “disease,” “born in the system” and symptomatic
of its natural operation. The most that Congress could do, Bell concluded, was to find a
way to curtail the “inflammation.”805
Southern Democrats Robert MT Hunter (VA) and Andrew Butler (SC) both
protested the legislation on the grounds that its proposed remedies exacerbated rather
than alleviated the cause of their distress. Hunter agreed with Bell that their organization
naturally and perpetually generated conflict between the “two great antagonist elements
of our social system” (the slave-holding and non-slaveholding States). Still, Hunter
claimed, Congress could prevent serious damage by “increasing the vis medicatrix
naturæ, the self-restoring principle of the system,” which depended on the “proper
distribution of power between the parts.” Repeating Calhoun’s direction, he urged
Congress to restore proportionate equality to the South. He explained that the South had a
greater preponderance of naturally conservative citizens than other portions of the Union.
“In what other portion of the Union do we find a rural population so complete in all the
804
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elements of strength and allegiance,” Hunter asked, “And does not history teach that a
country population is the safest depository of political power?” In fact, Hunter insisted,
all of southern history supported the claim that they had exclusively pursued
“conservative” political action.806 South Carolina’s Andrew Butler offered a more
concise diagnosis of the problem. In sustaining any compromise, Butler charged,
southern gentlemen “were literally sowing the seeds of suicidal diseases.”807 A few short
hours after Butler’s address, President Taylor, whose annual message instigated the entire
compromise debate, died of “cholera morbus” (in other words, a very bad stomach-ache).
Paradoxically, the death of a southern, slaveholding, Whig president improved the
chances that the Compromise legislation would pass. As Daniel Webster wrote to Boston
bigwig Franklin Haven, “The President [Fillmore] is a sensible man, and a conservative
Whig, and is not likely to be in favor of any “isms,” such as have votaries at the present
day.” Webster had no doubt that Taylor’s death “increased the probability” in favor of the
Compromise. After further discussion with his colleagues on the hill, Webster disclosed
that “The idea is now general that the Compromise will go through.”808 Unlike Zachary
Taylor, Millard Fillmore threw the party patronage and the power of the presidency
behind “conservative” Compromise Whigs, bringing Senators Webster and Thomas
Corwin (of Ohio) into his cabinet and meeting regularly with Henry Clay, who became
his unofficial voice in Congress. Unlike Taylor, Fillmore had a working knowledge of
government, having served in both State and national legislatures, and an understanding
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of the professional inducements and private deals that generated motion in Washington.
When Fillmore publicized his intention to approve every constitutional piece of
legislation that Congress sent him, he signaled that the Compromise would benefit from
the administration’s support, including whatever spoils or contracts might maintain its
momentum and ensure its safe passage through Congress. With Taylor gone, then, the
compromise men could drop the pretense of the collective measure (which faced
mounting opposition) and split the omnibus bill into its component parts, which they did.
Democratic and Whig compromise “conservatives” won, at least provisionally.
Over the next ten weeks, Congress passed the resulting five bills (resolving Texas and
New Mexico’s border dispute and providing for New Mexico’s territorial government;
California’s admission; Utah’s territorial government; the fugitive slave act; and
prohibiting the slave trade in DC) and Fillmore signed them into law. In spite of the effort
by obscure “Free Soil” men to destroy the “two old conservative parties, of the country,
the Whig and the Democratic party,” and elevate themselves on the wreck of the Union,
Georgia Whig William C. Dawson announced in the Senate, the forces of compromise
and Union had triumphed.809 A month later, Webster reported to President Fillmore that a
“highly important and conservative change had taken place” in the minds of Boston’s
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capitalist elite and among the “respectable portion of the Democrat party.” The following
year, Fillmore invited the “conservative democrats” to join the “conservative whigs” in a
joint Union party. Ritchie’s Daily Union scoffed at the proposition. The Whigs had
“already tried their hand at the business of conservatism” and failed because they rejected
the doctrines of State rights and strict-construction, the “only basis under our system of
all true conservatism.”810 Democratic and Whig “conservatives” had made an
instrumental and fundamentally fungible alliance with the specific goal of removing the
sources of agitation on the issue of slavery. Once they had accomplished their agenda
through the compromise measures, the Union stated, they had no reason to continue their
affiliation. Outside of this specific interest, they shared no other common cause.
The Compromise kicked off a complete transformation in the national parties,
burying the Whigs in their “sacred casket” by the mid-1850s, and spawning a new
national Republican party. In the early 1850s, southern Whigs defected to the Democratic
party, but the northern Democrats did not join the Whigs. In part, this asymmetry grew
out of the historical relationship (both real and fictive) between the Whig party, capital,
and labor rights (i.e., the public perception, especially prominent among workingmen’s
groups, that the Whigs loved capitalists and hated the poor.) As Ohio Senator Joshua
Giddings foretold during the compromise debates, “It is too late in the day to make
intelligent men believe that you have any very pure regard for the laboring men of New
England, while you sustain laws here to sell the laboring men and women of this District,
810

Samuel Houston repeated this admonition during an address to the Senate on the compromise measures
in December 1851. The Democratic party, alongside every other political party, boasted that it represented
the “true conservative party of the country.” If the party aimed at “conservatism,” then they must embrace
whomever joined them in loving and supporting that Constitution “strictly.” (The daily union. (Washington
[D.C.]), 07 Sept. 1851. Chronicling America- Historic American Newspapers. Lib. of Congress; 32nd
Congress 1st Session Cong. Globe 129 1852.)

413
like brutes in the market; that you have any real intention to pass laws for the relief of the
laboring men of the North while you keep in force laws for carrying on a coastwise
commerce in the bodies of southern laborers.” Whig conservatism made them anathema
to the “social” Democracy of the North, even after pro-slavery conservatism
contaminated the Democratic party. As a consequence, Republican party ideology
contained elements of both the Democratic and Whig party platforms, notably the
democratic support for labor and the Whig’s orientation toward nationalism and their
reliance on federal (or centralized) authority.
CONCLUDING THE ALLIANCE OF CONSERVATISMS
The realignment in party loyalties and priorities after 1848 briefly conjoined the
“Conservative” Whigs and the “Conservative Democracy”—two types of
“Conservatives” who formed a tepid alliance to put the territorial questions to rest before
the politics of slavery radicalized further. This bi-partisan coalition for “progressive
conservatism and slavery non-intervention” brought together “National” conservatives
from the Whig and Democratic parties, who advocated measures to temporize the
extremes on both sides of the slavery question. They were marginally joined by proslavery politicians who sought to reinforce with positive “conservative” legislation their
“constitutional” right to their property (slaves). In the debates over the ensuing
legislation, Democratic and Whig “conservatives” united Congress through a complex
series of alliances as brittle as sugar glass. In the long run, they failed to cut across
sectional lines because the organic ideology of “slave conservatism” precluded
compromise. Slavery reflected a metaphysical imperative expressed in the South’s
material institutions; it could not be disturbed or compromised by outside forces without
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undermining southern destiny. For pro-slavery “conservatives,” slavery was
constitutional in every sense: it served as the essential element in the structure of southern
society and (they argued) the United States Constitution itself was predicated on
preserving the institution of slavery, which made slavery an essential (literally
constitutional) American institution, as well. Any compromise on the question
invalidated this sacred compact and risked the entire structure of American society. In
this context, “national conservatives”—even those with anti-slavery sympathies—became
complicit in scaffolding slavery because they rooted their conservatism in the
perpetuation of the national Union.
By the 1850s, “conservatism” almost exclusively indicated an ontological
commitment to white hegemony, which generated a political program that always
recurred to pro-slavery interests. The principles of organic sovereignty sublimated the
explicit interests of these policies, while they simultaneously generated a systemic
imperative for their implementation. Incrementally and imperceptibly, Ohio’s Salmon P.
Chase observed, the “Era of CONSERVATISM” passed into the “Era of SLAVERY
PROPAGANDISM,” though it might be more accurate to say that the two eras merged.811
At this point, pro-slavery Democrats embraced popular conservatism—that is, the
conservatism “of the people and for the people.”812 Ever since the Locofocos had lifted
Ely Moore (then president of the National Trades Union) to Congress in 1835, the
Democracy had pitched the idea that the “people are the conservative party” of the United
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States. In a constitutional system predicated on equal rights, Moore had argued, the
people represented the party that fought to secure property and sustain the established
order. The party’s pro-slavery wing, as well, advocated a conservatism that they framed
in terms of equal rights, property (in slaves), and institutional security.
Counterintuitively, considering that he represented plantation-owners in a State with
restrictive suffrage, Calhoun effectively turned himself and his State-rights party into the
natural allies of the working-class democracy, aligning his anti-capitalist and free-trade
attitudes, and his chronic distrust of consolidated power, with their advocacy for labor
and against banks. Together, they came to represent the “conservative portions of
society”—the white, male, Christian, (preferably rural) upwardly-mobile “true citizens”
of the United States.813 The Democratic party promised to advocate for them through
positive legislation that ensured their access to the country’s riches, and committed
themselves to defend the natural order of a stable society (slavery included), with the
conservative portion perched like a cherry on top.
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CONCLUSION: A REVOLUTION FOR CONSERVATISM
In his Disquisition on Government (published posthumously in 1851), Calhoun
left his followers both a diagnostic manual for the Union and a handbook for revolution
when it became too diseased to save.814 When forming the Union, he wrote, the States in
their capacity as independent communities created a constitutional government, which
Calhoun described as an “organism.” In a synecdochic relationship, the constitution
comprised both the internal structure of the organism, and the whole organism, itself.
Through their act of creation, the States replicated the dynamic between God and man
found in Leibniz’s law of continuity. The States endowed their collective constitution
with both progressive and preservative faculties, each of which represented the
continuous agency of their creative power, and neither of which could function without
active State involvement.815 “The supervision of the creating power [the States],”
Calhoun wrote, “is indispensable to the preservation of the created.” Like Fichte, who
had argued that the rational state required an equilibrium produced by the “reciprocal
interaction” of its “organic forces,” Calhoun explained that the Union functioned
organically as a result of the “reciprocal action and reaction” of all of its parts, which
kept it in a state of equilibrium.816 The division of power between these parts constituted
the organism; without it, the organism could not exist. As it had in Blumenbach’s
configuration, the parts depended on the whole and the whole on its parts. Anything that
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displaced power within this system, strengthening one part of the organism at the expense
of another part, vitiated the constituent body.817
According to Calhoun, this system had operated in perfect harmony up to the
Missouri Compromise, which activated a latent disease in the US constitution. This
disease—the belief in slavery’s sinfulness—stimulated the fanatical and political cords
that ran through their organic system. Its severity was compounded by party patronage
(i.e., “the Spoils”), a chronic disease “easily contracted under all forms of government”
but “most fatal” in popular governments, like the United States, where it gave the ruling
party disproportionate power.818 So long as the States had constrained federal power,
Calhoun wrote, they had kept these infections in check. In other words, the “belief of the
sinfulness of slavery remained in a dormant state.” But the 1828 “Tariff of
Abominations” disturbed the vital equilibrium between the sections, Calhoun contended,
and Jackson’s 1833 Force Bill ceded the State’s decisive authority to the federal
government. At that point, the “creature” had usurped the creator’s position, effecting a
“thorough revolution” in their organic system.
Ever since then, Calhoun declared, the country had suffered from “too much
union.”819 In their deranged condition, whoever controlled the federal government and, in
particular, the executive office, dictated the entire country’s destiny. Anti-slavery fanatics
fought to control the disposition of the southern States through their command of the
federal government, and they were not beneath rousing the “strongest passions of the
817
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human heart,—avarice, ambition, and rivalry” to do so. Pre-disposed to deal with the
different portions of the Union unilaterality and universally, the abolitionists displaced
the people’s attachment from their social community into their political party, making
them insensible to the diversified needs of their country’s disparate parts.820 This
unhealthy relationship produced a state of alienation and hostility that would inevitably
prove fatal to the Union. “The nature of the disease is such,” wrote Calhoun, “that
nothing can reach it, short of some organic change” in the ontological structure of their
system.821 As an extension of their original constitutive power, Calhoun clarified, the
States wielded the power to modify that constitution. This amending power served as the
“vis medicatrix of the system;—its great repairing, healing, and conservative power;—
intended to remedy its disorders, in whatever cause or causes originating.” In its
weakened condition, the South was impotent to implement this antidote, but the North,
which had grown stronger at the South’s expense, had both the resources and the
responsibility to apply the remedy, or be held accountable for the consequences. At some
point, the law of communal “self-preservation” would kick in, compelling the Southern
States to withdraw from the Union. Unless the North acted to restore their constitutional
equilibrium, Calhoun proclaimed, revolution, alone, must follow.
Describing the Republic in Crisis from 1848 to 1861, historian John Ashworth
claimed that “There was no revolution expected here [in 1848]. And none came.”822 But
there was certainly a revolution forewarned. If the best thing that can be said about the
revolution that arrived a dozen years later was that it took its time in coming, then that
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might be less a commentary on the relative strength of American institutions than on the
willingness of American politicians to compromise their principles in the short term for
the illusion of political stability and the remote promise of political gain in the future.
Again and again, northern “conservatives” assumed that southern “conservatives” would
pay them Tuesday for pro-slavery today, while the southern “conservatives” refused to
countenance reciprocity on changes they considered essential to the life of their
governing organism. They explicitly and repeatedly declared their intentions to incite
revolution if the North failed to meet their demands: a totalized system of white
hegemony, grounded in the national institution of slavery, sutured by amendment into the
US Constitution.
According to Mississippi Democrat William S. Barry, compromise, itself,
undermined the country’s “organic law” (i.e., the Constitution). Citing Burke, Barry
charged that the perpetual dance of revolution and resistance on the House floor made the
“extreme medicine of the Constitution…its daily bread.” Legislative compromises
“forced through Congress by a bare majority” claimed the respect due the “original
creation” of the Constitution, while the “fruit of their pernicious graft” “corrupted” and
“perverted” its text. With each successive compromise, they moved further away from
the “letter and spirit” of the Constitution that Washington and Madison had framed in
1787. The Constitution grew increasingly infected under this “regimen of compromises,”
Barry lamented, while the “political system subjected to violent and unnatural nostrums”
became “more radically diseased by the quackery which attempts to relieve it.”823
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***
During the nineteenth century, the organic schema pervaded both transnational
and trans-Atlantic political thought. As it spread, it transformed the imagined totality. It
fundamentally altered how members of society viewed social, cultural, and political
phenomena, as well as their role in shaping, breaking, or preserving their society. By
mid-century in the United States, this schema had become the normative model for the
ideal state, providing both the justification for revolutions against artificial rulers (for
example, a federal government hostile to slavery) and the rationale for repressive state
action against foreign agents and destructive influences (such as abolitionists), as well as
the exclusion or quarantine of inorganic and potentially poisonous elements
(abolitionists, people of color, and ‘unassimilable’ residents, immigrants, and legal
aliens). Only in this framework could it make sense for an individual or group to assert
themselves or their doctrines as the “true conservatives” of the body politic. Only after
people operated under the ontological assumption that they lived (or should live) in an
organic state, could they claim to represent a living force that kept it alive.
“Conservative” was one such vital force, a teleological principle manifested in the body
of the state that flowed through every inch of its material organization, connecting every
part to the divine drive within itself. The question in this context was not whether a
society needed conservative principles, but what the nature of those principles might be
and in what elements of society or in what organization of the political body they might
be found.
The moment politicians defended a practice, institution, population, or principle
as “conservative,” they marked it as a politically volatile, if not untouchable topic, and
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placed themselves in a position of power against their opposition. A state-organism could
not survive without its conservative elements, by definition, and anyone rising to tear
down a publically-recognized “conservative” institution would either have to have some
politically-astute rhetoric on hand or to somehow de-naturalize its associations. That is,
they either had to prove that the institution in question was not conservative or that being
“conservative” was somehow a bad thing. Savvy politicians figured out that whomever
won the coveted “conservative” position, won the popular political higher ground. In the
white-nationalist North, free-soil Republicanism occupied that higher ground by 1860; in
the white-hegemonic South, pro-slavery Democracy did (at least, among those members
of the social body with political rights).
Because the organic model of state sovereignty relied on the vitalist concept of
conservative formation, it had both egalitarian and oppressive potential. The nature of a
state’s conservative principles depended on the Bildungstrieb encoded in its constitution
at the time of its original formation. In Fichte’s model, for example, the nation provided
the living principle (or Bildungstrieb) of an organic state and, therefore, the ideal basis
for the civic state. But organic nationalism represented only one genus of organic
statehood. What started as a radically emancipatory model of human potential became by
the mid-nineteenth century the justification for individual subordination to an “organic”
community under the protection of the state. In the wake of the 1848 revolutions,
international right-wing movements embraced ideological nationalism to empower their
machinery of coercion and control. In fact, the particular development of organic
nationalism, its instantiation in cultural forms and institutions, and its eventual turn
towards hierarchical, homogenizing, and repressive modes of power in the latter half of
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the nineteenth century can be understood as a product of its hybrid philosophical genesis
in sentimental theory and the developing theories of organic generation and reproduction
in the long eighteenth century.824
In the United States, pro-slavery southerners had long adopted the logic and
language of organic nationalism before ever ascribing to the label “nationalist.” Once
they assimilated the biological and genetic models of statehood, they constituted liberty
as a function of whiteness and formulated whiteness as a privilege predicated on
subjugation. Without slaves, southerners could not be free; by owning slaves, they truly
understood freedom. Plus, as they ultimately articulated, people of color required the
hierarchical and paternalistic structures of slavery to live. In this context, any assault on
their right to own slaves constituted an assault on their constitutional rights and justified
violent and repressive action against the perpetrators. With the complicity of both major
political parties (the Democrats and the Whigs), American statesmen promoted slave
labor and systemic racism alongside culturally homogenizing and materially coercive
legislation under the “conservative” cover of protecting the constitution “in its original
purity.”825
Since organic nationalism advanced an ideal statehood in which each nation
obtained sovereignty, it provided the conceptual framework and political motivation to
corroborate and codify “natural” divisions between nations, generating a divisive and
repressively normative politics of classification. Based on the physiology of a “proper
body” formulated by eighteenth-century empiricists and formalized in Kant’s aesthetics,
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organic state-formation incarnated a hierarchical and hegemonic “politics of normality”
that privileged the anatomical, gendered, and socio-cultural markers of the white, male,
Christian body.826 As a consequence, organic nationalism created the material conditions
for structural and ideological racism; its organization, political economy, and policies
produced the differences within its population that biological theories subsequently
racialized. By the mid-nineteenth century, members of the proliferating medical
disciplines had categorized and naturalized these perceptible differences between groups,
hypostasized as race, mapping the resulting taxonomy onto national distinctions and
biologically conscribing who legitimately belonged to them. This transformation changed
the agenda for statehood. States were no longer fundamentally determined by their
geographical boundaries or their legal and legislative institutions. Instead, the genetic
makeup of the political community dictated the nature, boundaries, and viability of the
state.
Real people of color lived in the lacuna of this discourse in the United States,
which often sublimated the explicit interests of its policies—its ontological commitment
to slavery—while invariably reinforcing organic hierarchies based on color, and other
pro-slavery principles. For both white nationalists and white hegemons, alike, people of
color embodied an organic, physiological otherness—inerasable, unassimilable,
irreducible. To call otherness “organic” implied that it existed within the body without
possibility of abscission and that it structured an individual’s entire being: framing their
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original organization, governing the laws of their existence, and controlling their
expression and potential. To call otherness “physiological” presumed a standard set of
characteristics and a specific measure of value or capacity for that entire group. In short,
they defined otherness as inherent and constitutional, as well as normative, qualitative,
and either determinative or prescriptive, depending on whether they viewed physiological
characteristics as diachronically fixed or if they believed that races had the capacity to
improve themselves (or be improved) over time, a distinction recalling the division
between evolutionary and epigenetic theories of development from the eighteenth
century.
The hereditary hierarchical social order played a similar, but not identical, role in
Britain and on the continent, marking physiological differences between castes that
naturalized their stratification, and structurally discouraged their social mobility, forms of
contact, and amalgamation.827 But even a British pauper was a citizen, though he might
lack any of the material or experiential benefits of that distinction. Though
physiologically differentiated, he was not organically separate—he belonged to the
British nation.828 In addition, British and continental imperialists centered their nation in
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a space apart from the organic, physiological other, a physical distance that US white
nationalists tried to enact in the northwest territories through legislation that excluded all
people of color from emigrating there. For many, “free soil” signified a land “free” of the
dual contagion of slavery and free people of color.
After the surge of organic nationalism in the mid-nineteenth century, “race” came
to represent a pejorative form of “nation”—or, rather, “race” was what remained when
describing a people considered indisposed to govern themselves. Nations begot states;
races were stateless. The ontological commitment to the state as an “organic body”
played a constitutive role in this process. Restrictive legislation, the curtailment of voting
rights and political participation, residency requirements, physical and legal boundaries
on property ownership, biases written into the penal code, and institutional as well as
super-structural borders on social and class mobility systematically denied people of
color the defining characteristics of citizenship in an organic state. At the same time,
biblical race-theorists like Josiah Priest determined that God denied people of color the
very “conservative principles” by which the “white race have elevated themselves,” and
speculative white hegemons like Iowa’s Democratic senator George W. Jones claimed
that people of color lacked the capacity to feel patriotism.829 “I have never heard of a trait
of character exhibited by an African tribe, or an individual of a tribe or of the race [to
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which our slaves belong], which denoted the possession of that unselfish and exalted
emotion” of patriotism as understood by the “citizen of our Republic, the Englishman, the
Frenchman, or the German.”830 For evidence, Jones looked to the free-State “Fred
Douglasses,” who lingered in the United States when their exposure to freedom, “white”
uplift, and literacy should have spurred them to go to their divinely-ordained country
(Africa) and build up a “free and intelligent nation” on its grounds. “Whiteness”
presumed the capacity to feel the “sublime emotions” that produced “true patriots and
pure statesmen,” but “the negro” had to emigrate to Liberia to prove his “love” for “his
race” and his “pride of nationality.” Their apparent unwillingness to do so proved that the
“negro race” could not feel the affections for their countrymen and the commitment to
advancing the “human race” that marked “white” men as ideal citizens for any political
state. In the political discourse of white supremacy, “blackness” signified a group of
people organically and historically marked for subjugation, categorically particularized
and substantially reduced to race, while the prima facie character of “whiteness” was
universal in its sensibility and aesthetically refined in its attachments. Political
convention amplified this hegemonic configuration: politicians only specified
“whiteness” when they discussed the socio-political status of color. As a result, “black
men” were “black” all of the time, but, in the “absence” of “color,” “white men” in the
record were just “men.”
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Martin Van Buren appointed Jones Surveyor-General of the Wisconsin and Iowa Territories in 1840 and
James K Polk reinstated Jones to that position when he took office. Although anti-slavery politicians
dominated Iowa’s Democratic party in the late 1850s, Jones voted in the Senate to approve Kansas’s proslavery Lecompton Constitution in 1858 and served as James Buchanan’s minister to New Grenada from
1859 to 1861. When he returned from Bogotá in December 1861, he had the distinction of being arrested
for disloyalty to the Union for his correspondence with Confederate president Jefferson Davis. Both of his
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To a certain extent, pro-slavery conservatism cannibalized the nascent left-wing
in the United States, by hostile takeover of the Democratic party. Historian Matthew
Karp characterized this position as a “proslavery vision of modernity,” in which
“proslavery progressives” advanced the institution of slavery as the solution to the social
inequalities that plagued the capitalist-industrial North, as well as a definitive defense
against the incursion of foreign radicalism (specifically, socialism and communism).831
Not only did they depict the southern slave economy as the future of American
commerce, southern slaveholders even went so far as to argue that slavery had eradicated
poverty; because of slavery, the South had no poor.832 For a time, these southerners
acknowledged, the protective tariff had artificially boosted northern free labor over
southern slave labor, but the North could not compete with the more progressive slave
economy in an open market. With the American system defeated at home, and the British
shift toward free trade abroad, pro-slavery southerners predicted, it was only a matter of
time before the northern labor force discovered that the South enjoyed a morally superior
system with higher earning potential than free-labor industrialism. As historian Joanne
Pope Melish noted, the assault on the spectre of color in the North obscured the
stratification of “white” society. In the South, the illusion of “white” equality could be
projected because of the material reality of “black” subjugation.833
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The pro-slavery-dominated Democrats presented themselves as the party for the
people—although, with the southern influence, the people became more narrowly
defined. A great change had come over the spirit of the Democrats “within a very short
period of time,” Ohio Opposition representative (and former Democrat) Timothy C. Day
observed in 1856. For half a century, Day recalled, the Democratic party “was the star of
hope for the oppressed everywhere…It was the radical, progressive, revolutionary party,
opposed to the ‘law and order’ of conservatism.” Now, Day found that same party with
“one foot on the heel, and the other on the head of the negro.” Talking of “nothing but
‘law and order’,” the “lion of Democracy” had become the “jackal of slavery.” In the
same way that they might examine some “wonderful phenomena of nature,” Day advised
that the public seek after the cause of this radical transformation. “Why is it,” he asked,
that a “bold, radical, and progressive policy has been abandoned, and the Democratic
party become retrogressive and conservative?” First, Day explained, the Whig party “left
all the soul it had, conservatism, to enter the body of the Democratic party” after its
death. Still, the main reason was that the Democrats had replaced the “living idea” of
“progress” with the twin ideas of “slavery and office.”834 Along the same lines,
Massachusetts Republican Henry Wilson told southern Democrats in 1858 to “Go home,
say to your privileged class, which you vauntingly say ‘leads progress, civilization, and
refinement,' that it is the opinion of the 'hireling laborers' of Massachusetts, if you have
no sympathy for your African bondmen, in whose veins flows so much of your own
blood, you should at least sympathize with the millions of your own race, whose labor
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you have dishonored and degraded by slavery!”835 In his scare quotes, Wilson pulled
from South Carolina Democratic senator James Henry Hammond, whose speech on
admitting Kansas with the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution has since become
notorious for its monarchical line declaring “cotton is king.”836 But his fellow-Senators
(Wilson, especially) jumped on Hammond’s larger argument that the organic harmony of
the South’s socio-political system generated “the best” social framework “in the world,”
and an “extent of political freedom, combined with entire security, such as no other
people ever enjoyed upon the face of the earth.” The South enslaved men of “inferior”
blood, while the North enslaved their “brothers of one blood,” propelling southern
“whites” to perfection and northern “whites” to anarchy. The North might complain of
southern rule, Hammond said, but southern rule had “preserved” the North. The South
had “kept the Government conservative,” placing it, and keeping it, “upon the
Constitution,” and that had led to the meagre “peace and prosperity” of the enslaved
white North.837
By 1858, the Democrats controlled the House, the Senate, and the White House.
They had the gall to pretend to be the party of the people, only to renounce those people
behind closed doors—so long as they lived in a different section of the country. Someone
like James Henry Hammond, who owned several plantations and hundreds of slaves,
presumed to dictate what “labor rights” meant to a man like Henry Wilson, who worked
as an indentured laborer on a farm from the age of ten to the age of twenty. Wilson had
835
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literally pulled himself up by his bootstraps (having become a cobbler after finishing his
indenture and eventually owning a thriving shoe manufactory), while, by contrast,
Hammond had inherited a huge amount of wealth and then studied under Dr. Thomas
Cooper at South Carolina College, before getting a law degree. What did he know about
how the “heart” of the country beat? As a pro-slavery Democrat from South Carolina,
how could Hammond talk about the power of the ballot box and pretend anything like a
popular vote brought his party to office when that party had systematically
disenfranchised the people who would vote for their opposition (locally and nationally)?
“The moderate, conservative, and national statesmen of the South, of the schools of
Jackson and Clay, have been driven into retirement,” Wilson intoned, “they are
ostracised, exiled, placed under the ban of the empire.” A “few liberal national men”
remained in the House, Wilson admitted, but the halls of Congress were now filled with
men who had “accepted [Calhoun’s] creed” and bowed to the “imperious sway” of his
disciples.838
***
“Slave” conservatives would never be satisfied by compromise because their
vision of an organic state required an unbounded system of slavery; and “national”
conservatives could not meet those needs without fundamentally undermining their
organic vision of an exclusively “white” nation. These two conservatisms did not
comprise the forces that caused the Civil War, but they reflected and reinforced them. As
Calhoun had said during his Michigan speech, “Language has been held in this
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discussion, which is clearly revolutionary in its character and tendency,” and which
augured an approaching confrontation between “the conservatives and the destructives.”
If this dissertation imparts nothing else, it should convey that the relative disposition of
“conservatives” and “destructives” depended entirely on the perspective of the speaker
and the context of the speech. In Calhoun’s formulation, language manifested and
stimulated the popular impulse for revolution—a complication he attempted to resolve by
policing it. In truth, however, Calhoun only considered “revolutionary” language a
problem in the mouths of “the destructives” (i.e., the abolitionists or the capitalists,
depending on his audience). When wielded by politicians looking to rouse a
“conservative” revolution on behalf of white hegemony and slavery, revolutionary and
“conservative” language served as an essential part of the political arsenal.839 Pro-slavery
“conservatives” determined that the vital interests of the country and the health and
integrity of the Union depended on the mutually constitutive social institution of slavery
and the sanctified superiority of the “white” race, and built an entire discourse to support
this worldview.
A revolution might trash the constitution, tear down institutions, and attempt to
physically destroy the body politic, but even its resolution does not erase the language
that incited it. Even a failed revolution like the Civil War does not dissolve the danger
that language enjoins. The language of “conservatism” survived the Civil War and
continued to work on the people’s “feelings and principles,” even after the Union was
resurrected. After the war, Conservative parties became a flashpoint for political and
inter-ethnic violence. From 1866 to 1881, Conservatives parties organized in Missouri,
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West Virginia, Maryland, New York, Delaware, Kentucky, Mississippi, Ohio, Michigan,
Louisiana, Arkansas, Alabama, and Tennessee, sometimes as separate organizations and
occasionally in affiliation with larger political parties. Like pre-war Conservatives, they
promised to enforce “law and order” against Republican radicals. Their innovation: a
terrorist wing (the Klu Klux Klan) tasked with the actual physical violence. In 1867, the
Nashville Union and Dispatch reported that a “Conservative mob,” composed principally
of “colored Conservatives” attacked a parade of the “colored Loyal League.”840 Within
four years, reports of this kind of internecine violence proliferated, leading to extensive
congressional hearings. In May of 1871, the Senate published a four-hundred and twentythree page report detailing a secret organization, established in 1866, that terrorized
Republicans in the South by “burning, stealing, whipping negroes,” and murdering the
leading men of the Republican party. In the report, witnesses repeatedly testified that this
“Ku Klux” was organized for the purpose of advancing the interests of the “Conservative
party,” which the interrogators clarified as another name for “Democratic.” According to
the Senate report, the Ku Klux Klan had two objectives: to “overthrow” reconstruction,
and to disenfranchise “the negro.”841
In a 2011 article on “The Contemporary American Conservative Movement,”
sociologists Neil Gross, Thomas Medvetz, and Rupert Russell suggested that ideology
politics acted as a new social form in the twenty-first century United States, blurring the
line between status and party and radically altering American stratification. Instead of “a
fixed category of belief or practice,” conservatism functioned as a “collective identity”
that evolved over time. “For many contemporary Americans,” they wrote, “political
840
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ideology and party affiliation…signal varying degrees of membership in one of two
increasingly well-recognized social groups—liberals and conservatives—that are
accorded (and vie for) differential amounts of social esteem in different contexts and
provide people with highly salient social identities.”842 This project reveals that this
illusion itself served a purpose historically: political agents in the nineteenth century
mobilized the narrative of party polarization and atomization to cement their spheres of
control and maintain a self-serving status quo. The imagined political binary allowed
both dominant political parties to subsume their positions on historically-divisive issues.
The same held true in the twentieth century. “Conservative” politics sublimated its
racism; and “liberal” politics its commitment to market capitalism. Meanwhile, both
parties displayed their opposition to the other party’s untenable stance on race or the
economy, a performance that absolved them politically from implementing substantive
changes to rectify racial and economic injustice. As status parties, “liberal” and
“conservative” invested the American political regime with the meaning historically
attendant on socio-demographic factors, like class or race, and drained the political
potential of inequality to galvanize groups against structural and systemic subjugation.
This long history of conservatism establishes the integral link between historical
conservatism and contemporary racial nationalism and opens up an avenue for inquiry
into the role that biopolitics played in shaping America’s socio-political imaginary and its
political and institutional genealogy. While neoliberal internationalism has dominated
global politics and shored up transnational power structures in recent decades, historians
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have increasingly turned away from nationalism as a categorical tool for analysis,
consigning it to the past alongside other historical and discursive fictions. Yet, twentyfirst-century political antagonisms have generated a renaissance of racial nationalism.
The rise of the “alt right” and retrenchment of white nationalism in the United States (not
to mention the recurrent threat of state secession), the insidious miasma of colorblind
racism, the breakup of the European Union, and the looming fragmentation of Great
Britain reveal nationalism to be a fiction that functions. Tracing the philosophical,
political, and material history of conservatism in the United States from its origins in
transnational social theory, moral philosophy, and bio-medical research to its migration
into U.S. intellectual discourse, its instantiation in U.S. politics, and its naturalization of
organic sovereignty and white supremacy, this project connects the various iterations of
twenty-first-century conservatism to their historical and intellectual antecedents. Without
nationalist conservatism and pro-slavery conservatism, modern conservatism could not
exist in the United States.
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